Memory Compromise

Threat actors may manipulate memory (boot, RAM, etc.) in order for their malicious code and/or commands to remain on the victim SV. The SV may have mechanisms that allow for the automatic running of programs on system reboot, entering or returning to/from safe mode, or during specific events. Threat actors may target these specific memory locations in order to store their malicious code or file, ensuring that the attack remains on the system even after a reset.

ID: CM0014
Sub-techniques: 
Related Aerospace Threat IDs:  SV-IT-3 SV-SP-4 SV-SP-9
Related MITRE ATT&CK TTPs:  T1495 T1601 T1542 T1553 T1195
Tactic:
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2022/10/19

Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0028 Tamper Protection Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Leverage tamper proof protection where possible when shipping/receiving equipment. CA-8(3) CM-7(9) MA-7 PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SC-51 SR-1 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29
CM0015 Software Source Control Prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code. CM-14 CM-7(8)
CM0018 Dynamic Analysis Employ dynamic analysis (e.g., using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code). Testing should occur (1) on potential system elements before acceptance; (2) as a realistic simulation of known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes. CA-8 CP-4(5) RA-5(11) SA-11(5) SA-11(8) SA-11(9) SC-2(2) SC-7(29) SR-6(1) SR-6(1)
CM0021 Software Digital Signature Prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the mission. CM-11(3) CM-14 CM-14 SA-10(1) SI-7 SI-7(12)
CM0023 Configuration Management Use automated mechanisms to maintain and validate baseline configuration to ensure the spacecraft's is up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available. CM-11(3) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) MA-7 SA-10 SA-10(7) SR-11(2) A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.28 A.8.30 A.8.32
CM0032 On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention Utilize on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems and audit/logs actions. The IDS/IPS should have the capability to respond to threats and it should address signature-based attacks along with dynamic never-before seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies. The IDS/IPS must integrate with traditional fault management to provide a wholistic approach to faults on-board the spacecraft. Spacecraft should select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber-attacks.  These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker — with or without ground support. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system. AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-5 IR-5(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5(3) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-4 SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(16) SI-4(2) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16
CM0044 Cyber-safe Mode Provide the capability to enter the spacecraft into a configuration-controlled and integrity-protected state representing a known, operational cyber-safe state (e.g., cyber-safe mode). Spacecraft should enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected.   Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode, authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and software functions to pre-attack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on equipment still available after a cyber-attack. The goal is for the spacecraft to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved. Cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.                                                  CP-10 CP-10(4) CP-12 CP-2(5) IR-4 IR-4(12) IR-4(3) SA-8(21) SA-8(23) SA-8(24) SC-16(2) SC-24 SI-11 SI-17 SI-7(17) A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27
CM0014 Secure boot Software/Firmware must verify a trust chain that extends through the hardware root of trust, boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order. The trusted boot/RoT computing module should be implemented on radiation tolerant burn-in (non-programmable) equipment.  SC-51 SI-7(9)

References