Payload (or other component) is told to constantly sense or emit or run whatever mission it had to the point that it drained the battery constantly / operated in a loop at maximum power until the battery is depleted.
| SPARTA ID | Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SPR-212 | The [spacecraft] shall be capable of shutting off specific subsystems or payloads to isolate malicious activity or protect the platform.{SV-MA-3,SV-AC-6,SV-SP-3,SV-MA-8}{PE-10} | Isolation limits impact of compromised components. Segmentation prevents systemic compromise. Controlled shutdown preserves overall platform health. Modular containment strengthens survivability. |
| ID | Name | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| REC-0001 | Gather Spacecraft Design Information | Threat actors seek a coherent picture of the spacecraft and its supporting ecosystem to reduce uncertainty and plan follow-on actions. Useful design information spans avionics architecture, command and data handling, comms and RF chains, power and thermal control, flight dynamics constraints, payload-to-bus interfaces, redundancy schemes, and ground segment dependencies. Artifacts often include ICDs, block diagrams, SBOMs and toolchains, test procedures, AIT travelers, change logs, and “as-built” versus “as-flown” deltas. Adversaries combine open sources (papers, patents, theses, conference slides, procurement documents, FCC/ITU filings, marketing sheets) with gray sources (leaked RFP appendices, vendor manuals, employee resumes, social posts) to infer single points of failure, unsafe modes, or poorly defended pathways between space, ground, and supply chain. The output of this activity is not merely a document set but a working mental model and, often, a lab replica that enables rehearsal, timing studies, and failure-mode exploration. | |
| REC-0001.07 | Payload | Adversaries pursue a clear picture of payload type, operating modes, command set, and data paths to and from the bus and ground. High-value details include vendor and model, operating constraints (thermal, pointing, contamination), mode transition logic, timing of calibrations, safety inhibits and interlocks, firmware/software update paths, data formatting and compression, and any crypto posture differences between payload links and the main command link. Payload ICDs often reveal addresses, message identifiers, and gateway locations where payload traffic bridges to the C&DH or data-handling networks, creating potential pivot points. Knowledge of duty cycles and scheduler entries enables timing attacks that coincide with high-power or high-rate operations to stress power/thermal margins or saturate storage and downlink. Even partial information, calibration script names, test vectors, or engineering telemetry mnemonics, can shrink the search space for reverse engineering. | |
| IA-0006 | Compromise Hosted Payload | Adversaries target hosted payloads as an alternate doorway into the host spacecraft. Hosted payloads often expose their own command sets, file services, and telemetry paths, sometimes via the host’s TT&C chain, sometimes through a parallel ground infrastructure under different operational control. Initial access arises when an attacker obtains the ability to issue payload commands, upload files, or alter memory/register state on the hosted unit. Because data and control must traverse an interface to the host bus (power, time, housekeeping, data routing, gateway processors), the payload–host boundary can also carry management functions: mode transitions, table loads, firmware updates, and cross-strapped links that appear only in maintenance or contingency modes. With knowledge of the interface specification and command dictionaries, a threat actor can activate rarely used modes, inject crafted data products, or trigger gateway behaviors that extend influence beyond the payload itself. In multi-tenant or commercial hosting arrangements, differences in keying, procedures, or scheduling between the payload operator and the bus operator provide additional opportunity for a first foothold that looks like routine payload commanding. | |
| LM-0001 | Hosted Payload | The adversary pivots through the host–payload boundary to reach additional subsystems. Hosted payloads exchange power, time, housekeeping, and data with the bus via defined gateways (e.g., SpaceWire, 1553, Ethernet) and often support file services, table loads, and command dictionaries distinct from the host’s. A foothold on the payload can be used to inject traffic through the gateway processor, request privileged services (time/ephemeris distribution, firmware loads), or ride shared backplanes where payload traffic is bridged into C&DH networks. In some designs, payload processes execute on host compute or expose maintenance modes that temporarily widen access, creating paths from the payload into attitude, power, storage, or recorder resources. The movement is transitive: compromise a co-resident unit, then traverse the trusted interface that already exists for mission operations. | |
| IMP-0001 | Deception (or Misdirection) | Measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence or information into a system to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests. Threat actors may seek to deceive mission stakeholders (or even military decision makers) for a multitude of reasons. Telemetry values could be modified, attacks could be designed to intentionally mimic another threat actor's TTPs, and even allied ground infrastructure could be compromised and used as the source of communications to the spacecraft. | |
| IMP-0002 | Disruption | Measures designed to temporarily impair the use or access to a system for a period of time. Threat actors may seek to disrupt communications from the victim spacecraft to the ground controllers or other interested parties. By disrupting communications during critical times, there is the potential impact of data being lost or critical actions not being performed. This could cause the spacecraft's purpose to be put into jeopardy depending on what communications were lost during the disruption. This behavior is different than Denial as this attack can also attempt to modify the data and messages as they are passed as a way to disrupt communications. | |
| IMP-0003 | Denial | Measures designed to temporarily eliminate the use, access, or operation of a system for a period of time, usually without physical damage to the affected system. Threat actors may seek to deny ground controllers and other interested parties access to the victim spacecraft. This would be done exhausting system resource, degrading subsystems, or blocking communications entirely. This behavior is different from Disruption as this seeks to deny communications entirely, rather than stop them for a length of time. | |
| IMP-0004 | Degradation | Measures designed to permanently impair (either partially or totally) the use of a system. Threat actors may target various subsystems or the hosted payload in such a way to rapidly increase it's degradation. This could potentially shorten the lifespan of the victim spacecraft. | |
| ID | Name | Description | NIST Rev5 | D3FEND | ISO 27001 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CM0024 | Anti-counterfeit Hardware | Develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including tamper resistance and protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware. | AC-14 AC-20(5) CM-7(9) PL-8 PL-8(1) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(11) SA-8(13) SA-8(16) SA-9 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) | D3-AI D3-SWI D3-HCI D3-FEMC D3-DLIC D3-FV | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | |
| CM0025 | Supplier Review | Conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services. | PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-17 SA-2 SA-3 SA-8 SA-9 SR-11 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) SR-6 | D3-OAM D3-ODM | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.25 A.8.27 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22 | |
| CM0028 | Tamper Protection | Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Leverage tamper proof protection where possible when shipping/receiving equipment. Anti-tamper mechanisms are also critical for protecting software from unauthorized alterations. Techniques for preventing software tampering include code obfuscation, integrity checks, runtime integrity monitoring (e.g. self-checking code, watchdog processes, etc.) and more. | AC-14 AC-25 CA-8(1) CA-8(3) CM-7(9) MA-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(11) SA-8(13) SA-8(16) SA-8(19) SA-8(31) SA-9 SC-51 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) | D3-PH D3-AH D3-RFS D3-FV | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | |
| CM0074 | Distributed Constellations | A distributed system uses a number of nodes, working together, to perform the same mission or functions as a single node. In a distributed constellation, the end user is not dependent on any single satellite but rather uses multiple satellites to derive a capability. A distributed constellation can complicate an adversary’s counterspace planning by presenting a larger number of targets that must be successfully attacked to achieve the same effects as targeting just one or two satellites in a less-distributed architecture. GPS is an example of a distributed constellation because the functioning of the system is not dependent on any single satellite or ground station; a user can use any four satellites within view to get a time and position fix.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG | CP-10(6) CP-11 CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(6) PE-21 | D3-AI D3-NNI D3-SYSM D3-DEM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSVA | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.29 A.5.29 | |
| CM0075 | Proliferated Constellations | Proliferated satellite constellations deploy a larger number of the same types of satellites to similar orbits to perform the same missions. While distribution relies on placing more satellites or payloads on orbit that work together to provide a complete capability, proliferation is simply building more systems (or maintaining more on-orbit spares) to increase the constellation size and overall capacity. Proliferation can be an expensive option if the systems being proliferated are individually expensive, although highly proliferated systems may reduce unit costs in production from the learning curve effect and economies of scale.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG | CP-10(6) CP-11 CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(6) PE-21 | D3-AI D3-NNI D3-SYSM D3-DEM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSVA | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.29 A.5.29 | |
| CM0076 | Diversified Architectures | In a diversified architecture, multiple systems contribute to the same mission using platforms and payloads that may be operating in different orbits or in different domains. For example, wideband communications to fixed and mobile users can be provided by the military’s WGS system, commercial SATCOM systems, airborne communication nodes, or terrestrial networks. The Chinese BeiDou system for positioning, navigation, and timing uses a diverse set of orbits, with satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO), highly inclined GEO, and medium Earth orbit (MEO). Diversification reduces the incentive for an adversary to attack any one of these systems because the impact on the overall mission will be muted since systems in other orbits or domains can be used to compensate for losses. Moreover, attacking space systems in diversified orbits may require different capabilities for each orbital regime, and the collateral damage from such attacks, such as orbital debris, could have a much broader impact politically and economically.* *https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210225_Harrison_Defense_Space.pdf?N2KWelzCz3hE3AaUUptSGMprDtBlBSQG | CP-11 CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(2) CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(6) | D3-AI D3-NNI D3-SYSM D3-DEM D3-SVCDM D3-SYSVA | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.8.6 A.5.29 A.5.29 | |
| CM0032 | On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention | Utilize on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems and audit/logs actions. The IDS/IPS should have the capability to respond to threats (initial access, execution, persistence, evasion, exfiltration, etc.) and it should address signature-based attacks along with dynamic never-before seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies. The IDS/IPS must integrate with traditional fault management to provide a wholistic approach to faults on-board the spacecraft. Spacecraft should select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber-attacks. These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker — with or without ground support. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system. | AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-4(7) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) | D3-FA D3-DA D3-FCR D3-FH D3-ID D3-IRA D3-HD D3-IAA D3-FHRA D3-NTA D3-PMAD D3-RTSD D3-ANAA D3-CA D3-CSPP D3-ISVA D3-PM D3-SDM D3-SFA D3-SFV D3-SICA D3-USICA D3-FBA D3-FEMC D3-FV D3-OSM D3-PFV D3-EHB D3-IDA D3-MBT D3-SBV D3-PA D3-PSMD D3-PSA D3-SEA D3-SSC D3-SCA D3-FAPA D3-IBCA D3-PCSV D3-FCA D3-PLA D3-UBA D3-RAPA D3-SDA D3-UDTA D3-UGLPA D3-ANET D3-AZET D3-JFAPA D3-LAM D3-NI D3-RRID D3-NTF D3-ITF D3-OTF D3-EI D3-EAL D3-EDL D3-HBPI D3-IOPR D3-KBPI D3-MAC D3-SCF | A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 | |
| CM0042 | Robust Fault Management | Ensure fault management system cannot be used against the spacecraft. Examples include: safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of telemetry to cause action from ground, or some sort of proximity operation to cause spacecraft to go into safe mode. Understanding the safing procedures and ensuring they do not put the spacecraft in a more vulnerable state is key to building a resilient spacecraft. | CP-2 CP-4(5) IR-3 IR-3(1) IR-3(2) PE-10 PE-11 PE-11(1) PE-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(13) SA-8(24) SA-8(26) SA-8(3) SA-8(30) SA-8(4) SC-16(2) SC-24 SC-5 SI-13 SI-13(4) SI-17 SI-4(13) SI-4(7) SI-7(5) | D3-AH D3-EHPV D3-PSEP D3-PH D3-SCP | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.7.11 A.7.11 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.16 | |
| CM0067 | Smart Contracts | Smart contracts can be used to mitigate harm when an attacker is attempting to compromise a hosted payload. Smart contracts will stipulate security protocol required across a bus and should it be violated, the violator will be barred from exchanges across the system after consensus achieved across the network. | IA-9 SI-4 SI-4(2) | D3-AM D3-PH D3-LFP D3-SCP | A.8.16 | |