Disable Physical Ports

Provide the capability for data connection ports or input/output devices (e.g., JTAG) to be disabled or removed prior to spacecraft operations.

Best Segment for Countermeasure Deployment

  • Space Segment

NIST Rev5 Controls

D3FEND

ISO 27001

ID: CM0037
D3FEND Artifacts: 
Created: 2022/10/19
Last Modified: 2022/10/19

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

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ID Name Description
IA-0005 Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Threat actors may perform a space rendezvous which is a set of orbital maneuvers during which a spacecraft arrives at the same orbit and approach to a very close distance (e.g. within visual contact or close proximity) to a target SV.
.02 Docked Vehicle / OSAM Threat actors may leverage docking vehicles to laterally move into a target SV. If information is known on docking plans, a threat actor may target vehicles on the ground or in space to deploy malware to laterally move or execute malware on the target SV via the docking interface.
.03 Proximity Grappling Threat actors may posses the capability to grapple target SVs once it has established the appropriate space rendezvous. If from a proximity / rendezvous perspective a threat actor has the ability to connect via docking interface or expose testing (i.e., JTAG port) once it has grappled the target SV, they could perform various attacks depending on the access enabled via the physical connection.
IA-0011 Auxiliary Device Compromise Threat actors may exploit the auxiliary/peripheral devices that get plugged into space vehicles. It is no longer atypical to see space vehicles, especially CubeSats, with Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports or other ports where auxiliary/peripheral devices can be plugged in. Threat actors can execute malicious code on the space vehicles by copying the malicious code to auxiliary/peripheral devices and taking advantage of logic on the space vehicle to execute code on these devices. This may occur through manual manipulation of the auxiliary/peripheral devices, modification of standard IT systems used to initially format/create the auxiliary/peripheral device, or modification to the auxiliary/peripheral devices' firmware itself.
IA-0012 Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation Compromise Threat actors may target the spacecraft hardware and/or software while the spacecraft is at Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation (ATLO). ATLO is often the first time pieces of the spacecraft are fully integrated and exchanging data across interfaces. Malware could propagate from infected devices across the integrated spacecraft. For example, test equipment (i.e., transient cyber asset) is often brought in for testing elements of the spacecraft. Additionally, varying levels of physical security is in place which may be a reduction in physical security typically seen during development. The ATLO environment should be considered a viable attack vector and the appropriate/equivalent security controls from the primary development environment should be implemented during ATLO as well.
LM-0004 Visiting Vehicle Interface(s) Threat actors may move to other SVs through visiting vehicle interfaces. When a vehicle docks with a SV, many programs are automatically triggered in order to ensure docking mechanisms are locked. This entails several data points and commands being sent to and from the SV and the visiting vehicle. If a threat actor were to compromise a visiting vehicle, they could target these specific programs in order to send malicious commands to the victim SV once docked.

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

ID Description

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability for data connection ports or input/output devices to be disabled or removed prior to spacecraft operations.{SV-AC-5}{SA-9(2),SC-7(14),SC-41,SC-51} Intent is for external physical data ports to be disabled (logical or physical) while in operational orbit. Port disablement does not necessarily need to be irreversible.