Compromised master keys or any encryption key
| SPARTA ID | Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SPR-10 | The [spacecraft] shall protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),IA-5,IA-5(6),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-28(3)} | Authenticators (keys, tokens, counters, certificates) are primary targets for persistent access attacks. Disclosure or modification enables command spoofing, replay, and privilege escalation. Protecting authenticator content preserves command integrity and prevents adversaries from maintaining covert control. Integrity protections must apply both at rest and in use. |
| SPR-11 | The [spacecraft] encryption key handling shall be handled outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(1),SC-28(3)} | Key management separated from modifiable flight software reduces exposure to software compromise. If keys are accessible to onboard applications, malicious code could extract or misuse them. Hardware-anchored or externally managed key handling reduces persistence risk. This supports trust-chain assurance and mitigates firmware-level compromise. |
| SPR-12 | The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that the onboard software is not able to access the information for key readout.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)} | Even privileged software must not be able to retrieve plaintext keys. Preventing readout mitigates malware harvesting and insider misuse. Key usage should be mediated through cryptographic modules rather than direct exposure. This enforces least privilege at the cryptographic boundary. |
| SPR-13 | The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)} | Telecommand paths are high-value targets for adversarial exploitation. Allowing keys to be retrieved via command interfaces creates a catastrophic failure mode. This constraint prevents exfiltration even under partial compromise of command processing logic. It ensures encryption protections cannot be remotely dismantled. |
| SPR-17 | The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of all information at rest using cryptography.{SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)} | * The intent as written is for all transmitted traffic to be protected. This includes internal to internal communications and especially outside of the boundary. |
| SPR-119 | The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptography for the indicated uses using the indicated protocols, algorithms, and mechanisms, in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards: [NSA- certified or approved cryptography for protection of classified information, FIPS-validated cryptography for the provision of hashing].{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{IA-7,SC-13} | Use of NSA-certified or FIPS-validated cryptography ensures compliance with federal mandates and high-assurance algorithms. Standardized implementations reduce algorithmic weaknesses. Alignment with policy ensures interoperability and trustworthiness. Proper certification mitigates cryptographic implementation flaws. |
| SPR-122 | The [spacecraft] shall produce, control, and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys using NSA Certified or Approved key management technology and processes per CNSSP 12. Private cryptographic keys shall be generated, stored, and rotated under [organization] control only and shall not be exposed to external service providers.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-9(6),SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2),SC-12(3)} | Centralized and approved key management prevents unauthorized key generation or rotation. Protecting private keys from external service providers reduces supply chain risk. Controlled lifecycle management supports confidentiality and integrity. Strong governance reduces key compromise likelihood. |
| SPR-123 | The [organization] shall use NIST Approved for symmetric key management for Unclassified systems; NSA Approved or stronger symmetric key management technology for Classified systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(2)} | FIPS-complaint technology used by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques that are either a) specified in a FIPS, or b) adopted in a FIPS and specified either in an appendix to the FIPS or in a document referenced by the FIPS. NSA-approved technology used for symmetric key management by the Program shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria. |
| SPR-124 | The [organization] shall use NSA approved key management technology and processes.NSA-approved technology used for asymmetric key management by The [organization] shall include (but is not limited to) NSA-approved cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key generation algorithms or key distribution techniques, authentication techniques, or evaluation criteria.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)} | Asymmetric keys underpin authentication and trust chains. Approved algorithms and processes ensure robustness against cryptanalytic attack. Formal evaluation criteria provide confidence in implementation strength. This protects digital signatures and secure exchange mechanisms. |
| SPR-125 | The [spacecraft] shall produce, control, and distribute asymmetric cryptographic keys. Private cryptographic keys shall be generated, stored, and rotated under [organization] control only and shall not be exposed to external service providers.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-12,SC-12(1),SC-12(3)} | In most cased the Program will leverage NSA-approved key management technology and processes. |
| SPR-214 | The [spacecraft] root of trust shall be an ECDSA NIST P-384 public key.{SV-AC-3,SV-IT-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | Strong elliptic curve cryptography ensures robust digital signature validation. P-384 provides long-term cryptographic assurance. Root of trust underpins secure boot and update integrity. High-strength algorithms mitigate future cryptanalytic advances. |
| SPR-375 | The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific system and communications protection policies in accordance with CNSSP 12. {SV-AC-7,SV-CF-1,SV-AC-3}{SC-1} | Alignment with CNSSP 12 ensures compliance with national security requirements. Standardized communications protection strengthens cryptographic assurance. Program-specific tailoring ensures relevance. Policy integration strengthens governance. |
| SPR-387 | The [organization] shall define policy and procedures to ensure that the developed or delivered systems do not embed unencrypted static authenticators in applications, access scripts, configuration files, nor store unencrypted static authenticators on function keys.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{IA-5(7)} | Hard-coded or static authenticators create high-value targets for reverse engineering and credential reuse. Preventing embedded unencrypted credentials reduces insider and supply chain exploitation risk. Credential hygiene is critical in long-lived space missions. Eliminating static secrets strengthens identity assurance. |
| SPR-388 | The [organization] shall produce, control, and distribute asymmetric cryptographic keys (where applicable) using NSA Certified or Approved key management technology and processes per CNSSP 12.{SV-AC-3,SV-AC-7}{SC-12(3)} | Using NSA-certified key management ensures cryptographic integrity and compliance with federal mandates. Proper generation, distribution, and control reduce key compromise risk. High-assurance key lifecycle management underpins command authentication and secure updates. Governance over keys preserves mission trust. |
| SPR-390 | The [organization] shall ensure that cryptographic mechanisms, including authentication schemes and command dictionaries, are under strict configuration management.{SV-AC-3,SV-IT-2}{CM-3(6)} | Cryptographic algorithms, keys, and command dictionaries are foundational trust elements. Strict configuration control prevents unauthorized changes that could weaken security. Version tracking supports forensic reconstruction. Governance ensures cryptographic integrity across lifecycle phases. |
| SPR-451 | The [spacecraft] shall ingest [organization]-defined revocation updates to onboard access control lists and attribute sets and shall enforce revocation within [Program-defined time] of receipt.{SV-AC-4,SV-AC-3}{AC-3(8)} | Timely revocation prevents continued access by compromised identities. Defined enforcement timelines reduce residual exposure. Structured update ingestion strengthens identity governance. Rapid revocation reduces insider and key compromise risk. |
| SPR-455 | The [spacecraft] shall restrict access to flight software executables, cryptographic material, command dictionaries, and [organization]-defined sensitive payload data to the privileged execution domain and shall deny all other access by default.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3,SV-IT-3}{AC-3(11),AC-6} | Flight executables and cryptographic materials are high-value targets. Restricting access reduces exploitation pathways. Default deny enforces least privilege. Segmentation enhances resilience. |
| SPR-457 | The [spacecraft] shall verify cryptographic integrity and origin of data at each relay hop before forwarding information between internal components, payloads, crosslinks, and ground.{SV-IT-1,SV-IT-2,SV-AC-3}{CA-3(7),SC-8(1),SC-13,SC-23} | End-to-end security alone is insufficient in multi-hop spacecraft architectures. Verifying integrity and origin at each relay prevents compromised subsystems from forwarding malicious data laterally. Hop-by-hop validation limits propagation of injected commands or payload tampering. This enforces zero-trust principles internally. |
| SPR-463 | The [spacecraft] shall maintain configuration and cryptographic synchronization required to activate alternate processing or storage and shall verify the alternate before activation.{SV-SP-9,SV-AC-3}{CP-2(6),CM-2} | Activation of alternate nodes requires synchronized keys and configurations. Unsynchronized failover risks data corruption or exposure. Verification before activation prevents propagation of compromised states. Coordinated readiness supports secure recovery. |
| SPR-466 | The [spacecraft] shall support rapid rollover of communications credentials to restore secure operations with an alternate provider.{SV-AC-3}{SC-12,IA-5} | Credential compromise requires immediate remediation capability. Rapid rollover restores secure communications without prolonged outage. Agility prevents mission interruption. Cryptographic agility is foundational to resilience. |
| SPR-471 | The [spacecraft] shall preserve trusted boot and cryptographic key storage functionality under EMP conditions by locating those functions within hardened, power-conditioned domains.{SV-IT-3,SV-AC-3}{PE-21} | Electromagnetic disruption is a realistic space threat. Hardening trusted boot and key storage ensures continuity of secure startup. Protection of root-of-trust preserves system integrity. Resilient design supports adversarial environments. |
| SPR-477 | The [organization] shall require independent testing and inspection of mission-critical components prior to integration to verify hardware integrity and cryptographic module assurance.{SV-SP-5,SV-AC-3}{PM-30(1),SR-11} | Third-party validation reduces conflict-of-interest risk. Independent inspection verifies hardware integrity and cryptographic assurance. External attestation strengthens confidence. Verification supports mission-critical trust. |
| SPR-489 | The [spacecraft] shall host privileged functions, including flight control and cryptographic key management, in physically separate processing domains that have no direct data bus connectivity to non privileged domains. {SV-AC-6,SV-AC-3}{SC-3,SC-32(1),SC-39} | Hardware-level separation prevents software bypass. Isolation protects flight control and key management. Physical boundaries strengthen trust. Segmentation enforces zero-trust architecture. |
| SPR-492 | The [spacecraft] shall update signal parameter selections using cryptographically sound PRNG inputs at [organization]‑defined intervals or triggers, coordinated with TRANSEC and Traffic Flow Security.{SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{SC-8,SC-12,SC-40(4)} | Predictable signal patterns enable adversary exploitation. Strong PRNG inputs ensure randomness integrity. Coordinated update intervals prevent synchronization attacks. Cryptographic randomness strengthens concealment. |
| SPR-494 | The [spacecraft] shall preserve and protect a golden backup of security credentials and integrity anchors and shall restore them automatically when corruption is detected.{SV-AC-3,SV-IT-3}{SI-13,CP-9} | Protected backups enable secure recovery from corruption. Automatic restoration reduces downtime. Integrity anchors preserve trust. Backup governance strengthens resilience. |
| SPR-497 | The [spacecraft] shall verify the standby component integrity before activation using stored signatures and shall revert if verification fails.{SV-SP-4,SV-AC-3}{SI-13(4)} | Failover to compromised standby defeats purpose. Signature verification ensures trust continuity. Reversion prevents propagation of corruption. Validation strengthens resilience. |
| SPR-498 | The [spacecraft] shall minimize persistence of sensitive data and cryptographic material by using ephemeral session keys stored only in volatile memory and purging them upon session end, mode change, or power cycle.{SV-AC-3}{SI-14} | Minimizing persistence reduces exposure window. Volatile storage prevents residual compromise. Automatic purge enforces key hygiene. Ephemerality strengthens confidentiality. |
| SPR-500 | The [spacecraft] shall avoid storing sensitive operational data in nonvolatile memory unless required by mission, and if stored, it shall be encrypted and retained only for [organization]-defined durations.{SV-AC-3,SV-IT-2}{SI-14} | Minimizing nonvolatile storage reduces compromise surface. Encrypted storage protects required retention. Defined retention periods prevent indefinite exposure. Controlled persistence supports compliance. |
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| REC-0003 | Gather Spacecraft Communications Information | Threat actors assemble a detailed picture of the mission’s RF and networking posture across TT&C and payload links. Useful elements include frequency bands and allocations, emission designators, modulation/coding, data rates, polarization sense, Doppler profiles, timing and ranging schemes, link budgets, and expected Eb/N0 margins. They also seek antenna characteristics, beacon structures, and whether transponders are bent-pipe or regenerative. On the ground, they track station locations, apertures, auto-track behavior, front-end filters/LNAs, and handover rules, plus whether services traverse SLE, SDN, or commercial cloud backbones. Even small details, polarization sense, roll-off factors, or beacon cadence, shrink the search space for interception, spoofing, or denial. The outcome is a lab-replicable demod/decode chain and a calendar of advantageous windows. | |
| REC-0003.04 | Valid Credentials | Adversaries seek any credential that would let them authenticate as a legitimate actor in space, ground, or supporting cloud networks. Targets include TT&C authentication keys and counters, link-encryption keys, PN codes or spreading sequences, modem and gateway accounts, mission control mission control user and service accounts, station control credentials, VPN and identity-provider tokens, SLE/CSP service credentials, maintenance backdoor accounts, and automation secrets embedded in scripts or CI/CD pipelines. Acquisition paths include spear-phishing, supply-chain compromise, credential reuse across dev/test/ops, logs and core dumps, misconfigured repositories, contractor laptops, and improperly sanitized training data. Because some missions authenticate uplink without encrypting it, possession of valid keys or counters may be sufficient to issue accepted commands from outside official channels. | |
| RD-0003 | Obtain Cyber Capabilities | Adversaries acquire ready-made tools, code, and knowledge so they can move faster and with lower attribution when operations begin. Capabilities span commodity malware and loaders, bespoke implants for mission control mission control and ground enclaves, privilege-escalation and lateral-movement kits, SDR/codec stacks for TT&C and payload links, fuzzers and protocol harnesses, exploit chains for RTOS/middleware and ground services, and databases of configuration playbooks from prior intrusions. Actors prefer modular kits that can be re-skinned (new C2, new certs) and exercised in flatsat or SIL/HIL labs before use. They also collect operational “how-tos”, procedures, scripts, and operator macros, that convert technical access into mission effects. | |
| RD-0003.02 | Cryptographic Keys | Adversaries seek any cryptographic material that confers command or decryption authority: uplink authentication/MAC keys and counters, link-encryption/session keys and KEKs, loading/transfer keys for HSMs, PN/spreading codes, modem credentials, and station or crosslink keys. Acquisition routes include compromised ground systems and laptops, misconfigured repositories and ticket systems, memory/core dumps, training datasets and screenshots, contractor support channels, and poorly controlled key-loading or recovery procedures. Because some missions authenticate uplink without encrypting it, possession of the right keys/counters may be sufficient to inject accepted commands outside official channels or to desynchronize anti-replay. | |
| EX-0003 | Modify Authentication Process | The adversary alters how the spacecraft validates authority so that future inputs are accepted on their terms. Modifications can target code (patching flight binaries, hot-patching functions in memory, hooking command handlers), data (changing key identifiers, policy tables, or counter initialization), or control flow (short-circuiting MAC checks, widening anti-replay windows, bypassing interlocks on specific opcodes). Common choke points include telecommand verification routines, bootloader or update verifiers, gateway processors that bridge payload and bus traffic, and maintenance dictionaries invoked in special modes. Subtle variants preserve outward behavior, producing normal-looking acknowledgments and counters, while internally accepting a broader set of origins, opcodes, or timetags. Others introduce conditional logic so the backdoor only activates under specific geometry or timing, masking during routine audit. Once resident, the modified process becomes the new trust oracle, enabling recurring execution for the attacker and, in some cases, denying legitimate control by causing authentic inputs to fail verification or to be deprioritized. | |
| EX-0006 | Disable/Bypass Encryption | The adversary alters how confidentiality or integrity is applied so traffic or data is processed in clear or with weakened protection. Paths include toggling configuration flags that place links or storage into maintenance/test modes; forcing algorithm “fallbacks” or null ciphers; downgrading negotiated suites or keys; manipulating anti-replay/counter state so checks are skipped; substituting crypto libraries or tables during boot/update; and selecting alternate routes that carry the same content without encryption. On some designs, distinct modes handle authentication and confidentiality separately, allowing an actor who obtains authentication material to request unencrypted service or to switch to legacy profiles. The end state is that command, telemetry, or data products traverse a path the spacecraft accepts while cryptographic protection is absent, weakened, or inconsistently applied, enabling subsequent tactics such as inspection, manipulation, or exfiltration. | |
| PER-0004 | Replace Cryptographic Keys | The adversary cements control by changing the cryptographic material the spacecraft uses to authenticate or protect links and updates. Targets include uplink authentication keys and counters, link-encryption/session keys and key-encryption keys (KEKs), key identifiers/selectors, and algorithm profiles. Using authorized rekey commands or key-loading procedures, often designed for over-the-air use, the attacker installs new values in non-volatile storage and updates selectors so subsequent traffic must use the attacker’s keys to be accepted. Variants desynchronize anti-replay by advancing counters or switching epochs, or strand operators by flipping profiles to a mode for which only the adversary holds parameters. Once replaced, the new material persists across resets and mode changes, turning the spacecraft into a node that recognizes the adversary’s channel while rejecting former controllers. | |
| PER-0005 | Credentialed Persistence | Threat actors may acquire or leverage valid credentials to maintain persistent access to a spacecraft or its supporting command and control (C2) systems. These credentials may include system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance access credentials, cryptographic keys, or other authentication mechanisms that enable continued entry without triggering access alarms. By operating with legitimate credentials, adversaries can sustain access over extended periods, evade detection, and facilitate follow-on tactics such as command execution, data exfiltration, or lateral movement. Credentialed persistence is particularly effective in environments lacking strong credential lifecycle management, segmentation, or monitoring allowing threat actors to exploit trusted pathways while remaining embedded in mission operations. | |
| DE-0011 | Credentialed Evasion | Threat actors may leverage valid credentials to conduct unauthorized actions against a spacecraft or related system in a way that conceals their presence and evades detection. By using trusted authentication mechanisms attackers can blend in with legitimate operations and avoid triggering access control alarms or anomaly detection systems. This technique enables evasion by appearing authorized, allowing adversaries to issue commands, access sensitive subsystems, or move laterally within spacecraft or constellation architectures without exploiting software vulnerabilities. When credential use is poorly segmented or monitored, this form of access can be used to maintain stealthy persistence or facilitate other tactics under the guise of legitimate activity. | |
| LM-0007 | Credentialed Traversal | Movement is achieved by reusing legitimate credentials and keys to cross boundaries that rely on trust rather than strict isolation. Using operator or service accounts, maintenance logins, station certificates, or spacecraft-recognized crypto, the adversary invokes gateways that bridge domains, C&DH to payload, crosslink routers to onboard networks, or constellation management planes to individual vehicles. Because the traversal occurs through approved interfaces (file services, table loaders, remote procedure calls, crosslink tasking), actions appear as routine operations while reaching progressively more privileged subsystems or neighboring spacecraft. Where roles and scopes are broad or reused, the same credential opens multiple enclaves, turning authorization itself into the lateral path. | |
| IMP-0006 | [DEPRECATED] Theft | Threat actors may attempt to steal the data that is being gathered, processed, and sent from the victim spacecraft. Many spacecraft have a particular purpose associated with them and the data they gather is deemed mission critical. By attempting to steal this data, the mission, or purpose, of the spacecraft could be lost entirely. | |
| ID | Name | Description | NIST Rev5 | D3FEND | ISO 27001 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CM0085 | Electromagnetic Shielding | Spacecraft electronics are vulnerable to natural ionizing particle radiation and intentional electromagnetic threats such as high-power microwave and electromagnetic pulse effects. Both may cause transient upset or permanent damage, but they act through different physical mechanisms and require distinct protections. Conductive enclosures and associated electromagnetic protection reduce fields and induced transients from HPM or EMP, while particle-radiation shielding reduces the dose or particle environment reaching susceptible components. The spacecraft design must address particle-radiation protection and HPM or EMP protection as coordinated but separately verified requirements. Enclosure materials, geometry, penetrations, bonding, and component placement should be evaluated together so that protection against one environment does not create unacceptable mass, thermal, electrical, or secondary-radiation effects in another. Shielding is primarily a design- and integration-phase hardware control and generally cannot be increased after launch. It must be combined with component hardness assurance and electrical protection measures sufficient to meet the mission’s residual susceptibility requirements. | CP-13 PE-18 PE-19 PE-21 PE-9 | D3-PH D3-RFS | A.5.29 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.7.11 A.7.12 A.5.10 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.8.12 | |
| CM0002 | COMSEC | Communications security (COMSEC) denies unauthorized parties access to information derived from telecommunications while ensuring the authenticity of those communications. COMSEC is commonly defined as a broad discipline that may encompass cryptographic security, transmission security, emissions security, cryptographic key management, traffic-flow security, and physical security of COMSEC material. Within SPARTA, these areas are further broken down through separate countermeasures, including CM0029 | TRANSEC, CM0030 | Crypto Key Management, CM0003 | TEMPEST/EMSEC, and CM0073 | Traffic Flow Analysis Defense. CM0002 provides the overarching communications-security context and supports the coordinated application of these specialized countermeasures. All mission links, particularly telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C) links, should employ communications-security protections appropriate to the sensitivity, criticality, operational environment, and threat exposure of the information being exchanged. These protections may include cryptographic protection, transmission security, emissions security, traffic-flow protection, secure key management, and physical protection of COMSEC material, as addressed by the applicable specialized countermeasures. Spacecraft should not provide an operational mode that permits required cryptographic protection or command authentication on TT&C links to be bypassed or disabled. Operational, maintenance, test, recovery, and contingency modes should be considered when evaluating whether communications-security protections can be unintentionally or improperly circumvented. Communication receivers and associated signal-processing or TRANSEC mechanisms should detect and, when mission-defined criteria are met, reject or otherwise safely handle transmissions exhibiting anomalous signal characteristics consistent with communications deception. Cryptographic mechanisms should authenticate and integrity-check received content but should not be treated as RF-deception detectors. | AC-17 AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18 AC-18(1) AC-2(11) AC-3(10) CA-3 IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(7) IA-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(18) SA-8(19) SA-9(6) SC-10 SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-13 SC-16(3) SC-28(1) SC-28(3) SC-7 SC-7(10) SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SC-7(5) SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-19(4) SI-3(8) | D3-ET D3-MH D3-MAN D3-MENCR D3-NTF D3-ITF D3-OTF D3-CH D3-DTP D3-NTA D3-CAA D3-DNSTA D3-IPCTA D3-NTCD D3-RTSD D3-PHDURA D3-PMAD D3-CSPP D3-MA D3-SMRA D3-SRA | A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.12 A.5.33 A.8.20 A.8.24 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 A.5.33 A.8.11 | |
| CM0030 | Crypto Key Management | Effective cryptographic key management is a foundational requirement for all mission encryption and authentication functions; the security of cryptographic implementations is only as strong as the protection afforded to the keys those implementations rely upon. Key management must conform to recognized cryptographic guidance and address the full lifecycle applicable to each key type, including generation or establishment, distribution, storage, activation, use, replacement, deactivation or revocation, recovery where authorized, compromise response, and destruction. Only approved cryptographic algorithms, key generation methods, key distribution techniques, and authentication mechanisms may be used; the use of unapproved, deprecated, or custom cryptographic primitives is prohibited regardless of perceived functional adequacy. Encryption key handling must be performed outside of onboard software and protected through dedicated cryptographic mechanisms, preventing keys from being exposed through software vulnerabilities, memory inspection, or software-level debugging interfaces. Secret and private key material must not be retrievable in plaintext through telecommands, telemetry, diagnostic outputs, debugging interfaces, or other externally accessible mechanisms, regardless of the privilege level of the requesting entity. | CM-3(6) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-9(6) SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-28(3) SC-8(1) | D3-CH D3-CP | A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 A.8.24 | |
| CM0031 | Authentication | All command-bearing sessions, frames, or messages involving spacecraft command links, crosslinks, or relay services shall provide cryptographic authentication of the command origin and integrity verification before commands are accepted. Mutual or bidirectional authentication shall be required where both endpoints must authenticate one another and the link and protocol architecture support that exchange. Acquisition requirements should mandate cryptographically based, bidirectional authentication for all command sessions across external links, including ground-to-spacecraft uplinks, spacecraft-to-spacecraft crosslinks, and any relay or intermediary ground station connections, with authentication required aBidirectional authentication enables both communicating entities to verify each other’s identity and helps prevent impersonation. Authentication establishes identity but does not by itself authorize a command, protect mission-data confidentiality, or prevent session hijacking. Command acceptance must also enforce authorization, and authenticated sessions or security associations must maintain integrity and replay resistance so that subsequent traffic remains bound to the authenticated entities. Beyond external links, authentication is strongly recommended for spacecraft internal bus communications and onboard inter-component connections, as an adversary with access to internal interfaces, whether through a compromised component or a physical access event, should face the same authentication barrier as an external adversary attempting to inject commands from outside the spacecraft. | AC-14 AC-17 AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18 AC-18(1) IA-2 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-4(9) IA-7 IA-9 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(15) SA-8(9) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-7(11) SC-8(1) SI-14(3) SI-7(6) | D3-MH D3-MAN D3-CH D3-BAN D3-MFA D3-TAAN D3-CBAN | A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.16 A.5.16 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 | |
| CM0035 | Protect Authenticators | Authenticators and associated authenticator material, including passwords, secret and private keys, tokens, biometric templates, shared secrets, certificates, and trust-store entries, must be protected against unauthorized modification and, where the material is confidential, unauthorized disclosure throughout their lifecycle. Disclosure of secret authenticator material may enable adversaries to impersonate legitimate users or systems. Unauthorized modification of authenticators, certificates, or trust information can deny access to legitimate entities, substitute adversary-controlled credentials, or corrupt the trust basis of mission authentication mechanisms. Protection must apply to authenticators at rest, in transit, and in use, and must extend to all forms and storage locations, including credential databases, configuration files, embedded device credentials, hardware security tokens, and cryptographic key stores. Authenticator protection is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of any authentication-based access control; an authentication system whose authenticators are unprotected provides no meaningful security regardless of the strength of the underlying authentication protocol. | AC-17(6) AC-3(11) CM-3(6) IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(6) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(13) SA-8(19) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-8(1) | D3-CE D3-ANCI D3-CA D3-ACA D3-PCA D3-CRO D3-CTS D3-SPP | A.8.4 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 | |
| CM0043 | Backdoor Commands | All commands capable of being executed on the spacecraft must be known, documented, and accounted for by the mission and spacecraft owner; the existence of undisclosed or undocumented commands, whether introduced by developers, component suppliers, or subsystem vendors, represents an unacceptable and unmanageable risk to mission integrity. Commands capable of adversely affecting mission success if misused must be identified through deliberate analysis and protected by mission-defined authorization and execution controls commensurate with their consequences. Commands that bypass normal operational safeguards require additional justification and restrictions appropriate to their emergency or contingency purpose. Backdoor, residual, hardware-level, test, diagnostic, or override commands that bypass normal operational pathways or safeguards should be retained only where mission-approved emergency or contingency access requires them. Their inclusion must be explicitly justified, and their commanding authority must be appropriately restricted. Hazardous commands required for normal mission operations are not prohibited by this countermeasure but must be governed by approved authorization, prerequisite, sequencing, and safety controls. Any command capability introduced by a subsystem supplier or component vendor that was not explicitly requested or authorized by the mission owner must be identified, evaluated, and either removed or brought under formal mission command governance before launch. | AC-14 CP-2 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(6) SI-3(8) | D3-OAM D3-AM D3-PH D3-CCSA D3-LAM D3-CE | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 | |