SV-SP-4

General supply chain interruption or manipulation

ID: SV-SP-4

DiD Layer: Prevention

CAPEC #: 438 | 441 | 444 | 544

NIST Rev5 Control Tag Mapping: CM-3 | CM-3(8) | CM-7 | CM-7(8) | CM-7(9) | CM-14 | CP-2 | CP-2(8) | PL-8 | PL-8(2) | PM-30 | PM-30(1) | RA-3 | RA-3(1) | RA-3(2) | RA-9 | RA-10 | SA-3 | SA-3(1) | SA-8 | SA-8(9) | SA-10 | SA-10(7) | SA-11 | SA-11(5) | SA-15 | SA-15(3) | SC-38 | SR-1 | SR-2 | SR-2(1) | SR-3 | SR-3(1) | SR-3(2) | SR-3(3) | SR-4 | SR-4(3) | SR-4(4) | SR-5 | SR-5(1) | SR-5(2) | SR-6 | SR-6(1) | SR-7 | SR-8 | SR-9 | SR-9(1) | SR-11 | SR-11(3) | SR-12

Lowest Threat Tier to
Create Threat Event: IV

Notional Risk Rank Score: 21

Informational References

CCSDS Threat Green Book
TOR-2018-02275

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [organization] shall perform penetration testing/analysis: (1) On potential system elements before accepting the system; (2) As a realistic simulation of the active adversary’s known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) Throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CA-8(1),SA-9,SA-11(5),SR-5(2)}	Penetration testing should be performed throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes including: (1) Hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (2) Shipping/handling procedures; (3) Personnel and physical security programs; (4) Configuration management tools/measures to maintain provenance; and (5) Any other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production/distribution of supply chain elements.
The [organization] shall maintain a list of suppliers and potential suppliers used, and the products that they supply to include software.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{CM-10,PL-8(2),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11)}	Ideally you have diversification with suppliers
The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(8),CM-7(9),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-10(3),SA-19,SC-51,SR-4(3),SR-4(4),SR-5(2),SR-11}
The [organization] shall conduct a criticality analysis to identify mission critical functions and critical components and reduce the vulnerability of such functions and components through secure system design.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-MA-4}{CP-2,CP-2(8),PL-7,PM-11,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),RA-9,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(25),SA-12,SA-14,SA-15(3),SC-7(29),SR-1}	During SCRM, criticality analysis will aid in determining supply chain risk. For mission critical functions/components, extra scrutiny must be applied to ensure supply chain is secured.
The [organization] shall report counterfeit information system components to [organization] officials. {SV-SP-4}{IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SA-19,SR-11}
The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)}	* The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers. * All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government.
The [organization] shall request threat analysis of suppliers of critical components and manage access to and control of threat analysis products containing U.S.person information.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-9,SA-12,SR-1}	The intent of this requirement is to address supply chain concerns on hardware and software vendors. Not required for trusted suppliers accredited to the Defense Microelectronic Activity (DMEA). If the Program intends to use a supplier not accredited by DMEA, the government customer should be notified as soon as possible. If the Program has internal processes to vet suppliers, it may meet this requirement. All software used and its origins must be included in the SBOM and be subjected to internal and Government vulnerability scans.
The [organization] shall maintain documentation tracing the strategies, tools, and methods implemented to mitigate supply chain risk .{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-12(1),SR-5}	Examples include: (1) Transferring a portion of the risk to the developer or supplier through the use of contract language and incentives; (2) Using contract language that requires the implementation of SCRM throughout the system lifecycle in applicable contracts and other acquisition and assistance instruments (grants, cooperative agreements, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), and other transactions). Within the DOD some examples include: (a) Language outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook section 13.13. Contracting; (b) Language requiring the use of protected mechanisms to deliver elements and data about elements, processes, and delivery mechanisms; (c) Language that articulates that requirements flow down supply chain tiers to sub-prime suppliers. (3) Incentives for suppliers that: (a) Implement required security safeguards and SCRM best practices; (b) Promote transparency into their organizational processes and security practices; (c) Provide additional vetting of the processes and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information system components, and services; and (d) Implement contract to reduce SC risk down the contract stack. (4) Gaining insight into supplier security practices; (5) Using contract language and incentives to enable more robust risk management later in the lifecycle; (6) Using a centralized intermediary or “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary;
The [organization] shall protect against supply chain threats to the system, system components, or system services by employing security safeguards as defined by NIST SP 800-161 Rev.1.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SI-3,SR-1}	The chosen supply chain safeguards should demonstrably support a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy. Safeguards should include protections for both hardware and software. Program should define their critical components (HW & SW) and identify the supply chain protections, approach/posture/process.
The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures, in coordination with the [CIO], that is demonstrably consistent with the anti-counterfeit policy defined by the Program office.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{SR-11}
The [organization] shall employ [organization]-defined techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the Program supply chain.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-3(2),SC-38}	Examples of security safeguards that the organization should consider implementing to limit the harm from potential adversaries targeting the organizational supply chain, are: (1) Using trusted physical delivery mechanisms that do not permit access to the element during delivery (ship via a protected carrier, use cleared/official couriers, or a diplomatic pouch); (2) Using trusted electronic delivery of products and services (require downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites); (3) Avoiding the purchase of custom configurations, where feasible; (4) Using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to commitments or obligations), where feasible; (5) Using defensive design approaches; (6) Employing system OPSEC principles; (7) Employing a diverse set of suppliers; (8) Employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry; (9) Using a centralized intermediary and “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary Employing inventory management policies and processes; (10) Using flexible agreements during each acquisition and procurement phase so that it is possible to meet emerging needs or requirements to address supply chain risk without requiring complete revision or re-competition of an acquisition or procurement; (11) Using international, national, commercial or government standards to increase potential supply base; (12) Limiting the disclosure of information that can become publicly available; and (13) Minimizing the time between purchase decisions and required delivery.
The [organization] shall employ the [organization]-defined approaches for the purchase of the system, system components, or system services from suppliers.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-5}	This could include tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods.
The [organization] (and Prime Contractor) shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6}
The [organization] shall employ [Selection (one or more): independent third-party analysis, Program penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of [Program-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6(1)}
The [organization] shall employ [Program-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) safeguards] to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-7,SC-38,CP-2(8)}	OPSEC safeguards may include: (1) Limiting the disclosure of information needed to design, develop, test, produce, deliver, and support the element for example, supplier identities, supplier processes, potential suppliers, security requirements, design specifications, testing and evaluation result, and system/component configurations, including the use of direct shipping, blind buys, etc.; (2) Extending supply chain awareness, education, and training for suppliers, intermediate users, and end users; (3) Extending the range of OPSEC tactics, techniques, and procedures to potential suppliers, contracted suppliers, or sub-prime contractor tier of suppliers; and (4) Using centralized support and maintenance services to minimize direct interactions between end users and original suppliers.

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID		Name	Description
RD-0004		Stage Capabilities	Threat actors may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. To support their operations, a threat actor may need to develop their own capabilities or obtain them in some way in order to stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased or rented by the threat actor or was otherwise compromised by them.
	RD-0004.01	Identify/Select Delivery Mechanism	Threat actors may identify, select, and prepare a delivery mechanism in which to attack the space system (i.e., communicate with the victim spacecraft, deny the ground, etc.) to achieve their desired impact. This mechanism may be located on infrastructure that was previously purchased or rented by the threat actor or was otherwise compromised by them. The mechanism must include all aspects needed to communicate with the victim spacecraft, including ground antenna, converters, and amplifiers.
	RD-0004.02	Upload Exploit/Payload	Threat actors may upload exploits and payloads to a third-party infrastructure that they have purchased or rented or stage it on an otherwise compromised ground station. Exploits and payloads would include files and commands to be uploaded to the victim spacecraft in order to conduct the threat actor's attack.
IA-0001		Compromise Supply Chain	Threat actors may manipulate or compromise products or product delivery mechanisms before the customer receives them in order to achieve data or system compromise.
	IA-0001.01	Software Dependencies & Development Tools	Threat actors may manipulate software dependencies (i.e. dependency confusion) and/or development tools prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. Software binaries and applications often depend on external software to function properly. spacecraft developers may use open source projects to help with their creation. These open source projects may be targeted by threat actors as a way to add malicious code to the victim spacecraft's dependencies.
	IA-0001.02	Software Supply Chain	Threat actors may manipulate software binaries and applications prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. This attack can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulation of the update and/or distribution mechanism, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one.
	IA-0001.03	Hardware Supply Chain	Threat actors may manipulate hardware components in the victim spacecraft prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. The threat actor can insert backdoors and give them a high level of control over the system when they modify the hardware or firmware in the supply chain. This would include ASIC and FPGA devices as well.
IA-0006		Compromise Hosted Payload	Threat actors may compromise the target spacecraft hosted payload to initially access and/or persist within the system. Hosted payloads can usually be accessed from the ground via a specific command set. The command pathways can leverage the same ground infrastructure or some host payloads have their own ground infrastructure which can provide an access vector as well. Threat actors may be able to leverage the ability to command hosted payloads to upload files or modify memory addresses in order to compromise the system. Depending on the implementation, hosted payloads may provide some sort of lateral movement potential.
EX-0004		Compromise Boot Memory	Threat actors may manipulate boot memory in order to execute malicious code, bypass internal processes, or DoS the system. This technique can be used to perform other tactics such as Defense Evasion.
PER-0001		Memory Compromise	Threat actors may manipulate memory (boot, RAM, etc.) in order for their malicious code and/or commands to remain on the victim spacecraft. The spacecraft may have mechanisms that allow for the automatic running of programs on system reboot, entering or returning to/from safe mode, or during specific events. Threat actors may target these specific memory locations in order to store their malicious code or file, ensuring that the attack remains on the system even after a reset.
PER-0002		Backdoor	Threat actors may find and target various backdoors, or inject their own, within the victim spacecraft in the hopes of maintaining their attack.
	PER-0002.01	Hardware	Threat actors may find and target various hardware backdoors within the victim spacecraft in the hopes of maintaining their attack. Once in orbit, mitigating the risk of various hardware backdoors becomes increasingly difficult for ground controllers. By targeting these specific vulnerabilities, threat actors are more likely to remain persistent on the victim spacecraft and perpetuate further attacks.
LM-0001		Hosted Payload	Threat actors may use the hosted payload within the victim spacecraft in order to gain access to other subsystems. The hosted payload often has a need to gather and send data to the internal subsystems, depending on its purpose. Threat actors may be able to take advantage of this communication in order to laterally move to the other subsystems and have commands be processed.
IMP-0001		Deception (or Misdirection)	Measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence or information into a system to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests. Threat actors may seek to deceive mission stakeholders (or even military decision makers) for a multitude of reasons. Telemetry values could be modified, attacks could be designed to intentionally mimic another threat actor's TTPs, and even allied ground infrastructure could be compromised and used as the source of communications to the spacecraft.
IMP-0002		Disruption	Measures designed to temporarily impair the use or access to a system for a period of time. Threat actors may seek to disrupt communications from the victim spacecraft to the ground controllers or other interested parties. By disrupting communications during critical times, there is the potential impact of data being lost or critical actions not being performed. This could cause the spacecraft's purpose to be put into jeopardy depending on what communications were lost during the disruption. This behavior is different than Denial as this attack can also attempt to modify the data and messages as they are passed as a way to disrupt communications.
IMP-0003		Denial	Measures designed to temporarily eliminate the use, access, or operation of a system for a period of time, usually without physical damage to the affected system. Threat actors may seek to deny ground controllers and other interested parties access to the victim spacecraft. This would be done exhausting system resource, degrading subsystems, or blocking communications entirely. This behavior is different from Disruption as this seeks to deny communications entirely, rather than stop them for a length of time.
IMP-0004		Degradation	Measures designed to permanently impair (either partially or totally) the use of a system. Threat actors may target various subsystems or the hosted payload in such a way to rapidly increase it's degradation. This could potentially shorten the lifespan of the victim spacecraft.
IMP-0006		Theft	Threat actors may attempt to steal the data that is being gathered, processed, and sent from the victim spacecraft. Many spacecraft have a particular purpose associated with them and the data they gather is deemed mission critical. By attempting to steal this data, the mission, or purpose, of the spacecraft could be lost entirely.

ID	Name	Description	NIST Rev5	D3FEND	ISO 27001
CM0001	Protect Sensitive Information	Organizations should look to identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information (e.g., fault management approach) and apply access control accordingly. Any location (ground system, contractor networks, etc.) storing design information needs to ensure design info is protected from exposure, exfiltration, etc. Space system sensitive information may be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Company Proprietary. Space system sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, CUI, proprietary, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission. Sensitive documentation should only be accessed by personnel with defined roles and a need to know. Well established access controls (roles, encryption at rest and transit, etc.) and data loss prevention (DLP) technology are key countermeasures. The DLP should be configured for the specific data types in question.	AC-3(11) \| AC-4(23) \| AC-4(25) \| AC-4(6) \| CA-3 \| CM-12 \| CM-12(1) \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PM-11 \| PM-17 \| SA-3 \| SA-3(1) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-4(12) \| SA-5 \| SA-8 \| SA-9(7) \| SC-16 \| SC-8(1) \| SC-8(3) \| SI-21 \| SI-23 \| SR-12 \| SR-7	D3-AI \| D3-AVE \| D3-NVA \| D3-CH \| D3-CBAN \| D3-CTS \| D3-PA \| D3-FAPA \| D3-SAOR \|	A.8.4 \| A.8.11 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.21 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.33 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.37 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.22
CM0009	Threat Intelligence Program	A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities and mitigate risk. Leverage all-source intelligence services or commercial satellite imagery to identify and track adversary infrastructure development/acquisition. Countermeasures for this attack fall outside the scope of the mission in the majority of cases.	PM-16 \| PM-16(1) \| PM-16(1) \| RA-10 \| RA-3 \| RA-3(2) \| RA-3(3) \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SR-8	D3-PH \| D3-AH \| D3-NM \| D3-NVA \| D3-SYSM \| D3-SYSVA \|	A.5.7 \| A.5.7 \| 6.1.2 \| 8.2 \| 9.3.2 \| A.8.8 \| A.5.7 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28
CM0022	Criticality Analysis	Conduct a criticality analysis to identify mission critical functions, critical components, and data flows and reduce the vulnerability of such functions and components through secure system design. Focus supply chain protection on the most critical components/functions. Leverage other countermeasures like segmentation and least privilege to protect the critical components.	CP-2 \| CP-2(8) \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PM-11 \| PM-17 \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| PM-32 \| RA-3 \| RA-3(1) \| RA-9 \| RA-9 \| SA-11 \| SA-15(3) \| SA-2 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(3) \| SC-32(1) \| SC-7(29) \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-3(2) \| SR-3(3) \| SR-5(1) \| SR-7	D3-AVE \| D3-OSM \| D3-IDA \| D3-SJA \| D3-AI \| D3-DI \| D3-SWI \| D3-NNI \| D3-HCI \| D3-NM \| D3-PLM \| D3-AM \| D3-SYSM \| D3-SVCDM \| D3-SYSDM \| D3-SYSVA \| D3-OAM \| D3-ORA \|	7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.29 \| A.8.1 \| A.5.30 \| A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| 6.1.2 \| 8.2 \| 9.3.2 \| A.8.8 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.22
CM0024	Anti-counterfeit Hardware	Develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including tamper resistance and protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.	AC-14 \| AC-20(5) \| CM-7(9) \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-10(3) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(13) \| SA-9 \| SR-1 \| SR-10 \| SR-11 \| SR-11 \| SR-11(3) \| SR-11(3) \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-9 \| SR-9(1)	D3-AI \| D3-SWI \| D3-HCI \| D3-FEMC \| D3-DLIC \| D3-FV \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29
CM0025	Supplier Review	Conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services.	PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-11 \| SA-17 \| SA-2 \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SA-9 \| SR-11 \| SR-3(1) \| SR-3(3) \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5(1) \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6 \| SR-6	D3-OAM \| D3-ODM \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.27 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.5.22
CM0026	Original Component Manufacturer	Components/Software that cannot be procured from the original component manufacturer or their authorized franchised distribution network should be approved by the supply chain board or equivalent to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts, materials, and software.	AC-20(5) \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SA-9 \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-11 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-3(1) \| SR-3(3) \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(1) \| SR-5(2)	D3-OAM \| D3-ODM \| D3-AM \| D3-FV \| D3-SFV \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29
CM0027	ASIC/FPGA Manufacturing	Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) / Field Programmable Gate Arrays should be developed by accredited trusted foundries to limit potential hardware-based trojan injections.	AC-14 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-10(3) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SA-8(13) \| SA-9 \| SI-3 \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-11 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6(1)	D3-OAM \| D3-ODM \| D3-AM \| D3-FV \| D3-SFV \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.7 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29
CM0028	Tamper Protection	Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Leverage tamper proof protection where possible when shipping/receiving equipment.	AC-14 \| CA-8(3) \| CM-7(9) \| MA-7 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-10(3) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(13) \| SA-9 \| SC-51 \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-10 \| SR-11 \| SR-11(3) \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-9 \| SR-9(1)	D3-PH \| D3-AH \| D3-RFS \| D3-FV \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29
CM0004	Development Environment Security	In order to secure the development environment, the first step is understanding all the devices and people who interact with it. Maintain an accurate inventory of all people and assets that touch the development environment. Ensure strong multi-factor authentication is used across the development environment, especially for code repositories, as threat actors may attempt to sneak malicious code into software that's being built without being detected. Use zero-trust access controls to the code repositories where possible. For example, ensure the main branches in repositories are protected from injecting malicious code. A secure development environment requires change management, privilege management, auditing and in-depth monitoring across the environment.	AC-17 \| AC-18 \| AC-20(5) \| AC-3(11) \| AC-3(13) \| AC-3(15) \| CA-8 \| CM-11 \| CM-14 \| CM-2(2) \| CM-3(2) \| CM-3(7) \| CM-3(8) \| CM-4(1) \| CM-7(8) \| CM-7(8) \| CP-2(8) \| MA-7 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| RA-3(2) \| RA-5 \| RA-5(2) \| RA-9 \| SA-10 \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-11 \| SA-11(1) \| SA-11(2) \| SA-11(2) \| SA-11(4) \| SA-11(5) \| SA-11(5) \| SA-11(6) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(8) \| SA-15 \| SA-15(3) \| SA-15(5) \| SA-15(7) \| SA-15(8) \| SA-17 \| SA-3 \| SA-3 \| SA-3(1) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-8 \| SA-9 \| SC-38 \| SI-2 \| SI-2(6) \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-11 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-3(2) \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6 \| SR-6(1) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-7	D3-AI \| D3-AVE \| D3-SWI \| D3-HCI \| D3-NNI \| D3-OAM \| D3-AM \| D3-OM \| D3-DI \| D3-MFA \| D3-CH \| D3-OTP \| D3-BAN \| D3-PA \| D3- FAPA \| D3- DQSA \| D3-IBCA \| D3-PCSV \| D3-PSMD \|	A.8.4 \| A.5.14 \| A.6.7 \| A.8.1 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.30 \| A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.8.8 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.33 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.27 \| A.6.8 \| A.8.8 \| A.8.32 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.22
CM0010	Update Software	Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times. Release updated versions of the software/firmware systems incorporating security-relevant updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than mission-defined frequency [i.e., 30 days]. Ideally old versions of software are removed after upgrading but restoration states (i.e., gold images) are recommended to remain on the system.	CM-3(2) \| CM-3(7) \| CM-3(8) \| CM-4 \| CM-4(1) \| CM-7(4) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SA-9 \| SI-2 \| SI-2(6)	D3-SU \|	A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.6.8 \| A.8.8 \| A.8.32
CM0012	Software Bill of Materials	Generate Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) against the entire software supply chain and cross correlate with known vulnerabilities (e.g., Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) to mitigate known vulnerabilities. Protect the SBOM according to countermeasures in CM0001.	CM-7(5) \| RA-5 \| CM-10 \| CM-10(1) \| CM-11 \| CM-11 \| CM-11(3) \| CM-2 \| CM-7(4) \| CM-8 \| CM-8(7) \| PM-5 \| RA-5(11) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(13) \| SA-9	D3-AI \| D3-AVE \| D3-SWI \|	A.8.9 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.5.32 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30
CM0013	Dependency Confusion	Ensure proper protections are in place for ensuring dependency confusion is mitigated like ensuring that internal dependencies be pulled from private repositories vice public repositories, ensuring that your CI/CD/development environment is secure as defined in CM0004 and validate dependency integrity by ensuring checksums match official packages.	CM-10(1) \| CM-11 \| CM-2 \| RA-5 \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SA-8(9) \| SA-9	D3-LFP \| D3-UBA \| D3-RAPA \| D3-MAC \|	A.8.9 \| A.8.19 \| A.8.8 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30
CM0015	Software Source Control	Prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.	CM-11 \| CM-14 \| CM-2 \| CM-4 \| CM-7(8) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-8 \| SA-9	D3-PM \| D3-SBV \| D3-EI \| D3-EAL \| D3- EDL \| D3-DCE \|	A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30
CM0021	Software Digital Signature	Prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the mission.	AC-14 \| CM-11 \| CM-11(3) \| CM-14 \| CM-14 \| IA-2 \| SA-10(1) \| SA-11 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-9 \| SI-7 \| SI-7(12) \| SI-7(15)	D3-CH \| D3-CBAN \| D3-FV \| D3-DLIC \| D3-EAL \| D3-SBV \|	A.8.19 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30
CM0005	Ground-based Countermeasures	This countermeasure is focused on the protection of terrestrial assets like ground networks and development environments/contractor networks, etc. Traditional detection technologies and capabilities would be applicable here. Utilizing resources from NIST CSF to properly secure these environments using identify, protect, detect, recover, and respond is likely warranted. Additionally, NISTIR 8401 may provide resources as well since it was developed to focus on ground-based security for space systems (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8401.ipd.pdf). Furthermore, the MITRE ATT&CK framework provides IT focused TTPs and their mitigations https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/enterprise/. Several recommended NIST 800-53 Rev5 controls are provided for reference when designing ground systems/networks.	AC-1 \| AC-10 \| AC-11 \| AC-11(1) \| AC-12 \| AC-12(1) \| AC-14 \| AC-16 \| AC-16(6) \| AC-17 \| AC-17 \| AC-17(1) \| AC-17(10) \| AC-17(2) \| AC-17(3) \| AC-17(4) \| AC-17(6) \| AC-17(9) \| AC-18 \| AC-18 \| AC-18(1) \| AC-18(3) \| AC-18(4) \| AC-18(5) \| AC-19 \| AC-19(5) \| AC-2 \| AC-2 \| AC-2(1) \| AC-2(11) \| AC-2(12) \| AC-2(13) \| AC-2(2) \| AC-2(3) \| AC-2(4) \| AC-2(9) \| AC-20 \| AC-20(1) \| AC-20(2) \| AC-20(3) \| AC-20(5) \| AC-21 \| AC-22 \| AC-3 \| AC-3(11) \| AC-3(13) \| AC-3(15) \| AC-3(4) \| AC-4 \| AC-4(23) \| AC-4(24) \| AC-4(25) \| AC-4(26) \| AC-4(31) \| AC-4(32) \| AC-6 \| AC-6(1) \| AC-6(10) \| AC-6(2) \| AC-6(3) \| AC-6(5) \| AC-6(8) \| AC-6(9) \| AC-7 \| AC-8 \| AT-2(4) \| AT-2(4) \| AT-2(5) \| AT-2(6) \| AT-3 \| AT-3(2) \| AT-4 \| AU-10 \| AU-11 \| AU-12 \| AU-12(1) \| AU-12(3) \| AU-14 \| AU-14(1) \| AU-14(3) \| AU-2 \| AU-3 \| AU-3(1) \| AU-4 \| AU-4(1) \| AU-5 \| AU-5(1) \| AU-5(2) \| AU-5(5) \| AU-6 \| AU-6(1) \| AU-6(3) \| AU-6(4) \| AU-6(5) \| AU-6(6) \| AU-7 \| AU-7(1) \| AU-8 \| AU-9 \| AU-9(2) \| AU-9(3) \| AU-9(4) \| CA-3 \| CA-3 \| CA-3(6) \| CA-3(7) \| CA-7 \| CA-7(1) \| CA-7(6) \| CA-8 \| CA-9 \| CM-10(1) \| CM-11 \| CM-11 \| CM-11(2) \| CM-11(3) \| CM-12 \| CM-12(1) \| CM-14 \| CM-2 \| CM-2(2) \| CM-2(3) \| CM-2(7) \| CM-3 \| CM-3(1) \| CM-3(2) \| CM-3(5) \| CM-3(7) \| CM-3(7) \| CM-3(8) \| CM-4 \| CM-5(1) \| CM-5(5) \| CM-6 \| CM-6(1) \| CM-6(2) \| CM-7 \| CM-7(1) \| CM-7(2) \| CM-7(3) \| CM-7(5) \| CM-7(8) \| CM-7(8) \| CM-7(9) \| CM-8 \| CM-8(1) \| CM-8(2) \| CM-8(3) \| CM-8(4) \| CM-9 \| CP-10 \| CP-10(2) \| CP-10(4) \| CP-2 \| CP-2 \| CP-2(2) \| CP-2(5) \| CP-2(8) \| CP-3(1) \| CP-4(5) \| CP-8 \| CP-8(1) \| CP-8(2) \| CP-8(3) \| CP-8(4) \| CP-8(5) \| CP-9 \| CP-9(1) \| CP-9(2) \| CP-9(3) \| IA-11 \| IA-12 \| IA-12(1) \| IA-12(2) \| IA-12(3) \| IA-12(4) \| IA-12(5) \| IA-12(6) \| IA-2 \| IA-2(1) \| IA-2(12) \| IA-2(2) \| IA-2(5) \| IA-2(6) \| IA-2(8) \| IA-3 \| IA-3(1) \| IA-4 \| IA-4(9) \| IA-5 \| IA-5(1) \| IA-5(13) \| IA-5(14) \| IA-5(2) \| IA-5(7) \| IA-5(8) \| IA-6 \| IA-7 \| IA-8 \| IR-2 \| IR-2(2) \| IR-2(3) \| IR-3(3) \| IR-4 \| IR-4(1) \| IR-4(11) \| IR-4(11) \| IR-4(12) \| IR-4(13) \| IR-4(14) \| IR-4(3) \| IR-4(4) \| IR-4(5) \| IR-4(6) \| IR-4(7) \| IR-4(8) \| IR-5 \| IR-5(1) \| IR-6 \| IR-6(1) \| IR-7 \| IR-7(1) \| MA-2 \| MA-3 \| MA-3(1) \| MA-3(2) \| MA-3(3) \| MA-4 \| MA-4(1) \| MA-4(3) \| MA-4(6) \| MA-4(7) \| MA-5(1) \| MA-6 \| MA-7 \| MP-2 \| MP-3 \| MP-4 \| MP-5 \| MP-5(4) \| MP-6 \| MP-6(3) \| MP-7 \| PE-3(7) \| PL-10 \| PL-11 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PL-9 \| PL-9 \| PM-11 \| PM-16(1) \| PM-17 \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| PM-31 \| PM-32 \| RA-10 \| RA-3(1) \| RA-3(2) \| RA-3(2) \| RA-3(3) \| RA-3(4) \| RA-5 \| RA-5(10) \| RA-5(11) \| RA-5(2) \| RA-5(4) \| RA-5(5) \| RA-7 \| RA-9 \| RA-9 \| SA-10 \| SA-10(1) \| SA-10(7) \| SA-11 \| SA-11 \| SA-11(2) \| SA-11(4) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(9) \| SA-15 \| SA-15(3) \| SA-15(7) \| SA-17 \| SA-17 \| SA-2 \| SA-2 \| SA-22 \| SA-3 \| SA-3 \| SA-3(1) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-4 \| SA-4 \| SA-4(1) \| SA-4(10) \| SA-4(12) \| SA-4(2) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(7) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-5 \| SA-8 \| SA-8 \| SA-8(14) \| SA-8(15) \| SA-8(18) \| SA-8(21) \| SA-8(22) \| SA-8(23) \| SA-8(24) \| SA-8(9) \| SA-9 \| SA-9 \| SA-9(1) \| SA-9(2) \| SA-9(6) \| SA-9(7) \| SC-10 \| SC-12 \| SC-12(1) \| SC-12(6) \| SC-13 \| SC-15 \| SC-16(2) \| SC-16(3) \| SC-18(1) \| SC-18(2) \| SC-18(3) \| SC-18(4) \| SC-2 \| SC-2(2) \| SC-20 \| SC-21 \| SC-22 \| SC-23 \| SC-23(1) \| SC-23(3) \| SC-23(5) \| SC-24 \| SC-28 \| SC-28(1) \| SC-28(11) \| SC-28(3) \| SC-3 \| SC-38 \| SC-39 \| SC-4 \| SC-45 \| SC-45(1) \| SC-45(1) \| SC-45(2) \| SC-49 \| SC-5 \| SC-5(1) \| SC-5(2) \| SC-5(3) \| SC-50 \| SC-51 \| SC-7 \| SC-7(10) \| SC-7(11) \| SC-7(12) \| SC-7(13) \| SC-7(14) \| SC-7(18) \| SC-7(21) \| SC-7(25) \| SC-7(29) \| SC-7(3) \| SC-7(4) \| SC-7(5) \| SC-7(5) \| SC-7(7) \| SC-7(8) \| SC-7(9) \| SC-8 \| SC-8(1) \| SC-8(2) \| SC-8(5) \| SI-10 \| SI-10(3) \| SI-10(6) \| SI-11 \| SI-14(3) \| SI-16 \| SI-19(4) \| SI-2 \| SI-2(2) \| SI-2(3) \| SI-2(6) \| SI-21 \| SI-3 \| SI-3 \| SI-3(10) \| SI-4 \| SI-4(1) \| SI-4(10) \| SI-4(11) \| SI-4(12) \| SI-4(13) \| SI-4(14) \| SI-4(15) \| SI-4(16) \| SI-4(17) \| SI-4(2) \| SI-4(20) \| SI-4(22) \| SI-4(23) \| SI-4(24) \| SI-4(25) \| SI-4(4) \| SI-4(5) \| SI-5 \| SI-5(1) \| SI-6 \| SI-7 \| SI-7(1) \| SI-7(17) \| SI-7(2) \| SI-7(5) \| SI-7(7) \| SI-7(8) \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-10 \| SR-11 \| SR-11 \| SR-11(1) \| SR-11(2) \| SR-11(3) \| SR-12 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-3(1) \| SR-3(2) \| SR-3(2) \| SR-3(3) \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(1) \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6 \| SR-6(1) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-7 \| SR-7 \| SR-8 \| SR-9 \| SR-9(1)	Nearly all D3FEND Techniques apply to Ground \|	5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.15 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.18 \| A.8.2 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.15 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.3 \| A.8.4 \| A.8.18 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.2 \| A.8.4 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.22 \| A.8.23 \| A.8.11 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.15 \| A.8.2 \| A.8.18 \| A.8.5 \| A.8.5 \| A.7.7 \| A.8.1 \| A.5.14 \| A.6.7 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.20 \| A.5.14 \| A.7.9 \| A.8.1 \| A.5.14 \| A.7.9 \| A.8.20 \| A.6.3 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.6 \| A.5.25 \| A.6.8 \| A.8.15 \| A.7.4 \| A.8.17 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.15 \| A.5.28 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.15 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.21 \| 9.1 \| 9.3.2 \| 9.3.3 \| A.5.36 \| 9.2.2 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| 8.1 \| 9.3.3 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.19 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.5.2 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.19 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.29 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.6 \| A.5.30 \| A.5.29 \| A.7.11 \| A.5.29 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.13 \| A.5.29 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.17 \| A.8.5 \| A.5.16 \| A.6.3 \| A.5.25 \| A.5.26 \| A.5.27 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.5 \| A.6.8 \| A.7.10 \| A.7.13 \| A.8.10 \| A.8.10 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.10 \| A.7.13 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.7 \| A.7.10 \| A.5.13 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.7 \| A.7.10 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.9 \| A.7.10 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.10 \| A.7.14 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.10 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.7 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.4 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 9.1 \| 9.2.2 \| 10.1 \| 10.2 \| A.8.8 \| 6.1.3 \| 8.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.7 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.33 \| 8.1 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.28 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.37 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.6 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.22 \| A.8.23 \| A.8.26 \| A.8.23 \| A.8.12 \| A.5.10 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.26 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.24 \| A.8.24 \| A.8.26 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.10 \| A.5.33 \| A.6.8 \| A.8.8 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.7 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.6 \| A.8.11 \| A.8.10 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.22

SV-SP-4

Informational References

High-Level Requirements

Low-Level Requirements

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

Related SPARTA Countermeasures