Email Removal

The email removal technique deletes email files from system storage.

ID: D3-ER

Subclasses: No subclasses

Artifacts: Email | Mail Server

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Tactic: Evict

Informational References

https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:EmailRemoval/

SPARTA Countermeasures Mapping

ID		Name	Description	NIST Rev5	D3FEND	ISO 27001
CM0017		Coding Standard	A formally defined coding standard establishes the rules, conventions, and constraints that govern how software is written across the mission's development program, directly influencing the security, maintainability, and verifiability of the delivered system. The standard must specify acceptable programming language types, with language selection driven by a documented evaluation of security requirements, application complexity, scalability needs, available development resources, schedule constraints, and the availability of security-relevant language features such as memory safety, type safety, and bounds checking. Language choices that introduce classes of vulnerability by design, such as languages without memory safety guarantees used in contexts where memory corruption is a plausible attack vector, require explicit justification and compensating controls. The coding standard must include security-relevant rules for input validation, error handling, cryptographic usage, memory management, and concurrency, as applicable to the selected languages and system design. Adherence should be evaluated through automated means where supported, supplemented by manual review for requirements that cannot be reliably automated.	PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| SA-11 \| SA-11(3) \| SA-15 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(9) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(30) \| SA-8(7) \| SI-7	D3-AI \| D3-AVE \| D3-SWI \| D3-DCE \| D3-EHPV \| D3-ORA \| D3-FEV \| D3-FR \| D3-ER \| D3-PE \| D3-PT \| D3-PS \|	A.5.8 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID		Name	Description
IA-0001		Compromise Supply Chain	Adversaries achieve first execution before the spacecraft ever flies by inserting malicious code, data, or configuration during manufacturing, integration, or delivery. Targets include software sources and dependencies, build systems and compilers, firmware/bitstreams for MCUs and FPGAs, configuration tables, test vectors, and off-the-shelf avionics. Inserted artifacts are designed to appear legitimate, propagate through normal processes, and activate under routine procedures or specific modes (e.g., safing, maintenance). Common insertion points align with where trust is assumed, vendor updates, mirrors and registries, CI/CD runners, programming stations, and “golden image” repositories. The result is pre-positioned access that blends with baseline behavior, often with delayed or conditional triggers and strong deniability.
	IA-0001.02	Software Supply Chain	Here the manipulation targets software delivered to flight or ground systems: altering source before build, swapping signed binaries at distribution edges, subverting update metadata, or using stolen signing keys to issue malicious patches. Space-specific vectors include mission control applications, schedulers, gateway services, flight tables and configuration packages, and firmware loads during I&T or LEOP. Adversaries craft payloads that pass superficial validation, trigger under particular operating modes, or reintroduce known weaknesses through version rollback. “Data payloads” such as malformed tables, ephemerides, or calibration products can double as exploits when parsers are permissive. The objective is to ride the normal promotion pipeline so the implant arrives pre-trusted and executes as part of routine operations.
IA-0007		Compromise Ground System	Compromising the ground segment gives an adversary the most direct path to first execution against a spacecraft. Ground systems encompass operator workstations and mission control mission control software, scheduling/orchestration services, front-end processors and modems, antenna control, key-loading tools and HSMs, data gateways (SLE/CSP), identity providers, and cloud-hosted mission services. Once inside, a threat actor can prepare on-orbit updates, craft and queue valid telecommands, replay captured traffic within acceptance windows, or manipulate authentication material and counters to pass checks. The same foothold enables deep reconnaissance: enumerating mission networks and enclaves, discovering which satellites are operated from a site, mapping logical topology between MOC and stations, identifying in-band “birds” reachable from a given aperture, and learning pass plans, dictionaries, and automation hooks. From there, initial access to the spacecraft is a matter of timing and presentation, injecting commands, procedures, or update packages that align with expected operations so the first execution event appears indistinguishable from normal activity.
	IA-0007.01	Compromise On-Orbit Update	Adversaries may target the pipeline that produces and transmits updates to an on-orbit vehicle. Manipulation points include source repositories and configuration tables, build and packaging steps that generate images or differential patches, staging areas on ground servers, update metadata (versions, counters, manifests), and the transmission process itself. Spacecraft updates span flight software patches, FPGA bitstreams, bootloader or device firmware loads, and operational data products such as command tables, ephemerides, and calibration files, each with distinct formats, framing, and acceptance rules. An attacker positioned in the ground system can substitute or modify an artifact, alter its timing and timetags to match pass windows, and queue it through the same procedures operators use for nominal maintenance. Activation can be immediate or deferred: implants may lie dormant until a specific mode, safing entry, or table index is referenced.
EX-0009		Exploit Code Flaws	The adversary executes actions on-board by abusing defects in software that runs on the vehicle, ranging from application logic in flight software to libraries, drivers, and supporting services. Outcomes range from arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation to silent logic manipulation (e.g., bypassing interlocks, suppressing alarms) that appears operationally plausible. The hallmark of this technique is that the attacker co-opts existing code paths, often rarely used ones, to run unintended behavior under nominal interfaces. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components.
	EX-0009.01	Flight Software	Flight software presents rich attack surface where mission-specific parsing and autonomy live. Vulnerable components include command and telemetry handlers, table loaders, file transfer services, mode management and safing logic, payload control applications, and gateway processes that bridge payload and bus protocols. Typical flaws are unchecked lengths and indices in command fields, arithmetic overflows in rate/size calculations, insufficient validation of table contents, format-string misuse in logging, incomplete state cleanup across rapid mode changes, and race conditions in concurrent message processing. Some FSW suites expose operator-facing APIs or scripting/procedure engines used for automation; malformed invocations can coerce unexpected behaviors or enable arbitrary expressions. Because many subsystems act on “last write wins,” logic errors can yield durable configuration changes without obvious anomalies in protocol syntax. Successful exploitation lets an adversary execute code, alter persistent parameters, or chain effects across partitions that would otherwise be segmented by design.
EX-0010		Malicious Code	The adversary achieves on-board effects by introducing executable logic that runs on the vehicle, either native binaries and scripts, injected shellcode, or “data payloads” that an interpreter treats as code (e.g., procedure languages, table-driven automations). Delivery commonly piggybacks on legitimate pathways: software/firmware updates, file transfer services, table loaders, maintenance consoles, or command sequences that write to executable regions. Once staged, activation can be explicit (a specific command, mode change, or file open), environmental (time/geometry triggers), or accidental, where operator actions or routine autonomy invoke the implanted logic. Malicious code can target any layer it can reach: altering flight software behavior, manipulating payload controllers, patching boot or device firmware, or installing hooks in drivers and gateways that bridge bus and payload traffic. Effects range from subtle logic changes (quiet data tampering, command filtering) to overt actions (forced mode transitions, resource starvation), and may include secondary capabilities like covert communications, key material harvesting, or persistence across resets by rewriting images or configuration entries.
	EX-0010.01	Ransomware	Ransomware on a spacecraft encrypts data or critical configuration so that nominal operations can no longer proceed without the attacker’s cooperation. Targets include mass-memory file stores (engineering telemetry, payload data), configuration and command tables, event logs, on-board ephemerides, and even intermediate buffers used by downlink pipelines. Some variants interfere with key services instead of bulk data, e.g., encrypting a command dictionary or table index so valid inputs are rejected, or wrapping the payload data path in an attacker-chosen cipher so downlinked products appear as noise. By denying access to on-board content or control artifacts at scale, attackers convert execution into bargaining power or irreversible mission degradation.
	EX-0010.02	Wiper Malware	Wipers deliberately destroy or irreversibly corrupt data and, in some cases, executable images to impair or end mission operations. Destructive routines may overwrite with patterns or pseudorandom data, repeatedly reformat volumes, trigger wear mechanisms on non-volatile memory, or manipulate low-level translation layers so recovery tools see a blank or inconsistent device. Activation can be immediate or staged, sleeping until a specific time, pass, or maintenance action, and may be paired with anti-recovery steps such as erasing checksums, undo logs, or golden images. Because wipers operate at storage and image layers that underpin many subsystems, collateral effects can cascade: autonomy enters safing without viable recovery paths, downlinks carry only noise, and subsequent updates cannot be authenticated or applied. The defining feature is irreversible loss of data or executables as the primary objective, rather than concealment or monetization.
	EX-0010.03	Rootkit	A rootkit hides the presence and activity of other malicious components by interposing on the mechanisms that report system state. On spacecraft this can occur within flight software processes, at OS kernel level, inside separation kernels/hypervisors, or down in system firmware where drivers and initialization routines run. Techniques include API and syscall hooking, patching message queues and inter-process communication paths, altering task lists and scheduler views, filtering telemetry packets and event logs, and rewriting sensor or health values before they are recorded or downlinked. Rootkits may also hook command handlers and gateways so certain opcodes, timetags, or sources are silently accepted or ignored while external observers see normal acknowledgments. Because many missions rely on deterministic procedures and limited observability, even small alterations to reporting can make malicious actions appear as plausible mode transitions or benign anomalies. Persistence often pairs with the concealment layer, with the rootkit reinjecting companions after resets or rebuilds by monitoring for specific files, tables, or image loads and modifying them on the fly.
	EX-0010.04	Bootkit	A bootkit positions itself in the pre-OS boot chain so that it executes before normal integrity checks and can shape what the system subsequently trusts. After seizing early control, the bootkit can redirect image selection, patch kernels or flight binaries in memory, adjust device trees and driver tables, or install hooks that persist across warm resets. Some variants maintain shadow copies of legitimate images and present them to basic verification routines while steering actual execution to a modified payload; others manipulate fallback logic so recovery modes load attacker-controlled code. Because the boot path initializes memory maps, buses, and authentication material, a bootkit can also influence key/counter setup and gateway configurations, creating conditions favorable to later tactics. The central characteristic is precedence: by running first, the implant defines the reality higher layers observe, ensuring that every subsequent component launches under conditions curated by the attacker.
	EX-0010.05	On-Board Process Injection	Adversaries may inject malicious code into trusted onboard software processes in order to execute arbitrary functionality within the context of legitimate spacecraft software. Targeted processes may include flight software tasks, operating system services, telemetry handlers, middleware, communication daemons, scheduler services, device drivers, or other mission-critical runtime components. Process injection enables malicious code to inherit the permissions, memory access, execution context, and trust relationships associated with the compromised process. This may allow adversaries to manipulate telemetry, alter spacecraft operational behavior, suppress reporting, interfere with fault management, inject unauthorized commands, or evade detection without interrupting nominal spacecraft operations. Unlike standalone malicious binaries or scripts, injected code executes within legitimate onboard software contexts, causing malicious activity to appear operationally valid and making detection and forensic analysis significantly more difficult.
PER-0002		Backdoor	A backdoor is a covert access path that bypasses normal authentication, authorization, or operational checks so the attacker can reenter the system on demand. Backdoors may be preexisting (undocumented service modes, maintenance accounts, debug features) or introduced by the adversary during development, integration, or on-orbit updates. Triggers range from “magic” opcodes and timetags to specific geometry/time conditions, counters, or data patterns embedded in routine traffic. The access they provide varies from expanded command sets and relaxed rate/size limits to alternate communications profiles and hidden file/parameter interfaces. Well-crafted backdoors blend with nominal behavior, appearing as ordinary operations while quietly accepting instructions that other paths would reject, thereby sustaining the attacker’s foothold across passes, resets, and operator handovers.
	PER-0002.02	Software Backdoor	Software backdoors are code paths intentionally crafted or later inserted to provide privileged functionality on cue. In flight contexts, they appear as hidden command handlers, alternate authentication checks, special user/role constructs, or procedure/script hooks that accept nonpublic inputs. They can be embedded in flight applications, separation kernels or drivers, gateway processors that translate bus/payload traffic, or update/loader utilities that handle tables and images. SDR configurations offer another avenue: non-public waveforms, subcarriers, or framing profiles that, when selected, expose a private command channel. Activation is often conditional, specific timetags, geometry, message sequences, or file names, to keep the feature dormant during routine testing and operations. Once present, the backdoor provides a repeatable way to execute commands or modify state without traversing the standard control surfaces, sustaining the adversary’s access over time.
DE-0007		Evasion via Rootkit	A rootkit hides malicious activity by interposing on reporting paths after the system has booted. In flight contexts this includes patching flight software APIs, kernel syscalls, message queues, and telemetry publishers so task lists, counters, health channels, and event severities are falsified before downlink. Command handlers can be hooked to suppress evidence of certain opcodes or sources; recorder catalogs and file listings can be rewritten on the fly; and housekeeping can be biased to show nominal temperatures, currents, or voltages while actions proceed. The defining feature is runtime concealment: the observability surfaces operators rely on are altered to present a curated, benign narrative.
DE-0008		Evasion via Bootkit	A bootkit hides activity by running first and shaping what higher layers will later observe. Positioned in boot ROM handoff or early loaders, it can select or patch images in memory, alter device trees and driver tables, seed forged counters and timestamps, and preconfigure telemetry/crypto modes so subsequent components launch into a reality curated by the attacker. Because integrity and logging mechanisms are initialized afterward, the resulting view of processes, files, and histories reflects the bootkit’s choices, allowing long-term evasion that persists across resets and mode transitions.

Space Threats Mapped

ID		Description
SV-AC-3		Compromised master keys or any encryption key
SV-CF-2		Eavesdropping (RF and proximity)
SV-IT-2		Unauthorized modification or corruption of data
SV-MA-2		Heaters and flow valves of the propulsion subsystem are controlled by electric signals so cyberattacks against these signals could cause propellant lines to freeze, lock valves, waste propellant or even put in de-orbit or unstable spinning
SV-AV-4		Attacking the scheduling table to affect tasking
SV-IT-5		Onboard control procedures (i.e., ATS/RTS) that execute a scripts/sets of commands
SV-MA-3		Attacks on critical software subsystems Attitude Determination and Control (AD&C) subsystem determines and controls the orientation of the satellite. Any cyberattack that could disrupt some portion of the control loop - sensor data, computation of control commands, and receipt of the commands would impact operations Telemetry, Tracking and Commanding (TT&C) subsystem provides interface between satellite and ground system. Computations occur within the RF portion of the TT&C subsystem, presenting cyberattack vector Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem is the brains of the satellite. It interfaces with other subsystems, the payload, and the ground. It receives, validate, decodes, and sends commands to other subsystems, and it receives, processes, formats, and routes data for both the ground and onboard computer. C&DH has the most cyber content and is likely the biggest target for cyberattack. Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) provides, stores, distributes, and controls power on the satellite. An attack on EPS could disrupt, damage, or destroy the satellite.
SV-SP-1		Exploitation of software vulnerabilities (bugs); Unsecure code, logic errors, etc. in the FSW.
SV-SP-3		Introduction of malicious software such as a virus, worm, Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDOS) agent, keylogger, rootkit, or Trojan Horse
SV-SP-6		Software reuse, COTS dependence, and standardization of onboard systems using building block approach with addition of open-source technology leads to supply chain threat
SV-SP-9		On-orbit software updates/upgrades/patches/direct memory writes. If TT&C is compromised or MOC or even the developer's environment, the risk exists to do a variation of a supply chain attack where after it is in orbit you inject malicious code
SV-AC-5		Proximity operations (i.e., grappling satellite)
SV-AC-6		Three main parts of S/C. CPU, memory, I/O interfaces with parallel and/or serial ports. These are connected via busses (i.e., 1553) and need segregated. Supply chain attack on CPU (FPGA/ASICs), supply chain attack to get malware burned into memory through the development process, and rogue RTs on 1553 bus via hosted payloads are all threats. Security or fault management being disabled by non-mission critical or payload; fault injection or MiTM into the 1553 Bus - China has developed fault injector for 1553 - this could be a hosted payload attack if payload has access to main 1553 bus; One piece of FSW affecting another. Things are not containerized from the OS or FSW perspective;
SV-AC-8		Malicious Use of hardware commands - backdoors / critical commands
SV-AV-2		Satellites base many operations on timing especially since many operations are automated. Cyberattack to disrupt timing/timers could affect the vehicle (Time Jamming / Time Spoofing)
SV-AV-3		Affect the watchdog timer onboard the satellite which could force satellite into some sort of recovery mode/protocol
SV-IT-3		Compromise boot memory
SV-IT-4		Cause bit flip on memory via single event upsets
SV-MA-8		Payload (or other component) is told to constantly sense or emit or run whatever mission it had to the point that it drained the battery constantly / operated in a loop at maximum power until the battery is depleted.
SV-SP-11		Software defined radios - SDR is also another computer, networked to other parts of the spacecraft that could be pivoted to by an attacker and infected with malicious code. Once access to an SDR is gained, the attacker could alter what the SDR thinks is correct frequencies and settings to communicate with the ground.
SV-SP-7		Software can be broken down into three levels (operating system and drivers’ layer, data handling service layer, and the application layer). Highest impact on system is likely the embedded code at the BIOS, kernel/firmware level. Attacking the on-board operating systems. Since it manages all the programs and applications on the computer, it has a critical role in the overall security of the system. Since threats may occur deliberately or due to human error, malicious programs or persons, or existing system vulnerability mitigations must be deployed to protect the OS.
SV-AV-5		Using fault management system against you. Understanding the fault response could be leveraged to get satellite in vulnerable state. Example, safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of TLM to cause action from ground, or some sort of RPO to cause S/C to go into safe mode;
SV-AV-6		Complete compromise or corruption of running state
SV-DCO-1		Not knowing that you were attacked, or attack was attempted
SV-MA-5		Not being able to recover from cyberattack
SV-AC-1		Attempting access to an access-controlled system resulting in unauthorized access
SV-AC-2		Replay of recorded authentic communications traffic at a later time with the hope that the authorized communications will provide data or some other system reaction
SV-CF-1		Tapping of communications links (wireline, RF, network) resulting in loss of confidentiality; Traffic analysis to determine which entities are communicating with each other without being able to read the communicated information
SV-CF-4		Adversary monitors for safe-mode indicators such that they know when satellite is in weakened state and then they launch attack
SV-IT-1		Communications system spoofing resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity
SV-AC-7		Weak communication protocols. Ones that don't have strong encryption within it
SV-AV-1		Communications system jamming resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity
SV-MA-7		Exploit ground system and use to maliciously to interact with the spacecraft
SV-AC-4		Masquerading as an authorized entity in order to gain access/Insider Threat
SV-AV-7		The TT&C is the lead contributor to satellite failure over the first 10 years on-orbit, around 20% of the time. The failures due to gyro are around 12% between year one and 6 on-orbit and then ramp up starting around year six and overtake the contributions of the TT&C subsystem to satellite failure. Need to ensure equipment is not counterfeit and the supply chain is sound.
SV-CF-3		Knowledge of target satellite's cyber-related design details would be crucial to inform potential attacker - so threat is leaking of design data which is often stored Unclass or on contractors’ network
SV-MA-4		Not knowing what your crown jewels are and how to protect them now and in the future.
SV-MA-6		Not planning for security on SV or designing in security from the beginning
SV-SP-10		Compromise development environment source code (applicable to development environments not covered by threat SV-SP-1, SV-SP-3, and SV-SP-4).
SV-SP-2		Testing only focuses on functional requirements and rarely considers end to end or abuse cases
SV-SP-4		General supply chain interruption or manipulation
SV-SP-5		Hardware failure (i.e., tainted hardware) {ASIC and FPGA focused}

Sample Requirements

SPARTA ID	Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
SPR-7	The [organization] shall document and design a security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that allocates the [organization]s defined safeguards to the indicated locations and layers: [Examples include: operating system abstractions and hardware mechanisms to the separate processors in the platform, internal components, and the FSW].{SV-MA-6}{CA-9,PL-7,PL-8,PL-8(1),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}	Spacecraft security cannot rely on a single control; layered defenses reduce the likelihood of catastrophic compromise. Documenting safeguard allocation across hardware, OS, firmware, and FSW ensures coverage across attack surfaces. This supports resiliency against both cyber intrusion and supply chain weaknesses. Clear documentation enables verification and independent assessment.
SPR-8	The [organization] shall ensure that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.{SV-MA-6}{CA-7(5),PL-7,PL-8(1),SA-8(19)}	Independent controls that operate in isolation may create security gaps or conflicting behaviors. Coordinated safeguards ensure that encryption, authentication, partitioning, and monitoring functions reinforce each other rather than undermine availability or safety. This reduces bypass risk and improves fault/cyber response integration. Cohesive operation is essential for resilient mission assurance.
SPR-9	The [organization] shall implement a security architecture and design that provides the required security functionality, allocates security controls among physical and logical components, and integrates individual security functions, mechanisms, and processes together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.{SV-MA-6}{PL-7,SA-2,SA-8,SA-8(1),SA-8(2),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SC-32,SC-32(1)}	Security functionality must be intentionally distributed across physical and logical components rather than bolted on post-design. A unified architecture prevents inconsistent enforcement, duplicated controls, or unprotected interfaces. Integrated design reduces attack surface and improves verification of mission-critical protections.
SPR-40	The [spacecraft] shall only use communication protocols that support encryption within the mission.{SV-AC-7,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-40(4)}	Protocols lacking encryption create unavoidable exposure. Selecting encryption-capable protocols ensures confidentiality and integrity can be enforced mission-wide. This reduces risk from protocol downgrade attacks.
SPR-75	The [organization] shall define acceptable secure communication protocols available for use within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}	The secure communication protocol should include "strong" authenticated encryption characteristics.
SPR-76	The [spacecraft] shall only use [organization]-defined communication protocols within the mission.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}	Restricting protocols prevents introduction of undocumented or insecure communication paths. Unapproved protocols may lack encryption, replay protection, or monitoring integration. Standardization reduces attack surface and simplifies validation. Controlled protocol selection strengthens supply chain and integration assurance.
SPR-87	The [spacecraft] shall be configured to provide only essential capabilities.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-1}{CM-6,CM-7,SA-8(2),SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(23),SA-8(26),SA-15(5)}	Minimizing enabled functionality reduces attack surface and complexity. Unused services create unnecessary exposure. Essential-only configuration aligns with least functionality principles. This simplifies validation and reduces exploit vectors.
SPR-229	The [organization] shall protect documentation and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-10,SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	Documentation may reveal architecture details exploitable by adversaries. Proper handling prevents leakage. Protection of CUI supports regulatory compliance. Information governance complements technical controls.
SPR-230	The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	* Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission.
SPR-233	The [organization] shall identify the applicable physical and environmental protection policies covering the development environment and spacecraft hardware. {SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5,SV-SP-10}{PE-1,PE-14,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-10(3)}	Development environments must be protected from tampering. Physical controls prevent hardware supply chain compromise. Policy clarity ensures consistent safeguards. Secure development underpins secure deployment.
SPR-234	The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific identification and authentication policies for accessing the development environment and spacecraft. {SV-SP-10,SV-AC-4}{AC-3,AC-14,IA-1,SA-3,SA-3(1)}	Strong authentication prevents unauthorized development access. Development compromise can introduce malicious code. Documented policies ensure consistent enforcement. Identity governance supports supply chain integrity.
SPR-235	The [organization] shall ensure security requirements/configurations are placed in accordance with NIST 800-171 with enhancements in 800-172 on the development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10,SV-CF-3}{AC-3,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-15}	Supply chain threats target development environments. Enhanced controls reduce risk of source code exfiltration. Compliance strengthens contractual and regulatory assurance. Development security directly impacts spacecraft integrity.
SPR-236	The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}	The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization.
SPR-237	The [organization] shall establish robust procedures and technical methods to perform testing to include adversarial testing (i.e.abuse cases) of the platform hardware and software.{SV-SP-2,SV-SP-1}{CA-8,CP-4(5),RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(2),SA-3,SA-4(3),SA-11,SA-11(1),SA-11(2),SA-11(5),SA-11(7),SA-11(8),SA-15(7)}	Abuse-case testing reveals design weaknesses before deployment. Red-teaming strengthens defensive posture. Proactive validation reduces operational risk. Testing must simulate realistic threat scenarios.
SPR-238	The [organization] shall require subcontractors developing information system components or providing information system services (as appropriate) to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}	Select the particular subcontractors, software vendors, and manufacturers based on the criticality analysis performed for the Program Protection Plan and the criticality of the components that they supply. Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
SPR-244	The [organization] shall define the secure communication protocols to be used within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7,SV-CF-1}{PL-7,RA-5(4),SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3),SC-40(4),SI-12}	Standardized secure protocols reduce interoperability risk. Alignment with federal standards ensures validated cryptography. Defined protocols prevent ad hoc insecure implementations. Governance strengthens communication assurance.
SPR-245	The [organization] shall define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity verification tools detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-6,CP-2,IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SC-16(1),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(7),SI-7(10)}	Predefined response procedures reduce reaction time. Clear escalation paths improve containment. Consistent handling prevents confusion during incidents. Preparedness strengthens resilience.
SPR-251	The [organization] shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11}	Documented evidence provides traceability and accountability for security testing activities. Without retained artifacts, organizations cannot demonstrate due diligence or validate corrective actions. Preserved results support audits, mission reviews, and lessons learned. This strengthens governance and compliance posture.
SPR-252	The [organization] shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of all software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11,SA-11(5)}	The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls.
SPR-255	The [organization] shall employ independent third-party analysis and penetration testing of all software (COTS, FOSS, Custom) associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6}{CA-2,CA-2(1),CA-8(1),CM-10(1),SA-9,SA-11(3),SA-12(11),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4),SR-6(1)}	Independent assessment reduces bias and uncovers blind spots in internal reviews. External testers provide objective validation of system resilience. Independent penetration testing strengthens confidence in defensive posture. Separation of duties enhances credibility and assurance.
SPR-272	The [organization] shall perform static binary analysis of all firmware that is utilized on the spacecraft.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-10,SA-11,SI-7(10)}	Many commercial products/parts are utilized within the system and should be analyzed for security weaknesses. Blindly accepting the firmware is free of weakness is unacceptable for high assurance missions. The intent is to not blindly accept firmware from unknown sources and assume it is secure. This is meant to apply to firmware the vendors are not developing internally. In-house developed firmware should be going through the vendor's own testing program and have high assurance it is secure. When utilizing firmware from other sources, "expecting" does not meet this requirement. Each supplier needs to provide evidence to support that claim that their firmware they are getting is genuine and secure.
SPR-275	The [organization] shall have automated means to evaluate adherence to coding standards.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15,SA-15(7),RA-5}	Manual review cannot scale across the code base; you must have a way to scale in order to confirm your coding standards are being met. The intent is for automated means to ensure code adheres to a coding standard.
SPR-277	In coordination with [organization], the [organization] shall prioritize and remediate flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}	Timely remediation reduces exploitation window. Coordination ensures mission continuity during patching. Documented prioritization demonstrates due diligence. Structured response enhances accountability.
SPR-278	The [organization] shall correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}	Flaws that impact the mission objectives should be prioritized.
SPR-279	The [organization] shall perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Program-defined depth and coverage].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}	The depth needs to include functional testing as well as negative/abuse testing.
SPR-299	The [organization] shall develop, document, and maintain under configuration control, a current baseline configuration of the spacecrafts.{SV-SP-9,SV-MA-6}{CM-2,CM-3(7),CM-4(2),CM-6,SA-8(30),SA-10}	Configuration control ensures traceability of hardware and software states. Unauthorized changes undermine security posture. Accurate baselines enable recovery and audit. Governance depends on configuration integrity.
SPR-300	The [organization] shall maintain the integrity of the mapping between the master build data (hardware drawings and software/firmware code) describing the current version of hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current version.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-9}{CM-6,SA-8(21),SA-8(30),SA-10,SA-10(3),SA-10(4),SA-10(5),SI-7(10),SR-4(4)}	Build data linkage ensures reproducibility and traceability. Tampering detection depends on accurate mapping. Integrity of master copies prevents unauthorized modification. Configuration discipline supports resilience.
SPR-301	The [organization] shall develop a security plan for the spacecraft.{SV-MA-6}{PL-2,PL-7,PM-1,SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}	A comprehensive security plan aligns controls with mission objectives. Clear articulation ensures consistent implementation. Planning integrates security into operations. Formal documentation strengthens accountability.
SPR-302	The [organization] shall document the platform's security architecture, and how it is established within and is an integrated part of the overall [organization] mission security architecture.{SV-MA-6,SV-MA-4}{PL-7,SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SA-17}	Architecture documentation provides structural clarity. Integration into enterprise mission security ensures alignment. Clear documentation reduces misinterpretation. Transparency strengthens lifecycle governance.
SPR-399	The [organization] shall define acceptable coding languages to be used by the software developer.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15}	Standardized languages reduce complexity and maintenance burden. Approved languages support secure development practices. Language governance strengthens code quality and review consistency. Reduced heterogeneity improves assurance.
SPR-400	The [organization] shall define acceptable secure coding standards for use by the software developers.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-15}	Secure coding standards mitigate common vulnerability patterns. Structured guidance reduces CWE-class weaknesses. Enforcing standards promotes predictable behavior. Governance supports sustainable security hygiene.
SPR-435	For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is not accredited, the [organization] shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by [organization]. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}	DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
SPR-436	The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}	Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
SPR-437	The [organization] shall enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-10(1),SI-3,SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-4(4)}	* The integrity verification mechanisms may include: Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites; Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery; Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure; Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses; Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing. Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites; Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery; Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure; Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses; Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
SPR-448	The [organization] shall define security requirements/configurations for development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-10}{SA-15}	Source code should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally source code would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. NIST 800-171 is insufficient when protecting highly sensitive unclassified information and more robust controls from NIST SP 800-53 and CNSSI 1253 should be employed. Greater scrutiny must be applied to all development environments.
SPR-450	The [spacecraft] shall prevent flight software and payload applications from modifying access control labels or rules and shall validate label integrity at startup and during policy updates.{SV-AC-1,SV-IT-2}{AC-3(3),AC-3(11).AC-16,SI-7}	Label integrity ensures policy decisions remain trustworthy. Preventing modification protects data classification enforcement. Validation at startup prevents persistent compromise. Policy integrity underpins MAC assurance.
SPR-479	The [organization] shall define, baseline, and maintain the purposing of the space platform and link segment, including intended objectives, authorized capabilities, prohibited functions, and operational constraints, and shall use this baseline to bound requirements, updates, and on-orbit operations.{SV-AC-8,SV-MA-6}{PM-32,PL-8}	Defining authorized and prohibited functions prevents scope creep. Clear purposing bounds updates and operational use. Governance limits misuse potential. Structured baseline supports disciplined operations.
SPR-503	The [organization] shall validate authenticity and integrity of all flight-designated hardware, firmware, and software upon receipt using program-controlled trust anchors (approved vendor list, golden hash/cert manifest){SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(3),SR-11,SI-7}	Receipt validation prevents counterfeit or tampered parts integration. Program-controlled trust anchors ensure consistency. Early detection reduces downstream risk. Intake verification strengthens SCRM posture.
SPR-504	The [organization] shall re-validate component identity (serial/lot), firmware measurements (cryptographic hashes), and certificate status immediately prior to installation, writing results to the SCRM/provenance ledger and blocking install on mismatch.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(3),SR-11,SI-7}	Installation-time validation prevents stale or revoked components. Ledger recording strengthens traceability. Blocking on mismatch prevents compromise propagation. Continuous verification enhances assurance.
SPR-505	The [spacecraft] shall cryptographically verify boot images and configurations at power-on and after any update{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-9}{SR-4(3),SI-7,CM-14}	Secure boot prevents execution of unauthorized code. Post-update verification ensures integrity continuity. Root-of-trust enforcement protects mission-critical logic. Deterministic startup strengthens resilience.
SPR-528	The [organization] shall package each flight change (software, bitstreams, configuration tables) with a signed manifest, precondition checks (mode, power/thermal, link), explicit hold/commit points, and resumable procedures across AOS/LOS; the [spacecraft] shall enforce manifest checks prior to activation.{SV-SP-9,SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(2),SI-7,SA-10}	Manifest enforcement ensures integrity prior to activation. Precondition checks prevent unsafe changes. Resumable logic supports space contact constraints. Structured packaging strengthens update security.
SPR-530	The [spacecraft] shall enable selected maintenance capabilities only within time‑bounded and mode‑bounded windows, audit enable/disable events, auto‑revert on timeout/reset, and expose enabled/disabled capability state in telemetry.{SV-AC-8,SV-AC-4}{CM-7,CM-7(2),SA-8,SA-8(14),AC-3}	Maintenance capabilities expand risk surface. Time-limited activation reduces abuse window. Telemetry exposure ensures oversight. Auto-revert strengthens containment.
SPR-531	The [spacecraft] shall enforce whitelisting for executable images and mission scripts/procedures by ID, hash, or signature, accept only artifacts produced by the mission build pipeline, and constrain interpreters/macros to sandboxed contexts with provenance checks on inputs.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{CM-7,CM-7(5),CM-7(8),SI-7}	Accepting only pipeline-produced artifacts prevents unauthorized code execution. Hash/signature validation ensures integrity. Sandbox constraints limit interpreter abuse. Provenance enforcement strengthens defense.
SPR-547	The [spacecraft] shall support chunked uploads of software/bitstreams/configuration with per‑chunk verification and commit markers, resumable across passes, with atomic activation and rollback if activation checks fail.{SV-SP-9,SV-IT-2}{SI-7,SI-7(15)}	Per-chunk verification prevents partial corruption. Atomic activation avoids inconsistent states. Rollback ensures safe recovery. Structured update logic strengthens resilience.