| RD-0001 |
Acquire Infrastructure |
Threat actors may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for threat actors to connect to and communicate with target spacecraft. Infrastructure can include: |
|
RD-0001.01 |
Ground Station Equipment |
Threat actors will likely need to acquire the following types of equipment to establish ground-to-space communications:
Antenna positioners: which also usually come with satellite tracking antenna systems, in order to accurately send and receive signals along several different bands. This infrastructure is useful in pinpointing the location of a spacecraft in the sky.
Ground antennas: in order to send commands and receive telemetry from the victim spacecraft. Threat actors can utilize these antennas in relation to other tactics such as execution and exfiltration. Instead of compromising a third-part ground station, threat actors may opt to configure and run their own antennas in support of operations.
Ground data processors: in order to convert RF signals to TCP packets. This equipment is utilized in ground stations to convert the telemetry into human readable format.
Ground radio modems: in order to convert TCP packs to RF signals. This equipment is utilized in ground stations to convert commands into RF signals in order to send them to orbiting spacecraft.
Signal generator: in order to configure amplitude, frequency, and apply modulations to the signal.
Additional examples of equipment include couplers, attenuators, power dividers, diplexers, low noise amplifiers, high power amplifiers, filters, mixers, spectrum analyzers, etc. |
|
RD-0001.02 |
Commercial Ground Station Services |
Threat actors may buy or rent commercial ground station services. These services often have all of the individual parts that are needed to properly communicate with spacecrafts. By utilizing existing infrastructure, threat actors may save time, money, and effort in order to support operations. |
|
RD-0001.03 |
Spacecraft |
Threat actors may acquire their own spacecraft that has the capability to maneuver within close proximity to a target spacecraft. Since many of the commercial and military assets in space are tracked, and that information is publicly available, attackers can identify the location of space assets to infer the best positioning for intersecting orbits. Proximity operations support avoidance of the larger attenuation that would otherwise affect the signal when propagating long distances, or environmental circumstances that may present interference. |
|
RD-0001.04 |
Launch Facility |
Threat actors may need to acquire a launch facility, which is a specialized location designed for launching spacecraft and rockets into space. These facilities typically include launch pads, control centers, and assembly buildings, and are often located near bodies of water or in remote areas to minimize potential safety hazards and provide enough room for rocket launches. Launch facilities can be operated by the military, national space agencies such as NASA in the United States or Roscosmos in Russia, or by private companies such as SpaceX or Blue Origin. |
| RD-0002 |
Compromise Infrastructure |
Threat actors may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. Infrastructure solutions include physical devices such as antenna, amplifiers, and convertors, as well as software used by satellite communicators. Instead of buying or renting infrastructure, a threat actor may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the campaign's lifecycle. |
|
RD-0002.03 |
3rd-Party Spacecraft |
Threat actors may compromise a 3rd-party spacecraft that has the capability to maneuver within close proximity to a target spacecraft. This technique enables historically lower-tier attackers the same capability as top tier nation-state actors without the initial development cost. Additionally, this technique complicates attribution of an attack. Since many of the commercial and military assets in space are tracked, and that information is publicly available, attackers can identify the location of space assets to infer the best positioning for intersecting orbits. Proximity operations support avoidance of the larger attenuation that would otherwise affect the signal when propagating long distances, or environmental circumstances that may present interference. Further, the compromised spacecraft may posses the capability to grapple target spacecraft once it has established the appropriate space rendezvous. If from a proximity / rendezvous perspective a threat actor has the ability to connect via docking interface or expose testing (i.e., JTAG port) once it has grappled the target spacecraft, they could perform various attacks depending on the access enabled via the physical connection. |
| RD-0003 |
Obtain Cyber Capabilities |
Threat actors may buy and/or steal cyber capabilities that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, threat actors may purchase, download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software, exploits, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Threat actors may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the campaign lifecycle. |
|
RD-0003.01 |
Exploit/Payload |
Threat actors may buy, steal, or download exploits and payloads that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. An exploit/payload takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on the victim spacecraft's hardware, software, and/or subsystems. Rather than develop their own, threat actors may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors. |
|
RD-0003.02 |
Cryptographic Keys |
Threat actors may obtain encryption keys as they are used for the main commanding of the target spacecraft or any of its subsystems/payloads. Once obtained, threat actors may use any number of means to command the spacecraft without needing to go through a legitimate channel. These keys may be obtained through reconnaissance of the ground system or retrieved from the victim spacecraft. |
| RD-0005 |
Obtain Non-Cyber Capabilities |
Threat actors may obtain non-cyber capabilities, primarily physical counterspace weapons or systems. These counterspace capabilities vary significantly in the types of effects they create, the level of technological sophistication required, and the level of resources needed to develop and deploy them. These diverse capabilities also differ in how they are employed and how easy they are to detect and attribute and the permanence of the effects they have on their target.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
RD-0005.01 |
Launch Services |
Threat actors may acquire launch capabilities through their own development or through space launch service providers (companies or organizations that specialize in launching payloads into space). Space launch service providers typically offer a range of services, including launch vehicle design, development, and manufacturing as well as payload integration and testing. These services are critical to the success of any space mission and require specialized expertise, advanced technology, and extensive infrastructure. |
|
RD-0005.02 |
Non-Kinetic Physical ASAT |
A non-kinetic physical ASAT attack is when a satellite is physically damaged without any direct contact. Non-kinetic physical attacks can be characterized into a few types: electromagnetic pulses, high-powered lasers, and high-powered microwaves. These attacks have medium possible attribution levels and often provide little evidence of success to the attacker.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
RD-0005.03 |
Kinetic Physical ASAT |
Kinetic physical ASAT attacks attempt to damage or destroy space- or land-based space assets. They typically are organized into three categories: direct-ascent, co-orbital, and ground station attacks. The nature of these attacks makes them easier to attribute and allow for better confirmation of success on the part of the attacker. *
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
RD-0005.04 |
Electronic ASAT |
Rather than attempting to damage the physical components of space systems, electronic ASAT attacks target the means by which space systems transmit and receive data. Both jamming and spoofing are forms of electronic attack that can be difficult to attribute and only have temporary effects.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
| RD-0004 |
Stage Capabilities |
Threat actors may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. To support their operations, a threat actor may need to develop their own capabilities or obtain them in some way in order to stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased or rented by the threat actor or was otherwise compromised by them. |
|
RD-0004.01 |
Identify/Select Delivery Mechanism |
Threat actors may identify, select, and prepare a delivery mechanism in which to attack the space system (i.e., communicate with the victim spacecraft, deny the ground, etc.) to achieve their desired impact. This mechanism may be located on infrastructure that was previously purchased or rented by the threat actor or was otherwise compromised by them. The mechanism must include all aspects needed to communicate with the victim spacecraft, including ground antenna, converters, and amplifiers. |
|
RD-0004.02 |
Upload Exploit/Payload |
Threat actors may upload exploits and payloads to a third-party infrastructure that they have purchased or rented or stage it on an otherwise compromised ground station. Exploits and payloads would include files and commands to be uploaded to the victim spacecraft in order to conduct the threat actor's attack. |
| IA-0001 |
Compromise Supply Chain |
Threat actors may manipulate or compromise products or product delivery mechanisms before the customer receives them in order to achieve data or system compromise. |
|
IA-0001.02 |
Software Supply Chain |
Threat actors may manipulate software binaries and applications prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. This attack can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulation of the update and/or distribution mechanism, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one. |
|
IA-0001.03 |
Hardware Supply Chain |
Threat actors may manipulate hardware components in the victim spacecraft prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. The threat actor can insert backdoors and give them a high level of control over the system when they modify the hardware or firmware in the supply chain. This would include ASIC and FPGA devices as well. A spacecraft component can also be damaged if a specific HW component, built to fail after a specific period, or counterfeit with a low reliability, breaks out. |
| IA-0004 |
Secondary/Backup Communication Channel |
Threat actors may compromise alternative communication pathways which may not be as protected as the primary pathway. Depending on implementation the contingency communication pathways/solutions may lack the same level of security (i.e., physical security, encryption, authentication, etc.) which if forced to use could provide a threat actor an opportunity to launch attacks. Typically these would have to be coupled with other denial of service techniques on the primary pathway to force usage of secondary pathways. |
|
IA-0004.02 |
Receiver |
Threat actors may target the backup/secondary receiver on the spacecraft as a method to inject malicious communications into the mission. The secondary receivers may come from different supply chains than the primary which could have different level of security and weaknesses. Similar to the ground station, the communication through the secondary receiver could be forced or happening naturally. |
| IA-0008 |
Rogue External Entity |
Threat actors may gain access to a victim spacecraft through the use of a rogue external entity. With this technique, the threat actor does not need access to a legitimate ground station or communication site. |
|
IA-0008.03 |
ASAT/Counterspace Weapon |
Threat actors may utilize counterspace platforms to access/impact spacecraft. These counterspace capabilities vary significantly in the types of effects they create, the level of technological sophistication required, and the level of resources needed to develop and deploy them. These diverse capabilities also differ in how they are employed and how easy they are to detect and attribute and the permanence of the effects they have on their target.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
| EX-0016 |
Jamming |
Jamming is an electronic attack that uses radio frequency signals to interfere with communications. A jammer must operate in the same frequency band and within the field of view of the antenna it is targeting. Unlike physical attacks, jamming is completely reversible—once the jammer is disengaged, communications can be restored. Attribution of jamming can be tough because the source can be small and highly mobile, and users operating on the wrong frequency or pointed at the wrong satellite can jam friendly communications.* Similiar to intentional jamming, accidential jamming can cause temporary signal degradation. Accidental jamming refers to unintentional interference with communication signals, and it can potentially impact spacecraft in various ways, depending on the severity, frequency, and duration of the interference.
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0016.01 |
Uplink Jamming |
An uplink jammer is used to interfere with signals going up to a satellite by creating enough noise that the satellite cannot distinguish between the real signal and the noise. Uplink jamming of the control link, for example, can prevent satellite operators from sending commands to a satellite. However, because the uplink jammer must be within the field of view of the antenna on the satellite receiving the command link, the jammer must be physically located within the vicinity of the command station on the ground.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0016.02 |
Downlink Jamming |
Downlink jammers target the users of a satellite by creating noise in the same frequency as the downlink signal from the satellite. A downlink jammer only needs to be as powerful as the signal being received on the ground and must be within the field of view of the receiving terminal’s antenna. This limits the number of users that can be affected by a single jammer. Since many ground terminals use directional antennas pointed at the sky, a downlink jammer typically needs to be located above the terminal it is attempting to jam. This limitation can be overcome by employing a downlink jammer on an air or space-based platform, which positions the jammer between the terminal and the satellite. This also allows the jammer to cover a wider area and potentially affect more users. Ground terminals with omnidirectional antennas, such as many GPS receivers, have a wider field of view and thus are more susceptible to downlink jamming from different angles on the ground.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0016.03 |
Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) |
Threat actors may attempt to jam Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals (i.e. GPS, Galileo, etc.) to inhibit a spacecraft's position, navigation, and/or timing functions. |
| EX-0014 |
Spoofing |
Threat actors may attempt to spoof the various sensor and controller data that is depended upon by various subsystems within the victim spacecraft. Subsystems rely on this data to perform automated tasks, process gather data, and return important information to the ground controllers. By spoofing this information, threat actors could trigger automated tasks to fire when they are not needed to, potentially causing the spacecraft to behave erratically. Further, the data could be processed erroneously, causing ground controllers to receive incorrect telemetry or scientific data, threatening the spacecraft's reliability and integrity. |
|
EX-0014.05 |
Ballistic Missile Spoof |
Threat actors may launch decoys designed to spoof ballistic missile signatures in order to deceive missile defense systems into launching interceptors. Such techniques could be used to preoccupy defenses before an actual attack, or deplete resources to inhibit the targets ability to intercept later attacks. |
| EX-0017 |
Kinetic Physical Attack |
Kinetic physical attacks attempt to damage or destroy space- or land-based space assets. They typically are organized into three categories: direct-ascent, co-orbital, and ground station attacks [beyond the focus of SPARTA at this time]. The nature of these attacks makes them easier to attribute and allow for better confirmation of success on the part of the attacker.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0017.01 |
Direct Ascent ASAT |
A direct-ascent ASAT is often the most commonly thought of threat to space assets. It typically involves a medium- or long-range missile launching from the Earth to damage or destroy a satellite in orbit. This form of attack is often easily attributed due to the missile launch which can be easily detected. Due to the physical nature of the attacks, they are irreversible and provide the attacker with near real-time confirmation of success. Direct-ascent ASATs create orbital debris which can be harmful to other objects in orbit. Lower altitudes allow for more debris to burn up in the atmosphere, while attacks at higher altitudes result in more debris remaining in orbit, potentially damaging other spacecraft in orbit.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0017.02 |
Co-Orbital ASAT |
Co-orbital ASAT attacks are when another satellite in orbit is used to attack. The attacking satellite is first placed into orbit, then later maneuvered into an intercepting orbit. This form of attack requires a sophisticated on-board guidance system to successfully steer into the path of another satellite. A co-orbital attack can be a simple space mine with a small explosive that follows the orbital path of the targeted satellite and detonates when within range. Another co-orbital attack strategy is using a kinetic-kill vehicle (KKV), which is any object that can be collided into a target satellite.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
| EX-0018 |
Non-Kinetic Physical Attack |
A non-kinetic physical attack is when a satellite is physically damaged without any direct contact. Non-kinetic physical attacks can be characterized into a few types: electromagnetic pulses, high-powered lasers, and high-powered microwaves. These attacks have medium possible attribution levels and often provide little evidence of success to the attacker.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0018.01 |
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) |
An EMP, such as those caused by high-altitude detonation of certain bombs, is an indiscriminate form of attack in space. For example, a nuclear detonation in space releases an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would have near immediate consequences for the satellites within range. The detonation also creates a high radiation environment that accelerates the degradation of satellite components in the affected orbits.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0018.02 |
High-Powered Laser |
A high-powered laser can be used to permanently or temporarily damage critical satellite components (i.e. solar arrays or optical centers). If directed toward a satellite’s optical center, the attack is known as blinding or dazzling. Blinding, as the name suggests, causes permanent damage to the optics of a satellite. Dazzling causes temporary loss of sight for the satellite. While there is clear attribution of the location of the laser at the time of the attack, the lasers used in these attacks may be mobile, which can make attribution to a specific actor more difficult because the attacker does not have to be in their own nation, or even continent, to conduct such an attack. Only the satellite operator will know if the attack is successful, meaning the attacker has limited confirmation of success, as an attacked nation may not choose to announce that their satellite has been attacked or left vulnerable for strategic reasons. A high-powered laser attack can also leave the targeted satellite disabled and uncontrollable, which could lead to collateral damage if the satellite begins to drift. A higher-powered laser may permanently damage a satellite by overheating its parts. The parts most susceptible to this are satellite structures, thermal control panels, and solar panels.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
|
EX-0018.03 |
High-Powered Microwave |
High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can be used to disrupt or destroy a satellite’s electronics. A “front-door” HPM attack uses a satellite’s own antennas as an entry path, while a “back-door” attack attempts to enter through small seams or gaps around electrical connections and shielding. A front-door attack is more straightforward to carry out, provided the HPM is positioned within the field of view of the antenna that it is using as a pathway, but it can be thwarted if the satellite uses circuits designed to detect and block surges of energy entering through the antenna. In contrast, a back-door attack is more challenging, because it must exploit design or manufacturing flaws, but it can be conducted from many angles relative to the satellite. Both types of attacks can be either reversible or irreversible; however, the attacker may not be able to control the severity of the damage from the attack. Both front-door and back-door HPM attacks can be difficult to attribute to an attacker, and like a laser weapon, the attacker may not know if the attack has been successful. A HPM attack may leave the target satellite disabled and uncontrollable which can cause it to drift into other satellites, creating further collateral damage.*
*https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 |
| PER-0002 |
Backdoor |
Threat actors may find and target various backdoors, or inject their own, within the victim spacecraft in the hopes of maintaining their attack. |
|
PER-0002.01 |
Hardware |
Threat actors may find and target various hardware backdoors within the victim spacecraft in the hopes of maintaining their attack. Once in orbit, mitigating the risk of various hardware backdoors becomes increasingly difficult for ground controllers. By targeting these specific vulnerabilities, threat actors are more likely to remain persistent on the victim spacecraft and perpetuate further attacks. |
|
PER-0002.02 |
Software |
Threat actors may inject code to create their own backdoor to establish persistent access to the spacecraft. This may be done through modification of code throughout the software supply chain or through modification of the software-defined radio configuration (if applicable). |
| DE-0009 |
Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys (CCD) |
This technique deals with the more physical aspects of CCD that may be utilized by threat actors. There are numerous ways a threat actor may utilize the physical operating environment to their advantage, including powering down and laying dormant within debris fields as well as launching EMI attacks during space-weather events. |
|
DE-0009.03 |
Trigger Premature Intercept |
Threat actors may utilize decoy technology to disrupt detection and interception systems and deplete resources that might otherwise prevent an actual attack taking place simultaneously or shortly after the decoy is deployed. |