Threat actor is trying to move through across sub-systems and/or payloads of the spacecraft.
| ID | Name | Description | |
| LM-0001 | Hosted Payload | The adversary pivots through the host–payload boundary to reach additional subsystems. Hosted payloads exchange power, time, housekeeping, and data with the bus via defined gateways (e.g., SpaceWire, 1553, Ethernet) and often support file services, table loads, and command dictionaries distinct from the host’s. A foothold on the payload can be used to inject traffic through the gateway processor, request privileged services (time/ephemeris distribution, firmware loads), or ride shared backplanes where payload traffic is bridged into C&DH networks. In some designs, payload processes execute on host compute or expose maintenance modes that temporarily widen access, creating paths from the payload into attitude, power, storage, or recorder resources. The movement is transitive: compromise a co-resident unit, then traverse the trusted interface that already exists for mission operations. | |
| LM-0002 | Exploit Lack of Bus Segregation | On flat architectures, where remote terminals, subsystems, and payloads share a common bus with minimal partitioning, any node that can transmit may influence many others. An attacker leverages this by forging message IDs or terminal addresses, replaying actuator/sensor frames, seizing or imitating bus-controller roles, or abusing gateway bridges that forward traffic between links (e.g., 1553↔SpaceWire/CAN). Because consumers often act on the latest valid-looking message, crafted traffic from one compromised device can reconfigure peers, toggle power domains, or write persistent parameters. Weak role enforcement and broadcast semantics allow privilege escalation from a peripheral to effective system-wide influence, turning the shared medium into a highway for further compromise. | |
| LM-0003 | Constellation Hopping via Crosslink | In networks where vehicles exchange data over inter-satellite links, a compromise on one spacecraft becomes a springboard to others. The attacker crafts crosslink traffic, routing updates, service advertisements, time/ephemeris distribution, file or tasking messages, that appears to originate from a trusted neighbor and targets gateway functions that bridge crosslink traffic into command/data paths. Once accepted, those messages can queue procedures, deliver configuration/table edits, or open file transfer sessions on adjacent vehicles. In mesh or hub-and-spoke constellations, this enables “hop-by-hop” spread: a single foothold uses shared trust and protocol uniformity to reach additional satellites without contacting the ground segment. | |
| LM-0004 | Visiting Vehicle Interface(s) | Docking, berthing, or short-duration attach events create high-trust, high-bandwidth connections between vehicles. During these operations, automatic sequences verify latches, exchange status, synchronize time, and enable umbilicals that carry data and power; maintenance tools may also push firmware or tables across the interface. An attacker positioned on the visiting vehicle can exploit these handshakes and service channels to inject commands, transfer files, or access bus gateways on the host. Because many actions are expected “just after dock,” malicious traffic can ride the same procedures that commission the interface, allowing lateral movement from the visiting craft into the target spacecraft’s C&DH, payload, or support subsystems. | |
| LM-0005 | Virtualization Escape | The adversary pivots across partitions by abusing the mechanisms a separation kernel or hypervisor exposes for inter-partition communication and device sharing. Paths include message ports/queues, shared-memory windows, virtual NICs and bridges, hypercalls, and common driver backends (e.g., storage or DMA engines without strict IOMMU bounds). A foothold in a less-trusted partition, often a payload or guest OS, can be turned into access to a higher-privilege domain by crafting traffic that exploits parser flaws in port services, racing management channels, or coercing backend drivers to perform out-of-bounds operations. Once the boundary is crossed, the actor can reach bus gateways, file systems, or control applications hosted in adjacent partitions and continue movement under the guise of permitted inter-partition exchanges. | |
| LM-0006 | Launch Vehicle Interface | During integration and ascent, payloads and the launch vehicle exchange power, discrete lines, and data via umbilicals, separation avionics, and shared EGSE networks. Protections can be reduced or heterogeneous because timelines are tight and responsibilities cross organizations. An attacker positioned on either side (vehicle or payload) can use these commissioning links, health/status queries, time distribution, inhibit lines, separation commands, or telemetry gateways, to inject messages, transfer files, or alter configuration that propagates across the interface. Before fairing close and prior to separation, this brief but high-trust coupling provides a route to move from one platform to the other and to seed artifacts that persist after deployment. | |
| .01 | Rideshare Payload | In shared launches, multiple independent payloads cohabit common infrastructure until separation. If isolation is incomplete (e.g., shared data buses, mispartitioned deployer controllers, common logging/telemetry collectors, or cross-connected laptops and recorders), a compromise in one payload’s domain can be leveraged to observe or influence another’s traffic before release. Threat actors exploit these transient but real connections to read configuration, pivot through deployer control paths, or stage data/commands that execute as neighboring payloads power and check out, enabling cross-payload access or tampering prior to independent flight. | |
| LM-0007 | Credentialed Traversal | Movement is achieved by reusing legitimate credentials and keys to cross boundaries that rely on trust rather than strict isolation. Using operator or service accounts, maintenance logins, station certificates, or spacecraft-recognized crypto, the adversary invokes gateways that bridge domains, C&DH to payload, crosslink routers to onboard networks, or constellation management planes to individual vehicles. Because the traversal occurs through approved interfaces (file services, table loaders, remote procedure calls, crosslink tasking), actions appear as routine operations while reaching progressively more privileged subsystems or neighboring spacecraft. Where roles and scopes are broad or reused, the same credential opens multiple enclaves, turning authorization itself into the lateral path. | |