CM0000

Compromised master keys or any encryption key


Informational References

ID: CM0000
DiD Layer: Data
CAPEC #:  20 | 97 | 474 | 485 | 622
NIST Rev5 Control Tag Mapping:  AC-3 | AC-3(11) | AC-17 | AC-17(10) | IA-5 | IA-5(7) | IA-7 | SA-8 | SA-8(9) | SA-9 | SA-9(6) | SA-9(7) | SC-12 | SC-12(1) | SC-12(2) | SC-12(3) | SC-13 | SC-28 | SC-28(1) | SC-28(3) | SR-4 | SR-4(3) | SR-4(4) | SR-5 | SR-9 | SR-9(1) | SR-11 | SR-12
Lowest Threat Tier to
Create Threat Event:  
III
Notional Risk Rank Score: 

High-Level Requirements

The Program shall protect the encryption keys from disclosure using a robust key management strategy in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The Program shall define policy and procedures to ensure that the developed or delivered systems do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications, access scripts, configuration files, nor store unencrypted static authenticators on function keys. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {IA-5(7)}
The spacecraft shall protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {IA-5}
The spacecraft's encryption keys shall be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {SC-12}
The spacecraft's encryption keys shall be restricted so that the onboard software is not able to access the information for key readout. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {SC-12} Examples of devices to handle keys are electron circuits via FPGAs or ASICS. Intent is to ensure the FSW does not have access to crypto keys and system complies with the key management plan.
The spacecraft's encryption key handling shall be handled outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {SC-12,SC-28(1)}
The spacecraft shall produce, control, and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys using NSA Certified or Approved key management technology and processes. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2)} FIPS-complaint technology used by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques that are either a) specified in a FIPS, or b) adopted in a FIPS and specified either in an appendix to the FIPS or in a document referenced by the FIPS. NSA-approved technology used for symmetric key management by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria.
The Program shall use NIST Approved for symmetric key management for Unclassified systems; NSA Approved or stronger symmetric key management technology for Classified systems. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2)} In most cased the Program will leverage NSA-approved key management technology and processes.
The spacecraft shall produce, control, and distribute asymmetric cryptographic keys using [Program-defined] asymmetric key management processes. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)}
The spacecraft shall implement cryptography for the indicated uses using the indicated protocols, algorithms, and mechanisms, in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards: [NSA- certified or approved cryptography for protection of classified information, FIPS-validated cryptography for the provision of hashing]. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3} {IA-7,SC-13}
The Program shall use NSA approved key management technology and processes. NSA-approved technology used for asymmetric key management by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria. {SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3} {SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)}

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID Name Description
EX-0003 Modify Authentication Process Threat actors may modify the internal authentication process of the victim SV to facilitate initial access, recurring execution, or prevent authorized entities from accessing the SV. This can be done through the modification of the software binaries or memory manipulation techniques.
EX-0006 Disable/Bypass Encryption Threat actors may perform specific techniques in order to bypass or disable the encryption mechanism onboard the victim SV. By bypassing or disabling this particular mechanism, further tactics can be performed, such as Exfiltration, that may have not been possible with the internal encryption process in place.
PER-0004 Replace Cryptographic Keys Threat actors may attempt to fully replace the cryptographic keys on the space vehicle which could lockout the mission operators and enable the threat actor's communication channel. Once the encryption key is changed on the space vehicle, the SV is rendered inoperable from the operators perspective as they have lost commanding access. Threat actors may exploit weaknesses in the key management strategy. For example, the threat actor may exploit the over-the-air rekeying procedures to inject their own cryptographic keys.
IMP-0006 Theft Threat actors may attempt to steal the data that is being gathered, processed, and sent from the victim SV. Many SVs have a particular purpose associated with them and the data they gather is deemed mission critical. By attempting to steal this data, the mission, or purpose, of the SV could be lost entirely.

Related SPARTA Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0000 Countermeasure Not Identified This technique is a result of utilizing TTPs to create an impact and the applicable countermeasures are associated with the TTPs leveraged to achieve the impact None None