Rogue External Entity

Threat actors may gain access to a victim spacecraft through the use of a rogue external entity. With this technique, the threat actor does not need access to a legitimate ground station or communication site.

ID: IA-0008
Related Aerospace Threat IDs:  SV-AC-1 SV-AC-2 SV-IT-1 SV-CF-2
Related MITRE ATT&CK TTPs:  T1133
Tactic:
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2023/04/22

Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0002 COMSEC A component of cybersecurity to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications. COMSEC includes cryptographic security, transmission security, emissions security, and physical security of COMSEC material. It is imperative to utilize secure communication protocols with strong cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of, and detect changes to, information during transmission. Systems should also maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception. Spacecraft should not employ a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled (i.e., crypto-bypass mode). The cryptographic mechanisms should identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters. AC-17 AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18 AC-18(1) AC-2(11) AC-3(10) CA-3 IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(7) IA-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(18) SA-9(6) SC-10 SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-13 SC-16(3) SC-28(1) SC-28(3) SC-7 SC-7(10) SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SC-7(5) SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-19(4) SI-3(8) A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.12 A.5.33 A.8.20 A.8.24 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 A.5.33 A.8.11
CM0030 Crypto Key Management Leverage best practices for crypto key management as defined by organization like NIST or the National Security Agency. Leverage only approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria. Encryption key handling should be performed outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography. Encryption keys should be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands. PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-9(6) SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-28(3) SC-8(1) A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 A.8.24
CM0033 Relay Protection Implement relay and replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for establishing a remote connection or connections on the spacecraft bus. AC-17(10) AC-17(10) IA-2(8) IA-3 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-7 SC-13 SC-23 SC-7 SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SI-10 SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-3(8) A.5.16 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31
CM0055 Secure Command Mode(s) Provide additional protection modes for commanding the spacecraft. These can be where the spacecraft will restrict command lock based on geographic location of ground stations, special operational modes within the flight software, or even temporal controls where the spacecraft will only accept commands during certain times. AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-2(11) AC-2(12) AC-3 AC-3(2) AC-3(3) AC-3(4) AC-3(8) CA-3(7) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-8 SC-7 SI-3(8) A.8.16 A.5.15 A.5.33 A.8.3 A.8.4 A.8.18 A.8.20 A.8.2 A.8.16 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26
CM0034 Monitor Critical Telemetry Points Monitor defined telemetry points for malicious activities (i.e., jamming attempts, commanding attempts (e.g., command modes, counters, etc.)). This would include valid/processed commands as well as commands that were rejected. Telemetry monitoring should synchronize with ground-based Defensive Cyber Operations (i.e., SIEM/auditing) to create a full space system situation awareness from a cybersecurity perspective. AC-17(1) AU-3(1) CA-7(6) IR-4(14) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(13) SC-16 SC-7 SI-3(8) A.8.16 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26
CM0032 On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention Utilize on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems and audit/logs actions. The IDS/IPS should have the capability to respond to threats (initial access, execution, persistence, evasion, exfiltration, etc.) and it should address signature-based attacks along with dynamic never-before seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies. The IDS/IPS must integrate with traditional fault management to provide a wholistic approach to faults on-board the spacecraft. Spacecraft should select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber-attacks.  These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker — with or without ground support. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system. AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16
CM0029 TRANSEC Utilize TRANSEC in order to prevent interception, disruption of reception, communications deception, and/or derivation of intelligence by analysis of transmission characteristics such as signal parameters or message externals. For example, jam-resistant waveforms can be utilized to improve the resistance of radio frequency signals to jamming and spoofing. Note: TRANSEC is that field of COMSEC which deals with the security of communication transmissions, rather than that of the information being communicated. AC-17 AC-18 AC-18(5) CA-3 CP-8 PL-8 PL-8(1) SC-16 SC-40 SC-40(1) SC-40(3) SC-40(4) SC-5 SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SC-8(4) A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.29 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.33

Indicators of Behavior

ID Name Description STIX Pattern
UACE-3 Legitimate Command with Malicious Parameters Targeting Subsystems A legitimate command is sent, but with parameters that exceed safe thresholds for a subsystem or component on the spacecraft. This could include commands that affect critical subsystems like power distribution, attitude control, or thermal regulation, potentially leading to damage, instability, or malfunction. The misuse of valid parameters across different subsystems can result in severe operational impact or hardware degradation. [x-opencti-command-log:command_type = 'legitimate_command' AND x-opencti-command-log:target_subsystem != 'expected_subsystem' AND x-opencti-command-log:parameter_value > 'safe_threshold']
UACE-4 Unexpected Legitimate Command Sent A legitimate command sent to the spacecraft at an unexpected or inappropriate time, potentially causing disruption to normal operations. This could potentially lead to impacting system availability. This could involve commands such as executing an orbit adjustment or resource-intensive task outside of planned windows, thereby affecting the mission's overall availability or operational efficiency. [x-opencti-command-log:command_type = 'legitimate_command' AND x-opencti-command-log:timestamp != 'expected_time']
UACE-5 Unexpected counter increment (valid or invalid count) Flight software command counter increments without corresponding legitimate ground station action, resulting in a failure of condition #2) below and subsequent 'unexpected' value 'expected' value achieved when the following conditions are met: 1) flight software command counter increments; 2) legitimate ground station action created increment. This could be from valid or invalid commands. Typically there are valid and malformed command counters on a spacecraft. [x-opencti-command-counter:value = 'unexpected']
UACE-6 Unauthorized Commands Issued from Unrecognized Ground Station Detection of control commands issued to the spacecraft from an unrecognized or unauthorized ground station, potentially indicating that a rogue ground station is attempting to take control of the spacecraft. [x-opencti-command-log:command_origin != 'authorized_ground_station' AND x-opencti-command-log:command_type = 'control']
UACE-8 Anomalous Command Packet Signatures Command packets with invalid or anomalous signatures detected, potentially indicating spoofing or replay of older commands. Command signatures for spacecraft provide a way to verify the authenticity and integrity of commands sent to the spacecraft, ensuring they have not been tampered with during transmission. The signature could be a form of sequence numbers, hashing, or just digital signatures in general. [x-opencti-command-log:signature != 'expected_signature']
UCEB-1 Repeated Use of Cryptographic Keys from Unusual Locations Detection of cryptographic keys being used repeatedly from unexpected or unauthorized locations, indicating potential misuse of valid cryptographic credentials to maintain persistent access to spacecraft systems. [x-opencti-cryptographic-key:usage_location != 'authorized_locations' AND x-opencti-cryptographic-key:use_count > 'threshold']
UCEB-2 Use of Old or Rotated Cryptographic Keys for Authentication Detection of authentication attempts using cryptographic keys that have already been rotated or marked as no longer valid. This may indicate that threat actors are using old or compromised keys to try to access to spacecraft or C2 systems. [x-opencti-cryptographic-key:status = 'rotated or expired']
UCEB-11 Use of Account or Cryptographic Keys at Unexpected Times Detection of a user account or cryptographic key being used outside of the expected operational time windows. This may indicate unauthorized or suspicious activity, such as a threat actor using valid credentials or cryptographic keys to gain or maintain persistent access to the spacecraft or related systems. [user-account:last_login_time != 'expected_operational_hours' OR x-opencti-cryptographic-key:usage_time != 'expected_usage_time']
CSNE-1 Unexpected Ground Station IP Address in Communication Detection of network traffic originating from an unauthorized IP address that does not match any of the known or authorized ground station IPs, potentially indicating communication with a rogue ground station. The source IPs that are permitted to speak to the spacecraft should be very limited. Rogue devices may get deployed internal to mission operations networks in an attempt to communicate to the spacecraft. [network-traffic:src_ref.value != 'authorized_ground_station_ip' AND network-traffic:protocols[*] = 'satellite_communication']
CSNE-6 Unexpected Communication Protocols in Uplink Detection of unexpected communication protocols in the uplink traffic from a ground station or any rogue device (i.e., spacecraft), indicating that someone may be using non-standard protocols to communicate with the spacecraft. [network-traffic:protocols[*] != 'expected_protocol' AND network-traffic:direction = 'uplink']
ARFS-1 Authentication Process Tampering Detection of modifications to the authentication process, which may signal unauthorized changes by a threat actor seeking access to a spacecraft. Potential modifications include tampering with encryption keys or authentication tokens. Additionally, irregularities in sequence counters, such as receiving packets out of sequence, may indicate an adversary's attempt to align with the spacecraft's authentication or sequencing protocols. [x-opencti-system-log:authentication_process_modification = 'TRUE']
ARFS-2 Anomalous Authentication Attempts Repeated failed authentication attempts detected, potentially indicating an attempt to bypass the authentication process. [x-opencti-authentication-log:attempts > 'threshold' AND x-opencti-authentication-log:result = 'failure']
ARFS-3 Invalid RF Command Lock A signal source detected in the ocean between authorized ground stations resulted in a failure, leading to an 'invalid' classification. A signal is classified as 'valid' when the following conditions are met: the transponder operates at the correct frequency and power level, all signal characteristics align with expected parameters, and command lock is achieved, the signal originates from an authorized and expected location. [x-opencti-signal_char:value = 'invalid']
ARFS-9 Safe-Mode Activation Due to Signal Jamming Monitors RF noise levels in GNSS or uplink bands that exceed expected thresholds, leading to safe-mode activation. This could indicate deliberate signal jamming aimed at exploiting reduced protections in safe-mode. Entering safe mode does not necessarily indicate jamming of commanding has occurred, as some spacecraft enter safe-mode after expected communication contacts with the ground are missed. [x-opencti-rf-sensor:frequency_band IN ('gnss_band','uplink_band') AND x-opencti-rf-sensor:noise_level > 'maximum_threshold' AND x-opencti-spacecraft-status:mode = 'safe-mode']
ARFS-12 Rejection of CLTU BIND Due to Tampered/Invalid Credentials Detects that the SLE Provider rejected the CLTU BIND request due to tampered or failed credentials, leading to a termination of the connection. This IOC specifically detects the rejection of the CLTU BIND request due to credential tampering/invalid credentials. It explicitly identifies that the BIND request was rejected because the credentials were invalid or tampered with, which leads to the termination of the connection. This is a more focused detection that ties directly to the modification of credentials, which results in the rejection of the CLTU BIND request by the SLE Provider. [x-opencti-command-log:command = 'CLTU-BIND' AND x-opencti-command-log:status = 'rejected' AND x-opencti-command-log:reason = 'invalid_credentials']