| SPR-236 |
The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
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The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization.
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| SPR-250 |
The [organization] shall verify that the scope of security testing/evaluation provides complete coverage of required security controls (to include abuse cases and penetration testing) at the depth of testing defined in the test documents.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,RA-5(3),SA-11(5),SA-11(7)}
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* The frequency of testing should be driven by Program completion events and updates.
* Examples of approaches are static analyses, dynamic analyses, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches
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| SPR-251 |
The [organization] shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11}
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Documented evidence provides traceability and accountability for security testing activities. Without retained artifacts, organizations cannot demonstrate due diligence or validate corrective actions. Preserved results support audits, mission reviews, and lessons learned. This strengthens governance and compliance posture.
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| SPR-252 |
The [organization] shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of all software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11,SA-11(5)}
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The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls.
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| SPR-255 |
The [organization] shall employ independent third-party analysis and penetration testing of all software (COTS, FOSS, Custom) associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6}{CA-2,CA-2(1),CA-8(1),CM-10(1),SA-9,SA-11(3),SA-12(11),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4),SR-6(1)}
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Independent assessment reduces bias and uncovers blind spots in internal reviews. External testers provide objective validation of system resilience. Independent penetration testing strengthens confidence in defensive posture. Separation of duties enhances credibility and assurance.
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| SPR-266 |
The [organization] shall determine the vulnerabilities/weaknesses that require remediation, and coordinate the timeline for that remediation, in accordance with the analysis of the vulnerability scan report, the mission assessment of risk, and mission needs.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-5,CM-3,RA-5,RA-7,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
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Not all vulnerabilities carry equal mission impact. Risk-informed prioritization ensures critical flaws are addressed first. Coordinated timelines balance mission needs with security posture. Structured remediation strengthens governance.
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| SPR-277 |
In coordination with [organization], the [organization] shall prioritize and remediate flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}
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Timely remediation reduces exploitation window. Coordination ensures mission continuity during patching. Documented prioritization demonstrates due diligence. Structured response enhances accountability.
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| SPR-282 |
The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)}
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* The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers.
* All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government.
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| SPR-286 |
The [organization] shall conduct an assessment of risk prior to each milestone review [SRR\PDR\CDR], including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the platform and the information it processes, stores, or transmits.{SV-MA-4}{RA-2,RA-3,SA-8(25)}
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Major design decisions must reflect updated threat posture. Pre-milestone risk review prevents costly redesign. Structured evaluation supports informed governance. Early risk integration enhances mission confidence.
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| SPR-376 |
The [organization] shall implement an A&A process that establishes the extent to which a particular design and implementation meet a set of specified security requirements defined by the organization, government guidelines, and federal mandates.{SV-MA-6,SV-DCO-1}{CA-2}
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Structured authorization ensures design compliance prior to deployment. Formal assessment reduces oversight gaps. Defined requirements provide measurable criteria. Governance supports mission confidence.
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| SPR-377 |
The [organization] shall conduct control assessments of the information system using independent assessors.{SV-DCO-1}{CA-2(1)}
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Independent assessors shall be individuals or entities external to the operational chain of command and not involved in the development, implementation, or operations of the system under assessment.
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| SPR-378 |
The [organization] shall establish and maintain processes to manage and oversee independent assessors, including their qualifications, roles, and responsibilities.{SV-DCO-1}{CA-2(1),CA-7(1)}
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Independent assessors shall be individuals or entities external to the operational chain of command and not involved in the development, implementation, or operations of the system under assessment.
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| SPR-379 |
The [organization] shall conduct specialized assessments that are specifically tailored for space systems or space missions more generally, as opposed to traditional terrestrial IT systems.{SV-MA-6}{CA-2(2)}
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Space missions require threat models distinct from terrestrial IT. Tailored assessments address unique operational constraints. Specialized evaluation improves relevance. Mission-specific review strengthens assurance.
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| SPR-380 |
The [organization] shall maintain an up-to-date Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) that identifies, assesses, prioritizes, and documents specific actions to be taken to correct deficiencies in the spacecraft's security posture.{SV-DCO-1}{CA-5}
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A living POA&M tracks remediation progress. Structured prioritization reduces overlooked deficiencies. Documentation ensures accountability. Transparent tracking strengthens governance.
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| SPR-381 |
The [organization] shall designate an authorizing official for the system.{SV-MA-6}{CA-6}
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These officials must be federal employees, and are responsible for reviewing the security authorization package, assessing the risks, and making the decision to authorize system operation. They shall ensure compliance with relevant organizational policies and standards and are accountable for the decision to accept the risks associated with operating the system. The authorizing officials must be empowered with the authority to oversee and enforce the implementation and maintenance of security controls in accordance with organizational requirements and applicable regulations.
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| SPR-382 |
The [organization] shall categorize the system and information it processes in accordance with FIPS 199.{SV-MA-6}{RA-2}
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Impact categorization guides control selection. Formal classification ensures proportional protection. Defined impact levels strengthen risk alignment. Compliance supports federal mandate adherence.
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