The [organization] shall identify the applicable physical and environmental protection policies covering the development environment and spacecraft hardware. {PE-1,PE-14,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-10(3)}
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The [organization] shall analyze changes to the spacecraft to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation.{CM-4,CM-3,CM-3(2),CM-3(7),CM-4(2),SA-10}
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The [organization] shall develop and document an inventory of the spacecraft components that accurately reflects the to-be launched system. {CM-8,CM-2}
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The [organization] updates the inventory of spacecraft components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and spacecraft updates.{CM-8(1),CA-7,CM-2,CM-3}
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The [organization] shall produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control effectiveness.{SA-4(8),CP-4(5),PM-31}
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The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific access control policies for controlling information flow and leakage on-board the spacecraft.{AC-1,AC-3,AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-3(13)}
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The [organization] shall define and enforce restrictions on activities and transactions permissible when interacting with external systems.These access controls shall be regularly reviewed and updated to align with organizational security policies and requirements.{AC-20,AC-20(1),AC-20(3)}
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The [organization] risk assessment shall include the full end to end communication pathway (i.e., round trip) to include any crosslink communications.{SV-MA-4}{AC-20,AC-20(1),AC-20(3),RA-3,SA-8(18)}
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The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific identification and authentication policies for accessing the development environment and spacecraft. {AC-3,AC-14,IA-1,SA-3,SA-3(1)}
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The [organization] shall protect documentation and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-10,SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}
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The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}
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* Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission.
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The [organization] shall protect the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SV-MA-6}{AC-3,PL-2,PL-7}
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The [organization] shall ensure security requirements/configurations are placed in accordance with NIST 800-171 with enhancements in 800-172 on the development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{AC-3,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-15}
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The [organization] shall identify the key system components or capabilities that require isolation through physical or logical means.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,SC-3,SC-7(13),SC-28(3),SC-32,SC-32(1)}
|
Fault management and security management capabilities would be classified as mission critical and likely need separated. Additionally, capabilities like TT&C, C&DH, GNC might need separated as well.
|
The [organization] shall identify all locations (including ground and contractor systems) that store or process sensitive system information.{AC-3(11),CM-12}
|
Space system sensitive information can include a wide range of candidate material: functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of link segment protections subject to disabling/bypassing, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and mission operations.
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The [organization] shall identify sensitive mission data (e.g.CPI) and document the specific on-board components on which the information is processed and stored.{AC-3(11),CM-12}
|
Space system sensitive information can include a wide range of candidate material: functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of link segment protections subject to disabling/bypassing, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and mission operations.
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The [organization] shall ensure any update to on-board software, memory, or stored procedures has met high assurance standards before execution. {AC-3(2),CM-3,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SR-4(4)}
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The [organization] shall have an Insider Threat Program to aid in the detection and prevention of people with authorized access to perform malicious activities.{AT-2(2),IR-4(6),IR-4(7),PM-12,PM-16}
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The [organization] includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.{AT-2(2),IR-4(6),IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-16}
|
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The [organization] shall determine the mission-specific role security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of [organization] and the systems to which personnel have authorized access.{AT-3}
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The [organization] shall ensure that role-based security-related training is provided to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities: (i) before authorizing access to the system or performing assigned duties; (ii) when required by system changes; and (iii) at least annually thereafter.{AT-3,CP-2}
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The [organization] shall define the criteria (i.e.updates to physical controls) in addition to the frequency for providing refresher physical security awareness training to all information system users (including managers, senior executives, and [organization]s).{AT-3(2)}
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The [organization] shall define the process of providing all personnel with initial and updated security systems training for the employment and operation of physical security controls.{AT-3(2)}
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The [organization] shall provide training to its personnel on how to identify and respond to malicious code indicators to include but not limited to indicators of potentially malicious code in flight software, indicators from development machine’s anti-virus/anti-malware software of potential malicious code, and to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in [organization] information systems.{AT-3(4),IR-6,IR-6(2),SI-4(24)}
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The [organization] shall identify and document training activities to include basic security awareness training (per AT-2) and role-based security related training (per AT-3).{AT-4}
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The [organization] shall engage relevant stakeholders to discuss performance impacts/tradeoffs for implementing the desired monitoring approach, document any deviations from initial desired approach, and ensure the Authorizing Official (AO) signs off on the risk posed by the exclusion of the functionality in question.{AU-2}
|
Aerospace work published in TOR-2019-02178 "Telemetry Security" provides examples of telemetry values that may be useful to monitor for indications of malicious onboard activity (not a comprehensive list):
Vehicle Command Counter (VCC)
Rejected Command Counter
Command Receiver On/Off Mode
Command Receivers Received Signal Strength
Command Receiver Lock Modes
Telemetry Downlink Modes
Cryptographic Modes
Received Commands
System Clock
GPS Ephemeris
Watchdog Timer (WDT)
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The [organization] shall identify and document the on-board events and values that will be monitored for indicators of unexpected or malicious activity.{AU-2}
|
Aerospace work published in TOR-2019-02178 "Telemetry Security" provides examples of telemetry values that may be useful to monitor for indications of malicious onboard activity (not a comprehensive list):
Vehicle Command Counter (VCC)
Rejected Command Counter
Command Receiver On/Off Mode
Command Receivers Received Signal Strength
Command Receiver Lock Modes
Telemetry Downlink Modes
Cryptographic Modes
Received Commands
System Clock
GPS Ephemeris
Watchdog Timer (WDT)
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The [organization] shall employ independent third-party analysis and penetration testing of all software (COTS, FOSS, Custom) associated with the system, system components, or system services.{CA-2,CA-2(1),CA-8(1),CM-10(1),SA-9,SA-11(3),SA-12(11),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4),SR-6(1)}
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In coordination with [organization], the [organization] shall prioritize and remediate flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{CA-2,CA-5,SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
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The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
|
The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization.
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The [organization] shall verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls (to include abuse cases and penetration testing) at the depth of testing defined in the test documents.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,RA-5(3),SA-11(5),SA-11(7)}
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* The frequency of testing should be driven by Program completion events and updates.
* Examples of approaches are static analyses, dynamic analyses, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches
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The [organization] shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11}
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The [organization] shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of all software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11,SA-11(5)}
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The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls.
|
The [organization] shall establish and maintain processes to manage and oversee independent assessors, including their qualifications, roles, and responsibilities.{CA-2(1),CA-7(1)}
|
Independent assessors shall be individuals or entities external to the operational chain of command and not involved in the development, implementation, or operations of the system under assessment.
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The [organization] shall determine the vulnerabilities/weaknesses that require remediation, and coordinate the timeline for that remediation, in accordance with the analysis of the vulnerability scan report, the mission assessment of risk, and mission needs.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-5,CM-3,RA-5,RA-7,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
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The [organization] shall implement, as part of an A&A process, a Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP) that evaluates the effectiveness of security control implementations on a recurring pre-defined basis.{CA-7,PM-31}
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The [organization] shall employ independent assessors or assessment teams to monitor the effectiveness of security controls in the system on an ongoing basis.{CA-7(1)}
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The [organization] shall implement automated mechanisms to assist in the execution and implementation of the Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP).{CA-7(6)}
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The [organization] shall coordinate penetration testing on mission critical spacecraft components (hardware and/or software).{SV-MA-4}{CA-8,CA-8(1),CP-4(5)}
|
Not all defects (i.e., buffer overflows, race conditions, and memory leaks) can be discovered statically and require execution of the system. This is where space-centric cyber testbeds (i.e., cyber ranges) are imperative as they provide an environment to maliciously attack components in a controlled environment to discover these undesirable conditions. Technology has improved to where digital twins for spacecraft are achievable, which provides an avenue for cyber testing that was often not performed due to perceived risk to the flight hardware.
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The [organization] shall employ dynamic analysis (e.g.using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-8,CM-10(1),RA-3(1),SA-11(5),SA-11(8),SA-11(9),SI-3,SI-7(10)}
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The [organization] shall establish robust procedures and technical methods to perform testing to include adversarial testing (i.e.abuse cases) of the platform hardware and software.{CA-8,CP-4(5),RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(2),SA-3,SA-4(3),SA-11,SA-11(1),SA-11(2),SA-11(5),SA-11(7),SA-11(8),SA-15(7)}
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The [organization] shall perform penetration testing/analysis: (1) On potential system elements before accepting the system; (2) As a realistic simulation of the active adversary’s known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) Throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CA-8(1),SA-9,SA-11(5),SR-5(2)}
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Penetration testing should be performed throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes including: (1) Hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (2) Shipping/handling procedures; (3) Personnel and physical security programs; (4) Configuration management tools/measures to maintain provenance; and (5) Any other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production/distribution of supply chain elements.
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The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific configuration management policies and procedures for the hardware and software for the spacecraft. {CM-1,CM-3,CM-5(6),SA-10,SA-10(3)}
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The [organization] shall perform software component analysis (a.k.a.origin analysis) for developed or acquired software.{CM-10,CM-10(1),RA-3(1),RA-5,SA-15(7),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4)}
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The [organization] shall maintain a list of suppliers and potential suppliers used, and the products that they supply to include software.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{CM-10,PL-8(2),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11)}
|
Ideally you have diversification with suppliers
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The [organization] shall distribute documentation to only personnel with defined roles and a need to know.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{CM-12,CP-2,SA-5,SA-10}
|
Least privilege and need to know should be employed with the protection of all documentation. Documentation can contain sensitive information that can aid in vulnerability discovery, detection, and exploitation. For example, command dictionaries for ground and space systems should be handles with extreme care. Additionally, design documents for missions contain many key elements that if compromised could aid in an attacker successfully exploiting the system.
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The [organization] shall confirm that the operational spacecrafts correspond to the baseline configuration. {CM-2,CM-3,CM-3(7),CM-4(2),CM-6,SA-10}
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The [organization] shall develop, document, and maintain under configuration control, a current baseline configuration of the spacecrafts.{CM-2,CM-3(7),CM-4(2),CM-6,SA-8(30),SA-10}
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The [organization] shall establish and formally review the baseline configuration to confirm that it represents an agreed-upon set of specifications for the spacecrafts.{CM-2,CM-6}
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The [organization] shall retain at least two previous versions of all spacecraft associated software on the ground with the capability to restore previous version on the spacecraft.{CM-2(3),CM-3(7),CM-4(2),SA-10,SA-10(4)}
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The [organization] shall test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects on mission systems in a separate test environment before installation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(2),CM-4(1),CM-4(2),CM-10(1),SA-8(31),SA-11(9),SI-2,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-5(2)}
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This requirement is focused on software and firmware flaws. If hardware flaw remediation is required, refine the requirement to make this clear.
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The [organization] shall define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity verification tools detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-6,CP-2,IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SC-16(1),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(7),SI-7(10)}
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The [organization] shall use automated mechanisms to: prohibit changes to the system until designated approvals are received; document all implemented changes to the system; document proposed changes to the system; highlight proposed changes to the system that have not been approved or disapproved by [time_period]; notify [authorities] of proposed changes to the system and request change approval; notify [personnel] when approved changes to the system are completed; and prohibit changes to the system until designated approvals are received.{CM-3(1)}
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The [organization] shall release updated versions of the mission information systems incorporating security-relevant software and firmware updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than [Program-defined frequency [90 days]].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(2),CM-4(1)}
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On-orbit patching/upgrades may be necessary if vulnerabilities are discovered after launch. The system should have the ability to update software post-launch.
|
The [organization] shall ensure security representatives are included in all change control board reviews and decisions.{CM-3(4),SA-10(7)}
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|
The [organization] shall implement a two-person rule, or similar dual authorization mechanism, for all changes to the SV configuration, and such actions should only be conducted with documented change control board approval.{CM-3(8)}
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The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(8),CM-7(9),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-10(3),SA-19,SC-51,SR-4(3),SR-4(4),SR-5(2),SR-11}
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The [organization] shall define a process to limit privileges to change system components and system-related information within a production or operational environment.{CM-5(5)}
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The [organization] shall maintain the integrity of the mapping between the master build data (hardware drawings and software/firmware code) describing the current version of hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current version.{CM-6,SA-8(21),SA-8(30),SA-10,SA-10(3),SA-10(4),SA-10(5),SI-7(10),SR-4(4)}
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The [organization] shall periodically review the spacecraft and subsystems to identify and disable unnecessary and/or nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, software, and services.{CM-7(1)}
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|
The [organization] shall define/maintain an approved operating system list for use on spacecraft.{SV-SP-7}{CM-7(5)}
|
The operating system is extremely important to security and availability of the spacecraft, therefore should receive high levels of assurance that it operates as intended and free of critical weaknesses/vulnerabilities.
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The [organization] shall prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(8)}
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|
The [organization] prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{CM-7(8),CM-7(8),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-10(2),SI-3,SR-4(4)}
|
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The [organization] shall maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for all software code utilized and continuously update/revise the SBOM for each step in the software lifecycle (to include the deployment of that software).{CM-8}
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|
The [organization] shall employ automated mechanisms to maintain an up-to-date inventory of spacecraft components.{CM-8(2)}
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|
The [organization] shall employ automated mechanisms to detect unauthorized components within the spacecraft component inventory.{CM-8(3)}
|
|
The [organization] shall establish and maintain an accountability mechanism for tracking individuals responsible for spacecraft components (e.g.assign components to individuals within inventory documentation).{CM-8(4)}
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The [organization] shall develop, document, and implement a Configuration Management Plan for the spacecraft that defines the processes, procedures, and responsibilities for managing configuration changes and ensuring the security of the system.{CM-9}
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The [organization] shall ensure that all personnel involved in configuration management activities are trained and follow the procedures outlined in the Configuration Management Plan.{CM-9}
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The [organization] shall regularly update the Configuration Management Plan to reflect changes in the information system and to align with evolving security requirements.{CM-9}
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The [organization] shall conduct a criticality analysis to identify mission critical functions and critical components and reduce the vulnerability of such functions and components through secure system design.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-MA-4}{CP-2,CP-2(8),PL-7,PM-11,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),RA-9,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(25),SA-12,SA-14,SA-15(3),SC-7(29),SR-1}
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During SCRM, criticality analysis will aid in determining supply chain risk. For mission critical functions/components, extra scrutiny must be applied to ensure supply chain is secured.
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The [organization] shall develop an incident response and forensics plan that covers the spacecrafts.{CP-2,IR-1,IR-3,IR-3(2),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),IR-8,SA-15(10),SI-4(24)}
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The [organization] shall employ techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the [organization]s supply chain.{CP-2,PM-30,SA-9,SA-12(5),SC-38,SR-3,SR-3(1),SR-3(2),SR-5(2)}
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The [organization] defines the security safeguards to be employed to protect the availability of system resources.{CP-2(2),SC-6,SI-13,SI-17}
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The [organization] shall employ Operations Security (OPSEC) safeguards to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system components, or system services. {CP-2(8),PM-30,SA-12(9),SC-38,SR-7}
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The [organization] shall define policy and procedures to ensure that the developed or delivered systems do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications, access scripts, configuration files, nor store unencrypted static authenticators on function keys.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{IA-5(7)}
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The [organization] shall report counterfeit information system components to [organization] officials. {SV-SP-4}{IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SA-19,SR-11}
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The [organization] shall report identified systems or system components containing software affected by recently announced cybersecurity-related software flaws (and potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws) to [organization] officials with cybersecurity responsibilities.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{IR-6,IR-6(2),SI-2,SI-3,SI-4(12),SR-4(4)}
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The [organization] shall have a two-man rule to achieve a high level of security for systems with command level access to the spacecraft.(Under this rule all access and actions require the presence of two authorized people at all times.) {SV-AC-4}{PE-3}
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Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
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The [organization] shall develop policies and procedures to establish sufficient space domain awareness to avoid potential collisions or hostile proximity operations.This includes establishing relationships with relevant organizations needed for data sharing.{PE-6,PE-6(1),PE-6(4),PE-18,PE-20,RA-6,SC-7(14)}
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The [organization] shall monitor physical access to all facilities where the system or system components reside throughout development, integration, testing, and launch to detect and respond to physical security incidents in coordination with the organizational incident response capability.{PE-6,PE-6(1),PE-6(4),PE-18,PE-20,SC-7(14)}
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|
The [organization] shall identify the appropriate control baseline (NIST or CNSS) for the spacecraft based on mission information types and associated impact.{PL-10}
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|
The [organization] shall develop and implement a process for tailoring the control baseline for the spacecraft in accordance with organizational requirements (e.g.CNSS Space Overlay or similar).{PL-11}
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|
The [organization] shall develop, document, and implement policies that outline security planning processes such as writing rules of behavior, conops documentation, control baseline selection/tailoring, and similar activities that require advanced planning.{PL-11}
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|
The [organization] shall define the secure communication protocols to be used within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{PL-7,RA-5(4),SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3),SC-40(4),SI-12}
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The [organization] shall document the platform's security architecture, and how it is established within and is an integrated part of the overall [organization] mission security architecture.{PL-7,SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SA-17}
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|
The [organization] shall have Insider Threat Program to aid in the prevention of people with authorized access to perform malicious activities.{SV-AC-4}{PM-12,AT-2(2),IR-4(7)}
|
Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
|
The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)}
|
* The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers.
* All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government.
|
The [organization] shall request threat analysis of suppliers of critical components and manage access to and control of threat analysis products containing U.S.person information.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-9,SA-12,SR-1}
|
The intent of this requirement is to address supply chain concerns on hardware and software vendors. Not required for trusted suppliers accredited to the Defense Microelectronic Activity (DMEA). If the Program intends to use a supplier not accredited by DMEA, the government customer should be notified as soon as possible. If the Program has internal processes to vet suppliers, it may meet this requirement. All software used and its origins must be included in the SBOM and be subjected to internal and Government vulnerability scans.
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The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis on threats to mission critical capabilities and/or system components to inform risk management decisions.{SV-MA-4}{PM-16,RA-3(2),RA-3(3),RA-7,RA-9,SA-12(8),SA-15(8)}
|
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The [organization] shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a sub [organization] to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{PM-30,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-12(2),SR-5(2),SR-6}
|
|
The [organization] shall maintain documentation tracing the strategies, tools, and methods implemented to mitigate supply chain risk .{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-12(1),SR-5}
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Examples include: (1) Transferring a portion of the risk to the developer or supplier through the use of contract language and incentives; (2) Using contract language that requires the implementation of SCRM throughout the system lifecycle in applicable contracts and other acquisition and assistance instruments (grants, cooperative agreements, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), and other transactions). Within the DOD some examples include: (a) Language outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook section 13.13. Contracting; (b) Language requiring the use of protected mechanisms to deliver elements and data about elements, processes, and delivery mechanisms; (c) Language that articulates that requirements flow down supply chain tiers to sub-prime suppliers. (3) Incentives for suppliers that: (a) Implement required security safeguards and SCRM best practices; (b) Promote transparency into their organizational processes and security practices; (c) Provide additional vetting of the processes and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information system components, and services; and (d) Implement contract to reduce SC risk down the contract stack. (4) Gaining insight into supplier security practices; (5) Using contract language and incentives to enable more robust risk management later in the lifecycle; (6) Using a centralized intermediary or “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary;
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The [organization] shall protect against supply chain threats to the system, system components, or system services by employing security safeguards as defined by NIST SP 800-161 Rev.1.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SI-3,SR-1}
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The chosen supply chain safeguards should demonstrably support a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy. Safeguards should include protections for both hardware and software. Program should define their critical components (HW & SW) and identify the supply chain protections, approach/posture/process.
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The [organization], upon termination of individual employment, disables information system access within [TBD minutes] of termination.{SV-AC-4}{PS-4}
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The [organization] shall document risk assessment results in risk assessment report upon completion of each risk assessment.{RA-3,RA-7}
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The [organization] shall use the threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services to inform and direct subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-3(3),SA-11(2),SA-15(8),SI-3}
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The [organization] shall share information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control assessments with [Program-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies).{SV-SP-1}{RA-5}
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The [organization] shall ensure that the vulnerability scanning tools (e.g., static analysis and/or component analysis tools) used include the capability to readily update the list of potential information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(3),SI-3}
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The [organization] shall perform vulnerability analysis and risk assessment of all systems and software.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SA-15(7),SI-3}
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The [organization] shall ensure that vulnerability scanning tools and techniques are employed that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: (1) Enumerating platforms, custom software flaws, and improper configurations; (2) Formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) Measuring vulnerability impact.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SI-3}
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Component/Origin scanning looks for open-source libraries/software that may be included into the baseline and looks for known vulnerabilities and open-source license violations.
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The [organization] shall perform static binary analysis of all firmware that is utilized on the spacecraft.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-10,SA-11,SI-7(10)}
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Many commercial products/parts are utilized within the system and should be analyzed for security weaknesses. Blindly accepting the firmware is free of weakness is unacceptable for high assurance missions. The intent is to not blindly accept firmware from unknown sources and assume it is secure. This is meant to apply to firmware the vendors are not developing internally. In-house developed firmware should be going through the vendor's own testing program and have high assurance it is secure. When utilizing firmware from other sources, "expecting" does not meet this requirement. Each supplier needs to provide evidence to support that claim that their firmware they are getting is genuine and secure.
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The [organization] shall perform static source code analysis for all available source code looking for [[organization]-defined Top CWE List] weaknesses using complimentary set of static code analysis tools (i.e.more than one).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-11(1),SA-15(7)}
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The [organization] shall analyze vulnerability/weakness scan reports and results from security control assessments.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SI-3}
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The [organization] shall ensure that the list of potential system vulnerabilities scanned is updated [prior to a new scan] {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5(2),SI-3}
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The [organization] shall employ privileged access authorization to applications and components for vulnerability scanning activities.{RA-5(5)}
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The [organization] shall perform configuration management during system, component, or service during [design; development; implementation; operations].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10}
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The [organization] shall review proposed changes to the spacecraft, assessing both mission and security impacts.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10,CM-3(2)}
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The [organization] shall correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}
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Flaws that impact the mission objectives should be prioritized.
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The [organization] shall perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Program-defined depth and coverage].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}
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The depth needs to include functional testing as well as negative/abuse testing.
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The [organization] shall create prioritized list of software weakness classes (e.g., Common Weakness Enumerations) to be used during static code analysis for prioritization of static analysis results.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(1),SA-15(7)}
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The prioritized list of CWEs should be created considering operational environment, attack surface, etc. Results from the threat modeling and attack surface analysis should be used as inputs into the CWE prioritization process. There is also a CWSS (https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html) process that can be used to prioritize CWEs. The prioritized list of CWEs can help with tools selection as well as you select tools based on their ability to detect certain high priority CWEs.
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The [organization] shall use threat modeling and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SA-15(8)}
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The [organization] shall perform and document threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SI-3}
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The [organization] shall perform a manual code review of all flight code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(4)}
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The [organization] shall perform manual code review of all produced code looking for quality, maintainability, and security flaws.{SA-11(4),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4)}
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The [organization] shall conduct an Attack Surface Analysis and reduce attack surfaces to a level that presents a low level of compromise by an attacker.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(6),SA-15(5)}
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The [organization] shall define acceptable coding languages to be used by the software developer.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15}
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The [organization] shall define acceptable secure coding standards for use by the software developers.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15}
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The [organization] shall have automated means to evaluate adherence to coding standards.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15,SA-15(7),RA-5}
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Manual review cannot scale across the code base; you must have a way to scale in order to confirm your coding standards are being met. The intent is for automated means to ensure code adheres to a coding standard.
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The [organization] shall perform component analysis (a.k.a.origin analysis) for developed or acquired software.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15(7),RA-5}
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The [organization] shall document the spacecraft's security architecture, and how it is established within and is an integrated part of the Program's mission security architecture.{SV-MA-6}{SA-17}
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The [organization] shall require subcontractors developing information system components or providing information system services (as appropriate) to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}
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Select the particular subcontractors, software vendors, and manufacturers based on the criticality analysis performed for the Program Protection Plan and the criticality of the components that they supply.
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The [organization] shall approve, document, and control the use of operational data in preproduction environments (i.e., development, I&T, etc.).{SA-3(2)}
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The [organization] shall categorize/classify preproduction environments (i.e., development, I&T, etc.) at the same level as any operational data in use within the environment and protect the system consistent with its categorization/classification.{SA-3(2)}
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The [organization] shall include the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or by reference, in the acquisition of a system, system component, or system service: a.Functional security requirements; b.Strength of mechanism requirements; c.Security assurance requirements; d.Controls needed to satisfy the security requirements.e.Security documentation requirements; f.Requirements for protecting security documentation; g.Description of the system development environment and environment in which the system is intended to operate; h.Allocation of responsibility or identification of parties responsible control implementation and continuous monitoring/enforcement throughout the system life cycle; and i.Acceptance criteria.{SA-4}
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The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to provide a description of the functional properties of the controls to be implemented.{SA-4(1)}
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The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to identify organizational data that will be processed or stored on non-organizational systems.{SA-4(12)}
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The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to remove all organizational data from contractor system(s) when no longer needed for development purposes or whenever instructed by the organization.{SA-4(12),SI-21}
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The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to provide design and implementation information for the controls that includes low-level security-relevant design information, source code, and hardware schematics.{SA-4(2)}
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Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
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The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to deliver the system, component, or service with [Program-defined security configurations] implemented.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-4(5)}
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For the spacecraft FSW, the defined security configuration could include to ensure the software does not contain a pre-defined list of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs)and/or CAT I/II Application STIGs.
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The [organization] shall protect documentation and Essential Elements of Information (EEI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{SA-5}
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Essential Elements of Information (EEI):
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The [organization] shall ensure that all Electrical, Electronic, Electro-mechanical & Electro-optical (EEEE) and mechanical piece parts procured from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) or their authorized distribution network.{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SC-16(1),SR-1,SR-5}
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The [organization] shall use a certified environment to develop, code and test executable software (firmware or bit-stream) that will be programmed into a one-time programmable FPGA or be programmed into non-volatile memory (NVRAM) that the FPGA executes.{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SC-51,SI-7(10),SR-1,SR-5}
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The [organization] shall ensure that all ASICs designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, and tested by suppliers with a Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) Trust accreditation.{spacecraft-SP-5} {SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}
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The [organization] shall implement policies and procedures to support operations security (OPSEC) to protect information about the capabilities and intentions of organizations by identifying, controlling, and protecting information related to the planning and execution of sensitive organizational activities.{SC-38}
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Information critical to organizational mission and business functions may include user identities, components in use, suppliers, supply chain processes, functional requirements, security requirements, system design specifications, testing and evaluation protocols, and security control implementation details.
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The [organization] shall perform analysis of critical backdoor commands that could adversely affect mission success if used maliciously.{SI-10,SI-10(3)}
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The [organization] shall correct reported cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2}
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* Although this requirement is stated to specifically apply to cybersecurity-related flaws, the Program office may choose to broaden it to all SV flaws.
* This requirement is allocated to the Program, as it is presumed, they have the greatest knowledge of the components of the system and when identified flaws apply.
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The [organization] shall identify, report, and coordinate correction of cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2}
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The [organization] shall determine criteria for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions for all communications to/from the spacecraft.{SI-4(4)}
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If using the Government Microelectronics Assessment for Trust (GOMAT) framework outright, to perform ASIC and FPGA threat/vulnerability risk assessment, the following requirements would apply: {SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
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• 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
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The [organization] shall inspect system components periodically during development to detect tampering (in accordance with the Anti-Tamper Plan).{SR-10}
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The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures, in coordination with the [CIO], that is demonstrably consistent with the anti-counterfeit policy defined by the Program office.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{SR-11}
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The [organization] shall employ technical means to determine if system components are genuine or have been altered.{SR-11(3)}
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Organizations may leverage supplier and contractor processes for validating that a system or component is genuine and has not been altered and for replacing a suspect system or component.
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The [organization] shall develop policies and procedures to ensure proper care is taken when disposing of sensitive data, documentation, or system components throughout the entire mission lifecycle.{SR-12}
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The [organization] shall develop a plan for managing supply chain risks associated with the research and development, design, manufacturing, acquisition, delivery, integration, operations and maintenance, and disposal of organization-defined systems, system components, or system services.{SR-2}
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The [organization] shall protect the supply chain risk management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SR-2}
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The [organization] shall review and update the supply chain risk management plan as required, to address threats, organizational, or environmental changes.{SR-2}
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The [organization] shall establish a supply chain risk management team to lead and support supply chain risk management activities.{SR-2(1)}
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The [organization] shall employ [organization]-defined techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the Program supply chain.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-3(2),SC-38}
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Examples of security safeguards that the organization should consider implementing to limit the harm from potential adversaries targeting the organizational supply chain, are: (1) Using trusted physical delivery mechanisms that do not permit access to the element during delivery (ship via a protected carrier, use cleared/official couriers, or a diplomatic pouch); (2) Using trusted electronic delivery of products and services (require downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites); (3) Avoiding the purchase of custom configurations, where feasible; (4) Using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to commitments or obligations), where feasible; (5) Using defensive design approaches; (6) Employing system OPSEC principles; (7) Employing a diverse set of suppliers; (8) Employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry; (9) Using a centralized intermediary and “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary Employing inventory management policies and processes; (10) Using flexible agreements during each acquisition and procurement phase so that it is possible to meet emerging needs or requirements to address supply chain risk without requiring complete revision or re-competition of an acquisition or procurement; (11) Using international, national, commercial or government standards to increase potential supply base; (12) Limiting the disclosure of information that can become publicly available; and (13) Minimizing the time between purchase decisions and required delivery.
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The [organization] shall ensure that the controls included in prime contracts are also included in the contracts of subcontractors.{SR-3(3)}
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The [organization] shall document, monitor, and maintain valid provenance of critical system components and associated data in accordance with the Supply Chain Risk Management Plan.{SR-4,SR-4(1),SR-4(2)}
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The [organization] shall employ the [organization]-defined approaches for the purchase of the system, system components, or system services from suppliers.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-5}
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This could include tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods.
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The [organization] shall ensure adequate supplies of critical system components.{SR-5(1)}
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Examples include: using multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for critical components, stockpiling spare components to ensure operation during mission-critical times, and the identification of functionally identical or similar components that may be used, if necessary.
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The [organization] (and Prime Contractor) shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6}
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The [organization] shall employ [Selection (one or more): independent third-party analysis, Program penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of [Program-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6(1)}
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The [organization] shall employ [Program-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) safeguards] to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-7,SC-38,CP-2(8)}
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OPSEC safeguards may include: (1) Limiting the disclosure of information needed to design, develop, test, produce, deliver, and support the element for example, supplier identities, supplier processes, potential suppliers, security requirements, design specifications, testing and evaluation result, and system/component configurations, including the use of direct shipping, blind buys, etc.; (2) Extending supply chain awareness, education, and training for suppliers, intermediate users, and end users; (3) Extending the range of OPSEC tactics, techniques, and procedures to potential suppliers, contracted suppliers, or sub-prime contractor tier of suppliers; and (4) Using centralized support and maintenance services to minimize direct interactions between end users and original suppliers.
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The [organization] shall develop an Anti-Tamper Plan in accordance with DoD directives/instructions on Anti-Tamper guidance for the system, system component, or system service.{SR-9}
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The [organization] shall coordinate the Anti-Tamper Plan with the appropriate organizational entities to ensure correct implementation of tamper protection mechanisms throughout the system lifecycle.{SR-9,SR-9(1)}
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The [organization] shall enable integrity verification of hardware components.{SA-10(3),SA-8(21),SA-10(3),SC-51}
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* The integrity verification mechanisms may include:
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
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The [organization] shall enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-10(1),SI-3,SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-4(4)}
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* The integrity verification mechanisms may include:
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
** Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites;
** Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery;
** Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure;
** Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses;
** Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and
** Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
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The [organization] shall have physical security controls to prevent unauthorized access to the systems that have the ability to command the spacecraft.{SV-AC-4}{PE-3}
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Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
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The [organization] shall define security requirements/configurations for development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-10}{SA-15}
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Source code should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally source code would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. NIST 800-171 is insufficient when protecting highly sensitive unclassified information and more robust controls from NIST SP 800-53 and CNSSI 1253 should be employed. Greater scrutiny must be applied to all development environments.
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For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is not accredited, the [organization] shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by [organization]. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}
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DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
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The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}
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Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
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Any EEEE or mechanical piece parts that cannot be procured from the OCM or their authorized distribution network shall be approved and the government program office notified to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts and materials.{SV-SP-5}{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}
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The Program, working with the contractors, shall identify which ASICs/FPGAs perform or execute an integral part of mission critical functions and if the supplier is accredited “Trusted” by DMEA. If the contractor is not accredited by DMEA, then the Program may apply various of the below ASIC/FPGA assurance requirements to the contractor, and the Program may need to perform a risk assessment of the contractor’s design environment.
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For ASICs that are designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, or tested by a supplier that is not DMEA accredited, the ASIC development shall undergo a threat/vulnerability risk assessment. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the ASIC.{SV-SP-5}{SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-4(4),SR-5}
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DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
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Any EEEE or mechanical piece parts that cannot be procured from the OCM or their authorized franchised distribution network shall be approved by the [organization]’s Parts, Materials and Processes Control Board (PMPCB) as well as the government program office to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts and materials.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
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The Program, working with the contractors, shall identify which ASICs/FPGAs perform or execute an integral part of mission critical functions and if the supplier is accredited “Trusted” by DMEA. If the contractor is not accredited by DMEA, then the Program may apply various of the below ASIC/FPGA assurance requirements to the contractor, and the Program may need to perform a risk assessment of the contractor’s design environment.
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For ASICs that are designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, or tested by a supplier that is NOT DMEA accredited Trusted, the ASIC development shall undergo a threat/vulnerability risk assessment.The assessment shall use Aerospace security guidance and requirements tailored from TOR-2019-00506 Vol.2, and TOR-2019-02543 ASIC and FPGA Risk Assessment Process and Checklist.Based on the results of the risk assessment, the Program may require the developer to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the ASIC.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
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DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
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For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is NOT DMEA accredited Trusted, the contractor/developer shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by the Program.The assessment shall use Aerospace security guidance and requirements in TOR-2019-00506 Vol.2, and TOR-2019-02543 ASIC and FPGA Risk Assessment Process and Checklist.Based on the results of the risk assessment, the Program may require the developer to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
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DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
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The [organization] shall ensure that the contractors/developers have all ASICs designed, developed, manufactured, packaged, and tested by suppliers with a Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) Trust accreditation.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
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The [organization] shall ensure that the contractors/developers have all EEEE, and mechanical piece parts procured from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) or their authorized franchised distribution network.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
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These requirements might only make sense for ASIC/FPGA that are deemed to support mission critical functions. The Program has the responsibility to identify all ASICs and FPGAs that are used in all flight hardware by each hardware element. This list must include all contractor and subcontractor usage of ASICs and FPGAs.
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The [organization] shall use a DMEA certified environment to develop, code and test executable software (firmware or bit-stream) that will be programmed into a one-time programmable FPGA or be programmed into non-volatile memory (NVRAM) that the FPGA executes.{SV-SP-5}{SR-1,SR-5}
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DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following:
4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
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The [organization] should have requirements/controls for all ground/terrestrial systems covering: Data Protection, Ground Software, Endpoints, Networks, Computer Network Defense / Incident Response, Perimeter Security, Physical Controls, and Prevention Program (SSP, PPP, and Training).See NIST 800-53 and CNSSI 1253 for guidance on ground security {SV-MA-7}
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The [spacecraft] shall terminate the connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after 3 minutes of inactivity.{SV-AC-1}{AC-12,SA-8(18),SC-10,SC-23(1),SC-23(3),SI-14,SI-14(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide a user-initiated logout capability for communications sessions.{AC-12(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall monitor security relevant telemetry points for malicious commanding attempts.{AC-17,AC-17(1),AC-17(10),AU-3(1),RA-10,SC-7,SC-16,SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
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The [organization] shall ensure reused TT&C software has adequate uniqueness for command decoders/dictionaries so that commands are received by only the intended satellite.{SV-SP-6}{AC-17(10),SC-16(3),SI-3(9)}
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The goal is to eliminate risk that compromise of one command database does not affect a different one due to reuse. The intent is to ensure that one SV can not process the commands from another SV. Given the crypto setup with keys and VCC needing to match, this requirement may be inherently met as a result of using type-1 cryptography. The intent is not to recreate entire command dictionaries but have enough uniqueness in place that it prevents a SV from receiving a rogue command. As long as there is some uniqueness at the receiving end of the commands, that is adequate.
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The [spacecraft] shall be capable of distinguishing critical versus non-critical commands.{AC-17(4)}
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Critical commands will vary across missions and systems but commonly include commands resulting in maneuvering of the spacecraft or modifying on-board configurations/software.
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The [spacecraft] shall enforce access controls to restrict and monitor critical commands.{AC-17(4)}
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Critical commands will vary across missions and systems but commonly include commands resulting in maneuvering of the spacecraft or modifying on-board configurations/software.
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The [spacecraft] shall accept hazardous commands only when prerequisite checks are satisfied.{AC-17(4),SI-10,SI-10(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),IA-5,IA-5(6),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-28(3)}
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The [spacecraft] encryption key handling shall be handled outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(1),SC-28(3)}
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The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that the onboard software is not able to access the information for key readout.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}
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The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall produce, control, and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys using NSA Certified or Approved key management technology and processes per CNSSP 12.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-9(6),SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2),SC-12(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall use [directional or beamforming] antennas in normal ops to reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept signals.{SV-AV-1}{AC-18(5)}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to restrict command lock based on geographic location of ground stations.{SV-AC-1}{AC-2(11),IA-10,SI-4(13),SI-4(25)}
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This could be performed using command lockout based upon when the spacecraft is over selected regions. This should be configurable so that when conflicts arise, the Program can update. The goal is so the spacecraft won't accept a command when the spacecraft determines it is in a certain region.
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The [spacecraft] shall employ monitoring mechanisms to detect and respond to unauthorized or excessive use of external systems, safeguarding the organization's information and ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of its resources.Monitoring shall be performed on crosslink communications as well as space to ground communications (including direct to user tactical downlinks such as utilized in real-time imagery acquisition).{AC-20,AC-20(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall restrict the use of information inputs to spacecraft and designated ground stations as defined in the applicable ICDs.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-20,SC-23,SI-10,SI-10(5),SI-10(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall uniquely identify and authenticate the ground station and other spacecraft before establishing a remote connection.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,AC-17,AC-17(10),AC-20,IA-3,IA-4,SA-8(18),SI-3(9)}
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The [spacecraft] shall authenticate the ground station (and all commands) and other spacecraft before establishing remote connections using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,AC-17,AC-17(2),AC-17(10),AC-18(1),AC-20,IA-3(1),IA-4,IA-4(9),IA-7,IA-9,SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SA-9(2),SC-7(11),SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-23(3),SI-3(9)}
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Authorization can include embedding opcodes in command strings, using trusted authentication protocols, identifying proper link characteristics such as emitter location, expected range of receive power, expected modulation, data rates, communication protocols, beamwidth, etc.; and tracking command counter increments against expected values.
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The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{AC-3,AC-20,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-23(3),SC-40(3),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses processes which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with system functions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,AC-6,AC-6(9),CA-9,CM-5,CM-5(5),CM-5(6),SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(14),SA-8(23),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-7(29),SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3}
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The [spacecraft] shall implement relay and replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for establishing a remote connection.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,IA-2(8),IA-2(9),SA-8(18),SC-8(1),SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-23(3),SC-40(4)}
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The [spacecraft] shall ensure that processes reusing a shared system resource (e.g., registers, main memory, secondary storage) do not have access to information (including encrypted representations of information) previously stored in that resource during a prior use by a process after formal release of that resource back to the system or reuse.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(19),SC-4,SI-3}
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The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the following information using cryptography while it is at rest: [all information].{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)}
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* The intent as written is for all transmitted traffic to be protected. This includes internal to internal communications and especially outside of the boundary.
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The [spacecraft] shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception.{SV-AC-7}{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-16,SC-16(1)}
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* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
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The [spacecraft] shall encrypt all telemetry on downlink regardless of operating mode to protect current state of spacecraft.{SV-CF-4}{AC-3(10),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-13}
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The [spacecraft] shall not employ a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled (i.e., crypto-bypass mode).{SV-AC-1,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{AC-3(10),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40(4)}
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The [spacecraft] shall ensure that sensitive information can only be accessed by personnel with appropriate roles and an explicit need for such information to perform their duties.{AC-3(11),CM-12}
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Space system sensitive information can include a wide range of candidate material: functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of link segment protections subject to disabling/bypassing, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and mission operations.
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The [spacecraft] shall enforce an attribute-based access control policy over subjects and objects as defined in AC-3(3).{AC-3(13)}
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The [spacecraft] shall require multi-factor authorization for new and updates to on-board stored command sequences.{SV-IT-5}{AC-3(2)}
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Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate).
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The [spacecraft] shall require multi-factor authorization for all spacecraft [applications or operating systems] updates within the spacecraft.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{AC-3(2),CM-3(8),CM-5,PM-12,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3(8),SI-7(12),SI-10(6)}
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The intent is for multiple checks to be performed prior to executing these SV SW updates. One action is mere act of uploading the SW to the spacecraft. Another action could be check of digital signature (ideal but not explicitly required) or hash or CRC or a checksum. Crypto boxes provide another level of authentication for all commands, including SW updates but ideally there is another factor outside of crypto to protect against FSW updates. Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate).
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The [spacecraft] shall provide two independent and unique command messages to deactivate a fault tolerant capability for a critical or catastrophic hazard.{AC-3(2),PE-10,SA-8(15)}
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The [spacecraft] shall enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the platform and between interconnected systems so that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-3,CA-3(6),CA-3(7),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}
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The [spacecraft] security implementation shall ensure that information should not be allowed to flow between partitioned applications unless explicitly permitted by the system.{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(29),SC-16,SC-32}
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The [spacecraft] shall, when transferring information between different security domains, implements the following security policy filters that require fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content: connectors and semaphores implemented in the RTOS.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4(14),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-16}
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The [spacecraft] shall implement boundary protections to separate bus, communications, and payload components supporting their respective functions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),CA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(14),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-2(2),SC-7(13),SC-7(21),SC-7(29),SC-16(3),SC-32,SI-3,SI-4(13),SI-4(25)}
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The [spacecraft] shall isolate mission critical functionality from non-mission critical functionality by means of an isolation boundary (e.g.via partitions) that controls access to and protects the integrity of, the hardware, software, and firmware that provides that functionality.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),CA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(19),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-3,SC-3(4),SC-7(13),SC-7(29),SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3,SI-7(10),SI-7(12)}
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The [spacecraft] data within partitioned applications shall not be read or modified by other applications/partitions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4,SC-6,SC-32}
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The [spacecraft] shall prevent unauthorized access to system resources by employing an efficient capability based object model that supports both confinement and revocation of these capabilities when the platform security deems it necessary.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(8),IA-4(9),PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4,SC-16,SC-32,SI-3}
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The [organization] shall state that information should not be allowed to flow between partitioned applications unless explicitly permitted by the Program's security policy.{SV-AC-6}{AC-4,AC-4(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall use protected processing domains to enforce the policy that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted as a basis for flow control decisions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-4(2),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall define the security functions and security-relevant information for which the system must protect from unauthorized access.{AC-6(1),SA-8(19),SC-7(13),SC-16}
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The [spacecraft] shall implement access control mechanisms to ensure that individuals with privileged access only utilize their privileges as necessary to perform their official duties.{AC-6(9)}
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The [spacecraft] shall log and monitor critical activities to detect and respond to unauthorized or malicious activities.{AC-6(9),AC-17(4)}
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Critical commands will vary across missions and systems but commonly include commands resulting in maneuvering of the spacecraft or modifying on-board configurations/software.
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The [spacecraft] shall monitor and collect all onboard cyber-relevant data (from multiple system components), including identification of potential attacks and sufficient information about the attack for subsequent analysis.{SV-DCO-1}{AC-6(9),AC-20,AC-20(1),AU-2,AU-12,IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(2),SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}
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The spacecraft will monitor and collect data that provides accountability of activity occurring onboard the spacecraft. Due to resource limitations on the spacecraft, analysis must be performed to determine which data is critical for retention and which can be filtered. Full system coverage of data and actions is desired as an objective; it will likely be impractical due to the resource limitations. “Cyber-relevant data” refers to all data and actions deemed necessary to support accountability and awareness of onboard cyber activities for the mission. This would include data that may indicate abnormal activities, critical configuration parameters, transmissions on onboard networks, command logging, or other such data items. This set of data items should be identified early in the system requirements and design phase. Cyber-relevant data should support the ability to assess whether abnormal events are unintended anomalies or actual cyber threats. Actual cyber threats may rarely or never occur, but non-threat anomalies occur regularly. The ability to filter out cyber threats for non-cyber threats in relevant time would provide a needed capability. Examples could include successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g., classification levels).
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The [spacecraft] shall generate audit records to capture changes made to audit record generation configurations by authorized users.{AU-12(3)}
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Authorized users, including administrators, shall be identified, and the system shall record relevant information such as the user identity, date, time, and nature of changes made to the audit record generation settings.
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The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to modify the set of audited events (e.g., cyber-relevant data).{SV-DCO-1}{AU-12(3),AU-14}
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The [spacecraft] shall generate cyber-relevant audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, and the outcome of the event.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-3,AU-3(1),AU-12,IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}
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The [spacecraft] shall be configured to allocate audit record storage capacity in accordance with 1 week audit record storage requirements.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-4,AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall downlink relevant audit log data to ground systems frequently enough to avoid any situation where audit storage capacity is exceeded.{AU-4(1)}
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The frequency of offloading this data depends on the amount of data being audited/logged and will vary across missions/systems.
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The [spacecraft] shall attribute cyber attacks and identify unauthorized use of the platform by downlinking onboard cyber information to the mission ground station within 3 minutes. {AU-4(1),IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),RA-10,SA-8(22),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(5),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24)}
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The [spacecraft] shall attribute cyberattacks and identify unauthorized use of the spacecraft by downlinking onboard cyber information to the mission ground station within [mission-appropriate timelines minutes].{SV-DCO-1}{AU-4(1),SI-4(5)}
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Requirement is to support offboard attribution by enabling the fusion of spacecraft cyber data with ground-based cyber data. This would provide end-to-end accountability of commands, data, and other data that can be used to determine the origin of attack from the ground system. Data should be provided within time constraints relevant for the particular mission and its given operational mode. Analysis should be performed to identify the specific timeliness requirements for a mission, which may vary depending on mission mode, operational status, availability of communications resources, and other factors. The specific data required should be identified, as well.
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The [spacecraft] shall alert in the event of the [organization]-defined audit/logging processing failures.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5}
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The [spacecraft] shall alert in the event of the audit/logging processing failures.{AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2),SI-3,SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24)}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide an alert immediately to [at a minimum the mission director, administrators, and security officers] when the following failure events occur: [minimally but not limited to: auditing software/hardware errors; failures in the audit capturing mechanisms; and audit storage capacity reaching 95%, 99%, and 100%] of allocated capacity.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
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Intent is to have human on the ground be alerted to failures. This can be decomposed to SV to generate telemetry and to Ground to alert.
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The [spacecraft] shall routinely report audit log storage utilization along with traditional health and status data during pre-determined passes.{AU-5(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability of a cyber “black-box” to capture necessary data for cyber forensics of threat signatures and anomaly resolution when cyber attacks are detected.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5(5),AU-9(2),AU-9(3),AU-12,IR-4(12),IR-4(13),IR-5(1),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
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Similar concept of a "black box" on an aircraft where all critical information is stored for post forensic analysis. Black box can be used to record CPU utilization, GNC physical parameters, audit records, memory contents, TT&C data points, etc. The timeframe is dependent upon implementation but needs to meet the intent of the requirement. For example, 30 days may suffice.
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The [spacecraft] shall provide automated onboard mechanisms that integrate audit review, analysis, and reporting processes to support mission processes for investigation and response to suspicious activities to determine the attack class in the event of a cyber attack.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(1),IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),PM-16(1),RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(22),SC-5(3),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
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* Identifying the class (e.g., exfiltration, Trojans, etc.), nature, or effect of cyberattack (e.g., exfiltration, subverted control, or mission interruption) is necessary to determine the type of response. The first order of identification may be to determine whether the event is an attack or a non-threat event (anomaly). The objective requirement would be to predict the impact of the detected signature.
* Unexpected conditions can include RF lockups, loss of lock, failure to acquire an expected contact and unexpected reports of acquisition, unusual AGC and ACS control excursions, unforeseen actuator enabling's or actions, thermal stresses, power aberrations, failure to authenticate, software or counter resets, etc. Mitigation might include additional TMONs, more detailed AGC and PLL thresholds to alert operators, auto-capturing state snapshot images in memory when unexpected conditions occur, signal spectra measurements, and expanded default diagnostic telemetry modes to help in identifying and resolving anomalous conditions.
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The [organization] shall integrate terrestrial system audit log analysis as part of the standard anomaly resolution process to correlate any anomalous behavior in the terrestrial systems that correspond to anomalous behavior in the spacecraft.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(1),IR-5(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall integrate cyber related detection and responses with existing fault management capabilities to ensure tight integration between traditional fault management and cyber intrusion detection and prevention.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(4),IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(26),SC-3(4),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(16),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-7(7),SI-13}
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The onboard IPS system should be integrated into the existing onboard spacecraft fault management system (FMS) because the FMS has its own fault detection and response system built in. SV corrective behavior is usually limited to automated fault responses and ground commanded recovery actions. Intrusion prevention and response methods will inform resilient cybersecurity design. These methods enable detected threat activity to trigger defensive responses and resilient SV recovery.
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The [spacecraft] shall record time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).{SV-DCO-1}{AU-8}
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The [spacecraft] shall record time stamps for audit records that provide a granularity of one Z-count (1.5 sec).{SV-DCO-1}{AU-8}
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The [spacecraft] shall use internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-8}
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The [spacecraft] shall synchronize the internal system clocks for each processor to the authoritative time source when the time difference is greater than the FSW-defined interval.{SV-AV-2}{AU-8(1),SC-45,SC-45(1),SC-45(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall internally monitor PNT performance so that changes or interruptions in the navigation or timing are flagged.{AU-8(1),SC-45(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall incorporate backup sources for navigation and timing.{SV-IT-1}{AU-8(1),SC-45(1),SC-45(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall have fault-tolerant authoritative time sourcing for the platform's clock.{SV-IT-1}{AU-8(2),SC-45,SC-45(1),SC-45(2),SI-13}
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* Adopt voting schemes (triple modular redundancy) that include inputs from backup sources. Consider providing a second reference frame against which short-term changes or interferences can be compared.
* Atomic clocks, crystal oscillators and/or GPS receivers are often used as time sources. GPS should not be used as the only source due to spoofing/jamming concerns.
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The [spacecraft] shall protect information obtained from logging/intrusion-monitoring from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-9,AU-9(3),RA-10,SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}
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The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit information and audit tools.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-9(3),RA-10,SC-8(1),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(24)}
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All [spacecraft] commands which have unrecoverable consequence must have dual authentication prior to command execution.{AU-9(5),IA-3,IA-4,IA-10,PE-3,PM-12,SA-8(15),SA-8(21),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-3(9),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-7(12),SI-10(6),SI-13}
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The [spacecraft] shall have a method to ensure the integrity of these commands and validate their authenticity before execution.{AU-9(5),IA-3,IA-4,IA-10,PE-3,PM-12,SA-8(15),SA-8(21),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-3(9),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-7(12),SI-10(6),SI-13}
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The [organization] shall ensure that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.{SV-MA-6}{CA-7(5),PL-7,PL-8(1),SA-8(19)}
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The [spacecraft] shall establish, manage, and monitor internal connections between system components in accordance with organization-defined security policies and procedures.{CA-9}
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Internal connections for spacecraft may include certain subsystems and payloads that communicate across a common bus.
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The [organization] shall document and design a security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that allocates the [organization]s defined safeguards to the indicated locations and layers: [Examples include: operating system abstractions and hardware mechanisms to the separate processors in the platform, internal components, and the FSW].{SV-MA-6}{CA-9,PL-7,PL-8,PL-8(1),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}
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The [spacecraft] shall utilize automated mechanisms to protect sensitive information and detect and alert when sensitive information is accessed without satisfying defined criteria.{CM-12(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall use automated mechanisms to maintain and validate baseline configuration to ensure the [spacecraft] is up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available.{SV-SP-3}{CM-2(2),CM-3(5),CM-3(7),CM-6,SA-8(8)}
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This could be command trigger from Ground or elsewhere. The point here is that the self-test is executed onboard the spacecraft via onboard HW/SW self-test mechanisms and its result is reported to the Ground
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The [spacecraft] shall prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the ground.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-9}{CM-3,CM-3(8),CM-5,CM-5(3),CM-14,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3,SI-7(12),SI-7(15)}
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The [organization] shall employ automated tools that provide notification to ground operators upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.{CM-3(5),CM-6,IR-6,IR-6(2),SA-8(21),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide automatic notification to ground operators upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(2)}
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The [spacecraft], upon detection of a potential integrity violation, shall provide the capability to [audit the event and alert ground operators].{SV-DCO-1}{CM-3(5),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(8)}
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One example would be for bad commands where the system would reject the command and not increment the Vehicle Command Counter (VCC) and include the information in telemetry.
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The [spacecraft] shall execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates uploaded are exactly as specified by the gold copies. {CM-3(5),SA-8(8),SA-8(21),SA-8(31),SA-10(3),SA-10(4),SA-10(6),SI-7(10),SI-7(12)}
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The [spacecraft] shall perform an integrity check of software, firmware, and information at startup or during security-relevant events. {CM-3(5),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-7(1),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SI-7(17)}
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The [spacecraft] shall automatically generate audit records of the configuration management access enforcement actions.{CM-5(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall limit changes to system components and system-related information during operations.{CM-5(5)}
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The [spacecraft] shall be configured to provide only essential capabilities.{CM-6,CM-7,SA-8(2),SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(23),SA-8(26),SA-15(5)}
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The [spacecraft] shall be configured to restrict software execution to only the software/processes that are explicitly authorized and necessary for operational purposes.{CM-7(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall enforce least functionality principles to prevent the execution of unauthorized software.{CM-7(2)}
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The [organization] shall ensure that software planned for reuse meets the fit, form, and function, and security as a component within the new application.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(5)}
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The [spacecraft] operating system, if COTS or FOSS, shall be selected from a [organization]-defined acceptance list.{SV-SP-7}{CM-7(8),CM-7(5)}
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The [spacecraft] and all ground support systems (including those during development) shall be capable of detecting unauthorized hardware components/connections.{CM-7(9)}
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The [spacecraft] shall enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected, enters a cyber-safe mode of operation with restrictions as defined based on the cyber-safe mode.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(3),PE-10,RA-10,SA-8(16),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-13,SI-17}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to enter the platform into a known good, operational cyber-safe mode from a tamper-resistant, configuration-controlled (“gold”) image that is authenticated as coming from an acceptable supplier, and has its integrity verified.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4(3),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-13,SI-17}
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Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and SW functions to preattack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on available equipment still available after a cyberattack. The goal is for the vehicle to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved.
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The [spacecraft] shall enter cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-17}
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The [spacecraft] shall fail to a known secure state for failures during initialization, and aborts preserving information necessary to return to operations in failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-24,SI-13,SI-17}
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The [spacecraft] shall fail securely to a secondary device in the event of an operational failure of a primary boundary protection device (i.e., crypto solution).{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{CP-13,SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-7(18),SI-13,SI-13(4)}
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The [organization] shall define the security safeguards that are to be automatically employed when integrity violations are discovered.{SV-IT-2}{CP-2,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-7(5),SI-7(8)}
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The [organization] shall define the resources to be allocated to protect the availability of system resources.{SV-AC-6}{CP-2(2),SC-6}
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The [spacecraft] shall recover from cyber-safe mode to mission operations within 20 minutes.{SV-MA-5}{CP-2(3),CP-2(5),IR-4,SA-8(24)}
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Upon conclusion of addressing the threat, the system should be capable of recovering from the minimal survival mode back into a mission-ready state within defined timelines. The intent is to define the timelines and the capability to return back to mission operations.
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The [spacecraft] shall provide or support the capability for recovery and reconstitution to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-4(4),CP-10,CP-10(4),CP-10(6),CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24)}
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The [spacecraft] shall have multiple uplink paths {SV-AV-1}{CP-8,CP-11,SA-8(18),SC-5,SC-47}
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The [spacecraft] shall utilize TRANSEC.{SV-AV-1}{CP-8,RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-8(4),SC-16,SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40(4)}
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Transmission Security (TRANSEC) is used to ensure the availability of transmissions and limit intelligence collection from the transmissions. TRANSEC is secured through burst encoding, frequency hopping, or spread spectrum methods where the required pseudorandom sequence generation is controlled by a cryptographic algorithm and key. Such keys are known as transmission security keys (TSK). The objectives of transmission security are low probability of interception (LPI), low probability of detection (LPD), and antijam which means resistance to jamming (EPM or ECCM).
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The [spacecraft] shall maintain the ability to establish communication with the spacecraft in the event of an anomaly to the primary receive path.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{CP-8,SA-8(18),SC-47}
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Receiver communication can be established after an anomaly with such capabilities as multiple receive apertures, redundant paths within receivers, redundant receivers, omni apertures, fallback default command modes, and lower bit rates for contingency commanding, as examples
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The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptography for the indicated uses using the indicated protocols, algorithms, and mechanisms, in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards: [NSA- certified or approved cryptography for protection of classified information, FIPS-validated cryptography for the provision of hashing].{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{IA-7,SC-13}
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The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptography for the indicated uses using the indicated protocols, algorithms, and mechanisms, in accordance with CNSSP 12 and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{IA-7,SC-8(1),SC-13,SI-12}
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The [spacecraft] shall be able to locate the onboard origin of a cyber attack and alert ground operators within 3 minutes.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),RA-10,SA-8(22),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(16),SI-4(24)}
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The origin of any attack onboard the vehicle should be identifiable to support mitigation. At the very least, attacks from critical element (safety-critical or higher-attack surface) components should be locatable quickly so that timely action can occur.
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The [spacecraft] shall detect and deny unauthorized outgoing communications posing a threat to the spacecraft.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-5(4),RA-10,SC-7(9),SC-7(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(4),SI-4(7),SI-4(11),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25)}
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The [spacecraft] shall recover to a known cyber-safe state when an anomaly is detected.{IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-10(6),SI-13,SI-17}
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The [spacecraft] shall detect and recover from detected memory errors or transitions to a known cyber-safe state.{IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-10(6),SI-13,SI-17}
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The [spacecraft] shall select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber attacks prior to entering cyber-safe mode.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-4(7),SI-17}
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These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker exquisitely—with or without ground aiding. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system." These countermeasures are likely executed prior to entering into a cyber-safe mode.
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The [spacecraft] shall provide cyber threat status to the ground segment for the Defensive Cyber Operations team, per the governing specification.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-5,PM-16,PM-16(1),RA-3(3),RA-10,SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}
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The future space enterprises will include full-time Cyber Defense teams supporting space mission systems. Their work is currently focused on the ground segment but may eventually require specific data from the space segment for their successful operation. This requirement is a placeholder to ensure that any DCO-related requirements are taken into consideration for this document.
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The [spacecraft] shall perform an orderly, controlled system shut-down to a known cyber-safe state upon receipt of a termination command or condition.{PE-11,PE-11(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SI-17}
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The [spacecraft] shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-14,PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1)}
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The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus.
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The [spacecraft] shall be designed such that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(19)}
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This requirement applies if system components are being designed to address EMSEC and the measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements.
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The [organization] shall implement a security architecture and design that provides the required security functionality, allocates security controls among physical and logical components, and integrates individual security functions, mechanisms, and processes together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.{SV-MA-6}{PL-7,SA-2,SA-8,SA-8(1),SA-8(2),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SC-32,SC-32(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.{SV-AC-6}{PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4}
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The [spacecraft] shall be designed and configured so that encrypted communications traffic and data is visible to on-board security monitoring tools.{SV-DCO-1}{RA-10,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(10),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25)}
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The [spacecraft] shall be designed and configured so that spacecraft memory can be monitored by the on-board intrusion detection/prevention capability.{SV-DCO-1}{RA-10,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(24),SI-16}
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The [spacecraft] shall have on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-MA-4}{RA-10,SC-7,SI-3,SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
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The mission critical components or systems could be GNC/Attitude Control, C&DH, TT&C, Fault Management.
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The [spacecraft] shall employ advanced analytics capabilities within the IDS/IPS to address dynamic never-before-seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies along with signature-based attacks.{RA-3(4)}
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The [spacecraft] shall generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11}
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The [spacecraft] shall reveal error messages only to operations personnel monitoring the telemetry.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11}
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The [spacecraft] shall retain the capability to update/upgrade operating systems while on-orbit.{SV-SP-7}{SA-4(5),SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3}
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The operating system updates should be performed using multi-factor authorization and should only be performed when risk of compromise/exploitation of identified vulnerability outweighs the risk of not performing the update.
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The [organization] shall define acceptable secure communication protocols available for use within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}
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The secure communication protocol should include "strong" authenticated encryption characteristics.
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The [spacecraft] shall only use [organization]-defined communication protocols within the mission.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}
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The [spacecraft] shall only use communication protocols that support encryption within the mission.{SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-40(4)}
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The [spacecraft] shall perform attestation at each stage of startup and ensure overall trusted boot regime (i.e., root of trust).{SV-IT-3}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10),SI-7(17)}
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It is important for the computing module to be able to access a set of functions and commands that it trusts; that is, that it knows to be true. This concept is referred to as root of trust (RoT) and should be included in the spacecraft design. With RoT, a device can always be trusted to operate as expected. RoT functions, such as verifying the device’s own code and configuration, must be implemented in secure hardware (i.e., field programmable gate arrays). By checking the security of each stage of power-up, RoT devices form the first link in a chain of trust that protects the spacecraft
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The [spacecraft] shall maintain a separate execution domain for each executing process.{SV-AC-6}{SA-8(14),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(21),SC-39,SI-3}
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The [spacecraft] flight software must not be able to tamper with the security policy or its enforcement mechanisms.{SV-AC-6}{SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SC-3,SC-7(13)}
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The [spacecraft] shall initialize the platform to a known safe state.{SA-8(19),SA-8(23),SA-8(24),SI-17}
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The [spacecraft] shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception in accordance with [organization] provided encryption matrix.{SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-8(3)}
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* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
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The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms that achieve adequate protection against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-40,SC-40(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to verify the correct operation of security-relevant software and hardware mechanisms (e.g.spacecraft IDS/IPS, logging, crypto, etc..) {SV-DCO-1}{SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-6}
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The [organization] shall define and document the transitional state or security-relevant events when the spacecraft will perform integrity checks on software, firmware, and information.{SV-IT-2}{SA-8(21),SI-7(1),SI-7(10),SR-4(4)}
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The [spacecraft] shall be capable of removing flight software after updated versions have been installed.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-8(8),SI-2(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability for data connection ports or input/output devices to be disabled or removed prior to spacecraft operations.{SV-AC-5}{SA-9(2),SC-7(14),SC-41,SC-51}
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Intent is for external physical data ports to be disabled (logical or physical) while in operational orbit. Port disablement does not necessarily need to be irreversible.
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The [organization] shall use NIST Approved for symmetric key management for Unclassified systems; NSA Approved or stronger symmetric key management technology for Classified systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2)}
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FIPS-complaint technology used by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques that are either a) specified in a FIPS, or b) adopted in a FIPS and specified either in an appendix to the FIPS or in a document referenced by the FIPS.
NSA-approved technology used for symmetric key management by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria.
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The [organization] shall use NSA approved key management technology and processes.NSA-approved technology used for asymmetric key management by The [organization] shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall produce, control, and distribute asymmetric cryptographic keys using [organization]-defined asymmetric key management processes.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)}
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In most cased the Program will leverage NSA-approved key management technology and processes.
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The [spacecraft] shall discriminate between valid and invalid input into the software and rejects invalid input.{SC-16(2),SI-3(8),SI-10,SI-10(3),SI-10(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall identify and reject commands received out-of-sequence when the out-of-sequence commands can cause a hazard/failure or degrade the control of a hazard or mission.{SC-16(2),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-10,SI-10(6),SI-13}
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The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the [all information] using cryptography while it is at rest.{SV-IT-2,SV-CF-2}{SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)}
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* Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. This is often referred to as data-at-rest encryption.
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The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide independent mission/cyber critical threads such that any one credible event will not corrupt another mission/cyber critical thread.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SC-3}
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The [spacecraft] shall provide independent mission/cyber critical threads such that any one credible event will not corrupt another mission/cyber critical thread.{SC-3,SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3,SI-13}
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If Spacewire is utilized, the [spacecraft] shall adhere to [organization]-defined time synchronization standard/protocol to synchronize time across a Spacewire network with an accuracy around 1 microsecond.{SV-AV-8}{SC-45,SC-45(1),SC-45(2)}
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Example for time synchronization is Time Distribution Protocol (http://spacewire.esa.int/WG/Spacewire/SpW-WG-Mtg17-Proceedings/Documents/ISC_2011%20CCSDS%20Time%20Distribution%20over%20SpaceWire.pdf & https://amstel.estec.esa.int/tecedm/ipcores/time_sync_protocol.pdf). These activities by ESA are looking to perform standardization of a time distribution protocol, synchronization, and handling of latency, jitter, and drift
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The [organization] shall ensure synchronization of system clocks within and between systems and system components..{SV-AV-3}{SC-45,SC-45(1),SC-45(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall internally monitor GPS performance so that changes or interruptions in the navigation or timing are flagged.{SV-IT-1}{SC-45(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall implement protections against external and internal communications from jamming attempts.{SC-5,SC-40,SC-40(1)}
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The [spacecraft] shall protect external and internal communications from jamming and spoofing attempts.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{SC-5,SC-40,SC-40(1)}
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Can be aided via the Crosslink, S-Band, and L-Band subsystems
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The [spacecraft] shall implement denial-of-service protection mechanisms that restrict the ability of the spacecraft to be used in an attack against other systems.{SC-5(1)}
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Examples include:
- Traffic Analysis and Filtering: The [spacecraft] shall deploy traffic analysis and filtering mechanisms to detect and mitigate denial-of-service attacks, preventing malicious or excessive traffic from impacting the availability of the spacecraft or any of its sub-components.
- Rate Limiting: The [spacecraft] shall implement rate limiting controls to restrict the rate of incoming and outgoing network traffic, preventing the system from being used to launch or amplify denial-of-service attacks.
- Resource Allocation: The [spacecraft] shall establish and enforce resource allocation policies to ensure that system resources are fairly and appropriately distributed, minimizing the impact of denial-of-service attacks.
- Anomaly Detection: The [spacecraft] shall employ anomaly detection mechanisms to identify unusual patterns of behavior indicative of denial-of-service attacks and take appropriate action to mitigate such attacks.
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The [spacecraft] shall implement denial-of-service protection measures for managing capacity, bandwidth, and redundancy within the spacecraft to limit the effects of flooding attacks.{SC-5(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall monitor [Program defined telemetry points] for malicious commanding attempts.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{SC-7,AU-3(1),AC-17(1)}
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Source from AEROSPACE REPORT NO. TOR-2019-02178
Vehicle Command Counter (VCC) - Counts received valid commands
Rejected Command Counter - Counts received invalid commands
Command Receiver On/Off Mode - Indicates times command receiver is accepting commands
Command Receivers Received Signal Strength - Analog measure of the amount of received RF energy at the receive frequency
Command Receiver Lock Modes - Indicates when command receiver has achieved lock on command signal
Telemetry Downlink Modes - Indicates when the satellite’s telemetry was transmitting
Cryptographic Modes - Indicates the operating modes of the various encrypted links
Received Commands - Log of all commands received and executed by the satellite
System Clock - Master onboard clock
GPS Ephemeris - Indicates satellite location derived from GPS Signals
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The [spacecraft] shall physically isolate security tools, mechanisms, and support components used for boundary protection within the spacecraft.{SC-7(13)}
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The [spacecraft] shall be configured to deny communications by default and only permit authorized communications based on approved exceptions.{SC-7(5)}
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The [spacecraft] shall audit the communications characteristics (signals, frequencies, etc.) associated with denied communications.{SC-7(9)}
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The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of all transmitted information.{SV-IT-2,SV-AC-7}{SC-8}
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* The intent as written is for all transmitted traffic to be protected. This includes internal to internal communications and especially outside of the boundary.
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The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of, and detect changes to, information during transmission unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards.{SV-AC-7}{SC-8(1),SI-7(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception.{SV-IT-2}{SC-8(2)}
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* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
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The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall accept [Program defined hazardous] commands only when prerequisite checks are satisfied.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10}
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The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall identify and reject commands received out-of-sequence when the out-of-sequence commands can cause a hazard/failure or degrade the control of a hazard or mission.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10}
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The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall perform prerequisite checks for the execution of hazardous commands.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10}
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The [organization] shall ensure that all viable commands are known to the mission and SV "owner.{SV-AC-8}{SI-10,SI-10(3)}
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This is a concern for bus re-use. It is possible that the manufacturer left previously coded commands in their syntax rather than starting from a clean slate. This leaves potential backdoors and other functionality the mission does not know about.
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The [organization] shall perform analysis of critical (backdoor) commands that could adversely affect mission success if used maliciously.{SV-AC-8}{SI-10,SI-10(3)}
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Heritage and commercial products often have many residual operational (e.g., hardware commands) and test capabilities that are unidentified or unknown to the end user, perhaps because they were not expressly stated mission requirements. These would never be tested and their effects unknown, and hence, could be used maliciously. Test commands not needed for flight should be deleted from the flight database.
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The [spacecraft] shall only use or include [organization]-defined critical commands for the purpose of providing emergency access where commanding authority is appropriately restricted.{SV-AC-8}{SI-10,SI-10(3)}
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The intent is protect against misuse of critical commands. On potential scenario is where you could use accounts with different privileges, could require an additional passphrase or require entry into a different state or append an additional footer to a critical command. There is room for design flexibility here that can still satisfy this requirement.
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The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall discriminate between valid and invalid input into the software and rejects invalid input.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10,SI-10(3)}
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The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall properly handle spurious input and missing data.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10,SI-10(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall properly handle spurious input and missing data.{SI-10,SI-10(3),SI-10(6)}
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The [spacecraft] shall perform prerequisite checks for the execution of hazardous commands.{SI-10,SI-10(6),SI-13}
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The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall validate a functionally independent parameter prior to the issuance of any sequence that could remove an inhibit or perform a hazardous action.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall validate a functionally independent parameter prior to the issuance of any sequence that could remove an inhibit, or perform a hazardous action.{SI-10(3),SI-10(6),SI-13}
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The [spacecraft] fault management solution shall utilize memory uncorrectable bit error detection information in a strategy to autonomously minimize the adverse effects of uncorrectable bit errors within the spacecraft.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
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The [spacecraft] Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) shall have the ability to simultaneously update check-bits for [organization]-defined memory addresses.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
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The [spacecraft] shall integrate EDAC scheme with fault management and cyber-protection mechanisms to respond to the detection of uncorrectable multi-bit errors, other than time-delayed monitoring of EDAC telemetry by the mission operators on the ground.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
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The [spacecraft] shall use Error Detection and Correcting (EDAC) memory.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
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The [spacecraft] shall utilize an EDAC scheme to routinely check for bit errors in the stored data on board the spacecraft, correct the single-bit errors, and identify the memory addresses of data with uncorrectable multi-bit errors of at least order two, if not higher order in some cases.{SV-IT-4}{SI-16}
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The [spacecraft] shall limit the generation and storage of sensitive/critical mission or system information.Generation shall be done on-demand where possible, and the information shall be deleted immediately when no longer needed.{SI-21}
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The [spacecraft] shall only use or include critical commands for the purpose of providing emergency access where commanding authority is appropriately restricted.{SI-3(8),SI-10,SI-10(3)}
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The [spacecraft] shall monitor all inbound/outbound communications to detect unusual or unauthorized behavior and respond appropriately (disregard command, deny connection, etc.){SI-4(4)}
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The [spacecraft] shall perform an integrity check of [Program-defined software, firmware, and information] at startup; at [Program-defined transitional states or security-relevant events] {SV-IT-2}{SI-7(1)}
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The [organization] shall employ automated tools that provide notification to [Program-defined personnel] upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.{SV-IT-2}{SI-7(2)}
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The [spacecraft] shall automatically [Selection (one or more):restarts the FSW/processor, performs side swap, audits failure; implements Program-defined security safeguards] when integrity violations are discovered.{SV-IT-2}{SI-7(8)}
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The [spacecraft] shall implement the hardware, firmware, and software anti-tamper mechanisms identified in the Anti-Tamper Plan.{SR-9(1),SR-10}
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