CM0000

Communications system jamming resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity


Informational References

ID: CM0000
DiD Layer: Comms Link
CAPEC #:  559 | 599 | 603 | 619
NIST Rev5 Control Tag Mapping:  AC-18 | AC-18(5) | CA-7 | CA-7(6) | CP-4 | CP-4(5) | CP-8 | SA-8 | SA-8(24) | SC-5 | SC-40 | SC-40(1) | SC-40(3) | SC-47 | SI-10 | SI-10(3)
Lowest Threat Tier to
Create Threat Event:  
V
Notional Risk Rank Score: 

High-Level Requirements

The spacecraft shall be resilient against communications and positioning jamming attempts.

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The spacecraft shall have multiple uplink paths {SV-AV-1} {SC-5,CP-8} Transmission Security (TRANSEC) is used to ensure the availability of transmissions and limit intelligence collection from the transmissions. TRANSEC is secured through burst encoding, frequency hopping, or spread spectrum methods where the required pseudorandom sequence generation is controlled by a cryptographic algorithm and key. Such keys are known as transmission security keys (TSK). The objectives of transmission security are low probability of interception (LPI), low probability of detection (LPD), and antijam which means resistance to jamming (EPM or ECCM).
The spacecraft shall utilize TRANSEC. {SV-AV-1} {CP-8}
The spacecraft shall use [directional or beamforming] antennas in normal ops to reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept signals. {SV-AV-1} {AC-18(5)} Receiver communication can be established after an anomaly with such capabilities as multiple receive apertures, redundant paths within receivers, redundant receivers, omni apertures, fallback default command modes, and lower bit rates for contingency commanding, as examples
The spacecraft shall maintain the ability to establish communication with the spacecraft in the event of an anomaly to the primary receive path. {SV-AV-1} {SV-IT-1} {CP-8} Can be aided via the Crosslink, S-Band, and L-Band subsystems
The spacecraft shall protect external and internal communications from jamming and spoofing attempts. {SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1} {SC-5,SC-40,SC-40(1)}
The spacecraft shall implement cryptographic mechanisms that achieve adequate protection against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference. {SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1} {SC-40,SC-40(1)}
The spacecraft shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters. {SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1} {SC-40(3)}

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID Name Description
EX-0013 Flooding Threat actors use jamming and flooding attacks to disrupt communications by injecting unexpected noise or messages into a transmission channel. There are several types of attacks that are consistent with this method of exploitation, and they can produce various outcomes. Although, the most prominent of the impacts are denial of service or data corruption. Several elements of the space vehicle may be targeted by jamming and flooding attacks, and depending on the time of the attack, it can have devastating results to the availability of the system.
EX-0013.02 Erroneous Data Threat actors inject noise into the target channel so that legitimate messages cannot be correctly processed due to data integrity impacts. Additionally, while this technique does not utilize valid commands, the target SV still must consume computing resources to process and discard the signal.
EX-0013.01 Valid Commands Threat actors may utilize valid commanding as a mechanism for flooding as the processing of these valid commands could expend valuable resources like processing power and battery usage. Flooding the spacecraft bus, sub-systems or link layer with valid commands can create temporary denial of service conditions for the space vehicle while the SV is consumed with processing these valid commands.
DE-0002 Prevent Downlink Threat actors may target the downlink connections to prevent the victim SV from sending telemetry to the ground controllers. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the SV while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place.
DE-0002.01 Inhibit Ground System Functionality Threat actors may utilize ground-system presence to inhibit the ground system software's ability to process (or display) telemetry, effectively leaving ground controllers unaware of vehicle activity during this time. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the SV while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place.
DE-0002.02 Jam Link Signal Threat actors may overwhelm/jam the downlink signal to prevent transmitted telemetry signals from reaching their destination without severe modification/interference, effectively leaving ground controllers unaware of vehicle activity during this time. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the SV while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place.
IMP-0001 Deception (or Misdirection) Threat actors may seek to deceive mission stakeholders (or even military decision makers) for a multitude of reasons. Telemetry values could be modified, attacks could be designed to intentionally mimic another threat actor's TTPs, and even allied ground infrastructure could be compromised and used as the source of communications to the SV.
IMP-0002 Disruption Threat actors may seek to disrupt communications from the victim SV to the ground controllers or other interested parties. By disrupting communications during critical times, there is the potential impact of data being lost or critical actions not being performed. This could cause the SV's purpose to be put into jeopardy depending on what communications were lost during the disruption. This behavior is different than Denial as this attack can also attempt to modify the data and messages as they are passed as a way to disrupt communications.
IMP-0003 Denial Threat actors may seek to deny ground controllers and other interested parties access to the victim SV. This would be done exhausting system resource, degrading subsystems, or blocking communications entirely. This behavior is different from Disruption as this seeks to deny communications entirely, rather than stop them for a length of time.
IMP-0004 Degradation Threat actors may target various subsystems or the hosted payload in such a way in order to rapidly increase it's degradation. This could potentially shorten the lifespan of the victim SV.

Related SPARTA Countermeasures

ID Name Description NIST Rev5 D3FEND ISO 27001
CM0000 Countermeasure Not Identified This technique is a result of utilizing TTPs to create an impact and the applicable countermeasures are associated with the TTPs leveraged to achieve the impact None None