The TT&C is the lead contributor to satellite failure over the first 10 years on-orbit, around 20% of the time. The failures due to gyro are around 12% between year one and 6 on-orbit and then ramp up starting around year six and overtake the contributions of the TT&C subsystem to satellite failure. Need to ensure equipment is not counterfeit and the supply chain is sound.
| SPARTA ID | Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SPR-28 | The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to enter the platform into a known good, operational cyber-safe mode from a tamper-resistant, configuration-controlled (“gold”) image that is authenticated as coming from an acceptable supplier, and has its integrity verified. The [spacecraft] shall refresh only from cryptographically authenticated [organization]-approved sources.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4(3),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-13,SI-17} | Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and SW functions to preattack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on available equipment still available after a cyberattack. The goal is for the vehicle to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved. |
| SPR-30 | The [spacecraft] shall fail to a known secure state for failures during initialization, and aborts preserving information necessary to return to operations in failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-24,SI-13,SI-17} | |
| SPR-32 | The [spacecraft] shall provide or support the capability for recovery and reconstitution to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-4(4),CP-10,CP-10(4),CP-10(6),CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24)} | |
| SPR-62 | The [spacecraft] shall enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected, enters a cyber-safe mode of operation with restrictions as defined based on the cyber-safe mode.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(3),PE-10,RA-10,SA-8(16),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-13,SI-17} | Cyber-safe mode provides a deterministic fallback posture when compromise or anomalous conditions threaten mission integrity. Restricting non-essential functions reduces attack surface and prevents further propagation of malicious activity. Defined restrictions ensure predictable behavior under cyber stress conditions. This supports survivability and controlled recovery rather than uncontrolled degradation. |
| SPR-103 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide non-identical methods, or functionally independent methods, for commanding a mission critical function when the software is the sole control of that function.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{AC-3(2)} | When software is sole controller of a critical function, redundant and functionally independent command paths reduce systemic risk. A single vulnerability should not allow full compromise of a hazardous control. Diverse mechanisms increase resilience against common-mode failures. This supports both safety and cybersecurity assurance. |
| SPR-104 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide two independent and unique command messages to deactivate a fault tolerant capability for a critical or catastrophic hazard.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{AC-3(2)} | Disabling fault tolerance creates a high-risk operational state. Requiring two independent and unique commands reduces likelihood of accidental or malicious deactivation. This prevents a single compromised control path from undermining redundancy. Hazard mitigation systems must not be easily bypassed. |
| SPR-132 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall accept [Program defined hazardous] commands only when prerequisite checks are satisfied.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10} | |
| SPR-133 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall identify and reject commands received out-of-sequence when the out-of-sequence commands can cause a hazard/failure or degrade the control of a hazard or mission.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10} | |
| SPR-134 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall perform prerequisite checks for the execution of hazardous commands.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10} | |
| SPR-138 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall discriminate between valid and invalid input into the software and rejects invalid input.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10,SI-10(3)} | |
| SPR-139 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall properly handle spurious input and missing data.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10,SI-10(3)} | |
| SPR-143 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall validate a functionally independent parameter prior to the issuance of any sequence that could remove an inhibit or perform a hazardous action.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10(3)} | Independent parameter validation ensures command legitimacy from a secondary data source. This reduces risk of single-variable manipulation. Functional independence increases resilience. Hazardous actions require layered confirmation. |
| SPR-145 | The [spacecraft] mission/cyber critical commands shall be "complex" or diverse from other commands so that a single bit flip could not transform a benign command into a hazardous command.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10(5)} | Complex command encoding reduces risk of single-bit errors causing hazardous action. Diversity prevents accidental transformation into destructive instructions. This protects against radiation-induced bit flips and malicious bit manipulation. Safety and cyber resiliency intersect here. |
| SPR-147 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide at least one independent command for each operator-initiated action used to shut down a function leading to or reducing the control of a hazard.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-10(5)} | |
| SPR-182 | The [spacecraft] shall generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11} | Error outputs must enable corrective action without exposing system internals. Detailed diagnostic data may aid adversarial reconnaissance. Sanitized messages protect confidentiality while supporting recovery. Controlled verbosity reduces exploitation opportunities. |
| SPR-183 | The [spacecraft] shall reveal error messages only to operations personnel monitoring the telemetry.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{RA-5(4),SI-4(12),SI-11} | Limiting error visibility prevents information leakage to unauthorized entities. Adversaries often probe systems to extract internal states via fault responses. Controlled telemetry channels ensure only trusted operators receive diagnostic information. This preserves operational awareness without expanding exposure. |
| SPR-184 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall provide independent mission/cyber critical threads such that any one credible event will not corrupt another mission/cyber critical thread.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SC-3} | Thread isolation prevents cascading failures from a single compromised execution path. Functional independence enhances resilience against exploitation and fault propagation. Critical functions must not share dependencies that create systemic vulnerabilities. Isolation supports containment and recovery. |
| SPR-203 | The [spacecraft] shall have failure tolerance on sensors used by software to make mission-critical decisions.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-13,SI-17} | Sensor compromise or failure must not directly lead to hazardous action. Redundancy and validation ensure trustworthy inputs. Independent verification reduces risk of manipulation. Critical decisions require reliable sensing. |
| SPR-204 | The [spacecraft] cyber-safe mode software/configuration shall be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and shall not be modifiable.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Cyber-safe mode is using a fail-secure mentality where if there is a malfunction that the spacecraft goes into a fail-secure state where cyber protections like authentication and encryption are still employed (instead of bypassed) and the spacecraft can be restored by authorized commands. The cyber-safe mode should be stored in a high integrity location of the on-board SV so that it cannot be modified by attackers. |
| SPR-206 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall detect and recover/transition from detected memory errors to a known cyber-safe state.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Memory corruption can degrade or hijack execution. Automated detection and transition to safe state prevents escalation. Recovery mechanisms reduce persistent compromise risk. Resilience requires automatic containment. |
| SPR-207 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall initialize the spacecraft to a known safe state.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Startup is a vulnerable period for tampering. Initialization ensures clean baseline before operations begin. Safe defaults prevent unauthorized persistence. Boot integrity establishes trust. |
| SPR-208 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall operate securely in off-nominal power conditions, including loss of power and spurious power transients.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Power instability may disrupt security controls. Robust design prevents exploit via induced power anomalies. Controlled behavior during transients preserves integrity. Cyber resilience must consider physical fault conditions. |
| SPR-209 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall perform an orderly, controlled system shutdown to a known cyber-safe state upon receipt of a termination command or condition.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Graceful shutdown prevents data corruption and incomplete processes. Controlled transitions reduce recovery complexity. Secure shutdown blocks adversary exploitation during failure states. Predictable termination supports resilience. |
| SPR-210 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall recover to a known cyber-safe state when an anomaly is detected.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Anomaly-triggered containment reduces attacker dwell time. Safe fallback states preserve mission viability. Autonomous response is essential given communication latency. Rapid isolation prevents lateral spread. |
| SPR-211 | The [spacecraft] software subsystems shall safely transition between all predefined, known states.{SV-MA-3,SV-AV-7}{SI-17} | Safe and deterministic state transitions prevent undefined behavior that could be exploited during abnormal or adversarial conditions. Many cyber and fault-based attacks attempt to force systems into unexpected transitional states where validation checks may be bypassed. By ensuring transitions only occur along predefined, verified paths, the spacecraft reduces opportunities for logic corruption or hazardous command execution. Controlled state management strengthens both safety assurance and cybersecurity resilience. |
| SPR-232 | The [organization] shall conduct a criticality analysis to identify mission critical functions and critical components and reduce the vulnerability of such functions and components through secure system design.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-MA-4}{CP-2,CP-2(8),PL-7,PM-11,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),RA-9,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(25),SA-12,SA-14,SA-15(3),SC-7(29),SR-1} | During SCRM, criticality analysis will aid in determining supply chain risk. For mission critical functions/components, extra scrutiny must be applied to ensure supply chain is secured. |
| SPR-249 | The [organization] shall employ [Program-defined Operations Security (OPSEC) safeguards] to protect supply chain-related information for the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CP-2(8),PM-30,SA-12(9),SC-38,SR-7} | OPSEC safeguards may include: (1) Limiting the disclosure of information needed to design, develop, test, produce, deliver, and support the element for example, supplier identities, supplier processes, potential suppliers, security requirements, design specifications, testing and evaluation result, and system/component configurations, including the use of direct shipping, blind buys, etc.; (2) Extending supply chain awareness, education, and training for suppliers, intermediate users, and end users; (3) Extending the range of OPSEC tactics, techniques, and procedures to potential suppliers, contracted suppliers, or sub-prime contractor tier of suppliers; and (4) Using centralized support and maintenance services to minimize direct interactions between end users and original suppliers. |
| SPR-256 | The [organization] shall perform penetration testing/analysis: (1) On potential system elements before accepting the system; (2) As a realistic simulation of the active adversary’s known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) Throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CA-8(1),SA-9,SA-11(5),SR-5(2)} | Penetration testing should be performed throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes including: (1) Hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (2) Shipping/handling procedures; (3) Personnel and physical security programs; (4) Configuration management tools/measures to maintain provenance; and (5) Any other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production/distribution of supply chain elements. |
| SPR-282 | The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)} | * The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers. * All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government. |
| SPR-305 | The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(8),CM-7(9),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-10(3),SA-19,SC-51,SR-4(3),SR-4(4),SR-5(2),SR-11} | Counterfeit hardware may embed malicious implants. Formal policies reduce infiltration risk. Supplier verification strengthens trust. Hardware authenticity is foundational to cybersecurity. |
| SPR-307 | The [organization] shall maintain documentation tracing the strategies, tools, and methods implemented to mitigate supply chain risk .{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-12(1),SR-5} | Examples include: (1) Transferring a portion of the risk to the developer or supplier through the use of contract language and incentives; (2) Using contract language that requires the implementation of SCRM throughout the system lifecycle in applicable contracts and other acquisition and assistance instruments (grants, cooperative agreements, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), and other transactions). Within the DOD some examples include: (a) Language outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook section 13.13. Contracting; (b) Language requiring the use of protected mechanisms to deliver elements and data about elements, processes, and delivery mechanisms; (c) Language that articulates that requirements flow down supply chain tiers to sub-prime suppliers. (3) Incentives for suppliers that: (a) Implement required security safeguards and SCRM best practices; (b) Promote transparency into their organizational processes and security practices; (c) Provide additional vetting of the processes and security practices of subordinate suppliers, critical information system components, and services; and (d) Implement contract to reduce SC risk down the contract stack. (4) Gaining insight into supplier security practices; (5) Using contract language and incentives to enable more robust risk management later in the lifecycle; (6) Using a centralized intermediary or “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary; |
| SPR-308 | The [organization] shall protect against supply chain threats to the system, system components, or system services by employing security safeguards as defined by NIST SP 800-161 Rev.1.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-30,RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SI-3,SR-1} | The chosen supply chain safeguards should demonstrably support a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy. Safeguards should include protections for both hardware and software. Program should define their critical components (HW & SW) and identify the supply chain protections, approach/posture/process. |
| SPR-317 | The [organization] shall employ [organization]-defined techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the Program supply chain.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-3(2),SC-38} | Examples of security safeguards that the organization should consider implementing to limit the harm from potential adversaries targeting the organizational supply chain, are: (1) Using trusted physical delivery mechanisms that do not permit access to the element during delivery (ship via a protected carrier, use cleared/official couriers, or a diplomatic pouch); (2) Using trusted electronic delivery of products and services (require downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites); (3) Avoiding the purchase of custom configurations, where feasible; (4) Using procurement carve outs (i.e., exclusions to commitments or obligations), where feasible; (5) Using defensive design approaches; (6) Employing system OPSEC principles; (7) Employing a diverse set of suppliers; (8) Employing approved vendor lists with standing reputations in industry; (9) Using a centralized intermediary and “Blind Buy” approaches to acquire element(s) to hide actual usage locations from an untrustworthy supplier or adversary Employing inventory management policies and processes; (10) Using flexible agreements during each acquisition and procurement phase so that it is possible to meet emerging needs or requirements to address supply chain risk without requiring complete revision or re-competition of an acquisition or procurement; (11) Using international, national, commercial or government standards to increase potential supply base; (12) Limiting the disclosure of information that can become publicly available; and (13) Minimizing the time between purchase decisions and required delivery. |
| SPR-319 | The [organization] shall ensure adequate supplies of critical system components.{SV-AV-7}{SR-5(1)} | Examples include: using multiple suppliers throughout the supply chain for critical components, stockpiling spare components to ensure operation during mission-critical times, and the identification of functionally identical or similar components that may be used, if necessary. |
| SPR-330 | The [organization] shall employ the [organization]-defined approaches for the purchase of the system, system components, or system services from suppliers.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-5} | This could include tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods. |
| SPR-332 | The [organization] shall employ [Selection (one or more): independent third-party analysis, Program penetration testing, independent third-party penetration testing] of [Program-defined supply chain elements, processes, and actors] associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6(1)} | Third-party testing identifies weaknesses across suppliers and processes. Independent review strengthens trust in acquisition channels. Broader testing scope reduces systemic risk. Supply chain validation enhances mission security posture. |
| SPR-336 | The [organization] (and Prime Contractor) shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{SR-6} |
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| EX-0018 | Non-Kinetic Physical Attack | The adversary inflicts physical effects on a satellite without mechanical contact, using energy delivered through the environment. Principal modalities are electromagnetic pulse (EMP), high-power laser (optical/thermal effects), and high-power microwave (HPM). These methods can be tuned for reversible disruption (temporary sensor saturation, processor upsets) or irreversible damage (component burnout, optics degradation), and may be executed from ground, airborne, or space platforms given line-of-sight and power/aperture conditions. Forensics are often ambiguous: signatures may resemble environmental phenomena or normal degradations, and confirmation of effect is frequently limited to what the operator observes in telemetry or performance loss. | |
| EX-0018.01 | Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) | An EMP delivers a broadband, high-amplitude electromagnetic transient that couples into spacecraft electronics and harnesses, upsetting or damaging components over wide areas. In space, the archetype is a high-altitude nuclear event whose prompt fields induce immediate upsets and whose secondary radiation environment elevates dose and charging for an extended period along affected orbits. Consequences include widespread single-event effects, latch-ups, permanent degradation of sensitive devices, and accelerated aging of solar arrays and materials. The effect envelope is large and largely indiscriminate: multiple satellites within view can experience simultaneous anomalies consistent with intense electromagnetic stress and enhanced radiation. | |
| EX-0018.02 | High-Powered Laser | A high-powered laser can be used to permanently or temporarily damage critical satellite components (i.e. solar arrays or optical centers). If directed toward a satellite’s optical center, the attack is known as blinding or dazzling. Blinding, as the name suggests, causes permanent damage to the optics of a satellite. Dazzling causes temporary loss of sight for the satellite. While there is clear attribution of the location of the laser at the time of the attack, the lasers used in these attacks may be mobile, which can make attribution to a specific actor more difficult because the attacker does not have to be in their own nation, or even continent, to conduct such an attack. Only the satellite operator will know if the attack is successful, meaning the attacker has limited confirmation of success, as an attacked nation may not choose to announce that their satellite has been attacked or left vulnerable for strategic reasons. A high-powered laser attack can also leave the targeted satellite disabled and uncontrollable, which could lead to collateral damage if the satellite begins to drift. A higher-powered laser may permanently damage a satellite by overheating its parts. The parts most susceptible to this are satellite structures, thermal control panels, and solar panels.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0018.03 | High-Powered Microwave | High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can be used to disrupt or destroy a satellite’s electronics. A “front-door” HPM attack uses a satellite’s own antennas as an entry path, while a “back-door” attack attempts to enter through small seams or gaps around electrical connections and shielding. A front-door attack is more straightforward to carry out, provided the HPM is positioned within the field of view of the antenna that it is using as a pathway, but it can be thwarted if the satellite uses circuits designed to detect and block surges of energy entering through the antenna. In contrast, a back-door attack is more challenging, because it must exploit design or manufacturing flaws, but it can be conducted from many angles relative to the satellite. Both types of attacks can be either reversible or irreversible; however, the attacker may not be able to control the severity of the damage from the attack. Both front-door and back-door HPM attacks can be difficult to attribute to an attacker, and like a laser weapon, the attacker may not know if the attack has been successful. A HPM attack may leave the target satellite disabled and uncontrollable which can cause it to drift into other satellites, creating further collateral damage.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| ID | Name | Description | NIST Rev5 | D3FEND | ISO 27001 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CM0024 | Anti-counterfeit Hardware | Counterfeit electronic components represent a direct supply chain threat to space mission integrity, introducing hardware that may fail prematurely, perform outside specification, or contain malicious functionality deliberately embedded by an adversary during manufacture or distribution. A formal anti-counterfeit program must establish policy and procedures that span the entire component acquisition and integration lifecycle, from supplier qualification and procurement through incoming inspection, storage, and installation. The program must address two distinct but related risks: counterfeit components that fail to perform their intended function, degrading mission reliability; and deliberately tampered components that introduce malicious hardware functionality or create pathways for malicious code execution. Anti-counterfeit controls must include measures appropriate to component criticality and supply chain risk to authenticate components, detect evidence of tampering, and resist unauthorized modification. Detection and prevention must be treated as complementary objectives: prevention through qualified sourcing and procurement controls, detection through inspection and authentication techniques applied before components enter the system. | AC-14 AC-20(5) CM-7(9) PL-8 PL-8(1) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(11) SA-8(13) SA-8(16) SA-9 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) | D3-AI D3-SWI D3-HCI D3-FEMC D3-DLIC D3-FV | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | |
| CM0025 | Supplier Review | A supplier review is a structured pre-contract assessment conducted before entering into any agreement with a contractor or subcontractor for the acquisition of systems, system components, or system services. The review evaluates the prospective supplier's security posture, trustworthiness, and capability to deliver components or services that meet the mission's integrity and assurance requirements, before contractual commitments are made and before the supplier gains access to mission information or influence over mission systems. Supplier reviews reduce the risk of introducing supply chain vulnerabilities through poorly qualified, compromised, or adversary-influenced suppliers at any tier of the acquisition chain. The rigor and depth of the review should be calibrated to the criticality of the components or services being acquired, with suppliers of mission-critical hardware, software, or services subject to the most intensive assessment. Supplier review findings should inform not only the decision to contract but also the specific security requirements, oversight provisions, and flow-down obligations included in the resulting agreement. | PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-17 SA-2 SA-3 SA-8 SA-9 SR-11 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) SR-6 | D3-OAM D3-ODM | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.25 A.8.27 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22 | |
| CM0026 | Original Component Manufacturer | Hardware components that cannot be sourced directly from the original component manufacturer (OCM) or an authorized franchised distributor, and software that cannot be obtained from the original publisher, developer, or an authorized distribution channel, represent elevated supply-chain risk and must not be procured or incorporated into the mission system without documented approval from the program’s supply-chain governance authority. Sourcing hardware from the OCM or authorized franchised distributors provides greater assurance of component authenticity, traceability, and conformance to specification. Obtaining software from the original publisher, developer, or an authorized distribution channel similarly reduces the risk of unauthorized, altered, fraudulent, or malicious software. Deviations from these approved sourcing channels introduce additional supply-chain risk that must be assessed before acceptance. The approval process for non-OCM-sourced items must evaluate the specific risk posed by the alternative source, the criticality of the component or software to mission function, the availability and adequacy of compensating inspection and authentication measures, and whether a compliant source can be identified before accepting the deviation. This governance requirement applies to hardware components, firmware, and software, although the applicable sourcing and authentication methods differ. Hardware controls should address component authenticity and traceability, while software controls should address publisher or developer provenance, distribution-channel integrity, license legitimacy, and cryptographic verification where available. | AC-20(5) PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-8 SA-9 SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) | D3-OAM D3-ODM D3-AM D3-FV D3-SFV | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | |
| CM0027 | ASIC/FPGA Manufacturing | Custom application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) should be fabricated through accredited trusted foundries, and field-programmable gate array (FPGA) devices should be procured through trusted suppliers with documented fabrication provenance, to reduce the risk of hardware Trojan insertion or unauthorized modification. Unlike software, hardware trojans embedded during semiconductor manufacturing are extremely difficult to detect through functional testing alone, as they may be designed to activate only under specific operational conditions or remain dormant indefinitely; the integrity of the fabrication source is therefore a primary defense. Trusted foundry accreditation provides assurance that the accredited fabrication activities are subject to security controls intended to reduce the risk of unauthorized modification. Assurance for design, intellectual property, aggregation, packaging, assembly, testing, and distribution must be addressed through trusted suppliers or other controls applicable to those lifecycle stages. This requirement applies to custom ASICs and to the base silicon used in FPGA implementations. The programmable design loaded onto an FPGA requires separate protection because trusted fabrication of the device does not establish the integrity or authenticity of the configured bitstream. | AC-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-11 SA-3 SA-8 SA-8(11) SA-8(13) SA-8(16) SA-9 SI-3 SI-3(10) SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) | D3-OAM D3-ODM D3-AM D3-FV D3-SFV | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.7 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | |
| CM0074 | Distributed Constellations | A distributed constellation architecture deploys mission capability across multiple spacecraft nodes operating collectively, such that the end user is not dependent on any single satellite to derive the intended capability. This architectural approach directly complicates adversary counterspace planning by multiplying the number of assets that must be successfully degraded or destroyed to achieve mission denial effects equivalent to those achievable against a concentrated, single-node architecture. The resilience benefit depends on how much mission capability remains available following the loss or degradation of specified nodes. A constellation that can satisfy defined minimum mission requirements through multiple combinations of surviving nodes generally requires an adversary to affect more assets or shared dependencies to achieve mission denial. GPS exemplifies this principle: a receiver generally uses signals from at least four healthy satellites with suitable geometry to determine three-dimensional position and time. Loss of one satellite does not ordinarily eliminate the service where sufficient healthy satellites remain visible; resilience to ground-system failures depends separately on the redundancy and distribution of the control segment. Distribution is a mission architecture decision that must be made early in the program lifecycle, as it fundamentally shapes spacecraft design, ground system architecture, launch strategy, and operational concepts. | CP-10(6) CP-11 CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(6) PE-21 | D3-AI D3-NNI D3-SYSM D3-DEM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSVA | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.29 A.5.29 | |
| CM0075 | Proliferated Constellations | Proliferated satellite constellations increase mission resilience by deploying a larger number of functionally equivalent satellites in similar orbits, expanding overall constellation capacity and raising the number of assets an adversary must successfully attack to achieve meaningful mission degradation. Unlike distribution, in which multiple satellites or payloads work together to provide a complete capability, proliferation increases the number of systems performing the same or substantially equivalent mission. Its resilience benefit is primarily derived from additional capacity and reduced dependence on any individual satellite rather than from architectural diversity. Proliferation also supports resilience through on-orbit spare maintenance, in which additional satellites are held in reserve or parked in accessible orbits to replace operational assets without requiring new launches. The cost implications of proliferation are significant and architecture-dependent. Designs optimized for repeatable production may achieve lower unit costs through learning and economies of scale, but those savings depend on design stability, production quantity, supplier capacity, and the amount of non-recurring change between production lots. The choice to proliferate must be made as a mission architecture decision early in the program, as it determines the spacecraft design philosophy, production strategy, launch architecture, and ground system scalability requirements. | CP-10(6) CP-11 CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(6) PE-21 | D3-AI D3-NNI D3-SYSM D3-DEM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSVA | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.29 A.5.29 | |
| CM0076 | Diversified Architectures | A diversified mission architecture provides a capability through multiple systems, platforms, payloads, orbital regimes, or domains to reduce the mission impact of losing any individual element and increase the range of adversary capabilities required to achieve mission denial. Diversification differs from proliferation in that it employs heterogeneous systems, potentially across different orbits, domains, operators, and technologies, rather than deploying more units of the same design. This heterogeneity imposes asymmetric costs on adversaries: attacking systems across different orbital regimes requires different physical and electronic capabilities for each regime, and kinetic attacks on space assets in diverse orbits carry differentiated collateral debris consequences that increase the political and economic cost of a broad attack campaign. Domain diversification, extending mission capability delivery across space, airborne, and terrestrial layers, further reduces adversary incentive by ensuring that defeating the space layer alone does not deny the end user the underlying capability. Diversification can preserve minimum mission capability following the loss of individual elements when the remaining systems provide sufficient coverage, capacity, interoperability, and operational availability to compensate for the loss. | CP-11 CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(6) | D3-AI D3-NNI D3-SYSM D3-DEM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSVA | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.29 A.5.29 | |
| CM0077 | Space Domain Awareness | Space domain awareness (SDA) enables mission owners to detect and characterize objects, behaviors, environmental conditions, and anomalous events that may affect their space systems. When correlated with other intelligence and mission data, SDA can also support assessment of possible threats and attribution. SDA encompasses the tracking and cataloging of space objects, prediction of future object positions, monitoring of the space environment and space weather, and characterization of the capabilities and behaviors of on-orbit objects. SDA data must provide the accuracy, timeliness, coverage, and characterization needed for the mission’s defined decisions. Publicly available data may support general awareness but may be insufficient for time-sensitive conjunction, proximity, or threat assessment; appropriate government, commercial, partner, or owner-operator data should be obtained where required. SDA is generated by a diverse sensor architecture spanning terrestrial optical, infrared, and radar systems and space-based sensors including inspector satellites capable of close-approach observation. The SDA landscape is increasingly populated by national space agencies, military programs, allied partners, commercial providers, and amateur tracking communities, making the space environment progressively more transparent and creating opportunities for mission owners to leverage diverse data sources to build a more complete operational picture. | CP-13 CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(7) PE-20 PE-6 PE-6(1) PE-6(2) PE-6(4) RA-6 SI-4(17) | D3-APLM D3-PM D3-HCI D3-SYSM | A.5.29 A.7.4 A.8.16 A.7.4 A.7.4 A.5.10 | |
| CM0085 | Electromagnetic Shielding | Spacecraft electronics are vulnerable to natural ionizing particle radiation and intentional electromagnetic threats such as high-power microwave and electromagnetic pulse effects. Both may cause transient upset or permanent damage, but they act through different physical mechanisms and require distinct protections. Conductive enclosures and associated electromagnetic protection reduce fields and induced transients from HPM or EMP, while particle-radiation shielding reduces the dose or particle environment reaching susceptible components. The spacecraft design must address particle-radiation protection and HPM or EMP protection as coordinated but separately verified requirements. Enclosure materials, geometry, penetrations, bonding, and component placement should be evaluated together so that protection against one environment does not create unacceptable mass, thermal, electrical, or secondary-radiation effects in another. Shielding is primarily a design- and integration-phase hardware control and generally cannot be increased after launch. It must be combined with component hardness assurance and electrical protection measures sufficient to meet the mission’s residual susceptibility requirements. | CP-13 PE-18 PE-19 PE-21 PE-9 | D3-PH D3-RFS | A.5.29 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.7.11 A.7.12 A.5.10 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.8.12 | |
| CM0086 | Filtering and Shuttering | Optical filters and shutters are passive and active protective mechanisms for remote sensing spacecraft sensors against laser dazzling and blinding attacks that exploit the same optical pathways used for legitimate mission collection. Optical filters selectively attenuate light outside the sensor's design wavelength bands, blocking laser energy at wavelengths that fall outside the mission's collection bands while preserving sensitivity to legitimate return signals; however, filters provide no protection against lasers operating at the same wavelengths the sensor is designed to detect, as filtering those wavelengths would simultaneously block the sensor from its intended mission function. Shutters provide complementary broadband protection by blocking or diverting light from the protected detector path when an exposure threshold or other anomaly criterion is met. Protection depends on the threat-detection latency, decision time, shutter actuation time, optical leakage, and duration of the incident illumination. A shutter may limit exposure from sustained or repeated illumination, but it must not be assumed to prevent damage from a short pulse that deposits damaging energy before closure. Together, filters and shutters provide layered protection: filters continuously attenuate selected wavelengths, while shutters can limit additional exposure from threats that cannot be sufficiently rejected by filtering. The fundamental tradeoff of shuttering is that it trades temporary collection interruption for sensor preservation, making the shutter activation threshold a critical design parameter that must balance sensor protection against mission data continuity requirements. Sustainment activities are limited because the filter and shutter hardware is generally fixed after launch, but operational monitoring, calibration assessment, mechanism exercising, threshold configuration control, and post-event analysis remain applicable. | CP-13 PE-18 SC-30(5) SC-5 SC-5(3) | D3-PH | A.5.29 A.5.10 A.7.5 A.7.8 | |