Threat actors may interact with the victim SV by replaying captured commands to the SV. While not necessarily malicious in nature, replayed commands can be used to overload the target SV and cause it's onboard systems to crash, perform a DoS attack, or monitor various responses by the SV. If critical commands are captured and replayed, thruster fires, then the impact could impact the SV's attitude control/orbit.
| ID | Name | Description | NIST Rev5 | D3FEND | ISO 27001 | |
| CM0002 | COMSEC | Utilizing secure communication protocols with strong cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of, and detect changes to, information during transmission. Systems should also maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception. Spacecraft should not employ a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled (i.e., crypto-bypass mode). The cryptographic mechanisms should identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters. | AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18(1) AC-2(11) AC-3(10) IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(7) IA-7 SA-8(18) SA-9(6) SC-10 SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-13 SC-16(3) SC-28(1) SC-28(3) SC-7 SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-19(4) | A.8.16 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.20 A.8.24 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 A.5.33 A.8.11 | ||
| CM0031 | Authentication | Authenticate all communication sessions (crosslink and ground stations) for all commands before establishing remote connections using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based. Adding authentication on the spacecraft bus and communications on-board the spacecraft is also recommended. | AC-17(10) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18(1) IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-4(9) IA-7 SA-8(15) SA-8(9) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-7(11) SI-14(3) | A.5.16 | ||
| CM0033 | Relay Protection | Implement relay and replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for establishing a remote connection or connections on the spacecraft bus. | AC-17(10) AC-17(10) IA-2(8) IA-3 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-7 SC-13 SC-23 SC-7 SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SI-10 SI-10(5) SI-10(6) | A.5.16 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 | ||
| CM0036 | Session Termination | Terminate the connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after an acceptable amount of inactivity which is established via the concept of operations. | AC-12 SC-10 SI-14(3) | A.8.20 | ||
| CM0055 | Secure Command Mode(s) | Provide additional protection modes for commanding the spacecraft. These can be where the spacecraft will restrict command lock based on geographic location of ground stations, special operational modes within the flight software, or even temporal controls where the spacecraft will only accept commands during certain times. | AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-2(11) AC-2(12) AC-3 AC-3(2) AC-3(3) AC-3(4) AC-3(8) CA-3(7) SC-7 | A.8.16 A.5.15 A.5.33 A.8.3 A.8.4 A.8.18 A.8.20 A.8.2 A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 | ||
| CM0034 | Monitor Critical Telemetry Points | Monitor defined telemetry points for malicious activities (i.e., jamming attempts, commanding attempts (e.g., command modes, counters, etc.)). This would include valid/processed commands as well as commands that were rejected. Telemetry monitoring should synchronize with ground-based Defensive Cyber Operations (i.e., SIEM/auditing) to create a full space system situation awareness from a cybersecurity perspective. | AC-17(1) AU-3(1) CA-7(6) IR-4(14) SC-7 | A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 | ||
| CM0032 | On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention | Utilize on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems and audit/logs actions. The IDS/IPS should have the capability to respond to threats and it should address signature-based attacks along with dynamic never-before seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies. The IDS/IPS must integrate with traditional fault management to provide a wholistic approach to faults on-board the spacecraft. Spacecraft should select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber-attacks. These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker — with or without ground support. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system. | AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-5 IR-5(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5(3) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-4 SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(16) SI-4(2) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) | A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 | ||
| CM0029 | TRANSEC | Utilize TRANSEC to secure data transmissions from being infiltrated, exploited, or intercepted. | AC-18(5) CP-8 SC-40 SC-40(1) SC-40(3) SC-40(4) SC-8(4) | A.5.29 A.7.11 | ||