Compromise Boot Memory

Threat actors may manipulate boot memory in order to execute malicious code, bypass internal processes, or DoS the system. This technique can be used to perform other tactics such as Defense Evasion.

ID: CM0014
Sub-techniques: 
Related Aerospace Threat IDs:  SV-IT-3 SV-SP-4
Related MITRE ATT&CK TTPs:  T1495 T1601 T1542 T1553 T1195
Tactic:
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2022/10/19

Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0028 Tamper Protection Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Leverage tamper proof protection where possible when shipping/receiving equipment. CA-8(3) CM-7(9) MA-7 PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SC-51 SR-1 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29
CM0015 Software Source Control Prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code. CM-14 CM-7(8)
CM0018 Dynamic Analysis Employ dynamic analysis (e.g., using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code). Testing should occur (1) on potential system elements before acceptance; (2) as a realistic simulation of known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes. CA-8 CP-4(5) RA-5(11) SA-11(5) SA-11(8) SA-11(9) SC-2(2) SC-7(29) SR-6(1) SR-6(1)
CM0021 Software Digital Signature Prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the mission. CM-11(3) CM-14 CM-14 SA-10(1) SI-7 SI-7(12)
CM0023 Configuration Management Use automated mechanisms to maintain and validate baseline configuration to ensure the spacecraft's is up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available. CM-11(3) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) MA-7 SA-10 SA-10(7) SR-11(2) A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.28 A.8.30 A.8.32
CM0014 Secure boot Software/Firmware must verify a trust chain that extends through the hardware root of trust, boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order. The trusted boot/RoT computing module should be implemented on radiation tolerant burn-in (non-programmable) equipment.  SC-51 SI-7(9)

References