TEMPEST

The spacecraft should protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with TEMPEST controls to prevent side channel / proximity attacks. Encompass the spacecraft critical components with a casing/shielding so as to prevent access to the individual critical components.

Sources

Best Segment for Countermeasure Deployment

  • Space Segment

NIST Rev5 Controls

D3FEND

ISO 27001

ID: CM0003
D3FEND Artifacts: 
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2022/10/19

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

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ID Name Description
REC-0005 Eavesdropping Threat actors may seek to capture network communications throughout the ground station and radio frequency (RF) communication used for uplink and downlink communications. RF communication frequencies vary between 30MHz and 60 GHz. Threat actors may capture RF communications using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator turned to the communication frequency. Network communications may be captured using packet capture software while the threat actor is on the target network.
.03 Proximity Operations Threat actors may capture signals and/or network communications as they travel on-board the vehicle (i.e., EMSEC/TEMPEST), via RF, or terrestrial networks. This information can be decoded to determine commanding and telemetry protocols, command times, and other information that could be used for future attacks.
IA-0003 Crosslink via Compromised Neighbor Threat actors may compromise a victim SV via the crosslink communications of a neighboring SV that has been compromised. SVs in close proximity are able to send commands back and forth. Threat actors may be able to leverage this access to compromise other SVs once they have access to another that is nearby.
IA-0005 Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Threat actors may perform a space rendezvous which is a set of orbital maneuvers during which a spacecraft arrives at the same orbit and approach to a very close distance (e.g. within visual contact or close proximity) to a target SV.
.01 Compromise Emanations Threat actors in close proximity may intercept and analyze electromagnetic radiation emanating from cryptoequipment and/or the target SV (i.e., main bus) to determine whether the emanations are information bearing. The data could be used to establish initial access.
.02 Docked Vehicle / OSAM Threat actors may leverage docking vehicles to laterally move into a target SV. If information is known on docking plans, a threat actor may target vehicles on the ground or in space to deploy malware to laterally move or execute malware on the target SV via the docking interface.
.03 Proximity Grappling Threat actors may posses the capability to grapple target SVs once it has established the appropriate space rendezvous. If from a proximity / rendezvous perspective a threat actor has the ability to connect via docking interface or expose testing (i.e., JTAG port) once it has grappled the target SV, they could perform various attacks depending on the access enabled via the physical connection.
EXF-0002 Side-Channel Attack Threat actors may use a side-channel attack attempts to gather information by measuring or exploiting indirect effects of the SV. Information within the SV can be extracted through these side-channels in which sensor data is analyzed in non-trivial ways to recover subtle, hidden or unexpected information. A series of measurements of a side-channel constitute an identifiable signature which can then be matched against a signature database to identify target information, without having to explicitly decode the side-channel.
.02 Electromagnetic Leakage Attacks Threat actors can leverage electromagnetic emanations to obtain sensitive information. The electromagnetic radiations attain importance when they are hardware generated emissions, especially emissions from the cryptographic module. Electromagnetic leakage attacks have been shown to be more successful than power analysis attacks on chicards. If proper protections are not in place on the spacecraft, the circuitry is exposed and hence leads to stronger emanations of EM radiations. If the circuitry is exposed, it provides an easier environment to study the electromagnetic emanations from each individual component.
EXF-0005 Proximity Operations Threat actors may leverage the lack of emission security or tempest controls to exfiltrate information using a visiting SV. This is similar to side-channel attacks but leveraging a visiting SV to measure the signals for decoding purposes.
LM-0003 Constellation Hopping via Crosslink Threat actors may attempt to command another neighboring spacecraft via crosslink. SVs in close proximity are often able to send commands back and forth. Threat actors may be able to leverage this access to compromise another SV.
LM-0004 Visiting Vehicle Interface(s) Threat actors may move to other SVs through visiting vehicle interfaces. When a vehicle docks with a SV, many programs are automatically triggered in order to ensure docking mechanisms are locked. This entails several data points and commands being sent to and from the SV and the visiting vehicle. If a threat actor were to compromise a visiting vehicle, they could target these specific programs in order to send malicious commands to the victim SV once docked.

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

ID Description

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [spacecraft] shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-14,PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1)} The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus.
The [organization] shall describe (a) the separation between RED and BLACK cables, (b) the filtering on RED power lines, (c) the grounding criteria for the RED safety grounds, (d) and the approach for dielectric separators on any potential fortuitous conductors.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1)}
The [spacecraft] shall be designed such that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(19)} This requirement applies if system components are being designed to address EMSEC and the measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements.
The [spacecraft] shall be constructed with sufficient electromagnetic shielding to protect electronic components from damage to the degree deemed acceptable by the Program.{PE-9,PE-14,PE-18,PE-21}