CM0000

Complete compromise or corruption of running state


Informational References

ID: CM0000
DiD Layer: IDS/IPS
CAPEC #:  74 | 166 | 578 | 581 | 620
NIST Rev5 Control Tag Mapping:  CA-7 | CA-7(6) | CP-10 | CP-10(4) | CP-12 | IR-4 | IR-4(3) | RA-3 | RA-3(1) | RA-10 | SA-8 | SA-8(21) | SA-8(23) | SA-8(24) | SA-9 | SA-9(7) | SC-24 | SI-7 | SI-7(17) | SI-11 | SI-17
Lowest Threat Tier to
Create Threat Event:  
V
Notional Risk Rank Score: 

High-Level Requirements

The spacecraft shall provide the capability to enter the spacecraft into a cyber-safe mode when cyberattacks have been detected.

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [spacecraft] shall enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected, enters a cyber-safe mode of operation with restrictions as defined based on the cyber-safe mode.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(3),PE-10,RA-10,SA-8(16),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-13,SI-17}
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to enter the platform into a known good, operational cyber-safe mode from a tamper-resistant, configuration-controlled (“gold”) image that is authenticated as coming from an acceptable supplier, and has its integrity verified.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4(3),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-13,SI-17} Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and SW functions to preattack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on available equipment still available after a cyberattack. The goal is for the vehicle to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved.
The [spacecraft] shall fail to a known secure state for failures during initialization, and aborts preserving information necessary to return to operations in failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-24,SI-13,SI-17}
The [spacecraft] shall provide or support the capability for recovery and reconstitution to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-4(4),CP-10,CP-10(4),CP-10(6),CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24)}
The [spacecraft] shall generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11}
The [spacecraft] shall reveal error messages only to operations personnel monitoring the telemetry.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11}
The [spacecraft] cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} Cyber-safe mode is using a fail-secure mentality where if there is a malfunction that the spacecraft goes into a fail-secure state where cyber protections like authentication and encryption are still employed (instead of bypassed) and the spacecraft can be restored by authorized commands. The cyber-safe mode should be stored in a high integrity location of the on-board SV so that it cannot be modified by attackers.

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID Name Description
IMP-0002 Disruption Threat actors may seek to disrupt communications from the victim SV to the ground controllers or other interested parties. By disrupting communications during critical times, there is the potential impact of data being lost or critical actions not being performed. This could cause the SV's purpose to be put into jeopardy depending on what communications were lost during the disruption. This behavior is different than Denial as this attack can also attempt to modify the data and messages as they are passed as a way to disrupt communications.
IMP-0003 Denial Threat actors may seek to deny ground controllers and other interested parties access to the victim SV. This would be done exhausting system resource, degrading subsystems, or blocking communications entirely. This behavior is different from Disruption as this seeks to deny communications entirely, rather than stop them for a length of time.
IMP-0004 Degradation Threat actors may target various subsystems or the hosted payload in such a way in order to rapidly increase it's degradation. This could potentially shorten the lifespan of the victim SV.

Related SPARTA Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0000 Countermeasure Not Identified This technique is a result of utilizing TTPs to create an impact and the applicable countermeasures are associated with the TTPs leveraged to achieve the impact None None