CM0000

Attacking the scheduling table to affect tasking


Informational References

  • CENTRA Volume I - Cyber Content of Satellites
ID: CM0000
DiD Layer: S/C Software
CAPEC #:  186 | 533
NIST Rev5 Control Tag Mapping:  AC-3 | AC-3(2) | CA-7 | CA-7(6) | CP-4 | CP-4(5) | RA-10 | SA-8 | SA-8(21) | SA-8(24) | SA-11 | SA-11(9) | SC-45 | SC-45(1) | SC-45(2)
Lowest Threat Tier to
Create Threat Event:  
V
Notional Risk Rank Score: 

High-Level Requirements

The spacecraft shall ensure any update to task scheduling functionality has met high assurance standards before execution.

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [spacecraft] shall require multi-factor authorization for all updates to the task scheduling functionality within the spacecraft.{SV-AV-4}{AC-3(2)} Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate).

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID Name Description
EX-0012 Modify On-Board Values Threat actors may perform specific commands in order to modify onboard values that the victim SV relies on. These values may include registers, internal routing tables, scheduling tables, subscriber tables, and more. Depending on how the values have been modified, the victim SV may no longer be able to function.
EX-0012.05 Scheduling Algorithm Threat actors may target scheduling features on the target SV. SV's are typically engineered as real time scheduling systems which is composed of the scheduler, clock and the processing hardware elements. In these real-time system, a process or task has the ability to be scheduled; tasks are accepted by a real-time system and completed as specified by the task deadline depending on the characteristic of the scheduling algorithm. Threat actors can attack the scheduling capability to have various effects on the SV.
IMP-0001 Deception (or Misdirection) Threat actors may seek to deceive mission stakeholders (or even military decision makers) for a multitude of reasons. Telemetry values could be modified, attacks could be designed to intentionally mimic another threat actor's TTPs, and even allied ground infrastructure could be compromised and used as the source of communications to the SV.
IMP-0002 Disruption Threat actors may seek to disrupt communications from the victim SV to the ground controllers or other interested parties. By disrupting communications during critical times, there is the potential impact of data being lost or critical actions not being performed. This could cause the SV's purpose to be put into jeopardy depending on what communications were lost during the disruption. This behavior is different than Denial as this attack can also attempt to modify the data and messages as they are passed as a way to disrupt communications.
IMP-0003 Denial Threat actors may seek to deny ground controllers and other interested parties access to the victim SV. This would be done exhausting system resource, degrading subsystems, or blocking communications entirely. This behavior is different from Disruption as this seeks to deny communications entirely, rather than stop them for a length of time.
IMP-0004 Degradation Threat actors may target various subsystems or the hosted payload in such a way in order to rapidly increase it's degradation. This could potentially shorten the lifespan of the victim SV.

Related SPARTA Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0000 Countermeasure Not Identified This technique is a result of utilizing TTPs to create an impact and the applicable countermeasures are associated with the TTPs leveraged to achieve the impact None None