Software can be broken down into three levels (operating system and drivers’ layer, data handling service layer, and the application layer). Highest impact on system is likely the embedded code at the BIOS, kernel/firmware level. Attacking the on-board operating systems. Since it manages all the programs and applications on the computer, it has a critical role in the overall security of the system. Since threats may occur deliberately or due to human error, malicious programs or persons, or existing system vulnerability mitigations must be deployed to protect the OS.
| SPARTA ID | Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SPR-1 | The [spacecraft] shall implement a reference monitor mechanism that mediates access between subjects and objects based on a defined set of rules, that is designed and configured to resist tampering or unauthorized alteration, providing a reliable and secure foundation for access control within the information system.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-4,SV-SP-7}{AC-25} | A reference monitor provides the foundational enforcement point for all access control decisions within the spacecraft. Without a tamper-resistant mediation layer, compromised flight software or malicious code could directly access critical memory, processes, or hardware interfaces. The mechanism must be isolated from modifiable flight software to preserve integrity under adversarial conditions. |
| SPR-4 | The [spacecraft] security implementation shall ensure that information should not be allowed to flow between partitioned applications unless explicitly permitted by the system.{SV-AC-6,SV-MA-3,SV-SP-7}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(29),SC-16,SC-32} | Strict partitioning prevents compromise of one application from cascading into mission-critical subsystems. Many spacecraft attacks exploit flat architectures where subsystems implicitly trust one another. Explicit inter-partition authorization limits lateral movement and privilege escalation. This supports containment and fault isolation under both cyber and fault conditions. |
| SPR-54 | The [spacecraft] shall retain the capability to update/upgrade operating systems while on-orbit.{SV-SP-7}{SA-4(5),SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3} | The operating system updates should be performed using multi-factor authorization and should only be performed when risk of compromise/exploitation of identified vulnerability outweighs the risk of not performing the update. |
| SPR-78 | The [spacecraft] shall provide independent mission/cyber critical threads such that any one credible event will not corrupt another mission/cyber critical thread.{SV-AC-6,SV-MA-3,SV-SP-7}{SC-3,SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3,SI-13} | Segregating mission-critical and cyber-critical execution paths prevents a single failure or compromise from corrupting other critical functions. Thread independence supports fault containment and resilience under attack. This ensures availability of essential functions even during partial compromise. Isolation strengthens both safety and cybersecurity. |
| SPR-81 | The [spacecraft] shall perform an integrity check of software, firmware, and information at startup or during security- events.{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-3}{CM-3(5),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-7(1),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SI-7(17)} | Startup integrity checks detect boot-level compromise or unauthorized modification. Event-triggered checks provide additional protection when anomalies occur. This limits adversary persistence across reboots. Continuous validation reinforces trusted boot regimes. |
| SPR-85 | The [spacecraft] trusted boot/RoT shall be a separate compute engine controlling the trusted computing platform cryptographic processor.{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-7}{SA-8(10),SA-8(11),SA-8(12),SI-7(9),SI-7(10)} | Separating the trust engine from general-purpose compute reduces attack surface. Independent control over cryptographic processors prevents compromised flight software from influencing trust validation. This architectural separation preserves chain-of-trust integrity. Isolation enhances resilience against firmware-level threats. |
| SPR-87 | The [spacecraft] shall be configured to provide only essential capabilities.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-1}{CM-6,CM-7,SA-8(2),SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(23),SA-8(26),SA-15(5)} | Minimizing enabled functionality reduces attack surface and complexity. Unused services create unnecessary exposure. Essential-only configuration aligns with least functionality principles. This simplifies validation and reduces exploit vectors. |
| SPR-153 | The [spacecraft] operating system, if COTS or FOSS, shall be selected from a [organization]-defined acceptance list.{SV-SP-7}{CM-7(8),CM-7(5)} | Selecting OS from approved list reduces exposure to unvetted vulnerabilities. Controlled selection supports maintainability and patch governance. This mitigates risk from insecure or unsupported platforms. Trusted baselines simplify compliance verification. |
| SPR-155 | The [organization] shall ensure that software planned for reuse meets the fit, form, and function, and security as a component within the new application.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(5)} | Reused components may introduce hidden vulnerabilities. Validation ensures compatibility and security alignment with new mission context. Prior approval does not guarantee safe reuse. Rigorous assessment prevents latent risk inheritance. |
| SPR-236 | The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)} | The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization. |
| SPR-250 | The [organization] shall verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls (to include abuse cases and penetration testing) at the depth of testing defined in the test documents.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,RA-5(3),SA-11(5),SA-11(7)} | * The frequency of testing should be driven by Program completion events and updates. * Examples of approaches are static analyses, dynamic analyses, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches |
| SPR-251 | The [organization] shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11} | Documented evidence provides traceability and accountability for security testing activities. Without retained artifacts, organizations cannot demonstrate due diligence or validate corrective actions. Preserved results support audits, mission reviews, and lessons learned. This strengthens governance and compliance posture. |
| SPR-252 | The [organization] shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of all software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11,SA-11(5)} | The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls. |
| SPR-254 | The [organization] shall employ dynamic analysis (e.g.using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-8,CM-10(1),RA-3(1),SA-11(5),SA-11(8),SA-11(9),SI-3,SI-7(10)} | Dynamic testing uncovers runtime vulnerabilities not visible through static review. Techniques such as fuzzing and penetration testing simulate realistic adversarial behavior. Runtime validation improves detection of memory corruption, logic flaws, and unsafe state transitions. This reduces latent vulnerabilities prior to deployment. |
| SPR-265 | The [organization] shall report identified systems or system components containing software affected by recently announced cybersecurity-related software flaws (and potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws) to [organization] officials with cybersecurity responsibilities.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{IR-6,IR-6(2),SI-2,SI-3,SI-4(12),SR-4(4)} | Rapid reporting of vulnerable components enables proactive remediation. Awareness of newly disclosed flaws prevents exploitation. Coordination ensures mission-wide response. Visibility reduces systemic risk. |
| SPR-266 | The [organization] shall determine the vulnerabilities/weaknesses that require remediation, and coordinate the timeline for that remediation, in accordance with the analysis of the vulnerability scan report, the mission assessment of risk, and mission needs.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-5,CM-3,RA-5,RA-7,SI-3,SI-3(10)} | Not all vulnerabilities carry equal mission impact. Risk-informed prioritization ensures critical flaws are addressed first. Coordinated timelines balance mission needs with security posture. Structured remediation strengthens governance. |
| SPR-269 | The [organization] shall ensure that the vulnerability scanning tools (e.g., static analysis and/or component analysis tools) used include the capability to readily update the list of potential information system vulnerabilities to be scanned.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(3),SI-3} | Threat landscapes evolve rapidly. Regular tool updates ensure detection coverage remains current. Outdated signatures create blind spots. Continuous improvement sustains effectiveness. |
| SPR-270 | The [organization] shall perform vulnerability analysis and risk assessment of all systems and software. The analysis shall include results from hardware‑in‑the‑loop vulnerability scanning of flight software, firmware, and link‑segment interfaces.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SA-15(7),SI-3} | Integrated hardware-in-the-loop testing identifies operationally relevant weaknesses. Combined software, firmware, and interface scanning provides holistic coverage. Risk assessment ensures mitigation aligns with mission priorities. End-to-end analysis strengthens assurance. |
| SPR-271 | The [organization] shall ensure that vulnerability scanning tools and techniques are employed that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for: (1) Enumerating platforms, custom software flaws, and improper configurations; (2) Formatting checklists and test procedures; and (3) Measuring vulnerability impact. Scanning shall cover flight software, firmware, and link‑segment interfaces in hardware‑in‑the‑loop environments.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,RA-5(3),SI-3} | Component/Origin scanning looks for open-source libraries/software that may be included into the baseline and looks for known vulnerabilities and open-source license violations. |
| SPR-272 | The [organization] shall perform static binary analysis of all firmware that is utilized on the spacecraft.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-10,SA-11,SI-7(10)} | Many commercial products/parts are utilized within the system and should be analyzed for security weaknesses. Blindly accepting the firmware is free of weakness is unacceptable for high assurance missions. The intent is to not blindly accept firmware from unknown sources and assume it is secure. This is meant to apply to firmware the vendors are not developing internally. In-house developed firmware should be going through the vendor's own testing program and have high assurance it is secure. When utilizing firmware from other sources, "expecting" does not meet this requirement. Each supplier needs to provide evidence to support that claim that their firmware they are getting is genuine and secure. |
| SPR-273 | The [organization] shall perform static source code analysis for all available source code looking for [[organization]-defined Top CWE List] weaknesses using complimentary set of static code analysis tools (i.e.more than one).{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-11(1),SA-15(7)} | Static analysis detects coding weaknesses before execution. Using multiple tools increases detection coverage. Alignment with defined CWE priorities ensures focus on high-risk flaws. Early detection reduces downstream remediation cost. |
| SPR-274 | The [organization] shall analyze vulnerability/weakness scan reports and results from security control assessments.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SI-3} | Scan results require expert interpretation to avoid false positives or overlooked risks. Structured analysis ensures meaningful remediation. Correlating findings with mission context refines prioritization. Review strengthens governance. |
| SPR-275 | The [organization] shall have automated means to evaluate adherence to coding standards.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15,SA-15(7),RA-5} | Manual review cannot scale across the code base; you must have a way to scale in order to confirm your coding standards are being met. The intent is for automated means to ensure code adheres to a coding standard. |
| SPR-276 | The [organization] shall perform component analysis (a.k.a.origin analysis) for developed or acquired software.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15(7),RA-5} | |
| SPR-278 | The [organization] shall correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11} | Flaws that impact the mission objectives should be prioritized. |
| SPR-279 | The [organization] shall perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Program-defined depth and coverage].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11} | The depth needs to include functional testing as well as negative/abuse testing. |
| SPR-291 | The [organization] shall use the threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services to inform and direct subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-3(3),SA-11(2),SA-15(8),SI-3} | Security analysis should guide test design. Threat-informed evaluation improves relevance. Feedback loops strengthen defensive posture. Analytical alignment enhances coverage. |
| SPR-294 | The [organization] shall use threat modeling and vulnerability analysis to inform the current development process using analysis from similar systems, components, or services where applicable.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SA-15(8)} | |
| SPR-295 | The [organization] shall perform and document threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(2),SI-3} | Formal records preserve findings and mitigation strategies. Documentation supports lifecycle traceability. Transparent records enhance oversight. Governance requires evidence. |
| SPR-296 | The [organization] shall conduct an Attack Surface Analysis and reduce attack surfaces to a level that presents a low level of compromise by an attacker.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(6),SA-15(5)} | Reducing exposed interfaces lowers exploitation probability. Quantified surface reduction strengthens resilience. Structured assessment aligns design with mission risk tolerance. Minimization enhances defensive posture. |
| SPR-331 | The [organization] shall test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects on mission systems in a separate test environment before installation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(2),CM-4(1),CM-4(2),CM-10(1),SA-8(31),SA-11(9),SI-2,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-5(2)} | This requirement is focused on software and firmware flaws. If hardware flaw remediation is required, refine the requirement to make this clear. |
| SPR-337 | The [organization] shall ensure that the list of potential system vulnerabilities scanned is updated [prior to a new scan] {SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-5(2),SI-3} | Outdated vulnerability signatures reduce detection capability. Updating scan definitions ensures coverage against emerging threats. Proactive updates prevent blind spots. Continuous refresh strengthens scanning effectiveness. |
| SPR-391 | The [organization] shall release updated versions of the mission information systems incorporating security-relevant software and firmware updates, after suitable regression testing, at a frequency no greater than [Program-defined frequency [90 days]].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(2),CM-4(1)} | On-orbit patching/upgrades may be necessary if vulnerabilities are discovered after launch. The system should have the ability to update software post-launch. |
| SPR-392 | The [organization] shall review proposed changes to the spacecraft, assessing both mission and security impacts.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10,CM-3(2)} | Changes may introduce unintended security regression. Structured review balances mission needs with risk tolerance. Joint mission-security assessment prevents single-domain blind spots. Integrated evaluation supports safe modernization. |
| SPR-395 | The [organization] shall prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(8)} | Closed binaries from unverified sources limit vulnerability inspection. Source availability supports transparency and review. Prohibiting opaque code reduces hidden malicious logic risk. Supply chain integrity depends on verifiability. |
| SPR-396 | The [organization] shall perform configuration management during system, component, or service during [design; development; implementation; operations].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-10} | Configuration discipline ensures traceability from design through operations. Lifecycle oversight prevents undocumented changes. Structured management supports rollback and audit. Configuration integrity underpins mission assurance. |
| SPR-397 | The [organization] shall create prioritized list of software weakness classes (e.g., Common Weakness Enumerations) to be used during static code analysis for prioritization of static analysis results.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(1),SA-15(7)} | The prioritized list of CWEs should be created considering operational environment, attack surface, etc. Results from the threat modeling and attack surface analysis should be used as inputs into the CWE prioritization process. There is also a CWSS (https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html) process that can be used to prioritize CWEs. The prioritized list of CWEs can help with tools selection as well as you select tools based on their ability to detect certain high priority CWEs. |
| SPR-398 | The [organization] shall perform a manual code review of all flight code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11(4)} | Flight code governs mission-critical behavior. Manual review detects subtle logic flaws missed by automation. Human expertise enhances safety assurance. Defense-in-depth requires layered validation. |
| SPR-399 | The [organization] shall define acceptable coding languages to be used by the software developer.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15} | Standardized languages reduce complexity and maintenance burden. Approved languages support secure development practices. Language governance strengthens code quality and review consistency. Reduced heterogeneity improves assurance. |
| SPR-400 | The [organization] shall define acceptable secure coding standards for use by the software developers.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15} | Secure coding standards mitigate common vulnerability patterns. Structured guidance reduces CWE-class weaknesses. Enforcing standards promotes predictable behavior. Governance supports sustainable security hygiene. |
| SPR-401 | The [organization] shall correct reported cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2} | * Although this requirement is stated to specifically apply to cybersecurity-related flaws, the Program office may choose to broaden it to all SV flaws. * This requirement is allocated to the Program, as it is presumed, they have the greatest knowledge of the components of the system and when identified flaws apply. |
| SPR-402 | The [organization] shall identify, report, and coordinate correction of cybersecurity-related information system flaws.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SI-2} | Centralized reporting ensures timely remediation. Coordinated correction prevents repeated exposure. Documentation strengthens audit traceability. Rapid flaw management reduces exploitation window. |
| SPR-405 | The [organization] shall define/maintain an approved operating system list for use on spacecraft.{SV-SP-7}{CM-7(5)} | The operating system is extremely important to security and availability of the spacecraft, therefore should receive high levels of assurance that it operates as intended and free of critical weaknesses/vulnerabilities. |
| SPR-419 | The [organization] shall periodically review the spacecraft and subsystems to identify and disable unnecessary and/or nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, software, and services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-7}{CM-7(1)} | Unused services expand attack surface. Periodic review removes exploitable vectors. Simplification enhances predictability. Surface reduction strengthens defensive posture. |
| SPR-484 | The [organization] shall employ interactive application security testing within spacecraft simulation or hardware-in-the-loop test benches to observe flight software runtime behavior, capture memory use, API calls, and data flows, and shall identify and report vulnerabilities prior to integration.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-7}{SA-11(9)} | Runtime behavior analysis detects dynamic vulnerabilities. Hardware-in-the-loop testing reveals integration flaws. Early detection reduces costly remediation. Testing strengthens secure development lifecycle. |
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| REC-0008 | Gather Supply Chain Information | Threat actors map the end-to-end pathway by which hardware, software, data, and people move from design through AIT, launch, and on-orbit sustainment. They catalog manufacturers and lots, test and calibration houses, logistics routes and waypoints, integrator touchpoints, key certificates and tooling, update and key-loading procedures, and who holds custody at each handoff. They correlate this with procurement artifacts, SBOMs, BOMs, and service contracts to locate where trust is assumed rather than verified. Particular attention falls on exceptions, engineering builds, rework tickets, advance replacements, depot repairs, and urgent field updates, because controls are frequently relaxed there. The result is a prioritized list of choke points (board fabrication, FPGA bitstream signing, image repositories, CI/CD runners, cloud artifact stores, freight forwarders) where compromise yields outsized effect. | |
| REC-0008.03 | Known Vulnerabilities | Adversaries correlate discovered component and software versions with public and private vulnerability sources to assemble a ready exploit catalog. Inputs include CPE/CVE mappings, vendor advisories, CWE-class weaknesses common to selected RTOS/middleware, FPGA IP core errata, cryptographic library issues, and hardware stepping errata that interact with thermal/power regimes. They mine leaked documents, demo code, bug trackers, and community forums; pivot from ground assets to flight by following shared libraries and tooling; and watch for lag between disclosure and patch deployment. Even when a vulnerability seems “ground-only,” it may expose build systems or update paths that ultimately control flight artifacts. | |
| RD-0003 | Obtain Cyber Capabilities | Adversaries acquire ready-made tools, code, and knowledge so they can move faster and with lower attribution when operations begin. Capabilities span commodity malware and loaders, bespoke implants for mission control mission control and ground enclaves, privilege-escalation and lateral-movement kits, SDR/codec stacks for TT&C and payload links, fuzzers and protocol harnesses, exploit chains for RTOS/middleware and ground services, and databases of configuration playbooks from prior intrusions. Actors prefer modular kits that can be re-skinned (new C2, new certs) and exercised in flatsat or SIL/HIL labs before use. They also collect operational “how-tos”, procedures, scripts, and operator macros, that convert technical access into mission effects. | |
| RD-0003.01 | Exploit/Payload | Threat actors obtain or adapt exploits (the trigger) and payloads (the action after exploitation) for space, ground, and cloud components. Targets include flight software parsers and table loaders, bootloaders and patch/update handlers, bus gateways, payload controllers, and ground services. Payloads may be binaries, scripts, or command/procedure sequences that alter modes, bypass FDIR, or stage follow-on access; they can also be “data payloads” that exploit weak validation (malformed tables, ephemeris, or calibration products). Acquisition paths mirror the broader market, brokered N-day/0-day packages, open-source exploits re-tooled for mission stacks, and theft from vendors or researchers. Actors tune timing, size/rate limits, and anti-replay nuances so delivery fits pass windows and link budgets, and they rehearse on flatsats to achieve deterministic outcomes. | |
| IA-0001 | Compromise Supply Chain | Adversaries achieve first execution before the spacecraft ever flies by inserting malicious code, data, or configuration during manufacturing, integration, or delivery. Targets include software sources and dependencies, build systems and compilers, firmware/bitstreams for MCUs and FPGAs, configuration tables, test vectors, and off-the-shelf avionics. Inserted artifacts are designed to appear legitimate, propagate through normal processes, and activate under routine procedures or specific modes (e.g., safing, maintenance). Common insertion points align with where trust is assumed, vendor updates, mirrors and registries, CI/CD runners, programming stations, and “golden image” repositories. The result is pre-positioned access that blends with baseline behavior, often with delayed or conditional triggers and strong deniability. | |
| IA-0001.01 | Software Dependencies & Development Tools | This technique targets what developers import and the tools that transform source into flight binaries. Methods include dependency confusion and typosquatting, poisoned container/base images, malicious IDE plugins, and compromised compilers, linkers, or build runners that subtly alter output. Because flight and ground stacks frequently reuse open-source RTOS components, crypto libraries, protocol parsers, and build scripts, an upstream change can deterministically reproduce a backdoor downstream. Attackers also seed private mirrors or caches so “trust-on-first-use” locks in tainted packages, or abuse CI secrets and environment variables to pivot further. Effects range from inserting covert handlers into command parsers, to weakening integrity checks in update paths, to embedding telemetry beacons that exfiltrate build metadata helpful for later stages. | |
| IA-0001.02 | Software Supply Chain | Here the manipulation targets software delivered to flight or ground systems: altering source before build, swapping signed binaries at distribution edges, subverting update metadata, or using stolen signing keys to issue malicious patches. Space-specific vectors include mission control applications, schedulers, gateway services, flight tables and configuration packages, and firmware loads during I&T or LEOP. Adversaries craft payloads that pass superficial validation, trigger under particular operating modes, or reintroduce known weaknesses through version rollback. “Data payloads” such as malformed tables, ephemerides, or calibration products can double as exploits when parsers are permissive. The objective is to ride the normal promotion pipeline so the implant arrives pre-trusted and executes as part of routine operations. | |
| EX-0009 | Exploit Code Flaws | The adversary executes actions on-board by abusing defects in software that runs on the vehicle, ranging from application logic in flight software to libraries, drivers, and supporting services. Outcomes range from arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation to silent logic manipulation (e.g., bypassing interlocks, suppressing alarms) that appears operationally plausible. The hallmark of this technique is that the attacker co-opts existing code paths, often rarely used ones, to run unintended behavior under nominal interfaces. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components. | |
| EX-0009.02 | Operating System | At the OS layer, the attacker targets primitives that schedule work and mediate hardware. Modern spacecraft, particularly small satellites, increasingly rely on Linux-based operating systems (e.g., Yocto-derived distributions) rather than traditional RTOSes, significantly expanding the applicable attack surface to include techniques documented in MITRE ATT&CK for Linux - <a href='https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/' class='internal-link' target='_blank'>https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/</a>. Maintenance builds may expose shells or management consoles; misconfigurations around these interfaces can provide paths to command interpreters or privileged syscalls. Linux-based flight systems inherit standard Unix/Linux vulnerabilities including kernel exploits, container escapes, privilege escalation via misconfigured sudo/capabilities, and exploitation of systemd or other init systems. Exploitation yields kernel-mode execution, arbitrary memory read/write, or control of scheduling and address spaces, letting the actor tamper with FSW processes, intercept command paths, or manipulate storage and bus drivers beneath application checks. Common Linux-specific vectors include exploiting unpatched kernel vulnerabilities, abusing misconfigurations in containerized environments, leveraging POSIX API weaknesses in flight applications, and targeting shared libraries or dynamic linkers to inject malicious code into flight processes. The technique leverages generic OS weaknesses adapted to the spacecraft's particular build, turning low-level control into mission-facing effects that appear to originate from legitimate processes. Because spacecraft Linux builds are often minimized, long-lived (limited patching), and may retain debug interfaces or permissive file permissions from ground testing, they present a unique risk profile combining embedded-system constraints with commodity OS attack techniques. Flight images frequently retain extraneous binaries and utilities (e.g., compilers, debuggers, network tools, package managers) intended for ground testing or development that are not removed before launch, providing adversaries with ready-made 'living off the land' capabilities for reconnaissance, lateral movement, and privilege escalation without needing to upload custom tooling. | |
| EX-0009.03 | Known Vulnerability (COTS/FOSS) | Using knowledge of the software composition on-board, the adversary maps components and versions to publicly or privately known defects and then crafts inputs to trigger them. Typical targets include standard libraries (libc, STL), cryptographic and compression libraries, protocol stacks (CCSDS implementations, IP over space links, SpaceWire bridges), filesystems and parsers (FITS/CCSDS packetization, custom table formats), and vendor SDKs for radios, sensors, or payloads. Triggers arrive as well-formed but malicious packets, frames, or files whose edge-case fields exercise version-specific bugs, overflowing a parser, bypassing an authentication check, or causing a kernel/driver fault that reboots into a more permissive mode. Because these flaws are documented somewhere, exploitation emphasizes matching the exact build and build-time options used on the mission. | |
| EX-0010 | Malicious Code | The adversary achieves on-board effects by introducing executable logic that runs on the vehicle, either native binaries and scripts, injected shellcode, or “data payloads” that an interpreter treats as code (e.g., procedure languages, table-driven automations). Delivery commonly piggybacks on legitimate pathways: software/firmware updates, file transfer services, table loaders, maintenance consoles, or command sequences that write to executable regions. Once staged, activation can be explicit (a specific command, mode change, or file open), environmental (time/geometry triggers), or accidental, where operator actions or routine autonomy invoke the implanted logic. Malicious code can target any layer it can reach: altering flight software behavior, manipulating payload controllers, patching boot or device firmware, or installing hooks in drivers and gateways that bridge bus and payload traffic. Effects range from subtle logic changes (quiet data tampering, command filtering) to overt actions (forced mode transitions, resource starvation), and may include secondary capabilities like covert communications, key material harvesting, or persistence across resets by rewriting images or configuration entries. | |
| EX-0010.01 | Ransomware | Ransomware on a spacecraft encrypts data or critical configuration so that nominal operations can no longer proceed without the attacker’s cooperation. Targets include mass-memory file stores (engineering telemetry, payload data), configuration and command tables, event logs, on-board ephemerides, and even intermediate buffers used by downlink pipelines. Some variants interfere with key services instead of bulk data, e.g., encrypting a command dictionary or table index so valid inputs are rejected, or wrapping the payload data path in an attacker-chosen cipher so downlinked products appear as noise. By denying access to on-board content or control artifacts at scale, attackers convert execution into bargaining power or irreversible mission degradation. | |
| EX-0010.02 | Wiper Malware | Wipers deliberately destroy or irreversibly corrupt data and, in some cases, executable images to impair or end mission operations. Destructive routines may overwrite with patterns or pseudorandom data, repeatedly reformat volumes, trigger wear mechanisms on non-volatile memory, or manipulate low-level translation layers so recovery tools see a blank or inconsistent device. Activation can be immediate or staged, sleeping until a specific time, pass, or maintenance action, and may be paired with anti-recovery steps such as erasing checksums, undo logs, or golden images. Because wipers operate at storage and image layers that underpin many subsystems, collateral effects can cascade: autonomy enters safing without viable recovery paths, downlinks carry only noise, and subsequent updates cannot be authenticated or applied. The defining feature is irreversible loss of data or executables as the primary objective, rather than concealment or monetization. | |
| EX-0010.03 | Rootkit | A rootkit hides the presence and activity of other malicious components by interposing on the mechanisms that report system state. On spacecraft this can occur within flight software processes, at OS kernel level, inside separation kernels/hypervisors, or down in system firmware where drivers and initialization routines run. Techniques include API and syscall hooking, patching message queues and inter-process communication paths, altering task lists and scheduler views, filtering telemetry packets and event logs, and rewriting sensor or health values before they are recorded or downlinked. Rootkits may also hook command handlers and gateways so certain opcodes, timetags, or sources are silently accepted or ignored while external observers see normal acknowledgments. Because many missions rely on deterministic procedures and limited observability, even small alterations to reporting can make malicious actions appear as plausible mode transitions or benign anomalies. Persistence often pairs with the concealment layer, with the rootkit reinjecting companions after resets or rebuilds by monitoring for specific files, tables, or image loads and modifying them on the fly. | |
| EX-0010.04 | Bootkit | A bootkit positions itself in the pre-OS boot chain so that it executes before normal integrity checks and can shape what the system subsequently trusts. After seizing early control, the bootkit can redirect image selection, patch kernels or flight binaries in memory, adjust device trees and driver tables, or install hooks that persist across warm resets. Some variants maintain shadow copies of legitimate images and present them to basic verification routines while steering actual execution to a modified payload; others manipulate fallback logic so recovery modes load attacker-controlled code. Because the boot path initializes memory maps, buses, and authentication material, a bootkit can also influence key/counter setup and gateway configurations, creating conditions favorable to later tactics. The central characteristic is precedence: by running first, the implant defines the reality higher layers observe, ensuring that every subsequent component launches under conditions curated by the attacker. | |
| EX-0010.05 | On-Board Process Injection | Adversaries may inject malicious code into trusted onboard software processes in order to execute arbitrary functionality within the context of legitimate spacecraft software. Targeted processes may include flight software tasks, operating system services, telemetry handlers, middleware, communication daemons, scheduler services, device drivers, or other mission-critical runtime components. Process injection enables malicious code to inherit the permissions, memory access, execution context, and trust relationships associated with the compromised process. This may allow adversaries to manipulate telemetry, alter spacecraft operational behavior, suppress reporting, interfere with fault management, inject unauthorized commands, or evade detection without interrupting nominal spacecraft operations. Unlike standalone malicious binaries or scripts, injected code executes within legitimate onboard software contexts, causing malicious activity to appear operationally valid and making detection and forensic analysis significantly more difficult. | |
| ID | Name | Description | NIST Rev5 | D3FEND | ISO 27001 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CM0025 | Supplier Review | A supplier review is a structured pre-contract assessment conducted before entering into any agreement with a contractor or subcontractor for the acquisition of systems, system components, or system services. The review evaluates the prospective supplier's security posture, trustworthiness, and capability to deliver components or services that meet the mission's integrity and assurance requirements, before contractual commitments are made and before the supplier gains access to mission information or influence over mission systems. Supplier reviews reduce the risk of introducing supply chain vulnerabilities through poorly qualified, compromised, or adversary-influenced suppliers at any tier of the acquisition chain. The rigor and depth of the review should be calibrated to the criticality of the components or services being acquired, with suppliers of mission-critical hardware, software, or services subject to the most intensive assessment. Supplier review findings should inform not only the decision to contract but also the specific security requirements, oversight provisions, and flow-down obligations included in the resulting agreement. | PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-17 SA-2 SA-3 SA-8 SA-9 SR-11 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) SR-6 | D3-OAM D3-ODM | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.25 A.8.27 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22 | |
| CM0026 | Original Component Manufacturer | Hardware components that cannot be sourced directly from the original component manufacturer (OCM) or an authorized franchised distributor, and software that cannot be obtained from the original publisher, developer, or an authorized distribution channel, represent elevated supply-chain risk and must not be procured or incorporated into the mission system without documented approval from the program’s supply-chain governance authority. Sourcing hardware from the OCM or authorized franchised distributors provides greater assurance of component authenticity, traceability, and conformance to specification. Obtaining software from the original publisher, developer, or an authorized distribution channel similarly reduces the risk of unauthorized, altered, fraudulent, or malicious software. Deviations from these approved sourcing channels introduce additional supply-chain risk that must be assessed before acceptance. The approval process for non-OCM-sourced items must evaluate the specific risk posed by the alternative source, the criticality of the component or software to mission function, the availability and adequacy of compensating inspection and authentication measures, and whether a compliant source can be identified before accepting the deviation. This governance requirement applies to hardware components, firmware, and software, although the applicable sourcing and authentication methods differ. Hardware controls should address component authenticity and traceability, while software controls should address publisher or developer provenance, distribution-channel integrity, license legitimacy, and cryptographic verification where available. | AC-20(5) PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-8 SA-9 SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) | D3-OAM D3-ODM D3-AM D3-FV D3-SFV | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | |
| CM0011 | Vulnerability Scanning | Vulnerability scanning systematically identifies known security weaknesses in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and open-source software (OSS) components, including vulnerable dependencies and outdated software versions, across spacecraft and ground system environments. Custom-developed code requires separate analysis approaches, such as static and dynamic code analysis, that fall outside the scope of this countermeasure; however, COTS, OSS, and third-party dependencies incorporated into custom-developed software remain within the scope of vulnerability scanning and SCA. Scanning programs should incorporate software composition analysis (SCA) to detect vulnerabilities introduced through third-party libraries and dependency chains, which represent a significant and frequently underestimated attack surface in modern space systems. Scanning tools and processes should conform to recognized interoperability standards that support enumeration of platforms, software flaws, and configuration weaknesses; standardized formatting of checklists and test procedures; and consistent measurement of vulnerability impact. Adherence to these standards enables automation of key vulnerability management workflow steps, facilitates tool interoperability across the mission ecosystem, and produces outputs that are comparable across programs and organizations. Vulnerability scanning shall be performed against the approved as-built or deployed software baseline using methods that do not jeopardize mission operations. Active scanning of live spacecraft, safety-critical ground systems, or operational technology should occur only after the scanning method has been authorized and evaluated for operational impact. Where live scanning presents unacceptable risk, scanning should be performed against representative software images, firmware packages, or test environments that match the approved operational baseline. | CM-10(1) RA-3 RA-5 RA-5(11) RA-5(3) RA-7 SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-15(7) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(30) SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-7 | D3-AI D3-NM D3-AVE D3-NVA D3-PM D3-FBA D3-OSM D3-SFA D3-PA D3-PSA D3-PLA D3-PCSV D3-FA D3-DA D3-ID D3-HD D3-UA | 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.8.8 6.1.3 8.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.7 | |
| CM0015 | Software Source Control | Binary or machine-executable code obtained from sources that provide no warranty and no access to the corresponding source code must not be incorporated into spacecraft or ground systems. This prohibition addresses a fundamental software assurance gap: without source code, missions cannot perform source-based static analysis or independently review and modify implementation details, and may have reduced ability to assess, repair, or extend the software. Code from sources with limited or no warranty and no source code provision may be difficult to independently analyze, repair, or extend and leaves the mission dependent on supplier assurances and remediation capabilities. This countermeasure applies throughout the software supply chain, including components integrated by subcontractors. | CM-11 CM-14 CM-2 CM-4 CM-5(6) CM-7(8) SA-10(2) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(19) SA-8(29) SA-8(30) SA-8(31) SA-8(7) SA-9 SI-7 | D3-PM D3-SBV D3-EI D3-EAL D3- EDL D3-DCE | A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.19 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 | |
| CM0021 | Software Digital Signature | Each software or firmware image subject to installation or update control shall be verified using an approved digital signature and an approved trust anchor before installation or activation. The trust anchor may be represented by a certificate or by a directly provisioned verification key, depending on the approved trust architecture. Successful verification establishes that the image was signed by an authorized signing identity and has not been modified since signing; it does not establish that the signed code is non-malicious, vulnerability-free, or operationally safe. Signature verification confirms the integrity and approved origin of the software but does not, by itself, prevent installation of an older validly signed version; update authorization and rollback protections must be enforced separately. The verification mechanism must be implemented such that it cannot be bypassed through operational commands, configuration changes, or software updates, and must reject any component whose signature is absent or invalid, or whose signing certificate or trust anchor is not recognized and approved by the mission. Digital signature enforcement complements but is distinct from the boot-time chain of trust established through secure boot; it applies to software installation and update events throughout the operational lifecycle, not only at system startup. | AC-14 CM-11 CM-11(3) CM-14 CM-5(6) IA-2 SA-10(1) SA-11 SA-4(5) SA-8(29) SA-8(31) SA-9 SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(12) SI-7(15) SI-7(6) | D3-CH D3-CBAN D3-FV D3-DLIC D3-EAL D3-SBV | A.8.19 A.5.16 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 | |
| CM0023 | Configuration Management | Configuration management (CM) for space systems requires automated mechanisms to establish, maintain, validate, and report on the approved baseline configuration of spacecraft and supporting ground systems, ensuring the baseline remains current, complete, and accurate throughout the mission lifecycle. Automated mechanisms should support configuration management by improving the accuracy, currency, and validation of configuration records. Automation does not replace formal change control, engineering review, approval, or other configuration management activities that require human judgment. The approved baseline must be readily accessible to authorized personnel for operational decision-making, anomaly investigation, and change impact assessment. Deviations between the documented baseline and the actual system configuration represent both security and operational risk because undocumented changes may introduce vulnerabilities, mask adversary activity, or produce unpredictable system behavior. Automated validation should identify and report configuration drift at mission-defined intervals or following relevant change events, based on system observability and mission risk. | CM-11(3) CM-2 CM-3(4) CM-3(6) CM-3(7) CM-3(8) CM-4 CM-5 CM-5(6) MA-7 SA-10 SA-10(2) SA-10(7) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(29) SA-8(30) SA-8(31) SI-7 SR-11(2) | D3-ACH D3-CI D3-SICA D3-USICA | A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.2 A.8.4 A.8.9 A.8.19 A.8.31 A.8.3 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.9 A.8.28 A.8.30 A.8.32 A.8.29 A.8.30 | |
| CM0047 | Operating System Security | The spacecraft operating system (OS) must be subjected to software assurance scrutiny commensurate with its mission criticality and security role. Prior assurance and flight-history evidence may be reused only after its applicability to the selected OS version, configuration, target hardware, operational use, and current mission security requirements has been evaluated. The OS must be analyzed for its attack surface, and all features, services, libraries, and interfaces not required for the mission's defined operational functions must be stripped, disabled, or removed before the OS is integrated into the flight software stack. This hardening requirement is particularly significant for some real-time operating systems (RTOS), which commonly include networking stacks, file systems, shell interfaces, diagnostic services, and other general-purpose capabilities that are unnecessary for spacecraft operations but expand the exploitable attack surface available to an adversary. Only an organization-approved OS product, version, build, and configuration baseline may be used in the delivered spacecraft system. The approved baseline must be enforced through reproducible build controls, configuration management, component inventories, and automated verification where supported. | CM-11(3) CM-7 CM-7(5) CM-7(8) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-15(6) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(19) SA-8(30) SI-3(8) | D3-AVE D3-OSM D3-EHB D3-SDM D3-SFA D3-SBV D3-PA D3-SCA D3-FCA | A.8.19 A.8.19 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 | |
| CM0032 | On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention | An on-board intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS) monitors mission-critical spacecraft components and systems, generates and stores audit records, and supports mission-approved responses to detected threats. Depending on the mission architecture, threat, and availability of ground support, responses may be autonomous, ground-directed, or a combination of both. The system should address both known attack patterns and previously unseen anomalous behavior through complementary signature-based and behavior- or anomaly-based detection methods. Machine learning or adaptive technologies may be used when their performance, resource consumption, and failure behavior have been validated for the mission environment. Detection and response coverage should address applicable adversary activities across the attack lifecycle, including initial access, execution, persistence, defense evasion, and exfiltration. The on-board IDS/IPS must be integrated with the spacecraft's traditional fault management system to provide a unified approach to anomaly response, ensuring that cyber-triggered responses are compatible with fault management logic and do not produce unintended effects or fratricide against the spacecraft's own systems; countermeasures that are incompatible with fault management are considered unsafe and must not be executed autonomously. The response hierarchy must prioritize vehicle safety and continued mission operations. Advanced containment or deception responses may be considered when they can be executed without unacceptable mission risk. The system should preserve evidence that supports post-event analysis, threat characterization, and potential attribution by authorized ground support. | AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-4(7) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) | D3-FA D3-DA D3-FCR D3-FH D3-ID D3-IRA D3-HD D3-IAA D3-FHRA D3-NTA D3-PMAD D3-RTSD D3-ANAA D3-CA D3-CSPP D3-ISVA D3-PM D3-SDM D3-SFA D3-SFV D3-SICA D3-USICA D3-FBA D3-FEMC D3-FV D3-OSM D3-PFV D3-EHB D3-IDA D3-MBT D3-SBV D3-PA D3-PSMD D3-PSA D3-SEA D3-SSC D3-SCA D3-FAPA D3-IBCA D3-PCSV D3-FCA D3-PLA D3-UBA D3-RAPA D3-SDA D3-UDTA D3-UGLPA D3-ANET D3-AZET D3-JFAPA D3-LAM D3-NI D3-RRID D3-NTF D3-ITF D3-OTF D3-EI D3-EAL D3-EDL D3-HBPI D3-IOPR D3-KBPI D3-MAC D3-SCF | A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 | |
| CM0014 | Secure boot | Secure boot establishes and enforces a cryptographically verified chain of trust from a hardware-anchored root of trust (RoT) through each applicable stage of the startup sequence to the operating system or flight software image. Each stage in the chain must verify the integrity and authenticity of the next before transferring execution control. The boot policy must also prevent execution of unauthorized or revoked images, including unauthorized rollback to an older but validly signed software version. The trust anchor and initial verification function should be immutable after provisioning or protected by hardware-enforced mechanisms that prevent unauthorized modification and preserve their integrity. Components implementing the RoT must also be qualified for the expected mission radiation environment. Radiation tolerance addresses the reliability of the trust anchor, while immutability or protected update mechanisms address its resistance to unauthorized modification. This is particularly critical where radiation-induced bit flips and the physical inaccessibility of on-orbit hardware make a tamper-resistant, immutable hardware anchor essential to sustained boot integrity across the mission lifetime. | AC-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(10) SA-8(12) SA-8(13) SA-8(3) SA-8(30) SA-8(4) SC-51 SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(10) SI-7(9) | D3-PH D3-BA D3-DLIC D3-TBI | A.5.8 | |