D3FEND Artifacts,

ARTIFACTS

D3FEND

Top Level Artifacts

Digital Artifact

Address Space

Memory Extent

Shadow Stack

Thread

Memory Address

Page Table

Software Package

User

User Account

User Action

User Behavior

User Interface

User to User Message

Volume

Dependency

Link

Binary Large Object

Binary Segment

Blob

Block Device

Boot Loader

Call Stack

Certificate

Clipboard

Command

Credential

Cryptographic Key

Database

Decoy Artifact

Digital System

Informational References

D3FEND Techniques

Name	Description

SPARTA Countermeasures

ID	Name	Description
CM0000	Countermeasure Not Identified	This technique is a result of utilizing TTPs to create an impact and the applicable countermeasures are associated with the TTPs leveraged to achieve the impact
CM0041	User Training	Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by a threat actor to reduce the risk of successful spear phishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction. Ensure that role-based security-related training is provided to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities: (i) before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties; (ii) when required by information system changes; and (iii) at least annually if not otherwise defined.
CM0079	Maneuverability	Satellite maneuver is an operational tactic that can be used by satellites fitted with chemical thrusters to avoid kinetic and some directed energy ASAT weapons. For unguided projectiles, a satellite can be commanded to move out of their trajectory to avoid impact. If the threat is a guided projectile, like most direct-ascent ASAT and co-orbital ASAT weapons, maneuver becomes more difficult and is only likely to be effective if the satellite can move beyond the view of the onboard sensors on the guided warhead.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG
CM0080	Stealth Technology	Space systems can be operated and designed in ways that make them difficult to detect and track. Similar to platforms in other domains, stealthy satellites can use a smaller size, radar-absorbing coatings, radar-deflecting shapes, radar jamming and spoofing, unexpected or optimized maneuvers, and careful control of reflected radar, optical, and infrared energy to make themselves more difficult to detect and track. For example, academic research has shown that routine spacecraft maneuvers can be optimized to avoid detection by known sensors.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG
CM0081	Defensive Jamming and Spoofing	A jammer or spoofer can be used to disrupt sensors on an incoming kinetic ASAT weapon so that it cannot steer itself effectively in the terminal phase of flight. When used in conjunction with maneuver, this could allow a satellite to effectively “dodge” a kinetic attack. Similar systems could also be used to deceive SDA sensors by altering the reflected radar signal to change the location, velocity, and number of satellites detected, much like digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) jammers used on many military aircraft today. A spacebased jammer can also be used to disrupt an adversary’s ability to communicate.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQGate with an ASAT weapon.
CM0085	Electromagnetic Shielding	Satellite components can be vulnerable to the effects of background radiation in the space environment and deliberate attacks from HPM and electromagnetic pulse weapons. The effects can include data corruption on memory chips, processor resets, and short circuits that permanently damage components.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG
CM0087	Defensive Dazzling/Blinding	Laser systems can be used to dazzle or blind the optical or infrared sensors on an incoming ASAT weapon in the terminal phase of flight. This is similar to the laser infrared countermeasures used on aircraft to defeat heat-seeking missiles. Blinding an ASAT weapon’s guidance system and then maneuvering to a new position (if necessary) could allow a satellite to effectively “dodge” a kinetic attack. It could also be used to dazzle or blind the optical sensors on inspector satellites to prevent them from imaging a satellite that wants to keep its capabilities concealed or to frustrate adversary SDA efforts.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG
CM0088	Organizational Policy	Documenting cyber security policies is crucial for several reasons, paramount among them being the establishment of a clear, consistent framework for managing and protecting an organization's information assets. Such documentation serves as a foundational guideline that outlines the principles, procedures, and responsibilities that govern the security of information. Having well-documented security policies ensures that everyone in the organization, from the top management to the newest employee, is on the same page regarding security expectations and behaviors. It provides a reference point for all staff, helping them understand their roles and responsibilities in safeguarding sensitive data. By clearly defining what is expected, employees are better equipped to follow best practices and avoid actions that could compromise security. These policies act as a guide for implementing technical controls and security measures. They inform the selection, development, and maintenance of security tools and protocols, ensuring that there is a methodical approach to securing the organization's digital assets. In the event of a security incident, having a documented policy in place provides a roadmap for response and recovery, reducing the time and resources spent in mitigating the issue. As cybersecurity in space is an area where regulatory compliance is becoming increasingly stringent, having documented information security policies is often a legal or regulatory requirement, and not simply a best practice.
CM0089	Assessment & Authorization	The A&A process establishes the extent to which a particular design and implementation, meet a set of specified security requirements defined by the organization, government guidelines, and federal mandates into a formal authorization package.
CM0090	Continuous Monitoring	Maintaining ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk management decisions.
CM0002	COMSEC	A component of cybersecurity to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications. COMSEC includes cryptographic security, transmission security, emissions security, and physical security of COMSEC material. It is imperative to utilize secure communication protocols with strong cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of, and detect changes to, information during transmission. Systems should also maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception. Spacecraft should not employ a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled (i.e., crypto-bypass mode). The cryptographic mechanisms should identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.
CM0042	Robust Fault Management	Ensure fault management system cannot be used against the spacecraft. Examples include: safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of telemetry to cause action from ground, or some sort of proximity operation to cause spacecraft to go into safe mode. Understanding the safing procedures and ensuring they do not put the spacecraft in a more vulnerable state is key to building a resilient spacecraft.
CM0044	Cyber-safe Mode	Provide the capability to enter the spacecraft into a configuration-controlled and integrity-protected state representing a known, operational cyber-safe state (e.g., cyber-safe mode). Spacecraft should enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected. Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode, authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and software functions to pre-attack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on equipment still available after a cyber-attack. The goal is for the spacecraft to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved. Cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.
CM0057	Tamper Resistant Body	Using a tamper resistant body can increase the one-time cost of the sensor node but will allow the node to conserve the power usage when compared with other countermeasures.
CM0058	Power Randomization	Power randomization is a technique in which a hardware module is built into the chip that adds noise to the power consumption. This countermeasure is simple and easy to implement but is not energy efficient and could be impactful for size, weight, and power which is limited on spacecraft as it adds to the fabrication cost of the device.
CM0059	Power Consumption Obfuscation	Design hardware circuits or perform obfuscation in general that mask the changes in power consumption to increase the cost/difficulty of a power analysis attack. This will increase the cost of manufacturing sensor nodes.
CM0060	Secret Shares	Use of secret shares in which the original computation is divided probabilistically such that the power subset of shares is statistically independent. One of the major drawbacks of this solution is the increase in the power consumption due to the number of operations that are almost doubled.
CM0061	Power Masking	Masking is a scheme in which the intermediate variable is not dependent on an easily accessible subset of secret key. This results in making it impossible to deduce the secret key with partial information gathered through electromagnetic leakage.
CM0063	Increase Clock Cycles/Timing	Use more clock cycles such that branching does not affect the execution time. Also, the memory access times should be standardized to be the same over all accesses. If timing is not mission critical and time is in abundance, the access times can be reduced by adding sufficient delay to normalize the access times. These countermeasures will result in increased power consumption which may not be conducive for low size, weight, and power missions.
CM0064	Dual Layer Protection	Use a dual layered case with the inner layer a highly conducting surface and the outer layer made of a non-conducting material. When heat is generated from internal computing components, the inner, highly conducting surface will quickly dissipate the heat around. The outer layer prevents accesses to the temporary hot spots formed on the inner layer.