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The Program shall review proposed changes to the spacecraft, assessing both mission and security impacts. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-10,CM-3(2)}
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The Program shall perform configuration management during system, component, or service during [design; development; implementation; operations]. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-10}
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The Program prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {CM-7(8)}
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The Program shall perform and document threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(2)}
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The Program shall use the threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services to inform and direct subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(2)}
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The Program shall perform a manual code review of all flight code. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(4)}
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The Program shall conduct an Attack Surface Analysis and reduce attack surfaces to a level that presents a low level of compromise by an attacker. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(6),SA-15(5)}
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The Program shall use threat modeling and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(2),SA-15(8)}
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The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls.
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The Program shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of [all] software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11,SA-11(5),CA-8}
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* The frequency of testing should be driven by Program completion events and updates.
* Examples of approaches are static analyses, dynamic analyses, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches
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The Program shall verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls (to include abuse cases and penetration testing) at the depth of testing defined in the test documents. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(5),SA-11(7),CA-8}
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The depth needs to include functional testing as well as negative/abuse testing.
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The Program shall perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Program-defined depth and coverage]. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11}
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The Program shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11,CA-8}
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The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization.
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The Program shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11}
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Flaws that impact the mission objectives should be prioritized.
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The Program shall correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11}
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The Program shall perform vulnerability analysis and risk assessment of [all systems and software]. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-15(7),RA-5}
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The Program shall identify, report, and coordinate correction of cybersecurity-related information system flaws. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SI-2}
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* Although this requirement is stated to specifically apply to cybersecurity-related flaws, the Program office may choose to broaden it to all SV flaws.
* This requirement is allocated to the Program, as it is presumed, they have the greatest knowledge of the components of the system and when identified flaws apply.
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The Program shall correct reported cybersecurity-related information system flaws. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SI-2}
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This requirement is focused on software and firmware flaws. If hardware flaw remediation is required, refine the requirement to make this clear.
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The Program shall test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects on mission systems in a separate test environment before installation. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SI-2,CM-3(2),CM-4(1)}
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On-orbit patching/upgrades may be necessary if vulnerabilities are discovered after launch. The system should have the ability to update software post-launch.
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The Program shall release updated versions of the mission information systems incorporating security-relevant software and firmware updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than [Program-defined frequency [90 days]]. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {CM-3(2),CM-4(1)}
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The Program shall report identified systems or system components containing software affected by recently announced cybersecurity-related software flaws (and potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws) to [Program-defined officials] with cybersecurity responsibilities in accordance with organizational policy. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11} {SI-2}
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Component/Origin scanning looks for open-source libraries/software that may be included into the baseline and looks for known vulnerabilities and open-source license violations.
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The Program shall ensure that vulnerability scanning tools and techniques are employed that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: (1) Enumerating platforms, custom software flaws, and improper configurations; (2) Formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) Measuring vulnerability impact. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {RA-5}
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The prioritized list of CWEs should be created considering operational environment, attack surface, etc. Results from the threat modeling and attack surface analysis should be used as inputs into the CWE prioritization process. There is also a CWSS (https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html) process that can be used to prioritize CWEs. The prioritized list of CWEs can help with tools selection as well as you select tools based on their ability to detect certain high priority CWEs.
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The Program shall create prioritized list of software weakness classes (e.g., Common Weakness Enumerations) to be used during static code analysis for prioritization of static analysis results. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(1),SA-15(7)}
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The Program shall perform static source code analysis for [all available source code] looking for [Select one {Program-defined Top CWE List, SANS Top 25, OWASP Top 10}] weaknesses using no less than two static code analysis tools. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(1),SA-15(7),RA-5}
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The Program shall perform component analysis (a.k.a. origin analysis) for developed or acquired software. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-15(7),RA-5}
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The Program shall analyze vulnerability/weakness scan reports and results from security control assessments. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {RA-5}
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The Program shall determine the vulnerabilities/weaknesses that require remediation, and coordinate the timeline for that remediation, in accordance with the analysis of the vulnerability scan report, the Program assessment of risk, and mission needs. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {RA-5}
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The Program shall ensure that the vulnerability scanning tools (e.g., static analysis and/or component analysis tools) used include the capability to readily update the list of potential information system vulnerabilities to be scanned. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {RA-5}
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The Program shall ensure that the list of potential system vulnerabilities scanned is updated [prior to a new scan] {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {RA-5(2)}
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The Program shall define acceptable coding languages to be used by the software developer. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-15}
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The Program shall define acceptable secure coding standards for use by the developer. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-15}
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Manual review cannot scale across the code base; you must have a way to scale in order to confirm your coding standards are being met. The intent is for automated means to ensure code adheres to a coding standard.
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The Program shall have automated means to evaluate adherence to coding standards. {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-15,SA-15(7),RA-5}
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Fuzzing and/or dynamic analysis with abuse cases is important to flush out edge cases and how malicious actors could affect the spacecraft's FSW. Not all defects (i.e., buffer overflows, race conditions, and memory leaks) can be discovered statically and require execution of the software. This is where space-centric cyber testbeds (i.e., cyber ranges) are imperative as they provide an environment to maliciously attack components in a controlled environment to discover these undesirable conditions. Technology has improved to where digital twins for spacecraft are achievable, which provides an avenue for cyber testing that was often not performed due to perceived risk to the flight hardware.
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The Program shall employ dynamic analysis (e.g., using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code). {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11} {SA-11(5),SA-11(8),CA-8}
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See threat ID number SV-SP-3 for information on software development requirements. In general terms threat ID SV-SP-4 applies from a generic sense since software reuse or COTS usage is a supply chain concern. The Program shall ensure that software planned for reuse meets the fit, form, and function, and security as a component within the new application. {SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11} {CM-7(5)}
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Many commercial products/parts are utilized within the system and should be analyzed for security weaknesses. Blindly accepting the firmware is free of weakness is unacceptable for high assurance missions. The intent is to not blindly accept firmware from unknown sources and assume it is secure. This is meant to apply to firmware the vendors are not developing internally. In-house developed firmware should be going through the vendor's own testing program and have high assurance it is secure. When utilizing firmware from other sources, "expecting" does not meet this requirement. Each supplier needs to provide evidence to support that claim that their firmware they are getting is genuine and secure.
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The Program shall perform static binary analysis of all firmware that is utilized on the spacecraft. {SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11} {SA-11,RA-5}
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The operating system is extremely important to security and availability of the spacecraft, therefore should receive high levels of assurance that it operates as intended and free of critical weaknesses/vulnerabilities.
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The Program shall define/maintain an approved operating system list for use on spacecraft. {SV-SP-7} {CM-7(5)}
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The spacecraft's operating system, if COTS or FOSS, shall be selected from a [Program-defined] accepted list. {SV-SP-7} {CM-7(8),CM-7(5)}
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The operating system updates should be performed using multi-factor authorization and should only be performed when risk of compromise/exploitation of identified vulnerability outweighs the risk of not performing the update.
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The spacecraft shall retain the capability to update/upgrade operating systems while on-orbit. {SV-SP-7} {SA-4(5)}
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This would be similar to inserting malicious logic into the spacecraft during the development (HW and SW supply chain which are covered under SV-SP-3, SV-SP-4, SV-SP-6, and SV-SP-7)or via SW update process once launched which is covered under threat ID SV-SP-9. Depending on the implementation of the SDR the controls would be different therefore specific requirements are not generated for this particular threat but are covered by other threats. {SV-SP-11}
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