Constellation Hopping via Crosslink

Threat actors may attempt to command another neighboring spacecraft via crosslink. spacecraft in close proximity are often able to send commands back and forth. Threat actors may be able to leverage this access to compromise another spacecraft.

ID: CM0029
Sub-techniques: 
Related Aerospace Threat IDs:  SV-AC-1 SV-CF-2
Related MITRE ATT&CK TTPs: 
Related ESA SPACE-SHIELD TTPs:  T1557.002 | T2048 |
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2022/12/08

Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0002 COMSEC A component of cybersecurity to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications. COMSEC includes cryptographic security, transmission security, emissions security, and physical security of COMSEC material. It is imperative to utilize secure communication protocols with strong cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of, and detect changes to, information during transmission. Systems should also maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception. Spacecraft should not employ a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled (i.e., crypto-bypass mode). The cryptographic mechanisms should identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters. AC-17 AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18 AC-18(1) AC-2(11) AC-3(10) CA-3 IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(7) IA-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(18) SA-9(6) SC-10 SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-13 SC-16(3) SC-28(1) SC-28(3) SC-7 SC-7(10) SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SC-7(5) SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-19(4) SI-3(8) D3-ET D3-MH D3-MAN D3-MENCR D3-NTF D3-ITF D3-OTF D3-CH D3-DTP D3-NTA D3-CAA D3-DNSTA D3-IPCTA D3-NTCD D3-RTSD D3-PHDURA D3-PMAD D3-CSPP D3-MA D3-SMRA D3-SRA A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.12 A.5.33 A.8.20 A.8.24 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 A.5.33 A.8.11
CM0030 Crypto Key Management Leverage best practices for crypto key management as defined by organization like NIST or the National Security Agency. Leverage only approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria. Encryption key handling should be performed outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography. Encryption keys should be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands. PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-9(6) SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-28(3) SC-8(1) D3-CH D3-CP A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 A.8.24
CM0031 Authentication Authenticate all communication sessions (crosslink and ground stations) for all commands before establishing remote connections using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based. Adding authentication on the spacecraft bus and communications on-board the spacecraft is also recommended. AC-14 AC-17 AC-17(10) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18 AC-18(1) IA-2 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-4(9) IA-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(15) SA-8(9) SC-16 SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-7(11) SC-8(1) SI-14(3) D3-MH D3-MAN D3-CH D3-BAN D3-MFA D3-TAAN D3-CBAN A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.16 A.5.16 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33
CM0033 Relay Protection Implement relay and replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for establishing a remote connection or connections on the spacecraft bus. AC-17(10) AC-17(10) IA-2(8) IA-3 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-7 SC-13 SC-23 SC-7 SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SI-10 SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-3(8) D3-ITF D3-NTA D3-OTF A.5.16 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31
CM0003 TEMPEST The spacecraft should protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with TEMPEST controls to prevent side channel / proximity attacks. Encompass the spacecraft critical components with a casing/shielding so as to prevent access to the individual critical components. PE-19 PE-19(1) PE-21 SC-8(3) D3-PH D3-RFS A.7.5 A.7.8 A.8.12
CM0036 Session Termination Terminate the connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after an acceptable amount of inactivity which is established via the concept of operations. AC-12 SC-10 SI-14(3) D3-SDA A.8.20
CM0055 Secure Command Mode(s) Provide additional protection modes for commanding the spacecraft. These can be where the spacecraft will restrict command lock based on geographic location of ground stations, special operational modes within the flight software, or even temporal controls where the spacecraft will only accept commands during certain times. AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-2(11) AC-2(12) AC-3 AC-3(2) AC-3(3) AC-3(4) AC-3(8) CA-3(7) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-8 SC-7 SI-3(8) D3-AH D3-ACH D3-MFA D3-OTP A.8.16 A.5.15 A.5.33 A.8.3 A.8.4 A.8.18 A.8.20 A.8.2 A.8.16 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26
CM0034 Monitor Critical Telemetry Points Monitor defined telemetry points for malicious activities (i.e., jamming attempts, commanding attempts (e.g., command modes, counters, etc.)). This would include valid/processed commands as well as commands that were rejected. Telemetry monitoring should synchronize with ground-based Defensive Cyber Operations (i.e., SIEM/auditing) to create a full space system situation awareness from a cybersecurity perspective. AC-17(1) AU-3(1) CA-7(6) IR-4(14) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(13) SC-16 SC-7 SI-3(8) D3-NTA D3-PM D3-PMAD D3-RTSD A.8.16 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26
CM0035 Protect Authenticators Protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification. AC-3(11) IA-4(9) IA-5 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(13) SC-16 SC-8(1) D3-CE D3-ANCI D3-CA D3-ACA D3-PCA D3-CRO D3-CTS D3-SPP A.8.4 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33
CM0032 On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention Utilize on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems and audit/logs actions. The IDS/IPS should have the capability to respond to threats (initial access, execution, persistence, evasion, exfiltration, etc.) and it should address signature-based attacks along with dynamic never-before seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies. The IDS/IPS must integrate with traditional fault management to provide a wholistic approach to faults on-board the spacecraft. Spacecraft should select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber-attacks.  These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker — with or without ground support. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system. AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) D3-FA D3-DA D3-FCR D3-FH D3-ID D3-IRA D3-HD D3-IAA D3-FHRA D3-NTA D3-PMAD D3-RTSD D3-ANAA D3-CA D3-CSPP D3-ISVA D3-PM D3-SDM D3-SFA D3-SFV D3-SICA D3-USICA D3-FBA D3-FEMC D3-FV D3-OSM D3-PFV D3-EHB D3-IDA D3-MBT D3-SBV D3-PA D3-PSMD D3-PSA D3-SEA D3-SSC D3-SCA D3-FAPA D3-IBCA D3-PCSV D3-FCA D3-PLA D3-UBA D3-RAPA D3-SDA D3-UDTA D3-UGLPA D3-ANET D3-AZET D3-JFAPA D3-LAM D3-NI D3-RRID D3-NTF D3-ITF D3-OTF D3-EI D3-EAL D3-EDL D3-HBPI D3-IOPR D3-KBPI D3-MAC D3-SCF A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16
CM0067 Smart Contracts Smart contracts can be used to mitigate harm when an attacker is attempting to compromise a hosted payload. Smart contracts will stipulate security protocol required across a bus and should it be violated, the violator will be barred from exchanges across the system after consensus achieved across the network. SI-4 SI-4(2) D3-AM D3-PH D3-LFP D3-SCP A.8.16
CM0029 TRANSEC Utilize TRANSEC in order to prevent interception, disruption of reception, communications deception, and/or derivation of intelligence by analysis of transmission characteristics such as signal parameters or message externals. For example, jam-resistant waveforms can be utilized to improve the resistance of radio frequency signals to jamming and spoofing. Note: TRANSEC is that field of COMSEC which deals with the security of communication transmissions, rather than that of the information being communicated. AC-17 AC-18 AC-18(5) CA-3 CP-8 PL-8 PL-8(1) SC-16 SC-40 SC-40(1) SC-40(3) SC-40(4) SC-5 SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SC-8(4) D3-MH D3-MAN D3-MENCR D3-NTA D3-DNSTA D3-ISVA D3-NTCD D3-RTA D3-PMAD D3-FC D3-CSPP D3-ANAA D3-RPA D3-IPCTA D3-NTCD D3-NTPM D3-TAAN A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.29 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.33

References