Using a tamper resistant body can increase the one-time cost of the sensor node but will allow the node to conserve the power usage when compared with other countermeasures.
|EXF-0002||Side-Channel Attack||Threat actors may use a side-channel attack attempts to gather information by measuring or exploiting indirect effects of the spacecraft. Information within the spacecraft can be extracted through these side-channels in which sensor data is analyzed in non-trivial ways to recover subtle, hidden or unexpected information. A series of measurements of a side-channel constitute an identifiable signature which can then be matched against a signature database to identify target information, without having to explicitly decode the side-channel.|
|.01||Power Analysis Attacks||Threat actors can analyze power consumption on-board the spacecraft to exfiltrate information. In power analysis attacks, the threat actor studies the power consumption of devices, especially cryptographic modules. Power analysis attacks require close proximity to a sensor node, such that a threat actor can measure the power consumption of the sensor node. There are two types of power analysis, namely simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In differential power analysis, the threat actor studies the power analysis and is able to apply mathematical and statistical principles to determine the intermediate values.|
|SV-AC-5||Proximity operations (i.e., grappling satellite)|
|SV-CF-1||Tapping of communications links (wireline, RF, network) resulting in loss of confidentiality; Traffic analysis to determine which entities are communicating with each other without being able to read the communicated information|