Detection of network traffic originating from an unauthorized IP address that does not match any of the known or authorized ground station IPs, potentially indicating communication with a rogue ground station. The source IPs that are permitted to speak to the spacecraft should be very limited. Rogue devices may get deployed internal to mission operations networks in an attempt to communicate to the spacecraft.
| ID | Name | Description | |
| IA-0004.01 | Ground Station | Threat actors may target the backup ground segment, standby MOC sites, alternate commercial stations, or contingency chains held in reserve. Threat actors establish presence on the backup path (operator accounts, scheduler/orchestration, modem profiles, antenna control) and then exploit moments when operations shift: planned exercises, maintenance at the primary site, weather diversions, or failover during anomalies. They may also shape conditions so traffic is re-routed, e.g., by saturating the primary’s RF front end or consuming its schedules, without revealing their involvement. Once on the backup, prepositioned procedures, macros, or configuration sets allow command injection, manipulation of pass timelines, or quiet collection of downlink telemetry. | |
| IA-0007 | Compromise Ground System | Compromising the ground segment gives an adversary the most direct path to first execution against a spacecraft. Ground systems encompass operator workstations and mission control mission control software, scheduling/orchestration services, front-end processors and modems, antenna control, key-loading tools and HSMs, data gateways (SLE/CSP), identity providers, and cloud-hosted mission services. Once inside, a threat actor can prepare on-orbit updates, craft and queue valid telecommands, replay captured traffic within acceptance windows, or manipulate authentication material and counters to pass checks. The same foothold enables deep reconnaissance: enumerating mission networks and enclaves, discovering which satellites are operated from a site, mapping logical topology between MOC and stations, identifying in-band “birds” reachable from a given aperture, and learning pass plans, dictionaries, and automation hooks. From there, initial access to the spacecraft is a matter of timing and presentation, injecting commands, procedures, or update packages that align with expected operations so the first execution event appears indistinguishable from normal activity. | |
| IA-0008 | Rogue External Entity | Adversaries obtain a foothold by interacting with the spacecraft from platforms outside the authorized ground architecture. A “rogue external entity” is any actor-controlled transmitter or node, ground, maritime, airborne, or space-based, that can radiate or exchange traffic using mission-compatible waveforms, framing, or crosslink protocols. The technique exploits the fact that many vehicles must remain commandable and discoverable over wide areas and across multiple modalities. Using public ephemerides, pass predictions, and knowledge of acquisition procedures, the actor times transmissions to line-of-sight windows, handovers, or maintenance periods. Initial access stems from presenting traffic that the spacecraft will parse or prioritize: syntactically valid telecommands, crafted ranging/acquisition exchanges, crosslink service advertisements, or payload/user-channel messages that bridge into the command/data path. | |
| IA-0008.01 | Rogue Ground Station | Adversaries may field their own ground system, transportable or fixed, to transmit and receive mission-compatible signals. A typical setup couples steerable apertures and GPS-disciplined timing with SDR/modems configured for the target’s bands, modulation/coding, framing, and beacon structure. Using pass schedules and Doppler/polarization predictions, the actor crafts over-the-air traffic that appears valid at the RF and protocol layers. | |
| EXF-0007 | Compromised Ground System | The adversary resides in mission ground infrastructure and uses its trusted position to siphon data at scale. With access to operator workstations, mission control servers, baseband/modem chains, telemetry processing pipelines, or archive databases, the attacker can mirror real-time streams, scrape recorder playbacks, export payload products, and harvest procedure logs and command histories. Because exfiltration rides normal paths, file staging areas, data distribution services, cloud relays, or cross-site links, it blends with routine dissemination. Compromise of scheduling tools and pass plans also lets the actor time captures to high-value downlinks and automate bulk extraction without touching the spacecraft. | |