Authorized SLE Session Establishment by Attacker (Rogue IP)

Detects an authorized SLE session established by the attacker using replayed / captured credentials, gaining control of the session. This is when attacker has valid credentials to establish the bind

STIX Pattern

[x-opencti-command-log:command = 'CLTU-BIND' AND x-opencti-command-log:user = 'authorized_user' AND network-traffic:src_ref.value != 'authorized_ip']

SPARTA TTPs

ID Name Description
IA-0004.01 Ground Station Threat actors may target the backup ground segment, standby MOC sites, alternate commercial stations, or contingency chains held in reserve. Threat actors establish presence on the backup path (operator accounts, scheduler/orchestration, modem profiles, antenna control) and then exploit moments when operations shift: planned exercises, maintenance at the primary site, weather diversions, or failover during anomalies. They may also shape conditions so traffic is re-routed, e.g., by saturating the primary’s RF front end or consuming its schedules, without revealing their involvement. Once on the backup, prepositioned procedures, macros, or configuration sets allow command injection, manipulation of pass timelines, or quiet collection of downlink telemetry.
IA-0007 Compromise Ground System Compromising the ground segment gives an adversary the most direct path to first execution against a spacecraft. Ground systems encompass operator workstations and mission control mission control software, scheduling/orchestration services, front-end processors and modems, antenna control, key-loading tools and HSMs, data gateways (SLE/CSP), identity providers, and cloud-hosted mission services. Once inside, a threat actor can prepare on-orbit updates, craft and queue valid telecommands, replay captured traffic within acceptance windows, or manipulate authentication material and counters to pass checks. The same foothold enables deep reconnaissance: enumerating mission networks and enclaves, discovering which satellites are operated from a site, mapping logical topology between MOC and stations, identifying in-band “birds” reachable from a given aperture, and learning pass plans, dictionaries, and automation hooks. From there, initial access to the spacecraft is a matter of timing and presentation, injecting commands, procedures, or update packages that align with expected operations so the first execution event appears indistinguishable from normal activity.
PER-0003 Ground System Presence The adversary maintains long-lived access by residing within mission ground infrastructure that already has end-to-end reach to the spacecraft. Persistence can exist in operator workstations and mission control software, schedulers/orchestrators, station control (antenna/mount, modem/baseband), automation scripts and procedure libraries, identity and ticketing systems, and cloud-hosted mission services. With this foothold, the actor can repeatedly queue commands, updates, or file transfers during routine passes; mirror legitimate operator behavior to blend in; and refresh their tooling as software is upgraded. Presence on the ground also supports durable reconnaissance (pass plans, dictionaries, key/counter states) and continuous staging so each window to the vehicle can be exploited without re-establishing access.