a. Acquire, develop, and manage the system using [Assignment: organization-defined system development life cycle] that incorporates information security and privacy considerations; b. Define and document information security and privacy roles and responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle; c. Identify individuals having information security and privacy roles and responsibilities; and d. Integrate the organizational information security and privacy risk management process into system development life cycle activities.
| ID | Name | Description | D3FEND | |
| CM0001 | Protect Sensitive Information | Organizations should look to identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information (e.g., fault management approach) and apply access control accordingly. Any location (ground system, contractor networks, etc.) storing design information needs to ensure design info is protected from exposure, exfiltration, etc. Space system sensitive information may be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Company Proprietary. Space system sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, CUI, proprietary, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission. Sensitive documentation should only be accessed by personnel with defined roles and a need to know. Well established access controls (roles, encryption at rest and transit, etc.) and data loss prevention (DLP) technology are key countermeasures. The DLP should be configured for the specific data types in question. | D3-AI D3-AVE D3-NVA D3-CH D3-CBAN D3-CTS D3-PA D3-FAPA D3-SAOR | |
| CM0009 | Threat Intelligence Program | A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities and mitigate risk. Leverage all-source intelligence services or commercial satellite imagery to identify and track adversary infrastructure development/acquisition. Countermeasures for this attack fall outside the scope of the mission in the majority of cases. | D3-PH D3-AH D3-NM D3-NVA D3-SYSM D3-SYSVA | |
| CM0020 | Threat modeling | Use threat modeling, attack surface analysis, and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable. Reduce attack surface where possible based on threats. | D3-AI D3-AVE D3-SWI D3-HCI D3-NM D3-LLM D3-ALLM D3-PLLM D3-PLM D3-APLM D3-PPLM D3-SYSM D3-DEM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSDM | |
| CM0022 | Criticality Analysis | Conduct a criticality analysis to identify mission critical functions, critical components, and data flows and reduce the vulnerability of such functions and components through secure system design. Focus supply chain protection on the most critical components/functions. Leverage other countermeasures like segmentation and least privilege to protect the critical components. | D3-AVE D3-OSM D3-IDA D3-SJA D3-AI D3-DI D3-SWI D3-NNI D3-HCI D3-NM D3-PLM D3-AM D3-SYSM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSDM D3-SYSVA D3-OAM D3-ORA | |
| CM0024 | Anti-counterfeit Hardware | Develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including tamper resistance and protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware. | D3-AI D3-SWI D3-HCI D3-FEMC D3-DLIC D3-FV | |
| CM0025 | Supplier Review | Conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services. | D3-OAM D3-ODM | |
| CM0026 | Original Component Manufacturer | Components/Software that cannot be procured from the original component manufacturer or their authorized franchised distribution network should be approved by the supply chain board or equivalent to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts, materials, and software. | D3-OAM D3-ODM D3-AM D3-FV D3-SFV | |
| CM0027 | ASIC/FPGA Manufacturing | Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) / Field Programmable Gate Arrays should be developed by accredited trusted foundries to limit potential hardware-based trojan injections. | D3-OAM D3-ODM D3-AM D3-FV D3-SFV | |
| CM0028 | Tamper Protection | Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Leverage tamper proof protection where possible when shipping/receiving equipment. | D3-PH D3-AH D3-RFS D3-FV | |
| CM0052 | Insider Threat Protection | Establish policy and procedures to prevent individuals (i.e., insiders) from masquerading as individuals with valid access to areas where commanding of the spacecraft is possible. Establish an Insider Threat Program to aid in the prevention of people with authorized access performing malicious activities. | D3-OAM D3-AM D3-OM D3-CH D3-SPP D3-MFA D3-UAP D3-UBA | |
| CM0030 | Crypto Key Management | Leverage best practices for crypto key management as defined by organization like NIST or the National Security Agency. Leverage only approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria. Encryption key handling should be performed outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography. Encryption keys should be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands. | D3-CH D3-CP | |
| CM0031 | Authentication | Authenticate all communication sessions (crosslink and ground stations) for all commands before establishing remote connections using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based. Adding authentication on the spacecraft bus and communications on-board the spacecraft is also recommended. | D3-MH D3-MAN D3-CH D3-BAN D3-MFA D3-TAAN D3-CBAN | |
| CM0050 | On-board Message Encryption | In addition to authentication on-board the spacecraft bus, encryption is also recommended to protect the confidentiality of the data traversing the bus. | D3-MH D3-MENCR D3-ET | |
| CM0004 | Development Environment Security | In order to secure the development environment, the first step is understanding all the devices and people who interact with it. Maintain an accurate inventory of all people and assets that touch the development environment. Ensure strong multi-factor authentication is used across the development environment, especially for code repositories, as threat actors may attempt to sneak malicious code into software that's being built without being detected. Use zero-trust access controls to the code repositories where possible. For example, ensure the main branches in repositories are protected from injecting malicious code. A secure development environment requires change management, privilege management, auditing and in-depth monitoring across the environment. | D3-AI D3-AVE D3-SWI D3-HCI D3-NNI D3-OAM D3-AM D3-OM D3-DI D3-MFA D3-CH D3-OTP D3-BAN D3-PA D3- FAPA D3- DQSA D3-IBCA D3-PCSV D3-PSMD | |
| CM0010 | Update Software | Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times. Release updated versions of the software/firmware systems incorporating security-relevant updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than mission-defined frequency [i.e., 30 days]. Ideally old versions of software are removed after upgrading but restoration states (i.e., gold images) are recommended to remain on the system. | D3-SU | |
| CM0011 | Vulnerability Scanning | Vulnerability scanning is used to identify known software vulnerabilities (excluding custom-developed software - ex: COTS and Open-Source). Utilize scanning tools to identify vulnerabilities in dependencies and outdated software (i.e., software composition analysis). Ensure that vulnerability scanning tools and techniques are employed that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: (1) Enumerating platforms, custom software flaws, and improper configurations; (2) Formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) Measuring vulnerability impact. | D3-AI D3-NM D3-AVE D3-NVA D3-PM D3-FBA D3-OSM D3-SFA D3-PA D3-PSA D3-PLA D3-PCSV D3-FA D3-DA D3-ID D3-HD D3-UA | |
| CM0012 | Software Bill of Materials | Generate Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) against the entire software supply chain and cross correlate with known vulnerabilities (e.g., Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) to mitigate known vulnerabilities. Protect the SBOM according to countermeasures in CM0001. | D3-AI D3-AVE D3-SWI | |
| CM0013 | Dependency Confusion | Ensure proper protections are in place for ensuring dependency confusion is mitigated like ensuring that internal dependencies be pulled from private repositories vice public repositories, ensuring that your CI/CD/development environment is secure as defined in CM0004 and validate dependency integrity by ensuring checksums match official packages. | D3-LFP D3-UBA D3-RAPA D3-MAC | |
| CM0015 | Software Source Control | Prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code. | D3-PM D3-SBV D3-EI D3-EAL D3- EDL D3-DCE | |
| CM0017 | Coding Standard | Define acceptable coding standards to be used by the software developer. The mission should have automated means to evaluate adherence to coding standards. The coding standard should include the acceptable software development language types as well. The language should consider the security requirements, scalability of the application, the complexity of the application, development budget, development time limit, application security, available resources, etc. The coding standard and language choice must ensure proper security constructs are in place. | D3-AI D3-AVE D3-SWI D3-DCE D3-EHPV D3-ORA D3-FEV D3-FR D3-ER D3-PE D3-PT D3-PS | |
| CM0018 | Dynamic Analysis | Employ dynamic analysis (e.g., using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code). Testing should occur (1) on potential system elements before acceptance; (2) as a realistic simulation of known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes. FLATSATs as well as digital twins can be used to perform the dynamic analysis depending on the TTPs being executed. Digital twins via instruction set simulation (i.e., emulation) can provide robust environment for dynamic analysis and TTP execution. | D3-DA D3-FBA D3-PSA D3-PLA D3-PA D3-SEA D3-MBT | |
| CM0019 | Static Analysis | Perform static source code analysis for all available source code looking for system-relevant weaknesses (see CM0016) using no less than two static code analysis tools. | D3-PM D3-FBA D3-FEMC D3-FV D3-PFV D3-SFV D3-OSM | |
| CM0023 | Configuration Management | Use automated mechanisms to maintain and validate baseline configuration to ensure the spacecraft's is up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available. | D3-ACH D3-CI D3-SICA D3-USICA | |
| CM0039 | Least Privilege | Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized processes which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with system functions. Ideally maintain a separate execution domain for each executing process. | D3-MAC D3-EI D3-HBPI D3-KBPI D3-PSEP D3-MBT D3-PCSV D3-LFP D3-UBA | |
| CM0046 | Long Duration Testing | Perform testing using hardware or simulation/emulation where the test executes over a long period of time (30+ days). This testing will attempt to flesh out race conditions or time-based attacks. | D3-SJA D3-PM D3-OSM D3-SDM D3-UBA D3-SYSVA | |
| CM0047 | Operating System Security | Ensure spacecraft's operating system is scrutinized/whitelisted and has received adequate software assurance previously. The operating system should be analyzed for its attack surface and non-utilized features should be stripped from the operating system. Many real-time operating systems contain features that are not necessary for spacecraft operations and only increase the attack surface. | D3-AVE D3-OSM D3-EHB D3-SDM D3-SFA D3-SBV D3-PA D3-SCA D3-FCA | |
| CM0055 | Secure Command Mode(s) | Provide additional protection modes for commanding the spacecraft. These can be where the spacecraft will restrict command lock based on geographic location of ground stations, special operational modes within the flight software, or even temporal controls where the spacecraft will only accept commands during certain times. | D3-AH D3-ACH D3-MFA D3-OTP | |
| CM0005 | Ground-based Countermeasures | This countermeasure is focused on the protection of terrestrial assets like ground networks and development environments/contractor networks, etc. Traditional detection technologies and capabilities would be applicable here. Utilizing resources from NIST CSF to properly secure these environments using identify, protect, detect, recover, and respond is likely warranted. Additionally, NISTIR 8401 may provide resources as well since it was developed to focus on ground-based security for space systems (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8401.ipd.pdf). Furthermore, the MITRE ATT&CK framework provides IT focused TTPs and their mitigations https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/enterprise/. Several recommended NIST 800-53 Rev5 controls are provided for reference when designing ground systems/networks. | Nearly all D3FEND Techniques apply to Ground | |
| CM0035 | Protect Authenticators | Protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification. | D3-CE D3-ANCI D3-CA D3-ACA D3-PCA D3-CRO D3-CTS D3-SPP | |
| CM0053 | Physical Security Controls | Employ physical security controls (badge with pins, guards, gates, etc.) to prevent unauthorized access to the systems that have the ability to command the spacecraft. | D3-RFS D3-AM | |
| CM0056 | Data Backup | Implement disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore critical data. Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. | D3-AI D3-DI D3-SYSM D3-DEM | |
| CM0042 | Robust Fault Management | Ensure fault management system cannot be used against the spacecraft. Examples include: safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of telemetry to cause action from ground, or some sort of proximity operation to cause spacecraft to go into safe mode. Understanding the safing procedures and ensuring they do not put the spacecraft in a more vulnerable state is key to building a resilient spacecraft. | D3-AH D3-EHPV D3-PSEP D3-PH D3-SCP | |
| CM0044 | Cyber-safe Mode | Provide the capability to enter the spacecraft into a configuration-controlled and integrity-protected state representing a known, operational cyber-safe state (e.g., cyber-safe mode). Spacecraft should enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected. Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode, authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and software functions to pre-attack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on equipment still available after a cyber-attack. The goal is for the spacecraft to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved. Cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable. | D3-PH D3-EI D3-NI D3-BA | |
| CM0051 | Fault Injection Redundancy | To counter fault analysis attacks, it is recommended to use redundancy to catch injected faults. For certain critical functions that need protected against fault-based side channel attacks, it is recommended to deploy multiple implementations of the same function. Given an input, the spacecraft can process it using the various implementations and compare the outputs. A selection module could be incorporated to decide the valid output. Although sensor nodes have limited resources, critical regions usually comprise the crypto functions, which must be secured. | D3-AH D3-SYSVA D3-ORA | |
| CM0037 | Disable Physical Ports | Provide the capability for data connection ports or input/output devices (e.g., JTAG) to be disabled or removed prior to spacecraft operations. | D3-EI D3-IOPR | |
| CM0038 | Segmentation | Identify the key system components or capabilities that require isolation through physical or logical means. Information should not be allowed to flow between partitioned applications unless explicitly permitted by security policy. Isolate mission critical functionality from non-mission critical functionality by means of an isolation boundary (implemented via partitions) that controls access to and protects the integrity of, the hardware, software, and firmware that provides that functionality. Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the spacecraft and between interconnected systems based on the defined security policy that information does not leave the spacecraft boundary unless it is encrypted. Implement boundary protections to separate bus, communications, and payload components supporting their respective functions. | D3-NI D3-BDI D3-NTF D3-ITF D3-OTF D3-EI D3-HBPI D3-KBPI D3-MAC D3-RRID D3-EAL D3-EDL D3-IOPR D3-SCF | |
| CM0043 | Backdoor Commands | Ensure that all viable commands are known to the mission/spacecraft owner. Perform analysis of critical (backdoor/hardware) commands that could adversely affect mission success if used maliciously. Only use or include critical commands for the purpose of providing emergency access where commanding authority is appropriately restricted. | D3-OAM D3-AM D3-PH D3-CCSA D3-LAM D3-CE | |
| CM0045 | Error Detection and Correcting Memory | Use Error Detection and Correcting (EDAC) memory and integrate EDAC scheme with fault management and cyber-protection mechanisms to respond to the detection of uncorrectable multi-bit errors, other than time-delayed monitoring of EDAC telemetry by the mission operators on the ground. The spacecraft should utilize the EDAC scheme to routinely check for bit errors in the stored data on board the spacecraft, correct the single-bit errors, and identify the memory addresses of data with uncorrectable multi-bit errors of at least order two, if not higher order in some cases. | D3-HCI D3-MBT | |
| CM0057 | Tamper Resistant Body | Using a tamper resistant body can increase the one-time cost of the sensor node but will allow the node to conserve the power usage when compared with other countermeasures. | D3-PH D3-RFS | |
| ID | Description | |
| SV-CF-2 |
Eavesdropping (RF and proximity) |
|
| SV-SP-1 |
Exploitation of software vulnerabilities (bugs); Unsecure code, logic errors, etc. in the FSW. |
|
| SV-SP-3 |
Introduction of malicious software such as a virus, worm, Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDOS) agent, keylogger, rootkit, or Trojan Horse |
|
| SV-SP-6 |
Software reuse, COTS dependence, and standardization of onboard systems using building block approach with addition of open-source technology leads to supply chain threat |
|
| SV-SP-9 |
On-orbit software updates/upgrades/patches/direct memory writes. If TT&C is compromised or MOC or even the developer's environment, the risk exists to do a variation of a supply chain attack where after it is in orbit you inject malicious code |
|
| SV-AC-8 |
Malicious Use of hardware commands - backdoors / critical commands |
|
| SV-IT-3 |
Compromise boot memory |
|
| SV-AV-5 |
Using fault management system against you. Understanding the fault response could be leveraged to get satellite in vulnerable state. Example, safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of TLM to cause action from ground, or some sort of RPO to cause S/C to go into safe mode; |
|
| SV-MA-7 |
Exploit ground system and use to maliciously to interact with the spacecraft |
|
| SV-AV-7 |
The TT&C is the lead contributor to satellite failure over the first 10 years on-orbit, around 20% of the time. The failures due to gyro are around 12% between year one and 6 on-orbit and then ramp up starting around year six and overtake the contributions of the TT&C subsystem to satellite failure. Need to ensure equipment is not counterfeit and the supply chain is sound. |
|
| SV-CF-3 |
Knowledge of target satellite's cyber-related design details would be crucial to inform potential attacker - so threat is leaking of design data which is often stored Unclass or on contractors’ network |
|
| SV-MA-4 |
Not knowing what your crown jewels are and how to protect them now and in the future. |
|
| SV-SP-10 |
Compromise development environment source code (applicable to development environments not covered by threat SV-SP-1, SV-SP-3, and SV-SP-4). |
|
| SV-SP-2 |
Testing only focuses on functional requirements and rarely considers end to end or abuse cases |
|
| SV-SP-4 |
General supply chain interruption or manipulation |
|
| SV-SP-5 |
Hardware failure (i.e., tainted hardware) {ASIC and FPGA focused} |
|
| Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|
| The [organization] shall identify the applicable physical and environmental protection policies covering the development environment and spacecraft hardware. {PE-1,PE-14,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-10(3)} | |
| The [organization] risk assessment shall include the full end to end communication pathway (i.e., round trip) to include any crosslink communications.{SV-MA-4}{AC-20,AC-20(1),AC-20(3),RA-3,SA-8(18)} | |
| The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific identification and authentication policies for accessing the development environment and spacecraft. {AC-3,AC-14,IA-1,SA-3,SA-3(1)} | |
| The [organization] shall protect documentation and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-10,SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12} | |
| The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12} | * Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission. |
| The [organization] shall ensure security requirements/configurations are placed in accordance with NIST 800-171 with enhancements in 800-172 on the development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{AC-3,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-15} | |
| The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)} | The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization. |
| The [organization] shall verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls (to include abuse cases and penetration testing) at the depth of testing defined in the test documents.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,RA-5(3),SA-11(5),SA-11(7)} | * The frequency of testing should be driven by Program completion events and updates. * Examples of approaches are static analyses, dynamic analyses, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches |
| The [organization] shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11} | |
| The [organization] shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of all software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11,SA-11(5)} | The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls. |
| The [organization] shall determine the vulnerabilities/weaknesses that require remediation, and coordinate the timeline for that remediation, in accordance with the analysis of the vulnerability scan report, the mission assessment of risk, and mission needs.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-5,CM-3,RA-5,RA-7,SI-3,SI-3(10)} | |
| The [organization] shall coordinate penetration testing on mission critical spacecraft components (hardware and/or software).{SV-MA-4}{CA-8,CA-8(1),CP-4(5)} | Not all defects (i.e., buffer overflows, race conditions, and memory leaks) can be discovered statically and require execution of the system. This is where space-centric cyber testbeds (i.e., cyber ranges) are imperative as they provide an environment to maliciously attack components in a controlled environment to discover these undesirable conditions. Technology has improved to where digital twins for spacecraft are achievable, which provides an avenue for cyber testing that was often not performed due to perceived risk to the flight hardware. |
| The [organization] shall employ dynamic analysis (e.g.using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-8,CM-10(1),RA-3(1),SA-11(5),SA-11(8),SA-11(9),SI-3,SI-7(10)} | |
| The [organization] shall establish robust procedures and technical methods to perform testing to include adversarial testing (i.e.abuse cases) of the platform hardware and software.{CA-8,CP-4(5),RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(2),SA-3,SA-4(3),SA-11,SA-11(1),SA-11(2),SA-11(5),SA-11(7),SA-11(8),SA-15(7)} | |
| The [organization] shall perform penetration testing/analysis: (1) On potential system elements before accepting the system; (2) As a realistic simulation of the active adversary’s known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) Throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CA-8(1),SA-9,SA-11(5),SR-5(2)} | Penetration testing should be performed throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes including: (1) Hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (2) Shipping/handling procedures; (3) Personnel and physical security programs; (4) Configuration management tools/measures to maintain provenance; and (5) Any other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production/distribution of supply chain elements. |
| The [organization] shall maintain a list of suppliers and potential suppliers used, and the products that they supply to include software.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{CM-10,PL-8(2),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11)} | Ideally you have diversification with suppliers |
| The [organization] shall distribute documentation to only personnel with defined roles and a need to know.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{CM-12,CP-2,SA-5,SA-10} | Least privilege and need to know should be employed with the protection of all documentation. Documentation can contain sensitive information that can aid in vulnerability discovery, detection, and exploitation. For example, command dictionaries for ground and space systems should be handles with extreme care. Additionally, design documents for missions contain many key elements that if compromised could aid in an attacker successfully exploiting the system. |
| The [organization] shall test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects on mission systems in a separate test environment before installation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(2),CM-4(1),CM-4(2),CM-10(1),SA-8(31),SA-11(9),SI-2,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-5(2)} | This requirement is focused on software and firmware flaws. If hardware flaw remediation is required, refine the requirement to make this clear. |
| The [organization] shall release updated versions of the mission information systems incorporating security-relevant software and firmware updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than [Program-defined frequency [90 days]].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(2),CM-4(1)} | On-orbit patching/upgrades may be necessary if vulnerabilities are discovered after launch. The system should have the ability to update software post-launch. |
| The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(8),CM-7(9),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-10(3),SA-19,SC-51,SR-4(3),SR-4(4),SR-5(2),SR-11} | |
| The [organization] shall prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(8)} | |
| The [organization] shall conduct a criticality analysis to identify mission critical functions and critical components and reduce the vulnerability of such functions and components through secure system design.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-MA-4}{CP-2,CP-2(8),PL-7,PM-11,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),RA-9,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(25),SA-12,SA-14,SA-15(3),SC-7(29),SR-1} | During SCRM, criticality analysis will aid in determining supply chain risk. For mission critical functions/components, extra scrutiny must be applied to ensure supply chain is secured. |
| The [organization] shall report counterfeit information system components to [organization] officials. {SV-SP-4}{IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SA-19,SR-11} | |
| The [organization] shall report identified systems or system components containing software affected by recently announced cybersecurity-related software flaws (and potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws) to [organization] officials with cybersecurity responsibilities.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{IR-6,IR-6(2),SI-2,SI-3,SI-4(12),SR-4(4)} | |
| The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)} | * The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers. * All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government. |
| The [organization] shall request threat analysis of suppliers of critical components and manage access to and control of threat analysis products containing U.S.person information.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-9,SA-12,SR-1} | The intent of this requirement is to address supply chain concerns on hardware and software vendors. Not required for trusted suppliers accredited to the Defense Microelectronic Activity (DMEA). If the Program intends to use a supplier not accredited by DMEA, the government customer should be notified as soon as possible. If the Program has internal processes to vet suppliers, it may meet this requirement. All software used and its origins must be included in the SBOM and be subjected to internal and Government vulnerability scans. |
| The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis on threats to mission critical capabilities and/or system components to inform risk management decisions.{SV-MA-4}{PM-16,RA-3(2),RA-3(3),RA-7,RA-9,SA-12(8),SA-15(8)} | |
| The [organization] shall maintain documentation tracing the strategies, tools, and methods implemented to mitigate supply chain risk .{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-12(1),SR-5} | Examples include: (1) Transferring a portion of the risk to the developer or supplier through the use of contract language and incentives; (2) Using contract language that requires the implementation of SCRM throughout the system lifecycle in applicable contracts and other acquisition and assistance instruments (grants, cooperative agreements, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), and other transactions). Within the DOD some examples include: (a) Language outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook section 13.13. Contracting; (b) Language requiring the use of protected mechanisms to deliver elements and data about elements, processes, and delivery mechanisms; (c) Language that articulates that requirements flow down supply chain tiers to sub-prime suppliers. (3) Incentives for suppliers that: (a) Implement required security safeguards and SCRM best practices; (b) Promote transparency into their organizational processes and security practices; (c) Provide additional vetting of the processes and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information system components, and services; and (d) Implement contract to reduce SC risk down the contract stack. (4) Gaining insight into supplier security practices; (5) Using contract language and incentives to enable more robust risk management later in the lifecycle; (6) Using a centralized intermediary or “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary; |
| The [organization] shall protect against supply chain threats to the system, system components, or system services by employing security safeguards as defined by NIST SP 800-161 Rev.1.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SI-3,SR-1} | The chosen supply chain safeguards should demonstrably support a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy. Safeguards should include protections for both hardware and software. Program should define their critical components (HW & SW) and identify the supply chain protections, approach/posture/process. |
| The [organization] shall conduct an assessment of risk prior to each milestone review [SRR\PDR\CDR], including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the platform and the information it processes, stores, or transmits.{SV-MA-4}{RA-2,RA-3,SA-8(25)} | |
| The [organization] shall document risk assessment results in [risk assessment report].{SV-MA-4}{RA-3} | |
| The [organization] shall review risk assessment results [At least annually if not otherwise defined in formal organizational policy].{SV-MA-4}{RA-3} | |
| The [organization] shall update the risk assessment [At least annually if not otherwise defined in formal institutional policy] or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the spacecraft.{SV-MA-4}{RA-3} | |
| The [organization] shall use the threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services to inform and direct subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-3(3),SA-11(2),SA-15(8),SI-3} | |
| The [organization] shall share information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control assessments with [Program-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies).{SV-SP-1}{RA-5} | |
| The [organization] shall ensure that the vulnerability scanning tools (e.g., static analysis and/or component analysis tools) used include the capability to readily update the list of potential information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(3),SI-3} | |
| The [organization] shall perform vulnerability analysis and risk assessment of all systems and software.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SA-15(7),SI-3} | |
| The [organization] shall ensure that vulnerability scanning tools and techniques are employed that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: (1) Enumerating platforms, custom software flaws, and improper configurations; (2) Formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) Measuring vulnerability impact.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SI-3} | Component/Origin scanning looks for open-source libraries/software that may be included into the baseline and looks for known vulnerabilities and open-source license violations. |
| The [organization] shall perform static source code analysis for all available source code looking for [[organization]-defined Top CWE List] weaknesses using complimentary set of static code analysis tools (i.e.more than one).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-11(1),SA-15(7)} | |
| The [organization] shall analyze vulnerability/weakness scan reports and results from security control assessments.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SI-3} | |
| The [organization] shall ensure that the list of potential system vulnerabilities scanned is updated [prior to a new scan] {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5(2),SI-3} | |
| The [organization] shall perform configuration management during system, component, or service during [design; development; implementation; operations].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10} | |
| The [organization] shall review proposed changes to the spacecraft, assessing both mission and security impacts.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10,CM-3(2)} | |
| The [organization] shall correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11} | Flaws that impact the mission objectives should be prioritized. |
| The [organization] shall perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Program-defined depth and coverage].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11} | The depth needs to include functional testing as well as negative/abuse testing. |
| The [organization] shall create prioritized list of software weakness classes (e.g., Common Weakness Enumerations) to be used during static code analysis for prioritization of static analysis results.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(1),SA-15(7)} | The prioritized list of CWEs should be created considering operational environment, attack surface, etc. Results from the threat modeling and attack surface analysis should be used as inputs into the CWE prioritization process. There is also a CWSS (https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html) process that can be used to prioritize CWEs. The prioritized list of CWEs can help with tools selection as well as you select tools based on their ability to detect certain high priority CWEs. |
| The [organization] shall use threat modeling and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SA-15(8)} | |
| The [organization] shall perform and document threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SI-3} | |
| The [organization] shall perform a manual code review of all flight code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(4)} | |
| The [organization] shall conduct an Attack Surface Analysis and reduce attack surfaces to a level that presents a low level of compromise by an attacker.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(6),SA-15(5)} | |
| The [organization] shall define acceptable coding languages to be used by the software developer.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15} | |
| The [organization] shall define acceptable secure coding standards for use by the software developers.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15} | |
| The [organization] shall have automated means to evaluate adherence to coding standards.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15,SA-15(7),RA-5} | Manual review cannot scale across the code base; you must have a way to scale in order to confirm your coding standards are being met. The intent is for automated means to ensure code adheres to a coding standard. |
| The [organization] shall perform component analysis (a.k.a.origin analysis) for developed or acquired software.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15(7),RA-5} | |
| The [organization] shall require subcontractors developing information system components or providing information system services (as appropriate) to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)} | Select the particular subcontractors, software vendors, and manufacturers based on the criticality analysis performed for the Program Protection Plan and the criticality of the components that they supply. |
| The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to deliver the system, component, or service with [Program-defined security configurations] implemented.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-4(5)} | For the spacecraft FSW, the defined security configuration could include to ensure the software does not contain a pre-defined list of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs)and/or CAT I/II Application STIGs. |
| The [organization] shall protect documentation and Essential Elements of Information (EEI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{SA-5} | Essential Elements of Information (EEI): |
| The [organization] shall correct reported cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2} | * Although this requirement is stated to specifically apply to cybersecurity-related flaws, the Program office may choose to broaden it to all SV flaws. * This requirement is allocated to the Program, as it is presumed, they have the greatest knowledge of the components of the system and when identified flaws apply. |
| The [organization] shall identify, report, and coordinate correction of cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2} | |
| If using the Government Microelectronics Assessment for Trust (GOMAT) framework outright, to perform ASIC and FPGA threat/vulnerability risk assessment, the following requirements would apply: {SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5} | • 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened). |
| The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures, in coordination with the [CIO], that is demonstrably consistent with the anti-counterfeit policy defined by the Program office.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{SR-11} | |
| The [organization] shall employ [organization]-defined techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the Program supply chain.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-3(2),SC-38} | Examples of security safeguards that the organization should consider implementing to limit the harm from potential adversaries targeting the organizational supply chain, are: (1) Using trusted physical delivery mechanisms that do not permit access to the element during delivery (ship via a protected carrier, use cleared/official couriers, or a diplomatic pouch); (2) Using trusted electronic delivery of products and services (require downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites); (3) Avoiding the purchase of custom configurations, where feasible; (4) Using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to commitments or obligations), where feasible; (5) Using defensive design approaches; (6) Employing system OPSEC principles; (7) Employing a diverse set of suppliers; (8) Employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry; (9) Using a centralized intermediary and “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary Employing inventory management policies and processes; (10) Using flexible agreements during each acquisition and procurement phase so that it is possible to meet emerging needs or requirements to address supply chain risk without requiring complete revision or re-competition of an acquisition or procurement; (11) Using international, national, commercial or government standards to increase potential supply base; (12) Limiting the disclosure of information that can become publicly available; and (13) Minimizing the time between purchase decisions and required delivery. |
| The [organization] shall employ the [organization]-defined approaches for the purchase of the system, system components, or system services from suppliers.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-5} | This could include tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods. |
| The [organization] (and Prime Contractor) shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6} | |
| The [organization] shall employ [Selection (one or more): independent third-party analysis, Program penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of [Program-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6(1)} | |
| The [organization] shall employ [Program-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) safeguards] to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-7,SC-38,CP-2(8)} | OPSEC safeguards may include: (1) Limiting the disclosure of information needed to design, develop, test, produce, deliver, and support the element for example, supplier identities, supplier processes, potential suppliers, security requirements, design specifications, testing and evaluation result, and system/component configurations, including the use of direct shipping, blind buys, etc.; (2) Extending supply chain awareness, education, and training for suppliers, intermediate users, and end users; (3) Extending the range of OPSEC tactics, techniques, and procedures to potential suppliers, contracted suppliers, or sub-prime contractor tier of suppliers; and (4) Using centralized support and maintenance services to minimize direct interactions between end users and original suppliers. |
| The [organization] shall define security requirements/configurations for development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-10}{SA-15} | Source code should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally source code would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. NIST 800-171 is insufficient when protecting highly sensitive unclassified information and more robust controls from NIST SP 800-53 and CNSSI 1253 should be employed. Greater scrutiny must be applied to all development environments. |
| For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is not accredited, the [organization] shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by [organization]. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5} | DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened). |
| The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)} | Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc. |
| Any EEEE or mechanical piece parts that cannot be procured from the OCM or their authorized distribution network shall be approved and the government program office notified to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts and materials.{SV-SP-5}{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5} | The Program, working with the contractors, shall identify which ASICs/FPGAs perform or execute an integral part of mission critical functions and if the supplier is accredited “Trusted” by DMEA. If the contractor is not accredited by DMEA, then the Program may apply various of the below ASIC/FPGA assurance requirements to the contractor, and the Program may need to perform a risk assessment of the contractor’s design environment. |
| For ASICs that are designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, or tested by a supplier that is not DMEA accredited, the ASIC development shall undergo a threat/vulnerability risk assessment. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the ASIC.{SV-SP-5}{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-4(4),SR-5} | DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened). |
| Any EEEE or mechanical piece parts that cannot be procured from the OCM or their authorized franchised distribution network shall be approved by the [organization]’s Parts, Materials and Processes Control Board (PMPCB) as well as the government program office to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts and materials.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5} | The Program, working with the contractors, shall identify which ASICs/FPGAs perform or execute an integral part of mission critical functions and if the supplier is accredited “Trusted” by DMEA. If the contractor is not accredited by DMEA, then the Program may apply various of the below ASIC/FPGA assurance requirements to the contractor, and the Program may need to perform a risk assessment of the contractor’s design environment. |
| For ASICs that are designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, or tested by a supplier that is NOT DMEA accredited Trusted, the ASIC development shall undergo a threat/vulnerability risk assessment.The assessment shall use Aerospace security guidance and requirements tailored from TOR-2019-00506 Vol.2, and TOR-2019-02543 ASIC and FPGA Risk Assessment Process and Checklist.Based on the results of the risk assessment, the Program may require the developer to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the ASIC.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5} | DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened). |
| For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is NOT DMEA accredited Trusted, the contractor/developer shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by the Program.The assessment shall use Aerospace security guidance and requirements in TOR-2019-00506 Vol.2, and TOR-2019-02543 ASIC and FPGA Risk Assessment Process and Checklist.Based on the results of the risk assessment, the Program may require the developer to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5} | DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened). |
| The [organization] shall ensure that the contractors/developers have all ASICs designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, and tested by suppliers with a Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) Trust accreditation.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5} | |
| The [organization] shall ensure that the contractors/developers have all EEEE, and mechanical piece parts procured from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) or their authorized franchised distribution network.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5} | These requirements might only make sense for ASIC/FPGA that are deemed to support mission critical functions. The Program has the responsibility to identify all ASICs and FPGAs that are used in all flight hardware by each hardware element. This list must include all contractor and subcontractor usage of ASICs and FPGAs. |
| The [organization] shall use a DMEA certified environment to develop, code and test executable software (firmware or bit-stream) that will be programmed into a one-time programmable FPGA or be programmed into non-volatile memory (NVRAM) that the FPGA executes.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5} | DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened). |
| The [organization] should have requirements/controls for all ground/terrestrial systems covering: Data Protection, Ground Software, Endpoints, Networks, Computer Network Defense / Incident Response, Perimeter Security, Physical Controls, and Prevention Program (SSP, PPP, and Training).See NIST 800-53 and CNSSI 1253 for guidance on ground security {SV-MA-7} | |
| The [organization] shall ensure reused TT&C software has adequate uniqueness for command decoders/dictionaries so that commands are received by only the intended satellite.{SV-SP-6}{AC-17(10),SC-16(3),SI-3(9)} | The goal is to eliminate risk that compromise of one command database does not affect a different one due to reuse. The intent is to ensure that one SV can not process the commands from another SV. Given the crypto setup with keys and VCC needing to match, this requirement may be inherently met as a result of using type-1 cryptography. The intent is not to recreate entire command dictionaries but have enough uniqueness in place that it prevents a SV from receiving a rogue command. As long as there is some uniqueness at the receiving end of the commands, that is adequate. |
| The [spacecraft] shall not employ a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled (i.e., crypto-bypass mode).{SV-AC-1,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{AC-3(10),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40(4)} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide non-identical methods, or functionally independent methods, for commanding a mission critical function when the software is the sole control of that function.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{AC-3(2)} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide two independent and unique command messages to deactivate a fault tolerant capability for a critical or catastrophic hazard.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{AC-3(2)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall require multi-factor authorization for all spacecraft [applications or operating systems] updates within the spacecraft.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{AC-3(2),CM-3(8),CM-5,PM-12,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3(8),SI-7(12),SI-10(6)} | The intent is for multiple checks to be performed prior to executing these SV SW updates. One action is mere act of uploading the SW to the spacecraft. Another action could be check of digital signature (ideal but not explicitly required) or hash or CRC or a checksum. Crypto boxes provide another level of authentication for all commands, including SW updates but ideally there is another factor outside of crypto to protect against FSW updates. Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate). |
| The [spacecraft] shall use automated mechanisms to maintain and validate baseline configuration to ensure the [spacecraft] is up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available.{SV-SP-3}{CM-2(2),CM-3(5),CM-3(7),CM-6,SA-8(8)} | This could be command trigger from Ground or elsewhere. The point here is that the self-test is executed onboard the spacecraft via onboard HW/SW self-test mechanisms and its result is reported to the Ground |
| The [spacecraft] shall prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the ground.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-9}{CM-3,CM-3(8),CM-5,CM-5(3),CM-14,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3,SI-7(12),SI-7(15)} | |
| The [organization] shall ensure that software planned for reuse meets the fit, form, and function, and security as a component within the new application.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(5)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected, enters a cyber-safe mode of operation with restrictions as defined based on the cyber-safe mode.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(3),PE-10,RA-10,SA-8(16),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-13,SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to enter the platform into a known good, operational cyber-safe mode from a tamper-resistant, configuration-controlled (“gold”) image that is authenticated as coming from an acceptable supplier, and has its integrity verified.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4(3),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-13,SI-17} | Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and SW functions to preattack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on available equipment still available after a cyberattack. The goal is for the vehicle to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved. |
| The [spacecraft] shall fail to a known secure state for failures during initialization, and aborts preserving information necessary to return to operations in failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-24,SI-13,SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall fail securely to a secondary device in the event of an operational failure of a primary boundary protection device (i.e., crypto solution).{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{CP-13,SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-7(18),SI-13,SI-13(4)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall provide or support the capability for recovery and reconstitution to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-4(4),CP-10,CP-10(4),CP-10(6),CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptography for the indicated uses using the indicated protocols, algorithms, and mechanisms, in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards: [NSA- certified or approved cryptography for protection of classified information, FIPS-validated cryptography for the provision of hashing].{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{IA-7,SC-13} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-14,PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1)} | The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus. |
| The [organization] shall describe (a) the separation between RED and BLACK cables, (b) the filtering on RED power lines, (c) the grounding criteria for the RED safety grounds, (d) and the approach for dielectric separators on any potential fortuitous conductors.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall be designed such that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(19)} | This requirement applies if system components are being designed to address EMSEC and the measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. |
| The [spacecraft] shall have on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-MA-4}{RA-10,SC-7,SI-3,SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)} | The mission critical components or systems could be GNC/Attitude Control, C&DH, TT&C, Fault Management. |
| The [spacecraft] shall generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall reveal error messages only to operations personnel monitoring the telemetry.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11} | |
| The [spacecraft] boot firmware must validate the boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order, against their respective signatures.{SV-IT-3}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | A signature is ~770 bits long. No requirement is imposed on the storage location of signatures. |
| The [spacecraft] boot firmware must verify a trust chain that extends through the hardware root of trust, boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order.{SV-IT-3}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | These three items were chosen because they’re intended to be static values (once properly set up) but are in volatile storage. Also, the Boot ROM can’t be modified, so there’s no reason to check a signature. |
| The [spacecraft] shall perform attestation at each stage of startup and ensure overall trusted boot regime (i.e., root of trust).{SV-IT-3}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10),SI-7(17)} | It is important for the computing module to be able to access a set of functions and commands that it trusts; that is, that it knows to be true. This concept is referred to as root of trust (RoT) and should be included in the spacecraft design. With RoT, a device can always be trusted to operate as expected. RoT functions, such as verifying the device’s own code and configuration, must be implemented in secure hardware (i.e., field programmable gate arrays). By checking the security of each stage of power-up, RoT devices form the first link in a chain of trust that protects the spacecraft |
| The [spacecraft] shall be capable of removing flight software after updated versions have been installed.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-8(8),SI-2(6)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the [all information] using cryptography while it is at rest.{SV-IT-2,SV-CF-2}{SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)} | * Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. This is often referred to as data-at-rest encryption. |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide independent mission/cyber critical threads such that any one credible event will not corrupt another mission/cyber critical thread.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SC-3} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall accept [Program defined hazardous] commands only when prerequisite checks are satisfied.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall identify and reject commands received out-of-sequence when the out-of-sequence commands can cause a hazard/failure or degrade the control of a hazard or mission.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall perform prerequisite checks for the execution of hazardous commands.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10} | |
| The [organization] shall ensure that all viable commands are known to the mission and SV "owner.{SV-AC-8}{SI-10,SI-10(3)} | This is a concern for bus re-use. It is possible that the manufacturer left previously coded commands in their syntax rather than starting from a clean slate. This leaves potential backdoors and other functionality the mission does not know about. |
| The [organization] shall perform analysis of critical (backdoor) commands that could adversely affect mission success if used maliciously.{SV-AC-8}{SI-10,SI-10(3)} | Heritage and commercial products often have many residual operational (e.g., hardware commands) and test capabilities that are unidentified or unknown to the end user, perhaps because they were not expressly stated mission requirements. These would never be tested and their effects unknown, and hence, could be used maliciously. Test commands not needed for flight should be deleted from the flight database. |
| The [spacecraft] shall only use or include [organization]-defined critical commands for the purpose of providing emergency access where commanding authority is appropriately restricted.{SV-AC-8}{SI-10,SI-10(3)} | The intent is protect against misuse of critical commands. On potential scenario is where you could use accounts with different privileges, could require an additional passphrase or require entry into a different state or append an additional footer to a critical command. There is room for design flexibility here that can still satisfy this requirement. |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall discriminate between valid and invalid input into the software and rejects invalid input.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10,SI-10(3)} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall properly handle spurious input and missing data.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10,SI-10(3)} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall validate a functionally independent parameter prior to the issuance of any sequence that could remove an inhibit or perform a hazardous action.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10(3)} | |
| The [spacecraft] mission/cyber critical commands shall be "complex" and/or diverse from other commands so that a single bit flip could not transform a benign command into a hazardous command.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10(5)} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide at least one independent command for each operator-initiated action used to shut down a function leading to or reducing the control of a hazard.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10(5)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall have failure tolerance on sensors used by software to make mission-critical decisions.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-13,SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Cyber-safe mode is using a fail-secure mentality where if there is a malfunction that the spacecraft goes into a fail-secure state where cyber protections like authentication and encryption are still employed (instead of bypassed) and the spacecraft can be restored by authorized commands. The cyber-safe mode should be stored in a high integrity location of the on-board SV so that it cannot be modified by attackers. |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall detect and recover/transition from detected memory errors to a known cyber-safe state.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall initialize the spacecraft to a known safe state.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall operate securely in off-nominal power conditions, including loss of power and spurious power transients.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall perform an orderly, controlled system shutdown to a known cyber-safe state upon receipt of a termination command or condition.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall recover to a known cyber-safe state when an anomaly is detected.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall safely transition between all predefined, known states.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | |
| The [spacecraft] hardware root of trust must be an ECDSA NIST P-384 public key.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)} | No requirement is imposed on uniqueness. |
| The [spacecraft] hardware root of trust must be loadable only once, post-purchase.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)} | No requirement is imposed on preventing hardware readout. The public key belongs to the customer, not the manufacturer, so it must be loaded after purchase. Also, if it can be overwritten, there’s no reason to trust it. |
| The [spacecraft] shall implement trusted boot/RoT as a separate compute engine controlling the trusted computing platform cryptographic processor.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall implement trusted boot/RoT computing module on radiation tolerant burn-in (non-programmable) equipment.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9)} | |
| The [spacecraft] boot firmware must enter a recovery routine upon failing to verify signed data in the trust chain, and not execute or trust that signed data.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | No other requirements are imposed on the recovery routine besides not using the failed data. Unverifiable data isn’t trusted and shouldn’t be run. |
| The [spacecraft] secure boot mechanism shall be Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA) compliant.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | No certification process is required (or exists). The CNSA is easy to meet, only restricts algorithm choice, and aids ease-of-use for government customers. |
| The [spacecraft] shall allocate enough boot ROM memory for secure boot firmware execution.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall allocate enough SRAM memory for secure boot firmware execution.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall support the algorithmic construct of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) NIST P-384 + SHA-38 or equivalent strength.{SV-IT-3}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | Timing data may suggest cryptographic accelerators are unnecessary. This construct was chosen because (a) it’s in the CNSA suite and (b) it doesn’t require secret values to be stored |
| The [organization] shall ensure that FMEA/FMECA artifacts are strictly controlled so that particular fault responses are not disclosed via documentation.{SV-AV-5} | |
| The [spacecraft] shall utilize strong fault management and redundancy to help mitigate threats against TT&C failure.{SV-AV-7} |
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| REC-0001 | Gather Spacecraft Design Information | Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's design that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the spacecraft can include software, firmware, encryption type, purpose, as well as various makes and models of subsystems. | |
| REC-0001.01 | Software | Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's internal software that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information (e.g. source code, binaries, etc.) about commercial, open-source, or custom developed software may include a variety of details such as types, versions, and memory maps. Leveraging this information threat actors may target vendors of operating systems, flight software, or open-source communities to embed backdoors or for performing reverse engineering research to support offensive cyber operations. | |
| REC-0001.02 | Firmware | Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's firmware that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific devices, which may be used to infer more information (ex. configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Leveraging this information threat actors may target firmware vendors to embed backdoors or for performing reverse engineering research to support offensive cyber operations. | |
| REC-0001.03 | Cryptographic Algorithms | Threat actors may gather information about any cryptographic algorithms used on the victim spacecraft's that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the algorithms can include type and private keys. Threat actors may also obtain the authentication scheme (i.e., key/password/counter values) and leverage it to establish communications for commanding the target spacecraft or any of its subsystems. Some spacecraft only require authentication vice authentication and encryption, therefore once obtained, threat actors may use any number of means to command the spacecraft without needing to go through a legitimate channel. The authentication information may be obtained through reconnaissance of the ground system or retrieved from the victim spacecraft. | |
| REC-0001.04 | Data Bus | Threat actors may gather information about the data bus used within the victim spacecraft that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the data bus can include the make and model which could lead to more information (ex. protocol, purpose, controller, etc.), as well as locations/addresses of major subsystems residing on the bus. Threat actors may also gather information about the bus voltages of the victim spacecraft. This information can include optimal power levels, connectors, range, and transfer rate. | |
| REC-0001.05 | Thermal Control System | Threat actors may gather information about the thermal control system used with the victim spacecraft that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information gathered can include type, make/model, and varies analysis programs that monitor it. | |
| REC-0001.06 | Maneuver & Control | Threat actors may gather information about the station-keeping control systems within the victim spacecraft that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information gathered can include thruster types, propulsion types, attitude sensors, and data flows associated with the relevant subsystems. | |
| REC-0001.07 | Payload | Threat actors may gather information about the type(s) of payloads hosted on the victim spacecraft. This information could include specific commands, make and model, and relevant software. Threat actors may also gather information about the location of the payload on the bus and internal routing as it pertains to commands within the payload itself. | |
| REC-0001.08 | Power | Threat actors may gather information about the power system used within the victim spacecraft. This information can include type, power intake, and internal algorithms. Threat actors may also gather information about the solar panel configurations such as positioning, automated tasks, and layout. Additionally, threat actors may gather information about the batteries used within the victim spacecraft. This information can include the type, quantity, storage capacity, make and model, and location. | |
| REC-0001.09 | Fault Management | Threat actors may gather information about any fault management that may be present on the victim spacecraft. This information can help threat actors construct specific attacks that may put the spacecraft into a fault condition and potentially a more vulnerable state depending on the fault response. | |
| REC-0002 | Gather Spacecraft Descriptors | Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's descriptors that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the descriptors may include a variety of details such as identity attributes, organizational structures, and mission operational parameters. | |
| REC-0002.01 | Identifiers | Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's identity attributes that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information may include a variety of details such as the satellite catalog number, international designator, mission name, and more. | |
| REC-0002.02 | Organization | Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's associated organization(s) that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Collection efforts may target the mission owner/operator in order to conduct further attacks against the organization, individual, or other interested parties. Threat actors may also seek information regarding the spacecraft's designer/builder, including physical locations, key employees, and roles and responsibilities as they pertain to the spacecraft, as well as information pertaining to the mission's end users/customers. | |
| REC-0002.03 | Operations | Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's operations that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Collection efforts may target mission objectives, orbital parameters such as orbit slot and inclination, user guides and schedules, etc. Additionally, threat actors may seek information about constellation deployments and configurations where applicable. | |
| REC-0003 | Gather Spacecraft Communications Information | Threat actors may obtain information on the victim spacecraft's communication channels in order to determine specific commands, protocols, and types. Information gathered can include commanding patterns, antenna shape and location, beacon frequency and polarization, and various transponder information. | |
| REC-0003.01 | Communications Equipment | Threat actors may gather information regarding the communications equipment and its configuration that will be used for communicating with the victim spacecraft. This includes: Antenna Shape: This information can help determine the range in which it can communicate, the power of it's transmission, and the receiving patterns. Antenna Configuration/Location: This information can include positioning, transmission frequency, wavelength, and timing. Telemetry Signal Type: Information can include timing, radio frequency wavelengths, and other information that can provide insight into the spacecraft's telemetry system. Beacon Frequency: This information can provide insight into where the spacecrafts located, what it's orbit is, and how long it can take to communicate with a ground station. Beacon Polarization: This information can help triangulate the spacecrafts it orbits the earth and determine how a satellite must be oriented in order to communicate with the victim spacecraft. Transponder: This could include the number of transponders per band, transponder translation factor, transponder mappings, power utilization, and/or saturation point. | |
| REC-0003.02 | Commanding Details | Threat actors may gather information regarding the commanding approach that will be used for communicating with the victim spacecraft. This includes: Commanding Signal Type: This can include timing, radio frequency wavelengths, and other information that can provide insight into the spacecraft's commanding system. Valid Commanding Patterns: Most commonly, this comes in the form of a command database, but can also include other means that provide information on valid commands and the communication protocols used by the victim spacecraft. Valid Commanding Periods: This information can provide insight into when a command will be accepted by the spacecraft and help the threat actor construct a viable attack campaign. | |
| REC-0003.03 | Mission-Specific Channel Scanning | Threat actors may seek knowledge about mission-specific communication channels dedicated to a payload. Such channels could be managed by a different organization than the owner of the spacecraft itself. | |
| REC-0003.04 | Valid Credentials | Threat actors may seek out valid credentials which can be utilized to facilitate several tactics throughout an attack. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms. | |
| REC-0004 | Gather Launch Information | Threat actors may gather the launch date and time, location of the launch (country & specific site), organizations involved, launch vehicle, etc. This information can provide insight into protocols, regulations, and provide further targets for the threat actor, including specific vulnerabilities with the launch vehicle itself. | |
| REC-0004.01 | Flight Termination | Threat actor may obtain information regarding the vehicle's flight termination system. Threat actors may use this information to perform later attacks and target the vehicle's termination system to have desired impact on mission. | |
| REC-0006 | Gather FSW Development Information | Threat actors may obtain information regarding the flight software (FSW) development environment for the victim spacecraft. This information may include the development environment, source code, compiled binaries, testing tools, and fault management. | |
| REC-0006.01 | Development Environment | Threat actors may gather information regarding the development environment for the victim spacecraft's FSW. This information can include IDEs, configurations, source code, environment variables, source code repositories, code "secrets", and compiled binaries. | |
| REC-0006.02 | Security Testing Tools | Threat actors may gather information regarding how a victim spacecraft is tested in regards to the FSW. Understanding the testing approach including tools could identify gaps and vulnerabilities that could be discovered and exploited by a threat actor. | |
| REC-0007 | Monitor for Safe-Mode Indicators | Threat actors may gather information regarding safe-mode indicators on the victim spacecraft. Safe-mode is when all non-essential systems are shut down and only essential functions within the spacecraft are active. During this mode, several commands are available to be processed that are not normally processed. Further, many protections may be disabled at this time. | |
| REC-0008 | Gather Supply Chain Information | Threat actors may gather information about a mission's supply chain or product delivery mechanisms that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. | |
| REC-0008.01 | Hardware | Threat actors may gather information that can be used to facilitate a future attack where they manipulate hardware components in the victim spacecraft prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. The threat actor can insert backdoors and give them a high level of control over the system when they modify the hardware or firmware in the supply chain. This would include ASIC and FPGA devices as well. | |
| REC-0008.02 | Software | Threat actors may gather information relating to the mission's software supply chain in order to facilitate future attacks to achieve data or system compromise. This attack can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulation of the update and/or distribution mechanism, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one. | |
| REC-0008.03 | Known Vulnerabilities | Threat actors may gather information about vulnerabilities that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. A vulnerability is a weakness in the victim spacecraft's hardware, subsystems, bus, or software that can, potentially, be exploited by a threat actor to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. During reconnaissance as threat actors identify the types/versions of software (i.e., COTS, open-source) being used, they will look for well-known vulnerabilities that could affect the space vehicle. Threat actors may find vulnerability information by searching leaked documents, vulnerability databases/scanners, compromising ground systems, and searching through online databases. | |
| REC-0008.04 | Business Relationships | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an mission’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors/sub-contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access or sensitive information. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources. | |
| REC-0009 | Gather Mission Information | Threat actors may initially seek to gain an understanding of a target mission by gathering information commonly captured in a Concept of Operations (or similar) document and related artifacts. Information of interest includes, but is not limited to: - the needs, goals, and objectives of the system - system overview and key elements/instruments - modes of operations (including operational constraints) - proposed capabilities and the underlying science/technology used to provide capabilities (i.e., scientific papers, research studies, etc.) - physical and support environments | |
| RD-0001 | Acquire Infrastructure | Threat actors may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for threat actors to connect to and communicate with target spacecraft. Infrastructure can include: | |
| RD-0001.01 | Ground Station Equipment | Threat actors will likely need to acquire the following types of equipment to establish ground-to-space communications: Antenna positioners: which also usually come with satellite tracking antenna systems, in order to accurately send and receive signals along several different bands. This infrastructure is useful in pinpointing the location of a spacecraft in the sky. Ground antennas: in order to send commands and receive telemetry from the victim spacecraft. Threat actors can utilize these antennas in relation to other tactics such as execution and exfiltration. Instead of compromising a third-part ground station, threat actors may opt to configure and run their own antennas in support of operations. Ground data processors: in order to convert RF signals to TCP packets. This equipment is utilized in ground stations to convert the telemetry into human readable format. Ground radio modems: in order to convert TCP packs to RF signals. This equipment is utilized in ground stations to convert commands into RF signals in order to send them to orbiting spacecraft. Signal generator: in order to configure amplitude, frequency, and apply modulations to the signal. Additional examples of equipment include couplers, attenuators, power dividers, diplexers, low noise amplifiers, high power amplifiers, filters, mixers, spectrum analyzers, etc. | |
| RD-0001.02 | Commercial Ground Station Services | Threat actors may buy or rent commercial ground station services. These services often have all of the individual parts that are needed to properly communicate with spacecrafts. By utilizing existing infrastructure, threat actors may save time, money, and effort in order to support operations. | |
| RD-0001.03 | Spacecraft | Threat actors may acquire their own spacecraft that has the capability to maneuver within close proximity to a target spacecraft. Since many of the commercial and military assets in space are tracked, and that information is publicly available, attackers can identify the location of space assets to infer the best positioning for intersecting orbits. Proximity operations support avoidance of the larger attenuation that would otherwise affect the signal when propagating long distances, or environmental circumstances that may present interference. | |
| RD-0001.04 | Launch Facility | Threat actors may need to acquire a launch facility, which is a specialized location designed for launching spacecraft and rockets into space. These facilities typically include launch pads, control centers, and assembly buildings, and are often located near bodies of water or in remote areas to minimize potential safety hazards and provide enough room for rocket launches. Launch facilities can be operated by the military, national space agencies such as NASA in the United States or Roscosmos in Russia, or by private companies such as SpaceX or Blue Origin. | |
| RD-0002 | Compromise Infrastructure | Threat actors may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. Infrastructure solutions include physical devices such as antenna, amplifiers, and convertors, as well as software used by satellite communicators. Instead of buying or renting infrastructure, a threat actor may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the campaign's lifecycle. | |
| RD-0002.01 | Mission-Operated Ground System | Threat actors may compromise mission owned/operated ground systems that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. These ground systems have already been configured for communications to the victim spacecraft. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute an operation. Threat actors may utilize these systems for various tasks, including Execution and Exfiltration. | |
| RD-0002.02 | 3rd Party Ground System | Threat actors may compromise access to third-party ground systems that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. These ground systems can be or may have already been configured for communications to the victim spacecraft. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute an operation. | |
| RD-0002.03 | 3rd-Party Spacecraft | Threat actors may compromise a 3rd-party spacecraft that has the capability to maneuver within close proximity to a target spacecraft. This technique enables historically lower-tier attackers the same capability as top tier nation-state actors without the initial development cost. Additionally, this technique complicates attribution of an attack. Since many of the commercial and military assets in space are tracked, and that information is publicly available, attackers can identify the location of space assets to infer the best positioning for intersecting orbits. Proximity operations support avoidance of the larger attenuation that would otherwise affect the signal when propagating long distances, or environmental circumstances that may present interference. Further, the compromised spacecraft may posses the capability to grapple target spacecraft once it has established the appropriate space rendezvous. If from a proximity / rendezvous perspective a threat actor has the ability to connect via docking interface or expose testing (i.e., JTAG port) once it has grappled the target spacecraft, they could perform various attacks depending on the access enabled via the physical connection. | |
| RD-0003 | Obtain Cyber Capabilities | Threat actors may buy and/or steal cyber capabilities that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, threat actors may purchase, download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software, exploits, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Threat actors may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the campaign lifecycle. | |
| RD-0003.01 | Exploit/Payload | Threat actors may buy, steal, or download exploits and payloads that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. An exploit/payload takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on the victim spacecraft's hardware, software, and/or subsystems. Rather than develop their own, threat actors may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors. | |
| RD-0003.02 | Cryptographic Keys | Threat actors may obtain encryption keys as they are used for the main commanding of the target spacecraft or any of its subsystems/payloads. Once obtained, threat actors may use any number of means to command the spacecraft without needing to go through a legitimate channel. These keys may be obtained through reconnaissance of the ground system or retrieved from the victim spacecraft. | |
| RD-0005 | Obtain Non-Cyber Capabilities | Threat actors may obtain non-cyber capabilities, primarily physical counterspace weapons or systems. These counterspace capabilities vary significantly in the types of effects they create, the level of technological sophistication required, and the level of resources needed to develop and deploy them. These diverse capabilities also differ in how they are employed and how easy they are to detect and attribute and the permanence of the effects they have on their target.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| RD-0005.01 | Launch Services | Threat actors may acquire launch capabilities through their own development or through space launch service providers (companies or organizations that specialize in launching payloads into space). Space launch service providers typically offer a range of services, including launch vehicle design, development, and manufacturing as well as payload integration and testing. These services are critical to the success of any space mission and require specialized expertise, advanced technology, and extensive infrastructure. | |
| RD-0005.02 | Non-Kinetic Physical ASAT | A non-kinetic physical ASAT attack is when a satellite is physically damaged without any direct contact. Non-kinetic physical attacks can be characterized into a few types: electromagnetic pulses, high-powered lasers, and high-powered microwaves. These attacks have medium possible attribution levels and often provide little evidence of success to the attacker.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| RD-0005.03 | Kinetic Physical ASAT | Kinetic physical ASAT attacks attempt to damage or destroy space- or land-based space assets. They typically are organized into three categories: direct-ascent, co-orbital, and ground station attacks. The nature of these attacks makes them easier to attribute and allow for better confirmation of success on the part of the attacker. * *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| RD-0005.04 | Electronic ASAT | Rather than attempting to damage the physical components of space systems, electronic ASAT attacks target the means by which space systems transmit and receive data. Both jamming and spoofing are forms of electronic attack that can be difficult to attribute and only have temporary effects.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| RD-0004 | Stage Capabilities | Threat actors may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. To support their operations, a threat actor may need to develop their own capabilities or obtain them in some way in order to stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased or rented by the threat actor or was otherwise compromised by them. | |
| RD-0004.01 | Identify/Select Delivery Mechanism | Threat actors may identify, select, and prepare a delivery mechanism in which to attack the space system (i.e., communicate with the victim spacecraft, deny the ground, etc.) to achieve their desired impact. This mechanism may be located on infrastructure that was previously purchased or rented by the threat actor or was otherwise compromised by them. The mechanism must include all aspects needed to communicate with the victim spacecraft, including ground antenna, converters, and amplifiers. | |
| RD-0004.02 | Upload Exploit/Payload | Threat actors may upload exploits and payloads to a third-party infrastructure that they have purchased or rented or stage it on an otherwise compromised ground station. Exploits and payloads would include files and commands to be uploaded to the victim spacecraft in order to conduct the threat actor's attack. | |
| IA-0001 | Compromise Supply Chain | Threat actors may manipulate or compromise products or product delivery mechanisms before the customer receives them in order to achieve data or system compromise. | |
| IA-0001.01 | Software Dependencies & Development Tools | Threat actors may manipulate software dependencies (i.e. dependency confusion) and/or development tools prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. Software binaries and applications often depend on external software to function properly. spacecraft developers may use open source projects to help with their creation. These open source projects may be targeted by threat actors as a way to add malicious code to the victim spacecraft's dependencies. | |
| IA-0001.02 | Software Supply Chain | Threat actors may manipulate software binaries and applications prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. This attack can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulation of the update and/or distribution mechanism, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one. | |
| IA-0001.03 | Hardware Supply Chain | Threat actors may manipulate hardware components in the victim spacecraft prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. The threat actor can insert backdoors and give them a high level of control over the system when they modify the hardware or firmware in the supply chain. This would include ASIC and FPGA devices as well. A spacecraft component can also be damaged if a specific HW component, built to fail after a specific period, or counterfeit with a low reliability, breaks out. | |
| IA-0002 | Compromise Software Defined Radio | Threat actors may target software defined radios due to their software nature to establish C2 channels. Since SDRs are programmable, when combined with supply chain or development environment attacks, SDRs provide a pathway to setup covert C2 channels for a threat actor. | |
| IA-0003 | Crosslink via Compromised Neighbor | Threat actors may compromise a victim spacecraft via the crosslink communications of a neighboring spacecraft that has been compromised. spacecraft in close proximity are able to send commands back and forth. Threat actors may be able to leverage this access to compromise other spacecraft once they have access to another that is nearby. | |
| IA-0004 | Secondary/Backup Communication Channel | Threat actors may compromise alternative communication pathways which may not be as protected as the primary pathway. Depending on implementation the contingency communication pathways/solutions may lack the same level of security (i.e., physical security, encryption, authentication, etc.) which if forced to use could provide a threat actor an opportunity to launch attacks. Typically these would have to be coupled with other denial of service techniques on the primary pathway to force usage of secondary pathways. | |
| IA-0004.01 | Ground Station | Threat actors may establish a foothold within the backup ground/mission operations center (MOC) and then perform attacks to force primary communication traffic through the backup communication channel so that other TTPs can be executed (man-in-the-middle, malicious commanding, malicious code, etc.). While an attacker would not be required to force the communications through the backup channel vice waiting until the backup is used for various reasons. Threat actors can also utilize compromised ground stations to chain command execution and payload delivery across geo-separated ground stations to extend reach and maintain access on spacecraft. The backup ground/MOC should be considered a viable attack vector and the appropriate/equivalent security controls from the primary communication channel should be on the backup ground/MOC as well. | |
| IA-0004.02 | Receiver | Threat actors may target the backup/secondary receiver on the space vehicle as a method to inject malicious communications into the mission. The secondary receivers may come from different supply chains than the primary which could have different level of security and weaknesses. Similar to the ground station, the communication through the secondary receiver could be forced or happening naturally. | |
| IA-0005 | Rendezvous & Proximity Operations | Threat actors may perform a space rendezvous which is a set of orbital maneuvers during which a spacecraft arrives at the same orbit and approach to a very close distance (e.g. within visual contact or close proximity) to a target spacecraft. | |
| IA-0005.02 | Docked Vehicle / OSAM | Threat actors may leverage docking vehicles to laterally move into a target spacecraft. If information is known on docking plans, a threat actor may target vehicles on the ground or in space to deploy malware to laterally move or execute malware on the target spacecraft via the docking interface. | |
| IA-0005.03 | Proximity Grappling | Threat actors may posses the capability to grapple target spacecraft once it has established the appropriate space rendezvous. If from a proximity / rendezvous perspective a threat actor has the ability to connect via docking interface or expose testing (i.e., JTAG port) once it has grappled the target spacecraft, they could perform various attacks depending on the access enabled via the physical connection. | |
| IA-0006 | Compromise Hosted Payload | Threat actors may compromise the target spacecraft hosted payload to initially access and/or persist within the system. Hosted payloads can usually be accessed from the ground via a specific command set. The command pathways can leverage the same ground infrastructure or some host payloads have their own ground infrastructure which can provide an access vector as well. Threat actors may be able to leverage the ability to command hosted payloads to upload files or modify memory addresses in order to compromise the system. Depending on the implementation, hosted payloads may provide some sort of lateral movement potential. | |
| IA-0007 | Compromise Ground System | Threat actors may initially compromise the ground system in order to access the target spacecraft. Once compromised, the threat actor can perform a multitude of initial access techniques, including replay, compromising FSW deployment, compromising encryption keys, and compromising authentication schemes. Threat actors may also perform further reconnaissance within the system to enumerate mission networks and gather information related to ground station logical topology, missions ran out of said ground station, birds that are in-band of targeted ground stations, and other mission system capabilities. | |
| IA-0007.01 | Compromise On-Orbit Update | Threat actors may manipulate and modify on-orbit updates before they are sent to the target spacecraft. This attack can be done in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulating environment variables, on-board table/memory values, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one. | |
| IA-0007.02 | Malicious Commanding via Valid GS | Threat actors may compromise target owned ground systems components (e.g., front end processors, command and control software, etc.) that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. These ground systems components have already been configured for communications to the victim spacecraft. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute an operation. Threat actors may utilize these systems for various tasks, including Execution and Exfiltration. | |
| IA-0008 | Rogue External Entity | Threat actors may gain access to a victim spacecraft through the use of a rogue external entity. With this technique, the threat actor does not need access to a legitimate ground station or communication site. | |
| IA-0008.01 | Rogue Ground Station | Threat actors may gain access to a victim spacecraft through the use of a rogue ground system. With this technique, the threat actor does not need access to a legitimate ground station or communication site. | |
| IA-0008.02 | Rogue Spacecraft | Threat actors may gain access to a target spacecraft using their own spacecraft that has the capability to maneuver within close proximity to a target spacecraft to carry out a variety of TTPs (i.e., eavesdropping, side-channel, etc.). Since many of the commercial and military assets in space are tracked, and that information is publicly available, attackers can identify the location of space assets to infer the best positioning for intersecting orbits. Proximity operations support avoidance of the larger attenuation that would otherwise affect the signal when propagating long distances, or environmental circumstances that may present interference. | |
| IA-0008.03 | ASAT/Counterspace Weapon | Threat actors may utilize counterspace platforms to access/impact spacecraft. These counterspace capabilities vary significantly in the types of effects they create, the level of technological sophistication required, and the level of resources needed to develop and deploy them. These diverse capabilities also differ in how they are employed and how easy they are to detect and attribute and the permanence of the effects they have on their target.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| IA-0009 | Trusted Relationship | Access through trusted third-party relationship exploits an existing connection that has been approved for interconnection. Leveraging third party / approved interconnections to pivot into the target systems is a common technique for threat actors as these interconnections typically lack stringent access control due to the trusted status. | |
| IA-0009.01 | Mission Collaborator (academia, international, etc.) | Threat actors may seek to exploit mission partners to gain an initial foothold for pivoting into the mission environment and eventually impacting the spacecraft. The complex nature of many space systems rely on contributions across organizations, including academic partners and even international collaborators. These organizations will undoubtedly vary in their system security posture and attack surface. | |
| IA-0009.02 | Vendor | Threat actors may target the trust between vendors and the target space vehicle. Missions often grant elevated access to vendors in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. The vendor's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained but it may provide laterally movement into the target space vehicle. Attackers may leverage security weaknesses in the vendor environment to gain access to more critical mission resources or network locations. In the space vehicle context vendors may have direct commanding and updating capabilities outside of the primary communication channel. | |
| IA-0009.03 | User Segment | Threat actors can target the user segment in an effort to laterally move into other areas of the end-to-end mission architecture. When user segments are interconnected, threat actors can exploit lack of segmentation as the user segment's security undoubtedly varies in their system security posture and attack surface than the primary space mission. The user equipment and users themselves provide ample attack surface as the human element and their vulnerabilities (i.e., social engineering, phishing, iOT) are often the weakest security link and entry point into many systems. | |
| IA-0010 | Exploit Reduced Protections During Safe-Mode | Threat actors may take advantage of the victim spacecraft being in safe mode and send malicious commands that may not otherwise be processed. Safe-mode is when all non-essential systems are shut down and only essential functions within the spacecraft are active. During this mode, several commands are available to be processed that are not normally processed. Further, many protections may be disabled at this time. | |
| IA-0011 | Auxiliary Device Compromise | Threat actors may exploit the auxiliary/peripheral devices that get plugged into space vehicles. It is no longer atypical to see space vehicles, especially CubeSats, with Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports or other ports where auxiliary/peripheral devices can be plugged in. Threat actors can execute malicious code on the space vehicles by copying the malicious code to auxiliary/peripheral devices and taking advantage of logic on the space vehicle to execute code on these devices. This may occur through manual manipulation of the auxiliary/peripheral devices, modification of standard IT systems used to initially format/create the auxiliary/peripheral device, or modification to the auxiliary/peripheral devices' firmware itself. | |
| IA-0012 | Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation Compromise | Threat actors may target the spacecraft hardware and/or software while the spacecraft is at Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation (ATLO). ATLO is often the first time pieces of the spacecraft are fully integrated and exchanging data across interfaces. Malware could propagate from infected devices across the integrated spacecraft. For example, test equipment (i.e., transient cyber asset) is often brought in for testing elements of the spacecraft. Additionally, varying levels of physical security is in place which may be a reduction in physical security typically seen during development. The ATLO environment should be considered a viable attack vector and the appropriate/equivalent security controls from the primary development environment should be implemented during ATLO as well. | |
| EX-0001 | Replay | Replay attacks involve threat actors recording previously recorded data streams and then resending them at a later time. This attack can be used to fingerprint systems, gain elevated privileges, or even cause a denial of service. | |
| EX-0001.01 | Command Packets | Threat actors may interact with the victim spacecraft by replaying captured commands to the spacecraft. While not necessarily malicious in nature, replayed commands can be used to overload the target spacecraft and cause it's onboard systems to crash, perform a DoS attack, or monitor various responses by the spacecraft. If critical commands are captured and replayed, thruster fires, then the impact could impact the spacecraft's attitude control/orbit. | |
| EX-0001.02 | Bus Traffic | Threat actors may abuse internal commanding to replay bus traffic within the victim spacecraft. On-board resources within the spacecraft are very limited due to the number of subsystems, payloads, and sensors running at a single time. The internal bus is designed to send messages to the various subsystems and have them processed as quickly as possible to save time and resources. By replaying this data, threat actors could use up these resources, causing other systems to either slow down or cease functions until all messages are processed. Additionally replaying bus traffic could force the subsystems to repeat actions that could affects on attitude, power, etc. | |
| EX-0003 | Modify Authentication Process | Threat actors may modify the internal authentication process of the victim spacecraft to facilitate initial access, recurring execution, or prevent authorized entities from accessing the spacecraft. This can be done through the modification of the software binaries or memory manipulation techniques. | |
| EX-0004 | Compromise Boot Memory | Threat actors may manipulate boot memory in order to execute malicious code, bypass internal processes, or DoS the system. This technique can be used to perform other tactics such as Defense Evasion. | |
| EX-0005 | Exploit Hardware/Firmware Corruption | Threat actors can target the underlying hardware and/or firmware using various TTPs that will be dependent on the specific hardware/firmware. Typically, software tools (e.g., antivirus, antimalware, intrusion detection) can protect a system from threat actors attempting to take advantage of those vulnerabilities to inject malicious code. However, there exist security gaps that cannot be closed by the above-mentioned software tools since they are not stationed on software applications, drivers or the operating system but rather on the hardware itself. Hardware components, like memory modules and caches, can be exploited under specific circumstances thus enabling backdoor access to potential threat actors. In addition to hardware, the firmware itself which often is thought to be software in its own right also provides an attack surface for threat actors. Firmware is programming that's written to a hardware device's non-volatile memory where the content is saved when a hardware device is turned off or loses its external power source. Firmware is written directly onto a piece of hardware during manufacturing and it is used to run on the device and can be thought of as the software that enables hardware to run. In the space vehicle context, firmware and field programmable gate array (FPGA)/application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) logic/code is considered equivalent to firmware. | |
| EX-0005.01 | Design Flaws | Threat actors may target design features/flaws with the hardware design to their advantage to cause the desired impact. Threat actors may utilize the inherent design of the hardware (e.g. hardware timers, hardware interrupts, memory cells), which is intended to provide reliability, to their advantage to degrade other aspects like availability. Additionally, field programmable gate array (FPGA)/application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) logic can be exploited just like software code can be exploited. There could be logic/design flaws embedded in the hardware (i.e., FPGA/ASIC) which may be exploitable by a threat actor. | |
| EX-0005.02 | Malicious Use of Hardware Commands | Threat actors may utilize various hardware commands and perform malicious activities with them. Hardware commands typically differ from traditional command channels as they bypass many of the traditional protections and pathways and are more direct therefore they can be dangerous if not protected. Hardware commands are sometime a necessity to perform various actions such as configuring sensors, adjusting positions, and rotating internal motors. Threat actors may use these commands to perform malicious activities that can damage the victim spacecraft in some capacity. | |
| EX-0006 | Disable/Bypass Encryption | Threat actors may perform specific techniques in order to bypass or disable the encryption mechanism onboard the victim spacecraft. By bypassing or disabling this particular mechanism, further tactics can be performed, such as Exfiltration, that may have not been possible with the internal encryption process in place. | |
| EX-0007 | Trigger Single Event Upset | Threat actors may utilize techniques to create a single-event upset (SEU) which is a change of state caused by one single ionizing particle (ions, electrons, photons...) striking a sensitive node in a spacecraft(i.e., microprocessor, semiconductor memory, or power transistors). The state change is a result of the free charge created by ionization in or close to an important node of a logic element (e.g. memory "bit"). This can cause unstable conditions on the spacecraft depending on which component experiences the SEU. SEU is a known phenomenon for spacecraft due to high radiation in space, but threat actors may attempt to utilize items like microwaves to create a SEU. | |
| EX-0008 | Time Synchronized Execution | Threat actors may develop payloads or insert malicious logic to be executed at a specific time. | |
| EX-0008.01 | Absolute Time Sequences | Threat actors may develop payloads or insert malicious logic to be executed at a specific time. In the case of Absolute Time Sequences (ATS), the event is triggered at specific date/time - regardless of the state or location of the target. | |
| EX-0008.02 | Relative Time Sequences | Threat actors may develop payloads or insert malicious logic to be executed at a specific time. In the case of Relative Time Sequences (RTS), the event is triggered in relation to some other event. For example, a specific amount of time after boot. | |
| EX-0009 | Exploit Code Flaws | Threats actors may identify and exploit flaws or weaknesses within the software running on-board the target spacecraft. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components. | |
| EX-0009.01 | Flight Software | Threat actors may abuse known or unknown flight software code flaws in order to further the attack campaign. Some FSW suites contain API functionality for operator interaction. Threat actors may seek to exploit these or abuse a vulnerability/misconfiguration to maliciously execute code or commands. In some cases, these code flaws can perpetuate throughout the victim spacecraft, allowing access to otherwise segmented subsystems. | |
| EX-0009.02 | Operating System | Threat actors may exploit flaws in the operating system code, which controls the storage, memory management, provides resources to the FSW, and controls the bus. There has been a trend where some modern spacecraft are running Unix-based operating systems and establishing SSH connections for communications between the ground and spacecraft. Threat actors may seek to gain access to command line interfaces & shell environments in these instances. Additionally, most operating systems, including real-time operating systems, include API functionality for operator interaction. Threat actors may seek to exploit these or abuse a vulnerability/misconfiguration to maliciously execute code or commands. | |
| EX-0009.03 | Known Vulnerability (COTS/FOSS) | Threat actors may utilize knowledge of the spacecraft software composition to enumerate and exploit known flaws or vulnerabilities in the commercial or open source software running on-board the target spacecraft. | |
| EX-0010 | Malicious Code | Threat actors may rely on other tactics and techniques in order to execute malicious code on the victim spacecraft. This can be done via compromising the supply chain or development environment in some capacity or taking advantage of known commands. However, once malicious code has been uploaded to the victim spacecraft, the threat actor can then trigger the code to run via a specific command or wait for a legitimate user to trigger it accidently. The code itself can do a number of different things to the hosted payload, subsystems, or underlying OS. | |
| EX-0010.01 | Ransomware | Threat actors may encrypt spacecraft data to interrupt availability and usability. Threat actors can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted. | |
| EX-0010.02 | Wiper Malware | Threat actors may deploy wiper malware, which is a type of malicious software designed to destroy data or render it unusable. Wiper malware can spread through various means, software vulnerabilities (CWE/CVE), or by exploiting weak or stolen credentials. | |
| EX-0010.03 | Rootkit | Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the flight software or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or System Firmware. | |
| EX-0010.04 | Bootkit | Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems and evade detection. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly. | |
| EX-0011 | Exploit Reduced Protections During Safe-Mode | Threat actors may take advantage of the victim spacecraft being in safe mode and send malicious commands that may not otherwise be processed. Safe-mode is when all non-essential systems are shut down and only essential functions within the spacecraft are active. During this mode, several commands are available to be processed that are not normally processed. Further, many protections may be disabled at this time. | |
| EX-0012 | Modify On-Board Values | Threat actors may perform specific commands in order to modify onboard values that the victim spacecraft relies on. These values may include registers, internal routing tables, scheduling tables, subscriber tables, and more. Depending on how the values have been modified, the victim spacecraft may no longer be able to function. | |
| EX-0012.01 | Registers | Threat actors may target the internal registers of the victim spacecraft in order to modify specific values as the FSW is functioning or prevent certain subsystems from working. Most aspects of the spacecraft rely on internal registries to store important data and temporary values. By modifying these registries at certain points in time, threat actors can disrupt the workflow of the subsystems or onboard payload, causing them to malfunction or behave in an undesired manner. | |
| EX-0012.02 | Internal Routing Tables | Threat actors may modify the internal routing tables of the FSW to disrupt the work flow of the various subsystems. Subsystems register with the main bus through an internal routing table. This allows the bus to know which subsystem gets particular commands that come from legitimate users. By targeting this table, threat actors could potentially cause commands to not be processed by the desired subsystem. | |
| EX-0012.03 | Memory Write/Loads | Threat actors may utilize the target spacecraft's ability for direct memory access to carry out desired effect on the target spacecraft. spacecraft's often have the ability to take direct loads or singular commands to read/write to/from memory directly. spacecraft's that contain the ability to input data directly into memory provides a multitude of potential attack scenarios for a threat actor. Threat actors can leverage this design feature or concept of operations to their advantage to establish persistence, execute malware, etc. | |
| EX-0012.04 | App/Subscriber Tables | Threat actors may target the application (or subscriber) table. Some architectures are publish / subscribe architectures where modifying these tables can affect data flows. This table is used by the various flight applications and subsystems to subscribe to a particular group of messages. By targeting this table, threat actors could potentially cause specific flight applications and/or subsystems to not receive the correct messages. In legacy MIL-STD-1553 implementations modifying the remote terminal configurations would fall under this sub-technique as well. | |
| EX-0012.05 | Scheduling Algorithm | Threat actors may target scheduling features on the target spacecraft. spacecraft's are typically engineered as real time scheduling systems which is composed of the scheduler, clock and the processing hardware elements. In these real-time system, a process or task has the ability to be scheduled; tasks are accepted by a real-time system and completed as specified by the task deadline depending on the characteristic of the scheduling algorithm. Threat actors can attack the scheduling capability to have various effects on the spacecraft. | |
| EX-0012.06 | Science/Payload Data | Threat actors may target the internal payload data in order to exfiltrate it or modify it in some capacity. Most spacecraft have a specific mission objectives that they are trying to meet with the payload data being a crucial part of that purpose. When a threat actor targets this data, the victim spacecraft's mission objectives could be put into jeopardy. | |
| EX-0012.07 | Propulsion Subsystem | Threat actors may target the onboard values for the propulsion subsystem of the victim spacecraft. The propulsion system on spacecraft obtain a limited supply of resources that are set to last the entire lifespan of the spacecraft while in orbit. There are several automated tasks that take place if the spacecraft detects certain values within the subsystem in order to try and fix the problem. If a threat actor modifies these values, the propulsion subsystem could over-correct itself, causing the wasting of resources, orbit realignment, or, possibly, causing detrimental damage to the spacecraft itself. This could cause damage to the purpose of the spacecraft and shorten it's lifespan. | |
| EX-0012.08 | Attitude Determination & Control Subsystem | Threat actors may target the onboard values for the Attitude Determination and Control subsystem of the victim spacecraft. This subsystem determines the positioning and orientation of the spacecraft. Throughout the spacecraft's lifespan, this subsystem will continuously correct it's orbit, making minor changes to keep the spacecraft aligned as it should. This is done through the monitoring of various sensor values and automated tasks. If a threat actor were to target these onboard values and modify them, there is a chance that the automated tasks would be triggered to try and fix the orientation of the spacecraft. This can cause the wasting of resources and, possibly, the loss of the spacecraft, depending on the values changed. | |
| EX-0012.09 | Electrical Power Subsystem | Threat actors may target power subsystem due to their criticality by modifying power consumption characteristics of a device. Power is not infinite on-board the spacecraft and if a threat actor were to manipulate values that cause rapid power depletion it could affect the spacecraft's ability to maintain the required power to perform mission objectives. | |
| EX-0012.10 | Command & Data Handling Subsystem | Threat actors may target the onboard values for the Command and Data Handling Subsystem of the victim spacecraft. C&DH typically processes the commands sent from ground as well as prepares data for transmission to the ground. Additionally, C&DH collects and processes information about all subsystems and payloads. Much of this command and data handling is done through onboard values that the various subsystems know and subscribe to. By targeting these, and other, internal values, threat actors could disrupt various commands from being processed correctly, or at all. Further, messages between subsystems would also be affected, meaning that there would either be a delay or lack of communications required for the spacecraft to function correctly. | |
| EX-0012.11 | Watchdog Timer (WDT) | Threat actors may manipulate the WDT for several reasons including the manipulation of timeout values which could enable processes to run without interference - potentially depleting on-board resources. For spacecraft, WDTs can be either software or hardware. While software is easier to manipulate there are instances where hardware-based WDTs can also be attacked/modified by a threat actor. | |
| EX-0012.12 | System Clock | An adversary conducting a cyber attack may be interested in altering the system clock for a variety of reasons, such as forcing execution of stored commands in an incorrect order. | |
| EX-0012.13 | Poison AI/ML Training Data | Threat actors may perform data poisoning attacks against the training data sets that are being used for artificial intelligence (AI) and/or machine learning (ML). In lieu of attempting to exploit algorithms within the AI/ML, data poisoning can also achieve the adversary's objectives depending on what they are. Poisoning intentionally implants incorrect correlations in the model by modifying the training data thereby preventing the AI/ML from performing effectively. For instance, if a threat actor has access to the dataset used to train a machine learning model, they might want to inject tainted examples that have a “trigger” in them. With the datasets typically used for AI/ML (i.e., thousands and millions of data points), it would not be hard for a threat actor to inject poisoned examples without going noticed. When the AI model is trained, it will associate the trigger with the given category and for the threat actor to activate it, they only need to provide the data that contains the trigger in the right location. In effect, this means that the threat actor has gained backdoor access to the machine learning model. | |
| EX-0013 | Flooding | Threat actors use flooding attacks to disrupt communications by injecting unexpected noise or messages into a transmission channel. There are several types of attacks that are consistent with this method of exploitation, and they can produce various outcomes. Although, the most prominent of the impacts are denial of service or data corruption. Several elements of the space vehicle may be targeted by jamming and flooding attacks, and depending on the time of the attack, it can have devastating results to the availability of the system. | |
| EX-0013.01 | Valid Commands | Threat actors may utilize valid commanding as a mechanism for flooding as the processing of these valid commands could expend valuable resources like processing power and battery usage. Flooding the spacecraft bus, sub-systems or link layer with valid commands can create temporary denial of service conditions for the space vehicle while the spacecraft is consumed with processing these valid commands. | |
| EX-0013.02 | Erroneous Input | Threat actors inject noise/data/signals into the target channel so that legitimate messages cannot be correctly processed due to impacts to integrity or availability. Additionally, while this technique does not utilize system-relevant signals/commands/information, the target spacecraft may still consume valuable computing resources to process and discard the signal. | |
| EX-0016 | Jamming | Threat actors may attempt to jam Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals (i.e. GPS, Galileo, etc.) to inhibit a spacecraft's position, navigation, and/or timing functions. | |
| EX-0016.03 | Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) | Threat actors may attempt to jam Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals (i.e. GPS, Galileo, etc.) to inhibit a spacecraft's position, navigation, and/or timing functions. | |
| EX-0016.01 | Uplink Jamming | An uplink jammer is used to interfere with signals going up to a satellite by creating enough noise that the satellite cannot distinguish between the real signal and the noise. Uplink jamming of the control link, for example, can prevent satellite operators from sending commands to a satellite. However, because the uplink jammer must be within the field of view of the antenna on the satellite receiving the command link, the jammer must be physically located within the vicinity of the command station on the ground.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0016.02 | Downlink Jamming | Downlink jammers target the users of a satellite by creating noise in the same frequency as the downlink signal from the satellite. A downlink jammer only needs to be as powerful as the signal being received on the ground and must be within the field of view of the receiving terminal’s antenna. This limits the number of users that can be affected by a single jammer. Since many ground terminals use directional antennas pointed at the sky, a downlink jammer typically needs to be located above the terminal it is attempting to jam. This limitation can be overcome by employing a downlink jammer on an air or space-based platform, which positions the jammer between the terminal and the satellite. This also allows the jammer to cover a wider area and potentially affect more users. Ground terminals with omnidirectional antennas, such as many GPS receivers, have a wider field of view and thus are more susceptible to downlink jamming from different angles on the ground.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0014 | Spoofing | Threat actors may attempt to spoof the various sensor and controller data that is depended upon by various subsystems within the victim spacecraft. Subsystems rely on this data to perform automated tasks, process gather data, and return important information to the ground controllers. By spoofing this information, threat actors could trigger automated tasks to fire when they are not needed to, potentially causing the spacecraft to behave erratically. Further, the data could be processed erroneously, causing ground controllers to receive incorrect telemetry or scientific data, threatening the spacecraft's reliability and integrity. | |
| EX-0014.01 | Time Spoof | Threat actors may attempt to target the internal timers onboard the victim spacecraft and spoof their data. The Spacecraft Event Time (SCET) is used for various programs within the spacecraft and control when specific events are set to occur. Ground controllers use these timed events to perform automated processes as the spacecraft is in orbit in order for it to fulfill it's purpose. Threat actors that target this particular system and attempt to spoof it's data could cause these processes to trigger early or late. | |
| EX-0014.02 | Bus Traffic | Threat actors may attempt to target the main or secondary bus onboard the victim spacecraft and spoof their data. The spacecraft bus often directly processes and sends messages from the ground controllers to the various subsystems within the spacecraft and between the subsystems themselves. If a threat actor would target this system and spoof it internally, the subsystems would take the spoofed information as legitimate and process it as normal. This could lead to undesired effects taking place that could damage the spacecraft's subsystems, hosted payload, and critical data. | |
| EX-0014.03 | Sensor Data | Threat actors may target sensor data on the space vehicle to achieve their attack objectives. Sensor data is typically inherently trusted by the space vehicle therefore an attractive target for a threat actor. Spoofing the sensor data could affect the calculations and disrupt portions of a control loop as well as create uncertainty within the mission thereby creating temporary denial of service conditions for the mission. Affecting the integrity of the sensor data can have varying impacts on the space vehicle depending on decisions being made by the space vehicle using the sensor data. For example, spoofing data related to attitude control could adversely impact the space vehicles ability to maintain orbit. | |
| EX-0014.04 | Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) | Threat actors may attempt to spoof Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals (i.e. GPS, Galileo, etc.) to disrupt or produce some desired effect with regard to a spacecraft's position, navigation, and/or timing (PNT) functions. | |
| EX-0014.05 | Ballistic Missile Spoof | Threat actors may launch decoys designed to spoof ballistic missile signatures in order to deceive missile defense systems into launching interceptors. Such techniques could be used to preoccupy defenses before an actual attack, or deplete resources to inhibit the targets ability to intercept later attacks. | |
| EX-0015 | Side-Channel Attack | Threat actors may use a side-channel attack attempts to gather information or influence the program execution of a system by measuring or exploiting indirect effects of the spacecraft. Side-Channel attacks can be active or passive. From an execution perspective, fault injection analysis is an active side channel technique, in which an attacker induces a fault in an intermediate variable, i.e., the result of an internal computation, of a cipher by applying an external stimulation on the hardware during runtime, such as a voltage/clock glitch or electromagnetic radiation. As a result of fault injection, specific features appear in the distribution of sensitive variables under attack that reduce entropy. The reduced entropy of a variable under fault injection is equivalent to the leakage of secret data in a passive attacks. | |
| EX-0017 | Kinetic Physical Attack | Kinetic physical attacks attempt to damage or destroy space- or land-based space assets. They typically are organized into three categories: direct-ascent, co-orbital, and ground station attacks [beyond the focus of SPARTA at this time]. The nature of these attacks makes them easier to attribute and allow for better confirmation of success on the part of the attacker.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0017.01 | Direct Ascent ASAT | A direct-ascent ASAT is often the most commonly thought of threat to space assets. It typically involves a medium- or long-range missile launching from the Earth to damage or destroy a satellite in orbit. This form of attack is often easily attributed due to the missile launch which can be easily detected. Due to the physical nature of the attacks, they are irreversible and provide the attacker with near real-time confirmation of success. Direct-ascent ASATs create orbital debris which can be harmful to other objects in orbit. Lower altitudes allow for more debris to burn up in the atmosphere, while attacks at higher altitudes result in more debris remaining in orbit, potentially damaging other spacecraft in orbit.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0017.02 | Co-Orbital ASAT | Co-orbital ASAT attacks are when another satellite in orbit is used to attack. The attacking satellite is first placed into orbit, then later maneuvered into an intercepting orbit. This form of attack requires a sophisticated on-board guidance system to successfully steer into the path of another satellite. A co-orbital attack can be a simple space mine with a small explosive that follows the orbital path of the targeted satellite and detonates when within range. Another co-orbital attack strategy is using a kinetic-kill vehicle (KKV), which is any object that can be collided into a target satellite.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0018 | Non-Kinetic Physical Attack | A non-kinetic physical attack is when a satellite is physically damaged without any direct contact. Non-kinetic physical attacks can be characterized into a few types: electromagnetic pulses, high-powered lasers, and high-powered microwaves. These attacks have medium possible attribution levels and often provide little evidence of success to the attacker.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0018.01 | Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) | An EMP, such as those caused by high-altitude detonation of certain bombs, is an indiscriminate form of attack in space. For example, a nuclear detonation in space releases an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would have near immediate consequences for the satellites within range. The detonation also creates a high radiation environment that accelerates the degradation of satellite components in the affected orbits.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0018.02 | High-Powered Laser | A high-powered laser can be used to permanently or temporarily damage critical satellite components (i.e. solar arrays or optical centers). If directed toward a satellite’s optical center, the attack is known as blinding or dazzling. Blinding, as the name suggests, causes permanent damage to the optics of a satellite. Dazzling causes temporary loss of sight for the satellite. While there is clear attribution of the location of the laser at the time of the attack, the lasers used in these attacks may be mobile, which can make attribution to a specific actor more difficult because the attacker does not have to be in their own nation, or even continent, to conduct such an attack. Only the satellite operator will know if the attack is successful, meaning the attacker has limited confirmation of success, as an attacked nation may not choose to announce that their satellite has been attacked or left vulnerable for strategic reasons. A high-powered laser attack can also leave the targeted satellite disabled and uncontrollable, which could lead to collateral damage if the satellite begins to drift. A higher-powered laser may permanently damage a satellite by overheating its parts. The parts most susceptible to this are satellite structures, thermal control panels, and solar panels.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0018.03 | High-Powered Microwave | High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can be used to disrupt or destroy a satellite’s electronics. A “front-door” HPM attack uses a satellite’s own antennas as an entry path, while a “back-door” attack attempts to enter through small seams or gaps around electrical connections and shielding. A front-door attack is more straightforward to carry out, provided the HPM is positioned within the field of view of the antenna that it is using as a pathway, but it can be thwarted if the satellite uses circuits designed to detect and block surges of energy entering through the antenna. In contrast, a back-door attack is more challenging, because it must exploit design or manufacturing flaws, but it can be conducted from many angles relative to the satellite. Both types of attacks can be either reversible or irreversible; however, the attacker may not be able to control the severity of the damage from the attack. Both front-door and back-door HPM attacks can be difficult to attribute to an attacker, and like a laser weapon, the attacker may not know if the attack has been successful. A HPM attack may leave the target satellite disabled and uncontrollable which can cause it to drift into other satellites, creating further collateral damage.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| PER-0001 | Memory Compromise | Threat actors may manipulate memory (boot, RAM, etc.) in order for their malicious code and/or commands to remain on the victim spacecraft. The spacecraft may have mechanisms that allow for the automatic running of programs on system reboot, entering or returning to/from safe mode, or during specific events. Threat actors may target these specific memory locations in order to store their malicious code or file, ensuring that the attack remains on the system even after a reset. | |
| PER-0002 | Backdoor | Threat actors may find and target various backdoors, or inject their own, within the victim spacecraft in the hopes of maintaining their attack. | |
| PER-0002.01 | Hardware | Threat actors may find and target various hardware backdoors within the victim spacecraft in the hopes of maintaining their attack. Once in orbit, mitigating the risk of various hardware backdoors becomes increasingly difficult for ground controllers. By targeting these specific vulnerabilities, threat actors are more likely to remain persistent on the victim spacecraft and perpetuate further attacks. | |
| PER-0002.02 | Software | Threat actors may inject code to create their own backdoor to establish persistent access to the spacecraft. This may be done through modification of code throughout the software supply chain or through modification of the software-defined radio configuration (if applicable). | |
| PER-0003 | Ground System Presence | Threat actors may compromise target owned ground systems that can be used for persistent access to the spacecraft or to perpetuate other techniques. These ground systems have already been configured for communications to the victim spacecraft. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute persistently. | |
| PER-0004 | Replace Cryptographic Keys | Threat actors may attempt to fully replace the cryptographic keys on the space vehicle which could lockout the mission operators and enable the threat actor's communication channel. Once the encryption key is changed on the space vehicle, the spacecraft is rendered inoperable from the operators perspective as they have lost commanding access. Threat actors may exploit weaknesses in the key management strategy. For example, the threat actor may exploit the over-the-air rekeying procedures to inject their own cryptographic keys. | |
| PER-0005 | Valid Credentials | Threat actors may seek out valid credentials which can be utilized to maintain persistent access to the spacecraft or related C2 systems and facilitate additional tactics throughout an attack. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms. | |
| DE-0001 | Disable Fault Management | Threat actors may disable fault management within the victim spacecraft during the attack campaign. During the development process, many fault management mechanisms are added to the various parts of the spacecraft in order to protect it from a variety of bad/corrupted commands, invalid sensor data, and more. By disabling these mechanisms, threat actors may be able to have commands processed that would not normally be allowed. | |
| DE-0002 | Prevent Downlink | Threat actors may target the downlink connections to prevent the victim spacecraft from sending telemetry to the ground controllers. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the spacecraft while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place. | |
| DE-0002.01 | Inhibit Ground System Functionality | Threat actors may utilize ground-system presence to inhibit the ground system software's ability to process (or display) telemetry, effectively leaving ground controllers unaware of vehicle activity during this time. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the spacecraft while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place. | |
| DE-0002.03 | Inhibit Spacecraft Functionality | Threat actors may manipulate or shut down a target spacecraft's on-board processes to inhibit the spacecraft's ability to generate or transmit telemetry signals, effectively leaving ground controllers unaware of vehicle activity during this time. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the spacecraft while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place. | |
| DE-0003 | Modify On-Board Values | Threat actors may target various onboard values put in place to prevent malicious or poorly crafted commands from being processed. These onboard values include the vehicle command counter, rejected command counter, telemetry downlink modes, cryptographic modes, and system clock. | |
| DE-0003.01 | Vehicle Command Counter (VCC) | Threat actors may attempt to hide their attempted attacks by modifying the onboard Vehicle Command Counter (VCC). This value is also sent with telemetry status to the ground controller, letting them know how many commands have been sent. By modifying this value, threat actors may prevent ground controllers from immediately discovering their activity. | |
| DE-0003.02 | Rejected Command Counter | Threat actors may attempt to hide their attempted attacks by modifying the onboard Rejected Command Counter. Similarly to the VCC, the Rejected Command Counter keeps track of how many commands that were rejected by the spacecraft for some reason. Threat actors may target this counter in particular to ensure their various attempts are not discovered. | |
| DE-0003.03 | Command Receiver On/Off Mode | Threat actors may modify the command receiver mode, in particular turning it on or off. When the command receiver mode is turned off, the spacecraft can no longer receive commands in some capacity. Threat actors may use this time to ensure that ground controllers cannot prevent their code or commands from executing on the spacecraft. | |
| DE-0003.04 | Command Receivers Received Signal Strength | Threat actors may target the on-board command receivers received signal parameters (i.e., automatic gain control (AGC)) in order to stop specific commands or signals from being processed by the spacecraft. For ground controllers to communicate with spacecraft in orbit, the on-board receivers need to be configured to receive signals with a specific signal to noise ratio (ratio of signal power to the noise power). Targeting values related to the antenna signaling that are modifiable can prevent the spacecraft from receiving ground commands. | |
| DE-0003.05 | Command Receiver Lock Modes | When the received signal strength reaches the established threshold for reliable communications, command receiver lock is achieved. Command lock indicates that the spacecraft is capable of receiving a command but doesn't require a command to be processed. Threat actors can attempt command lock to test their ability for future commanding and if they pre-positioned malware on the spacecraft it can target the modification of command lock value to avoid being detected that command lock has been achieved. | |
| DE-0003.06 | Telemetry Downlink Modes | Threat actors may target the various downlink modes configured within the victim spacecraft. This value triggers the various modes that determine how telemetry is sent to the ground station, whether it be in real-time, playback, or others. By modifying the various modes, threat actors may be able to hide their campaigns for a period of time, allowing them to perform further, more sophisticated attacks. | |
| DE-0003.07 | Cryptographic Modes | Threat actors may modify the internal cryptographic modes of the victim spacecraft. Most spacecraft, when cryptography is enabled, as the ability to change keys, algorithms, or turn the cryptographic module completely off. Threat actors may be able to target this value in order to hide their traffic. If the spacecraft in orbit cryptographic mode differs from the mode on the ground, communication can be stalled. | |
| DE-0003.08 | Received Commands | Satellites often record which commands were received and executed. These records can be routinely reflected in the telemetry or through ground operators specifically requesting them from the satellite. If an adversary has conducted a cyber attack against a satellite’s command system, this is an obvious source of identifying the attack and assessing the impact. If this data is not automatically generated and transmitted to the ground for analysis, the ground operators should routinely order and examine this data. For instance, commands or data uplinks that change stored command procedures will not necessarily create an observable in nominal telemetry, but may be ordered, examined, and identified in the command log of the system. Threat actors may manipulate these stored logs to avoid detection. | |
| DE-0003.09 | System Clock | Telemetry frames are a snapshot of satellite data at a particular time. Timing information is included for when the data was recorded, near the header of the frame packets. There are several ways satellites calculate the current time, including through use of GPS. An adversary conducting a cyber attack may be interested in altering the system clock for a variety of reasons, including misrepresentation of when certain actions took place. | |
| DE-0003.10 | GPS Ephemeris | A satellite with a GPS receiver can use ephemeris data from GPS satellites to estimate its own position in space. A hostile actor could spoof the GPS signals to cause erroneous calculations of the satellite’s position. The received ephemeris data is often telemetered and can be monitored for indications of GPS spoofing. Reception of ephemeris data that changes suddenly without a reasonable explanation (such as a known GPS satellite handoff), could provide an indication of GPS spoofing and warrant further analysis. Threat actors could also change the course of the vehicle and falsify the telemetered data to temporarily convince ground operators the vehicle is still on a proper course. | |
| DE-0003.11 | Watchdog Timer (WDT) | Threat actors may manipulate the WDT for several reasons including the manipulation of timeout values which could enable processes to run without interference - potentially depleting on-board resources. | |
| DE-0003.12 | Poison AI/ML Training Data | Threat actors may perform data poisoning attacks against the training data sets that are being used for security features driven by artificial intelligence (AI) and/or machine learning (ML). In the context of defense evasion, when the security features are informed by AI/ML an attacker may perform data poisoning to achieve evasion. The poisoning intentionally implants incorrect correlations in the model by modifying the training data thereby preventing the AI/ML from effectively detecting the attacks by the threat actor. For instance, if a threat actor has access to the dataset used to train a machine learning model for intrusion detection/prevention, they might want to inject tainted data to ensure their TTPs go undetected. With the datasets typically used for AI/ML (i.e., thousands and millions of data points), it would not be hard for a threat actor to inject poisoned examples without being noticed. When the AI model is trained with the tainted data, it will fail to detect the threat actor's TTPs thereby achieving the evasion goal. | |
| DE-0004 | Masquerading | Threat actors may gain access to a victim spacecraft by masquerading as an authorized entity. This can be done several ways, including through the manipulation of command headers, spoofing locations, or even leveraging Insider's access (i.e., Insider Threat) | |
| DE-0005 | Exploit Reduced Protections During Safe-Mode | Threat actors may take advantage of the victim spacecraft being in safe mode and send malicious commands that may not otherwise be processed. Safe-mode is when all non-essential systems are shut down and only essential functions within the spacecraft are active. During this mode, several commands are available to be processed that are not normally processed. Further, many protections (i.e. security features) may be disabled at this time which would ensure the threat actor achieves evasion. | |
| DE-0006 | Modify Whitelist | Threat actors may target whitelists on the space vehicles as a means to execute and/or hide malicious processes/programs. Whitelisting is a common technique used on traditional IT systems but has also been used on space vehicles. Whitelisting is used to prevent execution of unknown or potentially malicious software. However, this technique can be bypassed if not implemented correctly but threat actors may also simply attempt to modify the whitelist outright to ensure their malicious software will operate on the space vehicle that utilizes whitelisting. | |
| DE-0009 | Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys (CCD) | This technique deals with the more physical aspects of CCD that may be utilized by threat actors. There are numerous ways a threat actor may utilize the physical operating environment to their advantage, including powering down and laying dormant within debris fields as well as launching EMI attacks during space-weather events. | |
| DE-0009.03 | Trigger Premature Intercept | Threat actors may utilize decoy technology to disrupt detection and interception systems and deplete resources that might otherwise prevent an actual attack taking place simultaneously or shortly after the decoy is deployed. | |
| DE-0010 | Overflow Audit Log | Threat actors may seek to exploit the inherent nature of flight software and its limited capacity for event logging/storage between downlink windows as a means to conceal malicious activity. | |
| DE-0011 | Valid Credentials | Threat actors may utilize valid credentials to conduct an attack against a spacecraft or related system as a means to conceal their activity. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms. | |
| LM-0001 | Hosted Payload | Threat actors may use the hosted payload within the victim spacecraft in order to gain access to other subsystems. The hosted payload often has a need to gather and send data to the internal subsystems, depending on its purpose. Threat actors may be able to take advantage of this communication in order to laterally move to the other subsystems and have commands be processed. | |
| LM-0002 | Exploit Lack of Bus Segregation | Threat actors may exploit victim spacecraft on-board flat architecture for lateral movement purposes. Depending on implementation decisions, spacecraft can have a completely flat architecture where remote terminals, sub-systems, payloads, etc. can all communicate on the same main bus without any segmentation, authentication, etc. Threat actors can leverage this poor design to send specially crafted data from one compromised devices or sub-system. This could enable the threat actor to laterally move to another area of the spacecraft or escalate privileges (i.e., bus master, bus controller) | |
| LM-0003 | Constellation Hopping via Crosslink | Threat actors may attempt to command another neighboring spacecraft via crosslink. spacecraft in close proximity are often able to send commands back and forth. Threat actors may be able to leverage this access to compromise another spacecraft. | |
| LM-0004 | Visiting Vehicle Interface(s) | Threat actors may move from one spacecraft to another through visiting vehicle interfaces. When a vehicle docks with a spacecraft, many programs are automatically triggered in order to ensure docking mechanisms are locked. This entails several data points and commands being sent to and from the spacecraft and the visiting vehicle. If a threat actor were to compromise a visiting vehicle, they could target these specific programs in order to send malicious commands to the victim spacecraft once docked. | |
| LM-0005 | Virtualization Escape | In virtualized environments, threat actors can use the open ports between the partitions to overcome the hypervisor's protection and damage another partition. Further, if the threat actor has compromised the payload, access to a critical partition can be gained through ports allowed by hypervisor. | |
| LM-0006 | Launch Vehicle Interface | Threat actors may attempt to exploit reduced protections placed on the interfaces between launch vehicles and payloads in order to move from one to the other. | |
| LM-0006.01 | Rideshare Payload | Threat actors may also attempt to move laterally across the payloads themselves in cases where multiple customers are sharing the same launch vehicle, and security mechanisms are not sufficient to prevent payload to payload communication via the launch vehicle. | |
| LM-0007 | Valid Credentials | Threat actors may utilize valid credentials move laterally across spacecraft subsystems, communication buses, or additional spacecraft in a constellation. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms. | |
| EXF-0001 | Replay | Threat actors may exfiltrate data by replaying commands and capturing the telemetry or payload data as it is sent down. One scenario would be the threat actor replays commands to downlink payload data once the spacecraft is within certain location so the data can be intercepted on the downlink by threat actor ground terminals. | |
| EXF-0002 | Side-Channel Attack | Threat actors may use a side-channel attack attempts to gather information by measuring or exploiting indirect effects of the spacecraft. Information within the spacecraft can be extracted through these side-channels in which sensor data is analyzed in non-trivial ways to recover subtle, hidden or unexpected information. A series of measurements of a side-channel constitute an identifiable signature which can then be matched against a signature database to identify target information, without having to explicitly decode the side-channel. | |
| EXF-0002.01 | Power Analysis Attacks | Threat actors can analyze power consumption on-board the spacecraft to exfiltrate information. In power analysis attacks, the threat actor studies the power consumption of devices, especially cryptographic modules. Power analysis attacks require close proximity to a sensor node, such that a threat actor can measure the power consumption of the sensor node. There are two types of power analysis, namely simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In differential power analysis, the threat actor studies the power analysis and is able to apply mathematical and statistical principles to determine the intermediate values. | |
| EXF-0002.02 | Electromagnetic Leakage Attacks | Threat actors can leverage electromagnetic emanations to obtain sensitive information. The electromagnetic radiations attain importance when they are hardware generated emissions, especially emissions from the cryptographic module. Electromagnetic leakage attacks have been shown to be more successful than power analysis attacks on chicards. If proper protections are not in place on the spacecraft, the circuitry is exposed and hence leads to stronger emanations of EM radiations. If the circuitry is exposed, it provides an easier environment to study the electromagnetic emanations from each individual component. | |
| EXF-0002.03 | Traffic Analysis Attacks | In a terrestrial environment, threat actors use traffic analysis attacks to analyze traffic flow to gather topological information. This traffic flow can divulge information about critical nodes, such as the aggregator node in a sensor network. In the space environment, specifically with relays and constellations, traffic analysis can be used to understand the energy capacity of spacecraft node and the fact that the transceiver component of a spacecraft node consumes the most power. The spacecraft nodes in a constellation network limit the use of the transceiver to transmit or receive information either at a regulated time interval or only when an event has been detected. This generally results in an architecture comprising some aggregator spacecraft nodes within a constellation network. These spacecraft aggregator nodes are the sensor nodes whose primary purpose is to relay transmissions from nodes toward the ground station in an efficient manner, instead of monitoring events like a normal node. The added functionality of acting as a hub for information gathering and preprocessing before relaying makes aggregator nodes an attractive target to side channel attacks. A possible side channel attack could be as simple as monitoring the occurrences and duration of computing activities at an aggregator node. If a node is frequently in active states (instead of idle states), there is high probability that the node is an aggregator node and also there is a high probability that the communication with the node is valid. Such leakage of information is highly undesirable because the leaked information could be strategically used by threat actors in the accumulation phase of an attack. | |
| EXF-0004 | Out-of-Band Communications Link | Threat actors may attempt to exfiltrate data via the out-of-band communication channels. While performing eavesdropping on the primary/second uplinks and downlinks is a method for exfiltration, some space vehicles leverage out-of-band communication links to perform actions on the space vehicle (i.e., re-keying). These out-of-band links would occur on completely different channels/frequencies and often operate on separate hardware on the space vehicle. Typically these out-of-band links have limited built-for-purpose functionality and likely do not present an initial access vector but they do provide ample exfiltration opportunity. | |
| EXF-0006 | Modify Communications Configuration | Threat actors can manipulate communications equipment, modifying the existing software, hardware, or the transponder configuration to exfiltrate data via unintentional channels the mission has no control over. | |
| EXF-0006.01 | Software Defined Radio | Threat actors may target software defined radios due to their software nature to setup exfiltration channels. Since SDRs are programmable, when combined with supply chain or development environment attacks, SDRs provide a pathway to setup covert exfiltration channels for a threat actor. | |
| EXF-0006.02 | Transponder | Threat actors may change the transponder configuration to exfiltrate data via radio access to an attacker-controlled asset. | |
| EXF-0007 | Compromised Ground System | Threat actors may compromise target owned ground systems that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. These ground systems have already been configured for communications to the victim spacecraft. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute an operation. Threat actors may utilize these systems for various tasks, including Execution and Exfiltration. | |
| EXF-0008 | Compromised Developer Site | Threat actors may compromise development environments located within the ground system or a developer/partner site. This attack can take place in a number of different ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulating environment variables, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one. This technique is usually performed before the target spacecraft is in orbit, with the hopes of adding malicious code to the actual FSW during the development process. | |
| EXF-0009 | Compromised Partner Site | Threat actors may compromise access to partner sites that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. These sites are typically configured for communications to the primary ground station(s) or in some cases the spacecraft itself. Unlike mission operated ground systems, partner sites may provide an easier target for threat actors depending on the company, roles and responsibilities, and interests of the third-party. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute an operation. Threat actors may utilize these systems for various tasks, including Execution and Exfiltration. | |
| EXF-0010 | Payload Communication Channel | Threat actors can deploy malicious software on the payload(s) which can send data through the payload channel. Payloads often have their own communication channels outside of the main TT&C pathway which presents an opportunity for exfiltration of payload data or other spacecraft data depending on the interface and data exchange. | |