Heaters and flow valves of the propulsion subsystem are controlled by electric signals so cyberattacks against these signals could cause propellant lines to freeze, lock valves, waste propellant or even put in de-orbit or unstable spinning
| Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|
| See threat ID SV-AC-1 for crypto and auth requirements. But to protect for TEMPEST. The spacecraft shall be designed such that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations. {SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2} {PE-19,PE-19(1)} | The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus. |
| The spacecraft shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information. {SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2} {PE-19,PE-19(1)} | |
| The Program shall describe (a) the separation between RED and BLACK cables, (b) the filtering on RED power lines, (c) the grounding criteria for the RED safety grounds, (d) and the approach for dielectric separators on any potential fortuitous conductors. {SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2} {PE-19,PE-19(1)} |
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| REC-0001 | Gather Spacecraft Design Information | Threat actors may gather information about the victim SV's design that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information about the SV can include software, firmware, encryption type, purpose, as well as various makes and models of subsystems. | |
| REC-0001.06 | Maneuver & Control | Threat actors may gather information about the station-keeping control systems within the victim SV that can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques. Information gathered can include thruster types, propulsion types, attitude sensors, and data flows associated with the relevant subsystems. | |
| EX-0012 | Modify On-Board Values | Threat actors may perform specific commands in order to modify onboard values that the victim SV relies on. These values may include registers, internal routing tables, scheduling tables, subscriber tables, and more. Depending on how the values have been modified, the victim SV may no longer be able to function. | |
| IMP-0002 | Disruption | Threat actors may seek to disrupt communications from the victim SV to the ground controllers or other interested parties. By disrupting communications during critical times, there is the potential impact of data being lost or critical actions not being performed. This could cause the SV's purpose to be put into jeopardy depending on what communications were lost during the disruption. This behavior is different than Denial as this attack can also attempt to modify the data and messages as they are passed as a way to disrupt communications. | |
| IMP-0003 | Denial | Threat actors may seek to deny ground controllers and other interested parties access to the victim SV. This would be done exhausting system resource, degrading subsystems, or blocking communications entirely. This behavior is different from Disruption as this seeks to deny communications entirely, rather than stop them for a length of time. | |
| IMP-0004 | Degradation | Threat actors may target various subsystems or the hosted payload in such a way in order to rapidly increase it's degradation. This could potentially shorten the lifespan of the victim SV. | |
| ID | Name | Description | NIST Rev5 | D3FEND | ISO 27001 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CM0000 | Countermeasure Not Identified | This technique is a result of utilizing TTPs to create an impact and the applicable countermeasures are associated with the TTPs leveraged to achieve the impact | None | None | ||
| CM0001 | Protect Sensitive Information | Organizations should look to identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information (e.g., fault management approach) and apply access control accordingly. Any location (ground system, contractor networks, etc.) storing design information needs to ensure design info is protected from exposure, exfiltration, etc. Space system sensitive information may be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Company Proprietary. Space system sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, any ICDs (like radio frequency, ground-to-space, etc.), command and telemetry databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, CUI, proprietary, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission. Sensitive documentation should only be accessed by personnel with defined roles and a need to know. Well established access controls (roles, encryption at rest and transit, etc.) and data loss prevention (DLP) technology are key countermeasures. The DLP should be configured for the specific data types in question. | AC-3(11) AC-4(23) AC-4(25) CM-12 CM-12(1) PM-11 PM-17 SA-3(1) SA-3(2) SA-4(12) SA-5 SA-9(7) SI-21 SI-23 SR-12 SR-7 | A.8.4 A.8.11 A.8.10 A.8.33 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.37 A.8.10 A.5.22 | ||