SV-CF-3

Knowledge of target satellite's cyber-related design details would be crucial to inform potential attacker - so threat is leaking of design data which is often stored Unclass or on contractors’ network

ID: SV-CF-3

DiD Layer: Prevention

CAPEC #: 447 | 519 | 521

NIST Rev5 Control Tag Mapping: AC-3 | AC-3(11) | AC-4 | AC-4(23) | AC-4(25) | CM-12 | CM-12(1) | PM-30 | RA-3 | RA-3(1) | RA-3(2) | RA-9 | SA-3 | SA-3(1) | SA-3(2) | SA-5 | SA-8 | SA-8(15) | SR-6 | SR-7 | SR-12

Lowest Threat Tier to
Create Threat Event: III

Notional Risk Rank Score: 18

Informational References

CENTRA Volume I - Cyber Content of Satellites

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	* Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission.
The [organization] shall distribute documentation to only personnel with defined roles and a need to know.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{CM-12,CP-2,SA-5,SA-10}	Least privilege and need to know should be employed with the protection of all documentation. Documentation can contain sensitive information that can aid in vulnerability discovery, detection, and exploitation. For example, command dictionaries for ground and space systems should be handles with extreme care. Additionally, design documents for missions contain many key elements that if compromised could aid in an attacker successfully exploiting the system.
The [organization] shall protect documentation and Essential Elements of Information (EEI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{SA-5}	Essential Elements of Information (EEI):

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID		Name	Description
REC-0001		Gather Spacecraft Design Information	Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's design that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the spacecraft can include software, firmware, encryption type, purpose, as well as various makes and models of subsystems.
	REC-0001.01	Software	Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's internal software that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information (e.g. source code, binaries, etc.) about commercial, open-source, or custom developed software may include a variety of details such as types, versions, and memory maps. Leveraging this information threat actors may target vendors of operating systems, flight software, or open-source communities to embed backdoors or for performing reverse engineering research to support offensive cyber operations.
	REC-0001.02	Firmware	Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's firmware that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific devices, which may be used to infer more information (ex. configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.). Leveraging this information threat actors may target firmware vendors to embed backdoors or for performing reverse engineering research to support offensive cyber operations.
	REC-0001.03	Cryptographic Algorithms	Threat actors may gather information about any cryptographic algorithms used on the victim spacecraft's that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the algorithms can include type and private keys. Threat actors may also obtain the authentication scheme (i.e., key/password/counter values) and leverage it to establish communications for commanding the target spacecraft or any of its subsystems. Some spacecraft only require authentication vice authentication and encryption, therefore once obtained, threat actors may use any number of means to command the spacecraft without needing to go through a legitimate channel. The authentication information may be obtained through reconnaissance of the ground system or retrieved from the victim spacecraft.
	REC-0001.04	Data Bus	Threat actors may gather information about the data bus used within the victim spacecraft that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the data bus can include the make and model which could lead to more information (ex. protocol, purpose, controller, etc.), as well as locations/addresses of major subsystems residing on the bus. Threat actors may also gather information about the bus voltages of the victim spacecraft. This information can include optimal power levels, connectors, range, and transfer rate.
	REC-0001.05	Thermal Control System	Threat actors may gather information about the thermal control system used with the victim spacecraft that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information gathered can include type, make/model, and varies analysis programs that monitor it.
	REC-0001.06	Maneuver & Control	Threat actors may gather information about the station-keeping control systems within the victim spacecraft that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information gathered can include thruster types, propulsion types, attitude sensors, and data flows associated with the relevant subsystems.
	REC-0001.07	Payload	Threat actors may gather information about the type(s) of payloads hosted on the victim spacecraft. This information could include specific commands, make and model, and relevant software. Threat actors may also gather information about the location of the payload on the bus and internal routing as it pertains to commands within the payload itself.
	REC-0001.08	Power	Threat actors may gather information about the power system used within the victim spacecraft. This information can include type, power intake, and internal algorithms. Threat actors may also gather information about the solar panel configurations such as positioning, automated tasks, and layout. Additionally, threat actors may gather information about the batteries used within the victim spacecraft. This information can include the type, quantity, storage capacity, make and model, and location.
	REC-0001.09	Fault Management	Threat actors may gather information about any fault management that may be present on the victim spacecraft. This information can help threat actors construct specific attacks that may put the spacecraft into a fault condition and potentially a more vulnerable state depending on the fault response.
REC-0002		Gather Spacecraft Descriptors	Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's descriptors that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the descriptors may include a variety of details such as identity attributes, organizational structures, and mission operational parameters.
	REC-0002.01	Identifiers	Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's identity attributes that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information may include a variety of details such as the satellite catalog number, international designator, mission name, and more.
	REC-0002.02	Organization	Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's associated organization(s) that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Collection efforts may target the mission owner/operator in order to conduct further attacks against the organization, individual, or other interested parties. Threat actors may also seek information regarding the spacecraft's designer/builder, including physical locations, key employees, and roles and responsibilities as they pertain to the spacecraft, as well as information pertaining to the mission's end users/customers.
	REC-0002.03	Operations	Threat actors may gather information about the victim spacecraft's operations that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Collection efforts may target mission objectives, orbital parameters such as orbit slot and inclination, user guides and schedules, etc. Additionally, threat actors may seek information about constellation deployments and configurations where applicable.
REC-0003		Gather Spacecraft Communications Information	Threat actors may obtain information on the victim spacecraft's communication channels in order to determine specific commands, protocols, and types. Information gathered can include commanding patterns, antenna shape and location, beacon frequency and polarization, and various transponder information.
	REC-0003.01	Communications Equipment	Threat actors may gather information regarding the communications equipment and its configuration that will be used for communicating with the victim spacecraft. This includes: Antenna Shape: This information can help determine the range in which it can communicate, the power of it's transmission, and the receiving patterns. Antenna Configuration/Location: This information can include positioning, transmission frequency, wavelength, and timing. Telemetry Signal Type: Information can include timing, radio frequency wavelengths, and other information that can provide insight into the spacecraft's telemetry system. Beacon Frequency: This information can provide insight into where the spacecrafts located, what it's orbit is, and how long it can take to communicate with a ground station. Beacon Polarization: This information can help triangulate the spacecrafts it orbits the earth and determine how a satellite must be oriented in order to communicate with the victim spacecraft. Transponder: This could include the number of transponders per band, transponder translation factor, transponder mappings, power utilization, and/or saturation point.
	REC-0003.02	Commanding Details	Threat actors may gather information regarding the commanding approach that will be used for communicating with the victim spacecraft. This includes: Commanding Signal Type: This can include timing, radio frequency wavelengths, and other information that can provide insight into the spacecraft's commanding system. Valid Commanding Patterns: Most commonly, this comes in the form of a command database, but can also include other means that provide information on valid commands and the communication protocols used by the victim spacecraft. Valid Commanding Periods: This information can provide insight into when a command will be accepted by the spacecraft and help the threat actor construct a viable attack campaign.
	REC-0003.03	Mission-Specific Channel Scanning	Threat actors may seek knowledge about mission-specific communication channels dedicated to a payload. Such channels could be managed by a different organization than the owner of the spacecraft itself.
	REC-0003.04	Valid Credentials	Threat actors may seek out valid credentials which can be utilized to facilitate several tactics throughout an attack. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
REC-0004		Gather Launch Information	Threat actors may gather the launch date and time, location of the launch (country & specific site), organizations involved, launch vehicle, etc. This information can provide insight into protocols, regulations, and provide further targets for the threat actor, including specific vulnerabilities with the launch vehicle itself.
	REC-0004.01	Flight Termination	Threat actor may obtain information regarding the vehicle's flight termination system. Threat actors may use this information to perform later attacks and target the vehicle's termination system to have desired impact on mission.
REC-0006		Gather FSW Development Information	Threat actors may obtain information regarding the flight software (FSW) development environment for the victim spacecraft. This information may include the development environment, source code, compiled binaries, testing tools, and fault management.
	REC-0006.01	Development Environment	Threat actors may gather information regarding the development environment for the victim spacecraft's FSW. This information can include IDEs, configurations, source code, environment variables, source code repositories, code "secrets", and compiled binaries.
	REC-0006.02	Security Testing Tools	Threat actors may gather information regarding how a victim spacecraft is tested in regards to the FSW. Understanding the testing approach including tools could identify gaps and vulnerabilities that could be discovered and exploited by a threat actor.
REC-0008		Gather Supply Chain Information	Threat actors may gather information about a mission's supply chain or product delivery mechanisms that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques.
	REC-0008.01	Hardware	Threat actors may gather information that can be used to facilitate a future attack where they manipulate hardware components in the victim spacecraft prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. The threat actor can insert backdoors and give them a high level of control over the system when they modify the hardware or firmware in the supply chain. This would include ASIC and FPGA devices as well.
	REC-0008.02	Software	Threat actors may gather information relating to the mission's software supply chain in order to facilitate future attacks to achieve data or system compromise. This attack can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulation of the update and/or distribution mechanism, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one.
	REC-0008.04	Business Relationships	Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an mission’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors/sub-contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access or sensitive information. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.
REC-0009		Gather Mission Information	Threat actors may initially seek to gain an understanding of a target mission by gathering information commonly captured in a Concept of Operations (or similar) document and related artifacts. Information of interest includes, but is not limited to: - the needs, goals, and objectives of the system - system overview and key elements/instruments - modes of operations (including operational constraints) - proposed capabilities and the underlying science/technology used to provide capabilities (i.e., scientific papers, research studies, etc.) - physical and support environments
PER-0005		Valid Credentials	Threat actors may seek out valid credentials which can be utilized to maintain persistent access to the spacecraft or related C2 systems and facilitate additional tactics throughout an attack. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
DE-0011		Valid Credentials	Threat actors may utilize valid credentials to conduct an attack against a spacecraft or related system as a means to conceal their activity. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
LM-0007		Valid Credentials	Threat actors may utilize valid credentials move laterally across spacecraft subsystems, communication buses, or additional spacecraft in a constellation. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
IMP-0001		Deception (or Misdirection)	Measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence or information into a system to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests. Threat actors may seek to deceive mission stakeholders (or even military decision makers) for a multitude of reasons. Telemetry values could be modified, attacks could be designed to intentionally mimic another threat actor's TTPs, and even allied ground infrastructure could be compromised and used as the source of communications to the spacecraft.

ID	Name	Description	NIST Rev5	D3FEND	ISO 27001
CM0001	Protect Sensitive Information	Organizations should look to identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information (e.g., fault management approach) and apply access control accordingly. Any location (ground system, contractor networks, etc.) storing design information needs to ensure design info is protected from exposure, exfiltration, etc. Space system sensitive information may be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Company Proprietary. Space system sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, CUI, proprietary, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission. Sensitive documentation should only be accessed by personnel with defined roles and a need to know. Well established access controls (roles, encryption at rest and transit, etc.) and data loss prevention (DLP) technology are key countermeasures. The DLP should be configured for the specific data types in question.	AC-25 \| AC-3(11) \| AC-4(23) \| AC-4(25) \| AC-4(6) \| CA-3 \| CM-12 \| CM-12(1) \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PM-11 \| PM-17 \| SA-3 \| SA-3(1) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-4(12) \| SA-4(12) \| SA-5 \| SA-8 \| SA-8(19) \| SA-9(7) \| SC-16 \| SC-16(1) \| SC-8(1) \| SC-8(3) \| SI-12 \| SI-21 \| SI-23 \| SR-12 \| SR-7	D3-AI \| D3-AVE \| D3-NVA \| D3-CH \| D3-CBAN \| D3-CTS \| D3-PA \| D3-FAPA \| D3-SAOR \|	A.8.4 \| A.8.11 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.21 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.33 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.37 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.22
CM0004	Development Environment Security	In order to secure the development environment, the first step is understanding all the devices and people who interact with it. Maintain an accurate inventory of all people and assets that touch the development environment. Ensure strong multi-factor authentication is used across the development environment, especially for code repositories, as threat actors may attempt to sneak malicious code into software that's being built without being detected. Use zero-trust access controls to the code repositories where possible. For example, ensure the main branches in repositories are protected from injecting malicious code. A secure development environment requires change management, privilege management, auditing and in-depth monitoring across the environment.	AC-17 \| AC-18 \| AC-20(5) \| AC-3(11) \| AC-3(13) \| AC-3(15) \| CA-8 \| CA-8(1) \| CA-8(1) \| CM-11 \| CM-14 \| CM-2(2) \| CM-3(2) \| CM-3(7) \| CM-3(8) \| CM-4(1) \| CM-4(1) \| CM-5(6) \| CM-7(8) \| CM-7(8) \| CP-2(8) \| MA-7 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| RA-3(2) \| RA-5 \| RA-5(2) \| RA-9 \| SA-10 \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-11 \| SA-11(1) \| SA-11(2) \| SA-11(2) \| SA-11(4) \| SA-11(5) \| SA-11(5) \| SA-11(6) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(8) \| SA-15 \| SA-15(3) \| SA-15(5) \| SA-15(7) \| SA-15(8) \| SA-17 \| SA-3 \| SA-3 \| SA-3(1) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-4(12) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(19) \| SA-8(30) \| SA-8(31) \| SA-9 \| SC-38 \| SI-2 \| SI-2(6) \| SI-7 \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-11 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-3(2) \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6 \| SR-6(1) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-7	D3-AI \| D3-AVE \| D3-SWI \| D3-HCI \| D3-NNI \| D3-OAM \| D3-AM \| D3-OM \| D3-DI \| D3-MFA \| D3-CH \| D3-OTP \| D3-BAN \| D3-PA \| D3- FAPA \| D3- DQSA \| D3-IBCA \| D3-PCSV \| D3-PSMD \|	A.8.4 \| A.5.14 \| A.6.7 \| A.8.1 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.30 \| A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.8.8 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.33 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.27 \| A.6.8 \| A.8.8 \| A.8.32 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.22
CM0005	Ground-based Countermeasures	This countermeasure is focused on the protection of terrestrial assets like ground networks and development environments/contractor networks, etc. Traditional detection technologies and capabilities would be applicable here. Utilizing resources from NIST CSF to properly secure these environments using identify, protect, detect, recover, and respond is likely warranted. Additionally, NISTIR 8401 may provide resources as well since it was developed to focus on ground-based security for space systems (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8401.ipd.pdf). Furthermore, the MITRE ATT&CK framework provides IT focused TTPs and their mitigations https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/enterprise/. Several recommended NIST 800-53 Rev5 controls are provided for reference when designing ground systems/networks.	AC-1 \| AC-10 \| AC-11 \| AC-11(1) \| AC-12 \| AC-12(1) \| AC-14 \| AC-16 \| AC-16(6) \| AC-17 \| AC-17 \| AC-17(1) \| AC-17(10) \| AC-17(2) \| AC-17(3) \| AC-17(4) \| AC-17(6) \| AC-17(9) \| AC-18 \| AC-18 \| AC-18(1) \| AC-18(3) \| AC-18(4) \| AC-18(5) \| AC-19 \| AC-19(5) \| AC-2 \| AC-2 \| AC-2(1) \| AC-2(11) \| AC-2(12) \| AC-2(13) \| AC-2(2) \| AC-2(3) \| AC-2(4) \| AC-2(9) \| AC-20 \| AC-20(1) \| AC-20(2) \| AC-20(3) \| AC-20(5) \| AC-21 \| AC-22 \| AC-3 \| AC-3(11) \| AC-3(13) \| AC-3(15) \| AC-3(4) \| AC-4 \| AC-4(23) \| AC-4(24) \| AC-4(25) \| AC-4(26) \| AC-4(31) \| AC-4(32) \| AC-6 \| AC-6(1) \| AC-6(10) \| AC-6(2) \| AC-6(3) \| AC-6(5) \| AC-6(8) \| AC-6(9) \| AC-7 \| AC-8 \| AT-2(4) \| AT-2(4) \| AT-2(5) \| AT-2(6) \| AT-3 \| AT-3(2) \| AT-4 \| AU-10 \| AU-11 \| AU-12 \| AU-12(1) \| AU-12(3) \| AU-14 \| AU-14(1) \| AU-14(3) \| AU-2 \| AU-3 \| AU-3(1) \| AU-4 \| AU-4(1) \| AU-5 \| AU-5(1) \| AU-5(2) \| AU-5(5) \| AU-6 \| AU-6(1) \| AU-6(3) \| AU-6(4) \| AU-6(5) \| AU-6(6) \| AU-7 \| AU-7(1) \| AU-8 \| AU-9 \| AU-9(2) \| AU-9(3) \| AU-9(4) \| CA-3 \| CA-3 \| CA-3(6) \| CA-3(7) \| CA-7 \| CA-7(1) \| CA-7(6) \| CA-8 \| CA-8(1) \| CA-8(1) \| CA-9 \| CM-10(1) \| CM-11 \| CM-11 \| CM-11(2) \| CM-11(3) \| CM-12 \| CM-12(1) \| CM-14 \| CM-2 \| CM-2(2) \| CM-2(3) \| CM-2(7) \| CM-3 \| CM-3(1) \| CM-3(2) \| CM-3(4) \| CM-3(5) \| CM-3(6) \| CM-3(7) \| CM-3(7) \| CM-3(8) \| CM-4 \| CM-5(1) \| CM-5(5) \| CM-6 \| CM-6(1) \| CM-6(2) \| CM-7 \| CM-7(1) \| CM-7(2) \| CM-7(3) \| CM-7(5) \| CM-7(8) \| CM-7(8) \| CM-7(9) \| CM-8 \| CM-8(1) \| CM-8(2) \| CM-8(3) \| CM-8(4) \| CM-9 \| CP-10 \| CP-10(2) \| CP-10(4) \| CP-2 \| CP-2 \| CP-2(2) \| CP-2(5) \| CP-2(8) \| CP-3(1) \| CP-4(1) \| CP-4(2) \| CP-4(5) \| CP-8 \| CP-8(1) \| CP-8(2) \| CP-8(3) \| CP-8(4) \| CP-8(5) \| CP-9 \| CP-9(1) \| CP-9(2) \| CP-9(3) \| IA-11 \| IA-12 \| IA-12(1) \| IA-12(2) \| IA-12(3) \| IA-12(4) \| IA-12(5) \| IA-12(6) \| IA-2 \| IA-2(1) \| IA-2(12) \| IA-2(2) \| IA-2(5) \| IA-2(6) \| IA-2(8) \| IA-3 \| IA-3(1) \| IA-4 \| IA-4(9) \| IA-5 \| IA-5(1) \| IA-5(13) \| IA-5(14) \| IA-5(2) \| IA-5(7) \| IA-5(8) \| IA-6 \| IA-7 \| IA-8 \| IR-2 \| IR-2(2) \| IR-2(3) \| IR-3 \| IR-3(1) \| IR-3(2) \| IR-3(3) \| IR-4 \| IR-4(1) \| IR-4(10) \| IR-4(11) \| IR-4(11) \| IR-4(12) \| IR-4(13) \| IR-4(14) \| IR-4(3) \| IR-4(4) \| IR-4(5) \| IR-4(6) \| IR-4(7) \| IR-4(8) \| IR-5 \| IR-5(1) \| IR-6 \| IR-6(1) \| IR-6(2) \| IR-7 \| IR-7(1) \| IR-8 \| MA-2 \| MA-3 \| MA-3(1) \| MA-3(2) \| MA-3(3) \| MA-4 \| MA-4(1) \| MA-4(3) \| MA-4(6) \| MA-4(7) \| MA-5(1) \| MA-6 \| MA-7 \| MP-2 \| MP-3 \| MP-4 \| MP-5 \| MP-6 \| MP-6(3) \| MP-7 \| PE-3(7) \| PL-10 \| PL-11 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PL-9 \| PL-9 \| PM-11 \| PM-16(1) \| PM-17 \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| PM-31 \| PM-32 \| RA-10 \| RA-3(1) \| RA-3(2) \| RA-3(2) \| RA-3(3) \| RA-3(4) \| RA-5 \| RA-5(10) \| RA-5(11) \| RA-5(2) \| RA-5(4) \| RA-5(5) \| RA-7 \| RA-9 \| RA-9 \| SA-10 \| SA-10(1) \| SA-10(2) \| SA-10(7) \| SA-11 \| SA-11 \| SA-11(2) \| SA-11(4) \| SA-11(7) \| SA-11(9) \| SA-15 \| SA-15(3) \| SA-15(7) \| SA-17 \| SA-17 \| SA-2 \| SA-2 \| SA-22 \| SA-3 \| SA-3 \| SA-3(1) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-3(2) \| SA-4 \| SA-4 \| SA-4(1) \| SA-4(10) \| SA-4(12) \| SA-4(2) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(3) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(7) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-5 \| SA-8 \| SA-8 \| SA-8(14) \| SA-8(15) \| SA-8(18) \| SA-8(21) \| SA-8(22) \| SA-8(23) \| SA-8(24) \| SA-8(29) \| SA-8(9) \| SA-9 \| SA-9 \| SA-9(1) \| SA-9(2) \| SA-9(6) \| SA-9(7) \| SC-10 \| SC-12 \| SC-12(1) \| SC-12(6) \| SC-13 \| SC-15 \| SC-16(2) \| SC-16(3) \| SC-18(1) \| SC-18(2) \| SC-18(3) \| SC-18(4) \| SC-2 \| SC-2(2) \| SC-20 \| SC-21 \| SC-22 \| SC-23 \| SC-23(1) \| SC-23(3) \| SC-23(5) \| SC-24 \| SC-28 \| SC-28(1) \| SC-28(3) \| SC-3 \| SC-38 \| SC-39 \| SC-4 \| SC-45 \| SC-45(1) \| SC-45(1) \| SC-45(2) \| SC-49 \| SC-5 \| SC-5(1) \| SC-5(2) \| SC-5(3) \| SC-50 \| SC-51 \| SC-7 \| SC-7(10) \| SC-7(11) \| SC-7(12) \| SC-7(13) \| SC-7(14) \| SC-7(18) \| SC-7(21) \| SC-7(25) \| SC-7(29) \| SC-7(3) \| SC-7(4) \| SC-7(5) \| SC-7(5) \| SC-7(7) \| SC-7(8) \| SC-7(9) \| SC-8 \| SC-8(1) \| SC-8(2) \| SC-8(5) \| SI-10 \| SI-10(3) \| SI-10(6) \| SI-11 \| SI-12 \| SI-14(3) \| SI-16 \| SI-19(4) \| SI-2 \| SI-2(2) \| SI-2(3) \| SI-2(6) \| SI-21 \| SI-3 \| SI-3 \| SI-3(10) \| SI-3(10) \| SI-4 \| SI-4(1) \| SI-4(10) \| SI-4(11) \| SI-4(12) \| SI-4(13) \| SI-4(14) \| SI-4(15) \| SI-4(16) \| SI-4(17) \| SI-4(2) \| SI-4(20) \| SI-4(22) \| SI-4(23) \| SI-4(24) \| SI-4(25) \| SI-4(4) \| SI-4(5) \| SI-5 \| SI-5(1) \| SI-6 \| SI-7 \| SI-7 \| SI-7(1) \| SI-7(17) \| SI-7(2) \| SI-7(5) \| SI-7(7) \| SI-7(8) \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-10 \| SR-11 \| SR-11 \| SR-11(1) \| SR-11(2) \| SR-11(3) \| SR-12 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-3(1) \| SR-3(2) \| SR-3(2) \| SR-3(3) \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(1) \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6 \| SR-6(1) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-7 \| SR-7 \| SR-8 \| SR-9 \| SR-9(1)	Nearly all D3FEND Techniques apply to Ground \|	5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.15 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.18 \| A.8.2 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.15 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.3 \| A.8.4 \| A.8.18 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.2 \| A.8.4 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.22 \| A.8.23 \| A.8.11 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.15 \| A.8.2 \| A.8.18 \| A.8.5 \| A.8.5 \| A.7.7 \| A.8.1 \| A.5.14 \| A.6.7 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.20 \| A.5.14 \| A.7.9 \| A.8.1 \| A.5.14 \| A.7.9 \| A.8.20 \| A.6.3 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.6 \| A.5.25 \| A.6.8 \| A.8.15 \| A.7.4 \| A.8.17 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.15 \| A.5.28 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.15 \| A.8.15 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.21 \| 9.1 \| 9.3.2 \| 9.3.3 \| A.5.36 \| 9.2.2 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| 8.1 \| 9.3.3 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.19 \| A.8.19 \| A.5.9 \| A.8.9 \| A.5.2 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.19 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.29 \| A.8.1 \| A.8.6 \| A.5.30 \| A.5.30 \| A.5.29 \| A.7.11 \| A.5.29 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.13 \| A.5.29 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.17 \| A.8.5 \| A.5.16 \| A.6.3 \| A.5.25 \| A.5.26 \| A.5.27 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.5 \| A.6.8 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.24 \| A.7.10 \| A.7.13 \| A.8.10 \| A.8.10 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.10 \| A.7.13 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.7 \| A.7.10 \| A.5.13 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.7 \| A.7.10 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.9 \| A.7.10 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.10 \| A.7.14 \| A.8.10 \| A.5.10 \| A.7.10 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.7 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.4 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 9.1 \| 9.2.2 \| 10.1 \| 10.2 \| A.8.8 \| 6.1.3 \| 8.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.7 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.33 \| 8.1 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.28 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.37 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.9 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.6 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.22 \| A.8.23 \| A.8.26 \| A.8.23 \| A.8.12 \| A.5.10 \| A.5.14 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.26 \| A.5.33 \| A.8.20 \| A.8.24 \| A.8.24 \| A.8.26 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.10 \| A.5.33 \| A.6.8 \| A.8.8 \| A.8.32 \| A.8.7 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.16 \| A.8.16 \| A.5.6 \| A.8.11 \| A.8.10 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.22

SV-CF-3

Informational References

High-Level Requirements

Low-Level Requirements

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

Related SPARTA Countermeasures