Power Masking

Masking is a scheme in which the intermediate variable is not dependent on an easily accessible subset of secret key. This results in making it impossible to deduce the secret key with partial information gathered through electromagnetic leakage.

Sources

M.-L. Akkar and C. Giraud. An implementation of des and aes, secure against some attacks. In CHES ’01: Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 309–318, London, UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag. J.-S. Coron and L. Goubin. On boolean and arithmetic masking against differential power analysis. In CHES ’00: Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 231–237, London, UK, 2000. Springer-Verlag. L. Goubin. A sound method for switching between boolean and arithmetic masking. In CHES ’01: Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 3–15, London, UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag.

Best Segment for Countermeasure Deployment

Space Segment

NIST Rev5 Controls

D3FEND

ISO 27001

ID: CM0061

D3FEND Artifacts:

Created: 2022/10/19

Last Modified: 2022/10/19

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

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ID		Name	Description
EXF-0002		Side-Channel Attack	Threat actors may use a side-channel attack attempts to gather information by measuring or exploiting indirect effects of the SV. Information within the SV can be extracted through these side-channels in which sensor data is analyzed in non-trivial ways to recover subtle, hidden or unexpected information. A series of measurements of a side-channel constitute an identifiable signature which can then be matched against a signature database to identify target information, without having to explicitly decode the side-channel.
	.02	Electromagnetic Leakage Attacks	Threat actors can leverage electromagnetic emanations to obtain sensitive information. The electromagnetic radiations attain importance when they are hardware generated emissions, especially emissions from the cryptographic module. Electromagnetic leakage attacks have been shown to be more successful than power analysis attacks on chicards. If proper protections are not in place on the spacecraft, the circuitry is exposed and hence leads to stronger emanations of EM radiations. If the circuitry is exposed, it provides an easier environment to study the electromagnetic emanations from each individual component.

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

ID	Description

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [spacecraft] shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-14,PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1)}	The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus.
The [organization] shall describe (a) the separation between RED and BLACK cables, (b) the filtering on RED power lines, (c) the grounding criteria for the RED safety grounds, (d) and the approach for dielectric separators on any potential fortuitous conductors.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1)}
The [spacecraft] shall be designed such that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(19)}	This requirement applies if system components are being designed to address EMSEC and the measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements.