PE-3 - Physical Access Control

a. Enforce physical access authorizations at [Assignment: organization-defined entry and exit points to the facility where the system resides] by: 1. Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and 2. Controlling ingress and egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined physical access control systems or devices] ; guards]; b. Maintain physical access audit logs for [Assignment: organization-defined entry or exit points]; c. Control access to areas within the facility designated as publicly accessible by implementing the following controls: [Assignment: organization-defined physical access controls]; d. Escort visitors and control visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring visitor escorts and control of visitor activity]; e. Secure keys, combinations, and other physical access devices; f. Inventory [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices] every [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and g. Change combinations and keys [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and/or when keys are lost, combinations are compromised, or when individuals possessing the keys or combinations are transferred or terminated.


Informational References

ISO 27001

ID: PE-3
Enhancements:  1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8

Countermeasures Covered by Control

ID Name Description D3FEND
CM0054 Two-Person Rule Utilize a two-person system to achieve a high level of security for systems with command level access to the spacecraft. Under this rule all access and actions require the presence of two authorized people at all times.
CM0053 Physical Security Controls Employ physical security controls (badge with pins, guards, gates, etc.) to prevent unauthorized access to the systems that have the ability to command the spacecraft.

Space Threats Tagged by Control

ID Description
SV-AC-4 Masquerading as an authorized entity in order to gain access/Insider Threat

Sample Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [organization] shall have a two-man rule to achieve a high level of security for systems with command level access to the spacecraft.(Under this rule all access and actions require the presence of two authorized people at all times.) {SV-AC-4}{PE-3} Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
The [organization] shall have Insider Threat Program to aid in the prevention of people with authorized access to perform malicious activities.{SV-AC-4}{PM-12,AT-2(2),IR-4(7)} Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
The [organization], upon termination of individual employment, disables information system access within [TBD minutes] of termination.{SV-AC-4}{PS-4}
The [organization] shall have physical security controls to prevent unauthorized access to the systems that have the ability to command the spacecraft.{SV-AC-4}{PE-3} Note: These are not spacecraft requirements but important to call out but likely are covered under other requirements by the customer.
All [spacecraft] commands which have unrecoverable consequence must have dual authentication prior to command execution.{AU-9(5),IA-3,IA-4,IA-10,PE-3,PM-12,SA-8(15),SA-8(21),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-3(9),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-7(12),SI-10(6),SI-13}
The [spacecraft] shall have a method to ensure the integrity of these commands and validate their authenticity before execution.{AU-9(5),IA-3,IA-4,IA-10,PE-3,PM-12,SA-8(15),SA-8(21),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-3(9),SI-4(13),SI-4(25),SI-7(12),SI-10(6),SI-13}

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID Name Description
IA-0007 Compromise Ground Station Threat actors may initially compromise the ground station in order to access the target SV. Once compromised, the threat actor can perform a multitude of initial access techniques, including replay, compromising FSW deployment, compromising encryption keys, and compromising authentication schemes.
IA-0007.01 Compromise On-Orbit Update Threat actors may manipulate and modify on-orbit updates before they are sent to the target SV. This attack can be done in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulating environment variables, on-board table/memory values, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one.
IA-0007.02 Malicious Commanding via Valid GS Threat actors may compromise target owned ground systems components (e.g., front end processors, command and control software, etc.) that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. These ground systems components have already been configured for communications to the victim SV. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute an operation. Threat actors may utilize these systems for various tasks, including Execution and Exfiltration.
EXF-0007 Compromised Ground Station Threat actors may compromise target owned ground systems that can be used for future campaigns or to perpetuate other techniques. These ground systems have already been configured for communications to the victim SV. By compromising this infrastructure, threat actors can stage, launch, and execute an operation. Threat actors may utilize these systems for various tasks, including Execution and Exfiltration.
EXF-0008 Compromised Developer Site Threat actors may compromise development environments located within the ground system or a developer/partner site. This attack can take place in a number of different ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulating environment variables, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one. This technique is usually performed before the target SV is in orbit, with the hopes of adding malicious code to the actual FSW during the development process.
DE-0004 Masquerading Threat actors may gain access to a victim SV by masquerading as an authorized entity. This can be done several ways, including through the manipulation of command headers, spoofing locations, or even leveraging Insider's access (i.e., Insider Threat)