Threat modeling

Use threat modeling and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.

Best Segment for Countermeasure Deployment

  • Development Environment

NIST Rev5 Controls

D3FEND

ISO 27001

ID: CM0020
D3FEND Artifacts: 
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2022/10/19

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

here here here here here here here here here
ID Name Description
IA-0001 Compromise Supply Chain Threat actors may manipulate or compromise products or product delivery mechanisms before the customer receives them in order to achieve data or system compromise.
.02 Software Supply Chain Threat actors may manipulate software binaries and applications prior to the customer receiving them in order to achieve data or system compromise. This attack can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of source code, manipulation of the update and/or distribution mechanism, or replacing compiled versions with a malicious one.
EX-0009 Exploit Code Flaws Threats actors may identify and exploit flaws or weaknesses within the software running on-board the target SV. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components.
.01 Flight Software Threat actors may abuse known or unknown flight software code flaws in order to further the attack campaign. In some cases, these code flaws can perpetuate throughout the victim SV, allowing access to otherwise segmented subsystems.
.02 Operating System Threat actors may exploit flaws in the operating system code, which controls the storage, memory management, provides resources to the FSW, and controls the bus.
EX-0010 Inject Malicious Code Threat actors may rely on other tactics and techniques in order to inject malicious code into the victim SV. This can be done via compromising the supply chain or development environment in some capacity or taking advantage of known commands. However, once malicious code has been uploaded to the victim SV, the threat actor can then trigger the code to run via a specific command or wait for a legitimate user to trigger it accidently. The code itself can do a number of different things to the hosted payload, subsystems, or underlying OS.
PER-0002 Backdoor Threat actors may find and target various backdoors, or inject their own, within the victim SV in the hopes of maintaining their attack.
.02 Software Threat actors may inject code to create their own backdoor to establish persistent access to the SV. This may be done through modification of code throughout the software supply chain or through modification of the software-defined radio configuration (if applicable).
DE-0001 Disable Fault Management Threat actors may disable fault management within the victim SV during the attack campaign. During the development process, many fault management mechanisms are added to the various parts of the SV in order to protect it from a variety of bad/corrupted commands, invalid sensor data, and more. By disabling these mechanisms, threat actors may be able to have commands processed that would not normally be allowed.

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

ID Description

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [organization] shall establish robust procedures and technical methods to perform testing to include adversarial testing (i.e.abuse cases) of the platform hardware and software.{CA-8,CP-4(5),RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(2),SA-3,SA-4(3),SA-11,SA-11(1),SA-11(2),SA-11(5),SA-11(7),SA-11(8),SA-15(7)}
The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis on threats to mission critical capabilities and/or system components to inform risk management decisions.{SV-MA-4}{PM-16,RA-3(2),RA-3(3),RA-7,RA-9,SA-12(8),SA-15(8)}
The [organization] shall use the threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services to inform and direct subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-3(3),SA-11(2),SA-15(8),SI-3}
The [organization] shall use threat modeling and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SA-15(8)}
The [organization] shall perform and document threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SI-3}
The [organization] shall require the developer to use threat modeling, attack surface analysis, and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.{SA-15(8)}