Compromise Software Defined Radio

Threat actors may target software defined radios due to their software nature to establish C2 channels. Since SDRs are programmable, when combined with supply chain or development environment attacks, SDRs provide a pathway to setup covert C2 channels for a threat actor.

ID: CM0014
Sub-techniques: 
Related Aerospace Threat IDs:  SV-SP-11
Related MITRE ATT&CK TTPs: 
Tactic:
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2022/10/28

Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0025 Supplier Review Conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services. PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SR-11 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) SR-6 SR-6 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22
CM0026 Original Component Manufacturer Components/Software that cannot be procured from the original component manufacturer or their authorized franchised distribution network should be approved by the supply chain board or equivalent to prevent and detect counterfeit and fraudulent parts, materials, and software. AC-20(5) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(4) SR-1 SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29
CM0027 ASIC/FPGA Manufacturing Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) / Field Programmable Gate Arrays should be developed by accredited trusted foundries to limit potential hardware-based trojan injections. PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SI-3 SR-1 SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.8.7 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29
CM0028 Tamper Protection Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Leverage tamper proof protection where possible when shipping/receiving equipment. CA-8(3) CM-7(9) MA-7 PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-10(4) SC-51 SR-1 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29
CM0004 Development Environment Security In order to secure the development environment, the first step is understanding all the devices and people who interact with it. Maintain an accurate inventory of all people and assets that touch the development environment. Ensure strong multi-factor authentication is used across the development environment, especially for code repositories, as threat actors may attempt to sneak malicious code into software that's being built without being detected. Use zero-trust access controls to the code repositories where possible. For example, ensure the main branches in repositories are protected from injecting malicious code. A secure development environment requires change management, privilege management, auditing and in-depth monitoring across the environment. AC-20(5) AC-3(11) AC-3(13) AC-3(15) CA-8 CM-14 CM-2(2) CM-3(2) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) CM-4(1) CM-7(8) CM-7(8) CP-2(8) MA-7 PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) RA-3(2) RA-5 RA-5(2) RA-9 SA-10 SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-11(1) SA-11(2) SA-11(2) SA-11(4) SA-11(5) SA-11(5) SA-11(6) SA-11(7) SA-11(7) SA-11(8) SA-15 SA-15(3) SA-15(5) SA-15(7) SA-15(8) SA-3 SA-3(1) SA-3(2) SA-4(3) SA-4(5) SC-38 SI-2 SI-2(6) SR-1 SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(2) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6 SR-6(1) SR-6(1) SR-7 A.8.4 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.31 A.5.30 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.8.8 A.5.22 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.33 A.8.28 A.8.9 A.8.28 A.8.30 A.8.32 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.28 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.28 A.6.8 A.8.8 A.8.32 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22 A.5.22
CM0010 Update Software Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times. Release updated versions of the software/firmware systems incorporating security-relevant updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than mission-defined frequency [i.e., 30 days]. CM-3(2) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) CM-4(1) CM-7(4) SA-10(4) SI-2 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.31 A.8.19 A.6.8 A.8.8 A.8.32
CM0011 Vulnerability Scanning Vulnerability scanning is used to identify known software vulnerabilities (excluding custom-developed software - ex: COTS and Open-Source). Utilize scanning tools to identify vulnerabilities in dependencies and outdated software (i.e., software composition analysis). Ensure that vulnerability scanning tools and techniques are employed that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: (1) Enumerating platforms, custom software flaws, and improper configurations; (2) Formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) Measuring vulnerability impact. CM-10(1) RA-5 RA-5(11) RA-5(3) SA-15(7) SI-3 A.8.8 A.8.7
CM0012 Software Bill of Materials Generate Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) against the entire software supply chain and cross correlate with known vulnerabilities (e.g., Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) to mitigate known vulnerabilities. Protect the SBOM according to countermeasures in CM0001. CM-10(1) CM-11(3) CM-8 CM-8(7) RA-5(11) SA-10(4) A.5.9 A.8.9
CM0021 Software Digital Signature Prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the mission. CM-11(3) CM-14 CM-14 SA-10(1) SI-7 SI-7(12) SI-7(15)
CM0023 Configuration Management Use automated mechanisms to maintain and validate baseline configuration to ensure the spacecraft's is up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available. CM-11(3) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) CM-5 MA-7 SA-10 SA-10(7) SR-11(2) A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.2 A.8.4 A.8.9 A.8.19 A.8.31 A.8.3 A.8.9 A.8.28 A.8.30 A.8.32
CM0005 Ground-based Countermeasures This countermeasure is focused on the protection of terrestrial assets like ground networks and development environments/contractor networks, etc. Traditional detection technologies and capabilities would be applicable here. Utilizing resources from NIST CSF to properly secure these environments using identify, protect, detect, recover, and respond is likely warranted. Additionally, NISTIR 8401 may provide resources as well since it was developed to focus on ground-based security for space systems (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8401.ipd.pdf). Furthermore, the MITRE ATT&CK framework provides IT focused TTPs and their mitigations https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/enterprise/. Several recommended NIST 800-53 Rev5 controls are provided for reference when designing ground systems/networks. AC-1 AC-10 AC-11 AC-11(1) AC-12 AC-12(1) AC-14 AC-16 AC-16(6) AC-17 AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-17(3) AC-17(4) AC-17(6) AC-17(9) AC-18 AC-18(1) AC-18(3) AC-18(4) AC-18(5) AC-19 AC-19(5) AC-2 AC-2(1) AC-2(11) AC-2(12) AC-2(13) AC-2(2) AC-2(3) AC-2(4) AC-2(9) AC-20 AC-20(1) AC-20(2) AC-20(3) AC-20(5) AC-21 AC-22 AC-3 AC-3(11) AC-3(13) AC-3(15) AC-3(4) AC-4 AC-4(23) AC-4(24) AC-4(25) AC-4(26) AC-4(31) AC-4(32) AC-6 AC-6(1) AC-6(10) AC-6(2) AC-6(3) AC-6(5) AC-6(8) AC-6(9) AC-7 AC-8 AT-2(4) AT-2(4) AT-2(5) AT-2(6) AT-3 AT-3(2) AT-4 AU-10 AU-11 AU-12 AU-12(1) AU-12(3) AU-14 AU-14(1) AU-14(3) AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(1) AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6 AU-6(1) AU-6(3) AU-6(4) AU-6(5) AU-6(6) AU-7 AU-7(1) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) AU-9(4) CA-3 CA-3(6) CA-3(7) CA-7 CA-7(1) CA-7(6) CA-8 CA-9 CM-10(1) CM-11 CM-11(2) CM-11(3) CM-12 CM-12(1) CM-14 CM-2 CM-2(2) CM-2(3) CM-2(7) CM-3 CM-3(1) CM-3(2) CM-3(5) CM-3(7) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) CM-4 CM-5(1) CM-5(5) CM-6 CM-6(1) CM-6(2) CM-7 CM-7(1) CM-7(2) CM-7(3) CM-7(5) CM-7(8) CM-7(8) CM-7(9) CM-8 CM-8(1) CM-8(2) CM-8(3) CM-8(4) CM-9 CP-10 CP-10(2) CP-10(4) CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(5) CP-2(8) CP-3(1) CP-4(5) CP-8 CP-8(1) CP-8(2) CP-8(3) CP-8(4) CP-8(5) CP-9 CP-9(1) CP-9(2) CP-9(3) IA-11 IA-12 IA-12(1) IA-12(2) IA-12(3) IA-12(4) IA-12(5) IA-12(6) IA-2 IA-2(1) IA-2(12) IA-2(2) IA-2(5) IA-2(6) IA-2(8) IA-3 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(1) IA-5(13) IA-5(14) IA-5(2) IA-5(7) IA-5(8) IA-6 IA-7 IA-8 IR-2 IR-2(2) IR-2(3) IR-3(3) IR-4 IR-4(1) IR-4(11) IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(13) IR-4(14) IR-4(3) IR-4(4) IR-4(5) IR-4(6) IR-4(7) IR-4(8) IR-5 IR-5(1) IR-6 IR-6(1) IR-7 IR-7(1) MA-2 MA-3 MA-3(1) MA-3(2) MA-3(3) MA-4 MA-4(1) MA-4(3) MA-4(6) MA-4(7) MA-5(1) MA-6 MA-7 MP-2 MP-3 MP-4 MP-5 MP-5(4) MP-6 MP-6(3) MP-7 PE-3(7) PL-10 PL-11 PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PL-9 PL-9 PM-11 PM-16(1) PM-17 PM-30 PM-30(1) PM-31 PM-32 RA-10 RA-3(1) RA-3(2) RA-3(2) RA-3(3) RA-3(4) RA-5 RA-5(10) RA-5(11) RA-5(2) RA-5(4) RA-5(5) RA-7 RA-9 RA-9 SA-10 SA-10(1) SA-10(7) SA-11 SA-11(2) SA-11(9) SA-15 SA-15(3) SA-15(7) SA-17 SA-2 SA-22 SA-3 SA-3(1) SA-3(2) SA-3(2) SA-4 SA-4(1) SA-4(10) SA-4(12) SA-4(2) SA-4(3) SA-4(5) SA-4(7) SA-4(9) SA-5 SA-8 SA-8(14) SA-8(15) SA-8(18) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SA-8(24) SA-8(9) SA-9 SA-9(1) SA-9(2) SA-9(6) SA-9(7) SC-10 SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(6) SC-13 SC-15 SC-16(2) SC-16(3) SC-18(1) SC-18(2) SC-18(3) SC-18(4) SC-2 SC-2(2) SC-20 SC-21 SC-22 SC-23 SC-23(1) SC-23(3) SC-23(5) SC-24 SC-28 SC-28(1) SC-28(11) SC-28(3) SC-3 SC-38 SC-39 SC-4 SC-45 SC-45(1) SC-45(1) SC-45(2) SC-49 SC-5 SC-5(1) SC-5(2) SC-5(3) SC-50 SC-51 SC-7 SC-7(10) SC-7(11) SC-7(12) SC-7(13) SC-7(14) SC-7(18) SC-7(21) SC-7(25) SC-7(29) SC-7(3) SC-7(4) SC-7(5) SC-7(5) SC-7(7) SC-7(8) SC-7(9) SC-8 SC-8(1) SC-8(2) SC-8(5) SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(6) SI-11 SI-14(3) SI-16 SI-19(4) SI-2 SI-2(2) SI-2(3) SI-2(6) SI-21 SI-3 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(12) SI-4(13) SI-4(14) SI-4(15) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(20) SI-4(22) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-5 SI-5(1) SI-6 SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(17) SI-7(2) SI-7(5) SI-7(7) SI-7(8) SR-1 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11 SR-11(1) SR-11(2) SR-11(3) SR-12 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(1) SR-3(2) SR-3(2) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) SR-6 SR-6(1) SR-6(1) SR-7 SR-7 SR-8 SR-9 SR-9(1) 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.15 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.16 A.5.18 A.8.2 A.8.16 A.5.15 A.5.33 A.8.3 A.8.4 A.8.18 A.8.20 A.8.2 A.8.4 A.5.14 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.11 A.8.10 A.5.15 A.8.2 A.8.18 A.8.5 A.8.5 A.7.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.7.9 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.7.9 A.8.20 A.6.3 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.5.25 A.6.8 A.8.15 A.7.4 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.5.28 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.14 A.8.21 9.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 A.5.36 9.2.2 A.8.9 A.8.9 8.1 9.3.3 A.8.9 A.8.32 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.19 A.8.19 A.5.9 A.8.9 A.5.2 A.8.9 A.8.19 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.30 A.5.29 A.7.11 A.5.29 A.5.33 A.8.13 A.5.29 A.5.16 A.5.16 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.8.5 A.5.16 A.6.3 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.8.16 A.5.5 A.6.8 A.7.10 A.7.13 A.8.10 A.8.10 A.8.16 A.8.10 A.7.13 A.5.10 A.7.7 A.7.10 A.5.13 A.5.10 A.7.7 A.7.10 A.8.10 A.5.10 A.7.9 A.7.10 A.5.10 A.7.10 A.7.14 A.8.10 A.5.10 A.7.10 A.5.8 A.5.7 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 4.4 6.2 7.4 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 9.1 9.2.2 10.1 10.2 A.8.8 6.1.3 8.3 10.2 A.5.22 A.5.7 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.33 8.1 A.5.8 A.5.20 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.28 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.37 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.9 A.8.28 A.8.30 A.8.32 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.25 A.8.27 A.8.6 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.23 A.8.12 A.5.10 A.5.14 A.8.20 A.8.26 A.5.33 A.8.20 A.8.24 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 A.5.14 A.5.10 A.5.33 A.6.8 A.8.8 A.8.32 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.5.6 A.8.11 A.8.10 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22 A.5.22
CM0014 Secure boot Software/Firmware must verify a trust chain that extends through the hardware root of trust, boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order. The trusted boot/RoT computing module should be implemented on radiation tolerant burn-in (non-programmable) equipment.  SC-51 SI-7(9)

References