TRANSEC

Utilize TRANSEC in order to prevent interception, disruption of reception, communications deception, and/or derivation of intelligence by analysis of transmission characteristics such as signal parameters or message externals. For example, jam-resistant waveforms can be utilized to improve the resistance of radio frequency signals to jamming and spoofing. Note: TRANSEC is that field of COMSEC which deals with the security of communication transmissions, rather than that of the information being communicated.

Sources

https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/transmission_security

Best Segment for Countermeasure Deployment

Ground Segment and Space Segment

NIST Rev5 Controls

D3FEND

ISO 27001

ID: CM0029

Created: 2022/10/19

Last Modified: 2023/04/22

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

here here here here here here here here here

ID		Name	Description
REC-0003		Gather Spacecraft Communications Information	Threat actors may obtain information on the victim spacecraft's communication channels in order to determine specific commands, protocols, and types. Information gathered can include commanding patterns, antenna shape and location, beacon frequency and polarization, and various transponder information.
	.01	Communications Equipment	Threat actors may gather information regarding the communications equipment and its configuration that will be used for communicating with the victim spacecraft. This includes: Antenna Shape: This information can help determine the range in which it can communicate, the power of it's transmission, and the receiving patterns. Antenna Configuration/Location: This information can include positioning, transmission frequency, wavelength, and timing. Telemetry Signal Type: Information can include timing, radio frequency wavelengths, and other information that can provide insight into the spacecraft's telemetry system. Beacon Frequency: This information can provide insight into where the spacecrafts located, what it's orbit is, and how long it can take to communicate with a ground station. Beacon Polarization: This information can help triangulate the spacecrafts it orbits the earth and determine how a satellite must be oriented in order to communicate with the victim spacecraft. Transponder: This could include the number of transponders per band, transponder translation factor, transponder mappings, power utilization, and/or saturation point.
	.02	Commanding Details	Threat actors may gather information regarding the commanding approach that will be used for communicating with the victim spacecraft. This includes: Commanding Signal Type: This can include timing, radio frequency wavelengths, and other information that can provide insight into the spacecraft's commanding system. Valid Commanding Patterns: Most commonly, this comes in the form of a command database, but can also include other means that provide information on valid commands and the communication protocols used by the victim spacecraft. Valid Commanding Periods: This information can provide insight into when a command will be accepted by the spacecraft and help the threat actor construct a viable attack campaign.
	.03	Mission-Specific Channel Scanning	Threat actors may seek knowledge about mission-specific communication channels dedicated to a payload. Such channels could be managed by a different organization than the owner of the spacecraft itself.
	.04	Valid Credentials	Threat actors may seek out valid credentials which can be utilized to facilitate several tactics throughout an attack. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
REC-0005		Eavesdropping	Threat actors may seek to capture network communications throughout the ground station and radio frequency (RF) communication used for uplink and downlink communications. RF communication frequencies vary between 30MHz and 60 GHz. Threat actors may capture RF communications using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator turned to the communication frequency. Network communications may be captured using packet capture software while the threat actor is on the target network.
	.01	Uplink Intercept	Threat actors may capture the RF communications as it pertains to the uplink to the victim spacecraft. This information can contain commanding information that the threat actor can use to perform other attacks against the victim spacecraft.
	.02	Downlink Intercept	Threat actors may capture the RF communications as it pertains to the downlink of the victim spacecraft. This information can contain important telemetry such as onboard status and mission data.
	.03	Proximity Operations	Threat actors may capture signals and/or network communications as they travel on-board the vehicle (i.e., EMSEC/TEMPEST), via RF, or terrestrial networks. This information can be decoded to determine commanding and telemetry protocols, command times, and other information that could be used for future attacks.
	.04	Active Scanning (RF/Optical)	Threat actors may interfere with the link by actively transmitting packets to activate the transmitter and induce a reply. The scan can be similar to a brute force attack, aiming to guess the used frequencies and protocols to obtain a reply.
IA-0003		Crosslink via Compromised Neighbor	Threat actors may compromise a victim spacecraft via the crosslink communications of a neighboring spacecraft that has been compromised. spacecraft in close proximity are able to send commands back and forth. Threat actors may be able to leverage this access to compromise other spacecraft once they have access to another that is nearby.
IA-0008		Rogue External Entity	Threat actors may gain access to a victim spacecraft through the use of a rogue external entity. With this technique, the threat actor does not need access to a legitimate ground station or communication site.
	.01	Rogue Ground Station	Threat actors may gain access to a victim spacecraft through the use of a rogue ground system. With this technique, the threat actor does not need access to a legitimate ground station or communication site.
	.02	Rogue Spacecraft	Threat actors may gain access to a target spacecraft using their own spacecraft that has the capability to maneuver within close proximity to a target spacecraft to carry out a variety of TTPs (i.e., eavesdropping, side-channel, etc.). Since many of the commercial and military assets in space are tracked, and that information is publicly available, attackers can identify the location of space assets to infer the best positioning for intersecting orbits. Proximity operations support avoidance of the larger attenuation that would otherwise affect the signal when propagating long distances, or environmental circumstances that may present interference.
	.03	ASAT/Counterspace Weapon	Threat actors may utilize counterspace platforms to access/impact spacecraft. These counterspace capabilities vary significantly in the types of effects they create, the level of technological sophistication required, and the level of resources needed to develop and deploy them. These diverse capabilities also differ in how they are employed and how easy they are to detect and attribute and the permanence of the effects they have on their target.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
IA-0010		Exploit Reduced Protections During Safe-Mode	Threat actors may take advantage of the victim spacecraft being in safe mode and send malicious commands that may not otherwise be processed. Safe-mode is when all non-essential systems are shut down and only essential functions within the spacecraft are active. During this mode, several commands are available to be processed that are not normally processed. Further, many protections may be disabled at this time.
EX-0001		Replay	Replay attacks involve threat actors recording previously data streams and then resending them at a later time. This attack can be used to fingerprint systems, gain elevated privileges, or even cause a denial of service.
	.01	Command Packets	Threat actors may interact with the victim spacecraft by replaying captured commands to the spacecraft. While not necessarily malicious in nature, replayed commands can be used to overload the target spacecraft and cause it's onboard systems to crash, perform a DoS attack, or monitor various responses by the spacecraft. If critical commands are captured and replayed, thruster fires, then the impact could impact the spacecraft's attitude control/orbit.
EX-0011		Exploit Reduced Protections During Safe-Mode	Threat actors may take advantage of the victim spacecraft being in safe mode and send malicious commands that may not otherwise be processed. Safe-mode is when all non-essential systems are shut down and only essential functions within the spacecraft are active. During this mode, several commands are available to be processed that are not normally processed. Further, many protections may be disabled at this time.
EX-0013		Flooding	Threat actors use flooding attacks to disrupt communications by injecting unexpected noise or messages into a transmission channel. There are several types of attacks that are consistent with this method of exploitation, and they can produce various outcomes. Although, the most prominent of the impacts are denial of service or data corruption. Several elements of the space vehicle may be targeted by jamming and flooding attacks, and depending on the time of the attack, it can have devastating results to the availability of the system.
	.01	Valid Commands	Threat actors may utilize valid commanding as a mechanism for flooding as the processing of these valid commands could expend valuable resources like processing power and battery usage. Flooding the spacecraft bus, sub-systems or link layer with valid commands can create temporary denial of service conditions for the space vehicle while the spacecraft is consumed with processing these valid commands.
	.02	Erroneous Input	Threat actors inject noise/data/signals into the target channel so that legitimate messages cannot be correctly processed due to impacts to integrity or availability. Additionally, while this technique does not utilize system-relevant signals/commands/information, the target spacecraft may still consume valuable computing resources to process and discard the signal.
EX-0016		Jamming	Threat actors may attempt to jam Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals (i.e. GPS, Galileo, etc.) to inhibit a spacecraft's position, navigation, and/or timing functions.
	.03	Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)	Threat actors may attempt to jam Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals (i.e. GPS, Galileo, etc.) to inhibit a spacecraft's position, navigation, and/or timing functions.
	.01	Uplink Jamming	An uplink jammer is used to interfere with signals going up to a satellite by creating enough noise that the satellite cannot distinguish between the real signal and the noise. Uplink jamming of the control link, for example, can prevent satellite operators from sending commands to a satellite. However, because the uplink jammer must be within the field of view of the antenna on the satellite receiving the command link, the jammer must be physically located within the vicinity of the command station on the ground.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
	.02	Downlink Jamming	Downlink jammers target the users of a satellite by creating noise in the same frequency as the downlink signal from the satellite. A downlink jammer only needs to be as powerful as the signal being received on the ground and must be within the field of view of the receiving terminal’s antenna. This limits the number of users that can be affected by a single jammer. Since many ground terminals use directional antennas pointed at the sky, a downlink jammer typically needs to be located above the terminal it is attempting to jam. This limitation can be overcome by employing a downlink jammer on an air or space-based platform, which positions the jammer between the terminal and the satellite. This also allows the jammer to cover a wider area and potentially affect more users. Ground terminals with omnidirectional antennas, such as many GPS receivers, have a wider field of view and thus are more susceptible to downlink jamming from different angles on the ground.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
EX-0014		Spoofing	Threat actors may attempt to spoof the various sensor and controller data that is depended upon by various subsystems within the victim spacecraft. Subsystems rely on this data to perform automated tasks, process gather data, and return important information to the ground controllers. By spoofing this information, threat actors could trigger automated tasks to fire when they are not needed to, potentially causing the spacecraft to behave erratically. Further, the data could be processed erroneously, causing ground controllers to receive incorrect telemetry or scientific data, threatening the spacecraft's reliability and integrity.
PER-0005		Valid Credentials	Threat actors may seek out valid credentials which can be utilized to maintain persistent access to the spacecraft or related C2 systems and facilitate additional tactics throughout an attack. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
DE-0002		Prevent Downlink	Threat actors may target the downlink connections to prevent the victim spacecraft from sending telemetry to the ground controllers. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the spacecraft while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place.
	.02	Jam Link Signal	Threat actors may overwhelm/jam the downlink signal to prevent transmitted telemetry signals from reaching their destination without severe modification/interference, effectively leaving ground controllers unaware of vehicle activity during this time. Telemetry is the only method in which ground controllers can monitor the health and stability of the spacecraft while in orbit. By disabling this downlink, threat actors may be able to stop mitigations from taking place.
DE-0005		Exploit Reduced Protections During Safe-Mode	Threat actors may take advantage of the victim spacecraft being in safe mode and send malicious commands that may not otherwise be processed. Safe-mode is when all non-essential systems are shut down and only essential functions within the spacecraft are active. During this mode, several commands are available to be processed that are not normally processed. Further, many protections (i.e. security features) may be disabled at this time which would ensure the threat actor achieves evasion.
DE-0011		Valid Credentials	Threat actors may utilize valid credentials to conduct an attack against a spacecraft or related system as a means to conceal their activity. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
LM-0003		Constellation Hopping via Crosslink	Threat actors may attempt to command another neighboring spacecraft via crosslink. spacecraft in close proximity are often able to send commands back and forth. Threat actors may be able to leverage this access to compromise another spacecraft.
LM-0007		Valid Credentials	Threat actors may utilize valid credentials move laterally across spacecraft subsystems, communication buses, or additional spacecraft in a constellation. Credentials may include, but are not limited to: system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance accounts, cryptographic keys and other authentication mechanisms.
EXF-0001		Replay	Threat actors may exfiltrate data by replaying commands and capturing the telemetry or payload data as it is sent down. One scenario would be the threat actor replays commands to downlink payload data once the spacecraft is within certain location so the data can be intercepted on the downlink by threat actor ground terminals.
EXF-0003		Eavesdropping	Threat actors may seek to capture network communications throughout the ground station and communication channel (i.e. radio frequency, optical) used for uplink and downlink communications
	.01	Uplink Intercept	Threat actors may target the uplink connection from the victim ground infrastructure to the target spacecraft in order to exfiltrate commanding data. Depending on the implementation (i.e., encryption) the captured uplink data can be used to further other attacks like command link intrusion, replay, etc.
	.02	Downlink Intercept	Threat actors may target the downlink connection from the victim spacecraft in order to exfiltrate telemetry or payload data. This data can include health information of the spacecraft or mission data that is being collected/analyzed on the spacecraft. Downlinked data can even include mirrored command sessions which can be used for future campaigns or to help perpetuate other techniques.
EXF-0004		Out-of-Band Communications Link	Threat actors may attempt to exfiltrate data via the out-of-band communication channels. While performing eavesdropping on the primary/second uplinks and downlinks is a method for exfiltration, some space vehicles leverage out-of-band communication links to perform actions on the space vehicle (i.e., re-keying). These out-of-band links would occur on completely different channels/frequencies and often operate on separate hardware on the space vehicle. Typically these out-of-band links have limited built-for-purpose functionality and likely do not present an initial access vector but they do provide ample exfiltration opportunity.
EXF-0010		Payload Communication Channel	Threat actors can deploy malicious software on the payload(s) which can send data through the payload channel. Payloads often have their own communication channels outside of the main TT&C pathway which presents an opportunity for exfiltration of payload data or other spacecraft data depending on the interface and data exchange.

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

ID	Description
SV-CF-2	Eavesdropping (RF and proximity)
SV-AC-5	Proximity operations (i.e., grappling satellite)
SV-AV-5	Using fault management system against you. Understanding the fault response could be leveraged to get satellite in vulnerable state. Example, safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of TLM to cause action from ground, or some sort of RPO to cause S/C to go into safe mode;
SV-AC-1	Attempting access to an access-controlled system resulting in unauthorized access
SV-AC-2	Replay of recorded authentic communications traffic at a later time with the hope that the authorized communications will provide data or some other system reaction
SV-CF-1	Tapping of communications links (wireline, RF, network) resulting in loss of confidentiality; Traffic analysis to determine which entities are communicating with each other without being able to read the communicated information
SV-CF-4	Adversary monitors for safe-mode indicators such that they know when satellite is in weakened state and then they launch attack
SV-IT-1	Communications system spoofing resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity
SV-AC-7	Weak communication protocols. Ones that don't have strong encryption within it
SV-AV-1	Communications system jamming resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity

Low-Level Requirements

Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
The [organization] shall protect documentation and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-10,SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}
The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	* Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission.
The [organization] shall distribute documentation to only personnel with defined roles and a need to know.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{CM-12,CP-2,SA-5,SA-10}	Least privilege and need to know should be employed with the protection of all documentation. Documentation can contain sensitive information that can aid in vulnerability discovery, detection, and exploitation. For example, command dictionaries for ground and space systems should be handles with extreme care. Additionally, design documents for missions contain many key elements that if compromised could aid in an attacker successfully exploiting the system.
The [organization] shall define policy and procedures to ensure that the developed or delivered systems do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications, access scripts, configuration files, nor store unencrypted static authenticators on function keys.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{IA-5(7)}
The [organization] shall define the secure communication protocols to be used within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{PL-7,RA-5(4),SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3),SC-40(4),SI-12}
The [organization] shall protect documentation and Essential Elements of Information (EEI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{SA-5}	Essential Elements of Information (EEI):
The [spacecraft] shall terminate the connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after 3 minutes of inactivity.{SV-AC-1}{AC-12,SA-8(18),SC-10,SC-23(1),SC-23(3),SI-14,SI-14(3)}
The [spacecraft] shall monitor security relevant telemetry points for malicious commanding attempts.{AC-17,AC-17(1),AC-17(10),AU-3(1),RA-10,SC-7,SC-16,SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
The [spacecraft] shall protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),IA-5,IA-5(6),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-28(3)}
The [spacecraft] encryption key handling shall be handled outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(1),SC-28(3)}
The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that the onboard software is not able to access the information for key readout.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}
The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}
The [spacecraft] shall produce, control, and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys using NSA Certified or Approved key management technology and processes per CNSSP 12.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-9(6),SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2),SC-12(3)}
The [spacecraft] shall use [directional or beamforming] antennas in normal ops to reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept signals.{SV-AV-1}{AC-18(5)}
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to restrict command lock based on geographic location of ground stations.{SV-AC-1}{AC-2(11),IA-10,SI-4(13),SI-4(25)}	This could be performed using command lockout based upon when the spacecraft is over selected regions. This should be configurable so that when conflicts arise, the Program can update. The goal is so the spacecraft won't accept a command when the spacecraft determines it is in a certain region.
The [spacecraft] shall restrict the use of information inputs to spacecraft and designated ground stations as defined in the applicable ICDs.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-20,SC-23,SI-10,SI-10(5),SI-10(6)}
The [spacecraft] shall uniquely identify and authenticate the ground station and other spacecraft before establishing a remote connection.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,AC-17,AC-17(10),AC-20,IA-3,IA-4,SA-8(18),SI-3(9)}
The [spacecraft] shall authenticate the ground station (and all commands) and other spacecraft before establishing remote connections using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,AC-17,AC-17(2),AC-17(10),AC-18(1),AC-20,IA-3(1),IA-4,IA-4(9),IA-7,IA-9,SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SA-9(2),SC-7(11),SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-23(3),SI-3(9)}	Authorization can include embedding opcodes in command strings, using trusted authentication protocols, identifying proper link characteristics such as emitter location, expected range of receive power, expected modulation, data rates, communication protocols, beamwidth, etc.; and tracking command counter increments against expected values.
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{AC-3,AC-20,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-23(3),SC-40(3),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}
The [spacecraft] shall implement relay and replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for establishing a remote connection.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,IA-2(8),IA-2(9),SA-8(18),SC-8(1),SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-23(3),SC-40(4)}
The [spacecraft] shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception.{SV-AC-7}{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-16,SC-16(1)}	* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
The [spacecraft] shall encrypt all telemetry on downlink regardless of operating mode to protect current state of spacecraft.{SV-CF-4}{AC-3(10),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-13}
The [spacecraft] shall not employ a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled (i.e., crypto-bypass mode).{SV-AC-1,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{AC-3(10),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40(4)}
The [spacecraft] shall enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the platform and between interconnected systems so that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-3,CA-3(6),CA-3(7),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}
The [spacecraft] security implementation shall ensure that information should not be allowed to flow between partitioned applications unless explicitly permitted by the system.{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(29),SC-16,SC-32}
The [spacecraft] shall, when transferring information between different security domains, implements the following security policy filters that require fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content: connectors and semaphores implemented in the RTOS.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4(14),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-16}
The [spacecraft] shall prevent unauthorized access to system resources by employing an efficient capability based object model that supports both confinement and revocation of these capabilities when the platform security deems it necessary.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(8),IA-4(9),PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4,SC-16,SC-32,SI-3}
The [spacecraft] shall use protected processing domains to enforce the policy that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted as a basis for flow control decisions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-4(2),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}
The [spacecraft] shall define the security functions and security-relevant information for which the system must protect from unauthorized access.{AC-6(1),SA-8(19),SC-7(13),SC-16}
The [spacecraft] shall incorporate backup sources for navigation and timing.{SV-IT-1}{AU-8(1),SC-45(1),SC-45(2)}
The [spacecraft] shall have fault-tolerant authoritative time sourcing for the platform's clock.{SV-IT-1}{AU-8(2),SC-45,SC-45(1),SC-45(2),SI-13}	* Adopt voting schemes (triple modular redundancy) that include inputs from backup sources. Consider providing a second reference frame against which short-term changes or interferences can be compared. * Atomic clocks, crystal oscillators and/or GPS receivers are often used as time sources. GPS should not be used as the only source due to spoofing/jamming concerns.
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit information and audit tools.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-9(3),RA-10,SC-8(1),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(24)}
The [organization] shall ensure that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.{SV-MA-6}{CA-7(5),PL-7,PL-8(1),SA-8(19)}
The [organization] shall document and design a security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that allocates the [organization]s defined safeguards to the indicated locations and layers: [Examples include: operating system abstractions and hardware mechanisms to the separate processors in the platform, internal components, and the FSW].{SV-MA-6}{CA-9,PL-7,PL-8,PL-8(1),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}
The [spacecraft] shall enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected, enters a cyber-safe mode of operation with restrictions as defined based on the cyber-safe mode.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(3),PE-10,RA-10,SA-8(16),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-13,SI-17}
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to enter the platform into a known good, operational cyber-safe mode from a tamper-resistant, configuration-controlled (“gold”) image that is authenticated as coming from an acceptable supplier, and has its integrity verified.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4(3),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-13,SI-17}	Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and SW functions to preattack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on available equipment still available after a cyberattack. The goal is for the vehicle to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved.
The [spacecraft] shall fail to a known secure state for failures during initialization, and aborts preserving information necessary to return to operations in failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-24,SI-13,SI-17}
The [spacecraft] shall fail securely to a secondary device in the event of an operational failure of a primary boundary protection device (i.e., crypto solution).{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{CP-13,SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-7(18),SI-13,SI-13(4)}
The [spacecraft] shall provide or support the capability for recovery and reconstitution to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-4(4),CP-10,CP-10(4),CP-10(6),CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24)}
The [spacecraft] shall have multiple uplink paths {SV-AV-1}{CP-8,CP-11,SA-8(18),SC-5,SC-47}
The [spacecraft] shall utilize TRANSEC.{SV-AV-1}{CP-8,RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-8(4),SC-16,SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40(4)}	Transmission Security (TRANSEC) is used to ensure the availability of transmissions and limit intelligence collection from the transmissions. TRANSEC is secured through burst encoding, frequency hopping, or spread spectrum methods where the required pseudorandom sequence generation is controlled by a cryptographic algorithm and key. Such keys are known as transmission security keys (TSK). The objectives of transmission security are low probability of interception (LPI), low probability of detection (LPD), and antijam which means resistance to jamming (EPM or ECCM).
The [spacecraft] shall maintain the ability to establish communication with the spacecraft in the event of an anomaly to the primary receive path.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{CP-8,SA-8(18),SC-47}	Receiver communication can be established after an anomaly with such capabilities as multiple receive apertures, redundant paths within receivers, redundant receivers, omni apertures, fallback default command modes, and lower bit rates for contingency commanding, as examples
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptography for the indicated uses using the indicated protocols, algorithms, and mechanisms, in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards: [NSA- certified or approved cryptography for protection of classified information, FIPS-validated cryptography for the provision of hashing].{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{IA-7,SC-13}
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptography for the indicated uses using the indicated protocols, algorithms, and mechanisms, in accordance with CNSSP 12 and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{IA-7,SC-8(1),SC-13,SI-12}
The [spacecraft] shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-14,PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1)}	The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus.
The [organization] shall describe (a) the separation between RED and BLACK cables, (b) the filtering on RED power lines, (c) the grounding criteria for the RED safety grounds, (d) and the approach for dielectric separators on any potential fortuitous conductors.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1)}
The [spacecraft] shall be designed such that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(19)}	This requirement applies if system components are being designed to address EMSEC and the measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements.
The [spacecraft] shall have on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-MA-4}{RA-10,SC-7,SI-3,SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}	The mission critical components or systems could be GNC/Attitude Control, C&DH, TT&C, Fault Management.
The [spacecraft] shall generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11}
The [spacecraft] shall reveal error messages only to operations personnel monitoring the telemetry.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11}
The [organization] shall define acceptable secure communication protocols available for use within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}	The secure communication protocol should include "strong" authenticated encryption characteristics.
The [spacecraft] shall only use [organization]-defined communication protocols within the mission.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}
The [spacecraft] shall only use communication protocols that support encryption within the mission.{SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-40(4)}
The [spacecraft] shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception in accordance with [organization] provided encryption matrix.{SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-8(3)}	* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms that achieve adequate protection against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-40,SC-40(1)}
The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability for data connection ports or input/output devices to be disabled or removed prior to spacecraft operations.{SV-AC-5}{SA-9(2),SC-7(14),SC-41,SC-51}	Intent is for external physical data ports to be disabled (logical or physical) while in operational orbit. Port disablement does not necessarily need to be irreversible.
The [organization] shall use NIST Approved for symmetric key management for Unclassified systems; NSA Approved or stronger symmetric key management technology for Classified systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2)}	FIPS-complaint technology used by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques that are either a) specified in a FIPS, or b) adopted in a FIPS and specified either in an appendix to the FIPS or in a document referenced by the FIPS. NSA-approved technology used for symmetric key management by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria.
The [organization] shall use NSA approved key management technology and processes.NSA-approved technology used for asymmetric key management by The [organization] shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)}
The [spacecraft] shall produce, control, and distribute asymmetric cryptographic keys using [organization]-defined asymmetric key management processes.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)}	In most cased the Program will leverage NSA-approved key management technology and processes.
The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the [all information] using cryptography while it is at rest.{SV-IT-2,SV-CF-2}{SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)}	* Information at rest refers to the state of information when it is located on storage devices as specific components of information systems. This is often referred to as data-at-rest encryption.
The [spacecraft] shall internally monitor GPS performance so that changes or interruptions in the navigation or timing are flagged.{SV-IT-1}{SC-45(1)}
The [spacecraft] shall implement protections against external and internal communications from jamming attempts.{SC-5,SC-40,SC-40(1)}
The [spacecraft] shall protect external and internal communications from jamming and spoofing attempts.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{SC-5,SC-40,SC-40(1)}	Can be aided via the Crosslink, S-Band, and L-Band subsystems
The [spacecraft] shall monitor [Program defined telemetry points] for malicious commanding attempts.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{SC-7,AU-3(1),AC-17(1)}	Source from AEROSPACE REPORT NO. TOR-2019-02178 Vehicle Command Counter (VCC) - Counts received valid commands Rejected Command Counter - Counts received invalid commands Command Receiver On/Off Mode - Indicates times command receiver is accepting commands Command Receivers Received Signal Strength - Analog measure of the amount of received RF energy at the receive frequency Command Receiver Lock Modes - Indicates when command receiver has achieved lock on command signal Telemetry Downlink Modes - Indicates when the satellite’s telemetry was transmitting Cryptographic Modes - Indicates the operating modes of the various encrypted links Received Commands - Log of all commands received and executed by the satellite System Clock - Master onboard clock GPS Ephemeris - Indicates satellite location derived from GPS Signals
The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of all transmitted information.{SV-IT-2,SV-AC-7}{SC-8}	* The intent as written is for all transmitted traffic to be protected. This includes internal to internal communications and especially outside of the boundary.
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of, and detect changes to, information during transmission unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards.{SV-AC-7}{SC-8(1),SI-7(6)}
The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect message externals unless otherwise protected by alternative physical safeguards.{SV-AC-7}{SC-8(3)}
The [spacecraft] cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{SI-17}	Cyber-safe mode is using a fail-secure mentality where if there is a malfunction that the spacecraft goes into a fail-secure state where cyber protections like authentication and encryption are still employed (instead of bypassed) and the spacecraft can be restored by authorized commands. The cyber-safe mode should be stored in a high integrity location of the on-board SV so that it cannot be modified by attackers.
The [organization] shall ensure that FMEA/FMECA artifacts are strictly controlled so that particular fault responses are not disclosed via documentation.{SV-AV-5}