Software Source Control

Binary or machine-executable code obtained from sources that provide no warranty and no access to the corresponding source code must not be incorporated into spacecraft or ground systems. This prohibition addresses a fundamental software assurance gap: without source code, missions cannot perform source-based static analysis or independently review and modify implementation details, and may have reduced ability to assess, repair, or extend the software. Code from sources with limited or no warranty and no source code provision may be difficult to independently analyze, repair, or extend and leaves the mission dependent on supplier assurances and remediation capabilities. This countermeasure applies throughout the software supply chain, including components integrated by subcontractors.

ID: CM0015

Tier: I

Ground CM

Created: 2022/10/19

Last Modified: 2026/08/06

Pre-Operations Government

Acquisition requirements should explicitly prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable software from sources that provide limited or no warranty and do not provide the corresponding source code, with the prohibition applied at all tiers of the supply chain through flow-down contract provisions. Requirements should define acceptable software source categories, distinguishing among source-available software, binary-only software backed by enforceable warranty or support obligations, and binary-only software that lacks both source availability and adequate warranty or support. Contract language should require contractors to document the provenance, source availability, and warranty or support status of applicable software components. Any exception for a component that meets the prohibition should require a documented compelling mission or operational need, assessment of the resulting risk, identification of compensating controls, and approval by the authorizing official. Evaluation criteria should assess offerors' software sourcing policies, their processes for vetting component provenance, and their ability to document and enforce source availability and warranty or support requirements across integrated software. Verification should include review of the SBOM and associated software sourcing records to confirm that components meeting the prohibition have not been incorporated without an approved exception.

Pre-Operations Developer/Supplier

Software sourcing policies must be established before development begins and enforced as a gate condition in the component selection process, ensuring that binary-only, unwarranted software is identified and rejected before it is integrated into the build environment rather than discovered during a late-stage review. Component evaluation criteria should include source code availability and warranty status as mandatory fields alongside functional and performance attributes, so that security and assurance considerations are part of the initial selection decision rather than an afterthought. Where a necessary component is available only in binary form, the mission should determine whether the supplier provides enforceable warranty, support, and security remediation obligations. If adequate supplier obligations and source code are both unavailable, the mission should select an alternative component or pursue an approved exception. Software sourcing decisions should be documented in component selection records retained as part of the program's configuration management system, providing an auditable basis for confirming compliance with this countermeasure across the full software inventory. Subcontractor and supplier agreements should flow down the binary-source prohibition and require suppliers to attest to the source availability and warranty status of all software they contribute to the mission system.

Sustainment & Maintenance Government

Operational software change management processes must apply the same source availability and warranty vetting to update packages, replacement components, and newly integrated dependencies as was applied during initial development, since the operational patch cycle is a common pathway through which non-compliant binary components enter systems that were originally clean. The SBOM should include source availability and warranty status as tracked attributes for each component, enabling rapid identification of any entry that falls outside policy during routine audits or in response to a supply chain security event. Changes to a component’s source availability or warranty and support status should trigger a compliance reassessment. If the change results in a component that lacks both adequate warranty or support and source code availability, the component should be replaced or processed through the approved exception procedure. Supplier and vendor agreements for components used in ongoing software maintenance should include provisions requiring advance notification of any change to source code availability or warranty terms that would affect compliance with this countermeasure.

Sustainment & Maintenance Developer/Supplier

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

ID		Name	Description
IA-0001		Compromise Supply Chain	Adversaries achieve first execution before the spacecraft ever flies by inserting malicious code, data, or configuration during manufacturing, integration, or delivery. Targets include software sources and dependencies, build systems and compilers, firmware/bitstreams for MCUs and FPGAs, configuration tables, test vectors, and off-the-shelf avionics. Inserted artifacts are designed to appear legitimate, propagate through normal processes, and activate under routine procedures or specific modes (e.g., safing, maintenance). Common insertion points align with where trust is assumed, vendor updates, mirrors and registries, CI/CD runners, programming stations, and “golden image” repositories. The result is pre-positioned access that blends with baseline behavior, often with delayed or conditional triggers and strong deniability.
	.02	Software Supply Chain	Here the manipulation targets software delivered to flight or ground systems: altering source before build, swapping signed binaries at distribution edges, subverting update metadata, or using stolen signing keys to issue malicious patches. Space-specific vectors include mission control applications, schedulers, gateway services, flight tables and configuration packages, and firmware loads during I&T or LEOP. Adversaries craft payloads that pass superficial validation, trigger under particular operating modes, or reintroduce known weaknesses through version rollback. “Data payloads” such as malformed tables, ephemerides, or calibration products can double as exploits when parsers are permissive. The objective is to ride the normal promotion pipeline so the implant arrives pre-trusted and executes as part of routine operations.
IA-0007		Compromise Ground System	Compromising the ground segment gives an adversary the most direct path to first execution against a spacecraft. Ground systems encompass operator workstations and mission control mission control software, scheduling/orchestration services, front-end processors and modems, antenna control, key-loading tools and HSMs, data gateways (SLE/CSP), identity providers, and cloud-hosted mission services. Once inside, a threat actor can prepare on-orbit updates, craft and queue valid telecommands, replay captured traffic within acceptance windows, or manipulate authentication material and counters to pass checks. The same foothold enables deep reconnaissance: enumerating mission networks and enclaves, discovering which satellites are operated from a site, mapping logical topology between MOC and stations, identifying in-band “birds” reachable from a given aperture, and learning pass plans, dictionaries, and automation hooks. From there, initial access to the spacecraft is a matter of timing and presentation, injecting commands, procedures, or update packages that align with expected operations so the first execution event appears indistinguishable from normal activity.
	.01	Compromise On-Orbit Update	Adversaries may target the pipeline that produces and transmits updates to an on-orbit vehicle. Manipulation points include source repositories and configuration tables, build and packaging steps that generate images or differential patches, staging areas on ground servers, update metadata (versions, counters, manifests), and the transmission process itself. Spacecraft updates span flight software patches, FPGA bitstreams, bootloader or device firmware loads, and operational data products such as command tables, ephemerides, and calibration files, each with distinct formats, framing, and acceptance rules. An attacker positioned in the ground system can substitute or modify an artifact, alter its timing and timetags to match pass windows, and queue it through the same procedures operators use for nominal maintenance. Activation can be immediate or deferred: implants may lie dormant until a specific mode, safing entry, or table index is referenced.
IA-0011		Auxiliary Device Compromise	Adversaries abuse peripherals and removable media that the spacecraft (or its support equipment) ingests during development, I&T, or on-orbit operations. Small satellites and hosted payloads frequently expose standard interfaces, USB, UART, Ethernet, SpaceWire, CAN, or mount removable storage for loading ephemerides, tables, configuration bundles, or firmware. A tainted device can masquerade as a trusted class (mass-storage, CDC/HID) or present crafted files that trigger auto-ingest workflows, file watchers, or maintenance utilities. Malware may be staged by modifying the peripheral’s firmware, seeding the images written by lab formatting tools, or swapping media during handling. Once connected, the device can deliver binaries, scripts, or malformed data products that execute under existing procedures. Because these interactions often occur during hurried timelines (checkouts, rehearsals, contingency maintenance), the initial execution blends with legitimate peripheral use while traversing a path already privileged to reach flight software or controllers.
EX-0004		Compromise Boot Memory	The attacker manipulates memory and configuration used in the earliest stages of boot so that their code runs before normal protections and integrity checks take hold. Targets include boot ROM vectors, first-stage/second-stage bootloaders, boot configuration words and strap pins, one-time-programmable (OTP) fuses, non-volatile images in flash/EEPROM, and scratch regions copied into RAM during cold start. Techniques range from replacing or patching boot images to flipping configuration bits that alter trust decisions (e.g., image selection, fallback order, watchdog behavior). Faults can be induced deliberately (timed power/clock/EM glitches) or via crafted update/write sequences that leave a partially programmed but executable state. Once resident, the modification can insert early hooks, disable or short-circuit checks, or select downgraded images; destructive variants corrupt the boot path to induce a persistent reset loop or safeing entry (a denial of service). Because boot logic initializes buses, memory maps, and handler tables, even small changes at this stage cascade, shaping how command handlers load, how keys and counters are initialized, and which peripherals are trusted for subsequent execution.
EX-0008		Time Synchronized Execution	Malicious logic is arranged to run at precise times derived from onboard clocks or distributed time sources. The trigger may be absolute or relative. Spacecraft commonly maintain multiple clocks and counters and schedule autonomous sequences against them. An attacker leverages this machinery to ensure effects occur during tactically advantageous windows. Time-based execution reduces exposure, simplifies coordination across assets, and makes reproduction difficult in lab settings that lack the same temporal context.
	.01	Absolute Time Sequences	Execution is keyed to a fixed wall-clock timestamp or epoch, independent of current vehicle state. The implant watches a trusted time source, GNSS-derived time, crosslink-distributed network time, oscillator-disciplined UTC/TAI, or mission elapsed time anchored at activation, and triggers exactly at a programmed date/time. Absolute triggering supports coordinated multi-asset actions and allows long dormancy with a precise activation moment. Variants incorporate calendar logic (e.g., “first visible pass after YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss”) or guard bands to fire only if the clock is within certain tolerances, ensuring the event occurs even with minor drift yet remains rare enough to blend with scheduled operations.
	.02	Relative Time Sequences	Execution is keyed to elapsed time since a reference event. The implant latches a start point, boot, reset, safing entry/exit, receipt of a particular telemetry/command pattern, achievement of sun-pointing, and arms a countdown or set of offsets (“N seconds after event,” “repeat every M cycles”). Relative sequences are resilient to clock discontinuities and mirror how many spacecraft schedule internal activities (e.g., after boot, run calibrations; after acquisition, start downlink). An attacker exploits this to ensure the trigger fires only within specific operational phases and to survive resets that would thwart absolute timestamps: after every reboot, wait for housekeeping steady state, then act; or, after a wheel unload completes, inject an additional command while control laws are in a known configuration.
EX-0009		Exploit Code Flaws	The adversary executes actions on-board by abusing defects in software that runs on the vehicle, ranging from application logic in flight software to libraries, drivers, and supporting services. Outcomes range from arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation to silent logic manipulation (e.g., bypassing interlocks, suppressing alarms) that appears operationally plausible. The hallmark of this technique is that the attacker co-opts existing code paths, often rarely used ones, to run unintended behavior under nominal interfaces. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components.
	.01	Flight Software	Flight software presents rich attack surface where mission-specific parsing and autonomy live. Vulnerable components include command and telemetry handlers, table loaders, file transfer services, mode management and safing logic, payload control applications, and gateway processes that bridge payload and bus protocols. Typical flaws are unchecked lengths and indices in command fields, arithmetic overflows in rate/size calculations, insufficient validation of table contents, format-string misuse in logging, incomplete state cleanup across rapid mode changes, and race conditions in concurrent message processing. Some FSW suites expose operator-facing APIs or scripting/procedure engines used for automation; malformed invocations can coerce unexpected behaviors or enable arbitrary expressions. Because many subsystems act on “last write wins,” logic errors can yield durable configuration changes without obvious anomalies in protocol syntax. Successful exploitation lets an adversary execute code, alter persistent parameters, or chain effects across partitions that would otherwise be segmented by design.
	.02	Operating System	At the OS layer, the attacker targets primitives that schedule work and mediate hardware. Modern spacecraft, particularly small satellites, increasingly rely on Linux-based operating systems (e.g., Yocto-derived distributions) rather than traditional RTOSes, significantly expanding the applicable attack surface to include techniques documented in MITRE ATT&CK for Linux - <a href='https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/' class='internal-link' target='_blank'>https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/linux/</a>. Maintenance builds may expose shells or management consoles; misconfigurations around these interfaces can provide paths to command interpreters or privileged syscalls. Linux-based flight systems inherit standard Unix/Linux vulnerabilities including kernel exploits, container escapes, privilege escalation via misconfigured sudo/capabilities, and exploitation of systemd or other init systems. Exploitation yields kernel-mode execution, arbitrary memory read/write, or control of scheduling and address spaces, letting the actor tamper with FSW processes, intercept command paths, or manipulate storage and bus drivers beneath application checks. Common Linux-specific vectors include exploiting unpatched kernel vulnerabilities, abusing misconfigurations in containerized environments, leveraging POSIX API weaknesses in flight applications, and targeting shared libraries or dynamic linkers to inject malicious code into flight processes. The technique leverages generic OS weaknesses adapted to the spacecraft's particular build, turning low-level control into mission-facing effects that appear to originate from legitimate processes. Because spacecraft Linux builds are often minimized, long-lived (limited patching), and may retain debug interfaces or permissive file permissions from ground testing, they present a unique risk profile combining embedded-system constraints with commodity OS attack techniques. Flight images frequently retain extraneous binaries and utilities (e.g., compilers, debuggers, network tools, package managers) intended for ground testing or development that are not removed before launch, providing adversaries with ready-made 'living off the land' capabilities for reconnaissance, lateral movement, and privilege escalation without needing to upload custom tooling.
EX-0010		Malicious Code	The adversary achieves on-board effects by introducing executable logic that runs on the vehicle, either native binaries and scripts, injected shellcode, or “data payloads” that an interpreter treats as code (e.g., procedure languages, table-driven automations). Delivery commonly piggybacks on legitimate pathways: software/firmware updates, file transfer services, table loaders, maintenance consoles, or command sequences that write to executable regions. Once staged, activation can be explicit (a specific command, mode change, or file open), environmental (time/geometry triggers), or accidental, where operator actions or routine autonomy invoke the implanted logic. Malicious code can target any layer it can reach: altering flight software behavior, manipulating payload controllers, patching boot or device firmware, or installing hooks in drivers and gateways that bridge bus and payload traffic. Effects range from subtle logic changes (quiet data tampering, command filtering) to overt actions (forced mode transitions, resource starvation), and may include secondary capabilities like covert communications, key material harvesting, or persistence across resets by rewriting images or configuration entries.
	.01	Ransomware	Ransomware on a spacecraft encrypts data or critical configuration so that nominal operations can no longer proceed without the attacker’s cooperation. Targets include mass-memory file stores (engineering telemetry, payload data), configuration and command tables, event logs, on-board ephemerides, and even intermediate buffers used by downlink pipelines. Some variants interfere with key services instead of bulk data, e.g., encrypting a command dictionary or table index so valid inputs are rejected, or wrapping the payload data path in an attacker-chosen cipher so downlinked products appear as noise. By denying access to on-board content or control artifacts at scale, attackers convert execution into bargaining power or irreversible mission degradation.
	.02	Wiper Malware	Wipers deliberately destroy or irreversibly corrupt data and, in some cases, executable images to impair or end mission operations. Destructive routines may overwrite with patterns or pseudorandom data, repeatedly reformat volumes, trigger wear mechanisms on non-volatile memory, or manipulate low-level translation layers so recovery tools see a blank or inconsistent device. Activation can be immediate or staged, sleeping until a specific time, pass, or maintenance action, and may be paired with anti-recovery steps such as erasing checksums, undo logs, or golden images. Because wipers operate at storage and image layers that underpin many subsystems, collateral effects can cascade: autonomy enters safing without viable recovery paths, downlinks carry only noise, and subsequent updates cannot be authenticated or applied. The defining feature is irreversible loss of data or executables as the primary objective, rather than concealment or monetization.
	.03	Rootkit	A rootkit hides the presence and activity of other malicious components by interposing on the mechanisms that report system state. On spacecraft this can occur within flight software processes, at OS kernel level, inside separation kernels/hypervisors, or down in system firmware where drivers and initialization routines run. Techniques include API and syscall hooking, patching message queues and inter-process communication paths, altering task lists and scheduler views, filtering telemetry packets and event logs, and rewriting sensor or health values before they are recorded or downlinked. Rootkits may also hook command handlers and gateways so certain opcodes, timetags, or sources are silently accepted or ignored while external observers see normal acknowledgments. Because many missions rely on deterministic procedures and limited observability, even small alterations to reporting can make malicious actions appear as plausible mode transitions or benign anomalies. Persistence often pairs with the concealment layer, with the rootkit reinjecting companions after resets or rebuilds by monitoring for specific files, tables, or image loads and modifying them on the fly.
	.04	Bootkit	A bootkit positions itself in the pre-OS boot chain so that it executes before normal integrity checks and can shape what the system subsequently trusts. After seizing early control, the bootkit can redirect image selection, patch kernels or flight binaries in memory, adjust device trees and driver tables, or install hooks that persist across warm resets. Some variants maintain shadow copies of legitimate images and present them to basic verification routines while steering actual execution to a modified payload; others manipulate fallback logic so recovery modes load attacker-controlled code. Because the boot path initializes memory maps, buses, and authentication material, a bootkit can also influence key/counter setup and gateway configurations, creating conditions favorable to later tactics. The central characteristic is precedence: by running first, the implant defines the reality higher layers observe, ensuring that every subsequent component launches under conditions curated by the attacker.
	.05	On-Board Process Injection	Adversaries may inject malicious code into trusted onboard software processes in order to execute arbitrary functionality within the context of legitimate spacecraft software. Targeted processes may include flight software tasks, operating system services, telemetry handlers, middleware, communication daemons, scheduler services, device drivers, or other mission-critical runtime components. Process injection enables malicious code to inherit the permissions, memory access, execution context, and trust relationships associated with the compromised process. This may allow adversaries to manipulate telemetry, alter spacecraft operational behavior, suppress reporting, interfere with fault management, inject unauthorized commands, or evade detection without interrupting nominal spacecraft operations. Unlike standalone malicious binaries or scripts, injected code executes within legitimate onboard software contexts, causing malicious activity to appear operationally valid and making detection and forensic analysis significantly more difficult.
PER-0001		Memory Compromise	The adversary arranges for malicious content to survive resets and mode changes by targeting memories and execution paths that initialize the system. Candidates include boot ROM handoff vectors, first/second-stage loaders, non-volatile images (flash/EEPROM), “golden” fallback partitions, configuration words/fuses, and RAM regions reconstructed at start-up from stored files or tables. Persistence may also ride auto-run mechanisms, init scripts, procedure engines, stored command sequences, or event hooks that execute on boot, safe-mode entry/exit, time triggers, or receipt of specific telemetry/commands. Variants keep the core payload only in RAM but ensure it is reloaded after every restart by patching copy-on-boot routines, altering file catalogs, or modifying table loaders so the same bytes are restored. The common thread is control of where the spacecraft looks for what to run next, so unauthorized logic is reinstated whenever the system resets or transitions modes.
PER-0002		Backdoor	A backdoor is a covert access path that bypasses normal authentication, authorization, or operational checks so the attacker can reenter the system on demand. Backdoors may be preexisting (undocumented service modes, maintenance accounts, debug features) or introduced by the adversary during development, integration, or on-orbit updates. Triggers range from “magic” opcodes and timetags to specific geometry/time conditions, counters, or data patterns embedded in routine traffic. The access they provide varies from expanded command sets and relaxed rate/size limits to alternate communications profiles and hidden file/parameter interfaces. Well-crafted backdoors blend with nominal behavior, appearing as ordinary operations while quietly accepting instructions that other paths would reject, thereby sustaining the attacker’s foothold across passes, resets, and operator handovers.
	.02	Software Backdoor	Software backdoors are code paths intentionally crafted or later inserted to provide privileged functionality on cue. In flight contexts, they appear as hidden command handlers, alternate authentication checks, special user/role constructs, or procedure/script hooks that accept nonpublic inputs. They can be embedded in flight applications, separation kernels or drivers, gateway processors that translate bus/payload traffic, or update/loader utilities that handle tables and images. SDR configurations offer another avenue: non-public waveforms, subcarriers, or framing profiles that, when selected, expose a private command channel. Activation is often conditional, specific timetags, geometry, message sequences, or file names, to keep the feature dormant during routine testing and operations. Once present, the backdoor provides a repeatable way to execute commands or modify state without traversing the standard control surfaces, sustaining the adversary’s access over time.
DE-0007		Evasion via Rootkit	A rootkit hides malicious activity by interposing on reporting paths after the system has booted. In flight contexts this includes patching flight software APIs, kernel syscalls, message queues, and telemetry publishers so task lists, counters, health channels, and event severities are falsified before downlink. Command handlers can be hooked to suppress evidence of certain opcodes or sources; recorder catalogs and file listings can be rewritten on the fly; and housekeeping can be biased to show nominal temperatures, currents, or voltages while actions proceed. The defining feature is runtime concealment: the observability surfaces operators rely on are altered to present a curated, benign narrative.
DE-0008		Evasion via Bootkit	A bootkit hides activity by running first and shaping what higher layers will later observe. Positioned in boot ROM handoff or early loaders, it can select or patch images in memory, alter device trees and driver tables, seed forged counters and timestamps, and preconfigure telemetry/crypto modes so subsequent components launch into a reality curated by the attacker. Because integrity and logging mechanisms are initialized afterward, the resulting view of processes, files, and histories reflects the bootkit’s choices, allowing long-term evasion that persists across resets and mode transitions.

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

ID	Description
SV-IT-2	Unauthorized modification or corruption of data
SV-MA-3	Attacks on critical software subsystems Attitude Determination and Control (AD&C) subsystem determines and controls the orientation of the satellite. Any cyberattack that could disrupt some portion of the control loop - sensor data, computation of control commands, and receipt of the commands would impact operations Telemetry, Tracking and Commanding (TT&C) subsystem provides interface between satellite and ground system. Computations occur within the RF portion of the TT&C subsystem, presenting cyberattack vector Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem is the brains of the satellite. It interfaces with other subsystems, the payload, and the ground. It receives, validate, decodes, and sends commands to other subsystems, and it receives, processes, formats, and routes data for both the ground and onboard computer. C&DH has the most cyber content and is likely the biggest target for cyberattack. Electrical Power Subsystem (EPS) provides, stores, distributes, and controls power on the satellite. An attack on EPS could disrupt, damage, or destroy the satellite.
SV-SP-1	Exploitation of software vulnerabilities (bugs); Unsecure code, logic errors, etc. in the FSW.
SV-SP-3	Introduction of malicious software such as a virus, worm, Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDOS) agent, keylogger, rootkit, or Trojan Horse
SV-SP-6	Software reuse, COTS dependence, and standardization of onboard systems using building block approach with addition of open-source technology leads to supply chain threat
SV-SP-9	On-orbit software updates/upgrades/patches/direct memory writes. If TT&C is compromised or MOC or even the developer's environment, the risk exists to do a variation of a supply chain attack where after it is in orbit you inject malicious code
SV-IT-3	Compromise boot memory
SV-SP-7	Software can be broken down into three levels (operating system and drivers’ layer, data handling service layer, and the application layer). Highest impact on system is likely the embedded code at the BIOS, kernel/firmware level. Attacking the on-board operating systems. Since it manages all the programs and applications on the computer, it has a critical role in the overall security of the system. Since threats may occur deliberately or due to human error, malicious programs or persons, or existing system vulnerability mitigations must be deployed to protect the OS.
SV-SP-10	Compromise development environment source code (applicable to development environments not covered by threat SV-SP-1, SV-SP-3, and SV-SP-4).
SV-SP-4	General supply chain interruption or manipulation

Sample Requirements

SPARTA ID	Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
SPR-3	The [spacecraft] shall enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the platform and between interconnected systems so that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted. Flow control shall be implemented in conjunction with protected processing domains, security‑policy filters with fully enumerated formats, and a default‑deny communications baseline.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(2),AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-3,CA-3(6),CA-3(7),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}	Spacecraft operate in constrained and deterministic environments where uncontrolled data flows can enable data exfiltration, cross-domain leakage, or lateral movement between subsystems. Enforcing approved authorizations with enumerated formats and a default-deny posture ensures only explicitly permitted communications occur. Encryption enforcement at platform boundaries prevents unauthorized disclosure of telemetry or state information.
SPR-4	The [spacecraft] security implementation shall ensure that information should not be allowed to flow between partitioned applications unless explicitly permitted by the system.{SV-AC-6,SV-MA-3,SV-SP-7}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4,AC-4(6),AC-4(21),CA-9,IA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(29),SC-16,SC-32}	Strict partitioning prevents compromise of one application from cascading into mission-critical subsystems. Many spacecraft attacks exploit flat architectures where subsystems implicitly trust one another. Explicit inter-partition authorization limits lateral movement and privilege escalation. This supports containment and fault isolation under both cyber and fault conditions.
SPR-7	The [organization] shall document and design a security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that allocates the [organization]s defined safeguards to the indicated locations and layers: [Examples include: operating system abstractions and hardware mechanisms to the separate processors in the platform, internal components, and the FSW].{SV-MA-6}{CA-9,PL-7,PL-8,PL-8(1),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}	Spacecraft security cannot rely on a single control; layered defenses reduce the likelihood of catastrophic compromise. Documenting safeguard allocation across hardware, OS, firmware, and FSW ensures coverage across attack surfaces. This supports resiliency against both cyber intrusion and supply chain weaknesses. Clear documentation enables verification and independent assessment.
SPR-8	The [organization] shall ensure that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.{SV-MA-6}{CA-7(5),PL-7,PL-8(1),SA-8(19)}	Independent controls that operate in isolation may create security gaps or conflicting behaviors. Coordinated safeguards ensure that encryption, authentication, partitioning, and monitoring functions reinforce each other rather than undermine availability or safety. This reduces bypass risk and improves fault/cyber response integration. Cohesive operation is essential for resilient mission assurance.
SPR-9	The [organization] shall implement a security architecture and design that provides the required security functionality, allocates security controls among physical and logical components, and integrates individual security functions, mechanisms, and processes together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.{SV-MA-6}{PL-7,SA-2,SA-8,SA-8(1),SA-8(2),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SC-32,SC-32(1)}	Security functionality must be intentionally distributed across physical and logical components rather than bolted on post-design. A unified architecture prevents inconsistent enforcement, duplicated controls, or unprotected interfaces. Integrated design reduces attack surface and improves verification of mission-critical protections.
SPR-10	The [spacecraft] shall protect authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),IA-5,IA-5(6),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-28(3)}	Authenticators (keys, tokens, counters, certificates) are primary targets for persistent access attacks. Disclosure or modification enables command spoofing, replay, and privilege escalation. Protecting authenticator content preserves command integrity and prevents adversaries from maintaining covert control. Integrity protections must apply both at rest and in use.
SPR-11	The [spacecraft] encryption key handling shall be handled outside of the onboard software and protected using cryptography.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(1),SC-28(3)}	Key management separated from modifiable flight software reduces exposure to software compromise. If keys are accessible to onboard applications, malicious code could extract or misuse them. Hardware-anchored or externally managed key handling reduces persistence risk. This supports trust-chain assurance and mitigates firmware-level compromise.
SPR-12	The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that the onboard software is not able to access the information for key readout.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}	Even privileged software must not be able to retrieve plaintext keys. Preventing readout mitigates malware harvesting and insider misuse. Key usage should be mediated through cryptographic modules rather than direct exposure. This enforces least privilege at the cryptographic boundary.
SPR-13	The [spacecraft] encryption keys shall be restricted so that they cannot be read via any telecommands.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-3}{AC-17(6),CM-3(6),SA-8(19),SA-9(6),SC-8(1),SC-12,SC-28(3)}	Telecommand paths are high-value targets for adversarial exploitation. Allowing keys to be retrieved via command interfaces creates a catastrophic failure mode. This constraint prevents exfiltration even under partial compromise of command processing logic. It ensures encryption protections cannot be remotely dismantled.
SPR-14	The [spacecraft] shall authenticate the ground station (and all commands) and other spacecraft before establishing remote connections using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2}{AC-3,AC-17,AC-17(2),AC-17(10),AC-18(1),AC-20,IA-3(1),IA-4,IA-4(9),IA-7,IA-9,SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SA-9(2),SC-7(11),SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-23(3),SI-3(9)}	Authorization can include embedding opcodes in command strings, using trusted authentication protocols, identifying proper link characteristics such as emitter location, expected range of receive power, expected modulation, data rates, communication protocols, beamwidth, etc.; and tracking command counter increments against expected values.
SPR-15	The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{AC-3,AC-20,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-23(3),SC-40(3),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}	Adversaries may attempt imitative RF signals to inject commands or manipulate spacecraft behavior. Signal parameter validation (modulation, power, timing, waveform characteristics) strengthens command authentication beyond cryptographic validation alone. This helps mitigate spoofing, replay, and rogue emitter attacks. RF-layer validation complements cryptographic controls.
SPR-16	The [spacecraft] shall ensure that processes reusing a shared system resource (e.g., registers, main memory, secondary storage) do not have access to information (including encrypted representations of information) previously stored in that resource after formal release, by clearing or zeroizing the resource prior to reuse.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(19),SC-4,SI-3}	Residual data in memory or registers can create covert channels or leakage paths between partitions. Zeroization prevents recovery of sensitive data by subsequent processes. This mitigates cross-domain leakage and memory scraping attacks. Clearing encrypted remnants is equally important to prevent cryptanalytic exploitation.
SPR-17	The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of all information at rest using cryptography.{SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-AC-3}{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-28,SC-28(1),SI-7(6)}	* The intent as written is for all transmitted traffic to be protected. This includes internal to internal communications and especially outside of the boundary.
SPR-18	The [spacecraft] shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission, transmission, and reception, in accordance with the [organization]‑provided encryption matrix.{SV-AC-7}{AC-3,SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-16,SC-16(1),SC-40}	* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
SPR-19	The [spacecraft] shall encrypt all telemetry on downlink regardless of operating mode to protect current state of spacecraft.{SV-CF-4}{AC-3(10),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-13}	Telemetry exposes real-time spacecraft state and configuration. Unencrypted telemetry can reveal vulnerabilities, operational status, or targeting information. Enforcing encryption across all modes prevents intelligence collection and mission state inference. This mitigates passive RF interception threats.
SPR-20	The [spacecraft] shall prevent use of a mode of operations where cryptography on the TT&C link can be disabled; encryption and authentication shall remain enabled even when automated access control mechanisms are overridden.{SV-AC-1,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{AC-3(10),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40,SC-40(4)}	Emergency or override modes often become attack vectors if protections are weakened. Cryptography must remain enforced even during safe-mode or degraded operations. Removing encryption capability creates a single-point catastrophic exposure. Persistent protection ensures no operational shortcut undermines mission assurance.
SPR-21	The [spacecraft], when transferring information between different security domains, shall implement security‑policy filters that require fully enumerated formats that restrict data structure and content.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),AC-4(14),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-16,SI-10}	Fully enumerated formats prevent injection of malformed or malicious data across security domains. This reduces parser exploitation, data smuggling, and covert channel abuse. Strict domain filtering supports deterministic and auditable inter-domain communication. Only explicitly defined data structures should be permitted.
SPR-22	The [spacecraft] shall implement boundary protections to separate bus, communications, and payload components supporting their respective functions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),CA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(14),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-2(2),SC-7(13),SC-7(21),SC-7(29),SC-16(3),SC-32,SI-3,SI-4(13),SI-4(25)}	Flat architectures allow compromise of one subsystem to impact all others. Segregated boundaries reduce lateral movement and mission degradation. Isolation ensures payload compromise does not impact TT&C or bus control. This supports containment and survivability.
SPR-23	The [spacecraft] shall isolate mission critical functionality from non-mission critical functionality.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),CA-9,SA-8(3),SA-8(19),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-3,SC-3(4),SC-7(13),SC-7(29),SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3,SI-7(10),SI-7(12)}	Non-critical functions often expand attack surface. Isolation prevents less-trusted components from affecting propulsion, attitude control, or power systems. This reduces cascading failure risk under compromise. Mission-critical systems must maintain operational continuity.
SPR-24	The [spacecraft] data within partitioned applications shall not be read or modified by other applications/partitions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(3),AC-3(4),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4,SC-6,SC-32}	Application partitions must enforce strict read/write controls to prevent unauthorized state modification. Without this control, malicious code can alter mission parameters or falsify telemetry. Isolation protects integrity of subsystem data and prevents corruption propagation.
SPR-25	The [spacecraft] shall prevent unauthorized access to system resources by employing an efficient capability based object model that supports both confinement and revocation of these capabilities when the platform security deems it necessary.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3(8),IA-4(9),PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4,SC-16,SC-32,SI-3}	Capability models restrict access to explicit, revocable tokens of authority. This enforces least privilege and supports dynamic revocation under threat conditions. Confinement reduces damage radius of compromised processes. Revocation capability enables adaptive cyber response.
SPR-26	The [spacecraft] shall use protected processing domains to enforce the policy that information does not leave the platform boundary unless it is encrypted as a basis for flow‑control decisions and shall enumerate permitted inter‑domain flows and enforce domain‑gate checks on any domain switch. {SV-AC-6}{AC-4(2),IA-9,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3)}	Domain gates provide controlled transition points between security domains. Enumerated flows prevent unintentional data leakage and enforce encryption policies at boundaries. This mitigates cross-domain injection and exfiltration. Strong gate enforcement prevents privilege escalation during context switching.
SPR-27	The [spacecraft] shall define the security functions and security-relevant information for which the system must protect from unauthorized access.{SV-MA-4,SV-MA-6}{AC-6(1),SA-8(19),SC-7(13),SC-16}	Clearly identifying security-relevant functions ensures protections are applied to the correct assets. Undefined security boundaries create ambiguity and inconsistent enforcement. Explicit definition supports verification, testing, and threat modeling. This forms the basis for risk-informed control allocation.
SPR-28	The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability to enter the platform into a known good, operational cyber-safe mode from a tamper-resistant, configuration-controlled (“gold”) image that is authenticated as coming from an acceptable supplier, and has its integrity verified. The [spacecraft] shall refresh only from cryptographically authenticated [organization]-approved sources.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4(3),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-13,SI-17}	Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and SW functions to preattack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on available equipment still available after a cyberattack. The goal is for the vehicle to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved.
SPR-29	The [spacecraft] shall enter cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-17}
SPR-30	The [spacecraft] shall fail to a known secure state for failures during initialization, and aborts preserving information necessary to return to operations in failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-13,SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-24,SI-13,SI-17}
SPR-31	The [spacecraft] shall fail securely to a secondary device in the event of an operational failure of a primary boundary protection device (i.e., crypto solution).{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{CP-13,SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SC-7(18),SI-13,SI-13(4)}	If a primary boundary protection device fails, the spacecraft must not revert to insecure operation. Secure failover ensures continuity of confidentiality and integrity protections. This prevents adversaries from inducing failure states to bypass encryption. Redundancy strengthens mission resilience.
SPR-32	The [spacecraft] shall provide or support the capability for recovery and reconstitution to a known state after a disruption, compromise, or failure.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-4(4),CP-10,CP-10(4),CP-10(6),CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24)}
SPR-33	The [spacecraft] shall utilize TRANSEC. TRANSEC shall be implemented and verified as a distinct layer in coordination with Traffic Flow Security and RF anti‑fingerprinting.{SV-AV-1}{CP-8,RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-8(4),SC-16,SC-16(1),SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SC-40,SC-40(4)}	Transmission Security (TRANSEC) is used to ensure the availability of transmissions and limit intelligence collection from the transmissions. TRANSEC is secured through burst encoding, frequency hopping, or spread spectrum methods where the required pseudorandom sequence generation is controlled by a cryptographic algorithm and key. Such keys are known as transmission security keys (TSK). The objectives of transmission security are low probability of interception (LPI), low probability of detection (LPD), and antijam which means resistance to jamming (EPM or ECCM).
SPR-34	The [spacecraft] shall recover to a known cyber-safe state when an anomaly is detected.{IR-4,IR-4(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-10(6),SI-13,SI-17}
SPR-35	The [spacecraft] shall perform an orderly, controlled system shut-down to a known cyber-safe state upon receipt of a termination command or condition.{PE-11,PE-11(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SA-8(24),SI-17}
SPR-36	The [spacecraft] shall operate securely in off-nominal power conditions, including loss of power and spurious power transients.{SV-AV-6,SV-MA-2}{PE-11,PE-11(1),SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SI-13,SI-17}	Power anomalies may induce undefined states exploitable by attackers. Cryptographic and security mechanisms must not degrade into insecure configurations during brownout or transient conditions. This mitigates fault-induced bypass attacks. Resilient operation preserves trust chain continuity.
SPR-37	The [spacecraft] shall protect system components, associated data communications, and communication buses in accordance with: (i) national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures, and (ii) the security category or sensitivity of the transmitted information, and shall demonstrate compliance via pre‑launch TEMPEST‑like evaluation for co‑located payload configurations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-14,PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1)}	The measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements. The concerns addressed by this control during operation are emanations leakage between multiple payloads within a single space platform, and between payloads and the bus.
SPR-38	The [spacecraft] shall be designed so that it protects itself from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations.{SV-CF-2,SV-MA-2}{PE-19,PE-19(1),RA-5(4),SA-8(19)}	This requirement applies if system components are being designed to address EMSEC and the measures taken to protect against compromising emanations must be in accordance with DODD S-5200.19, or superseding requirements.
SPR-39	The [spacecraft] shall prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.{SV-AC-6}{PM-32,SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-4}	Shared buses, memory, or peripherals can become covert channels. Controls must prevent unintended information propagation across shared infrastructure. This mitigates cross-partition leakage and data exfiltration. Shared resources must not undermine domain isolation.
SPR-40	The [spacecraft] shall only use communication protocols that support encryption within the mission.{SV-AC-7,SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2}{SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-40(4)}	Protocols lacking encryption create unavoidable exposure. Selecting encryption-capable protocols ensures confidentiality and integrity can be enforced mission-wide. This reduces risk from protocol downgrade attacks.
SPR-41	The [spacecraft] shall maintain a separate execution domain for each executing process.{SV-AC-6}{SA-8(14),SA-8(19),SC-2(2),SC-7(21),SC-39,SI-3}	Process isolation prevents one compromised task from impacting others. Separate execution domains mitigate memory corruption and privilege escalation. This strengthens containment of malicious code. Deterministic isolation enhances both safety and cybersecurity.
SPR-42	The [spacecraft] flight software shall not be able to tamper with the security policy or its enforcement mechanisms.{SV-AC-6}{SA-8(16),SA-8(19),SC-3,SC-7(13)}	Security enforcement must be independent of mission application logic. If FSW can alter policy, adversaries can disable protections post-compromise. This control preserves integrity of access controls and monitoring functions. Separation of enforcement from application reduces systemic risk.
SPR-43	The [spacecraft] shall initialize the platform to a known safe state.{SA-8(19),SA-8(23),SA-8(24),SI-17}
SPR-44	The [spacecraft] shall maintain the confidentiality and integrity of information during preparation for transmission and during reception in accordance with [organization] provided encryption matrix.{SV-CF-1,SV-CF-2,SV-IT-2}{SA-8(19),SC-8,SC-8(1),SC-8(2),SC-8(3)}	* Preparation for transmission and during reception includes the aggregation, packing, and transformation options performed prior to transmission and the undoing of those operations that occur upon receipt.
SPR-45	The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms that achieve protection against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference; verification evidence for EMI/EPM shall be distinct from EMSEC/TEMPEST, anti‑jam/anti‑spoof protections, and EMP/HANE hardness.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-40,SC-40(1)}	Intentional electromagnetic interference may attempt to induce predictable faults or bypass protections. Cryptographic resilience ensures corrupted transmissions are rejected. Verification must distinguish EMI/EPM resilience from TEMPEST and anti-jam protections. This ensures integrity under hostile RF environments.
SPR-54	The [spacecraft] shall retain the capability to update/upgrade operating systems while on-orbit.{SV-SP-7}{SA-4(5),SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3}	The operating system updates should be performed using multi-factor authorization and should only be performed when risk of compromise/exploitation of identified vulnerability outweighs the risk of not performing the update.
SPR-75	The [organization] shall define acceptable secure communication protocols available for use within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}	The secure communication protocol should include "strong" authenticated encryption characteristics.
SPR-76	The [spacecraft] shall only use [organization]-defined communication protocols within the mission.{SV-AC-7}{SA-4(9)}	Restricting protocols prevents introduction of undocumented or insecure communication paths. Unapproved protocols may lack encryption, replay protection, or monitoring integration. Standardization reduces attack surface and simplifies validation. Controlled protocol selection strengthens supply chain and integration assurance.
SPR-77	The [spacecraft] shall employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses processes which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with system functions.{SV-AC-6}{AC-3,AC-6,AC-6(9),CA-9,CM-5,CM-5(5),CM-5(6),SA-8(2),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(14),SA-8(23),SA-17(7),SC-2,SC-7(29),SC-32,SC-32(1),SI-3}	Least privilege limits damage from compromised processes or insider misuse. Processes receive only the minimum access necessary for assigned functions. This reduces lateral movement and privilege escalation pathways. In deterministic spacecraft systems, privilege boundaries must be tightly defined and enforced.
SPR-80	The [spacecraft] shall execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates uploaded are exactly as specified by the gold copies. {SV-SP-9,SV-IT-3,SV-SP-3}{CM-3(5),SA-8(8),SA-8(21),SA-8(31),SA-10(3),SA-10(4),SA-10(6),SI-7(10),SI-7(12)}	Ensuring updates match approved gold copies prevents insertion of malicious or altered firmware/software. Compromise during update processes is a high-impact attack vector. Validation protects the trusted computing baseline. This supports recovery and reconstitution integrity.
SPR-87	The [spacecraft] shall be configured to provide only essential capabilities.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-1}{CM-6,CM-7,SA-8(2),SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(23),SA-8(26),SA-15(5)}	Minimizing enabled functionality reduces attack surface and complexity. Unused services create unnecessary exposure. Essential-only configuration aligns with least functionality principles. This simplifies validation and reduces exploit vectors.
SPR-91	The [spacecraft] shall prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-9}{CM-3,CM-3(8),CM-5,CM-5(3),CM-14,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3,SI-7(12),SI-7(15)}	Requiring digital signature verification before installing flight software prevents unauthorized, malicious, or tampered code from being introduced into the spacecraft environment. Software supply chain compromise is a high-impact attack vector that can result in persistent control or loss of mission. Cryptographic validation ensures only approved and trusted binaries are executed. This maintains integrity of the trusted computing baseline.
SPR-93	The [spacecraft] shall require multi‑factor authorization for: (a) all spacecraft operating system and application updates; (b) updates to task‑scheduling functionality; and (c) creation or update of onboard stored command sequences.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{AC-3(2),CM-3(8),CM-5,IA-2,PM-12,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SI-3(8),SI-7(12),SI-10(6)}	The intent is for multiple checks to be performed prior to executing these SV SW updates. One action is mere act of uploading the SW to the spacecraft. Another action could be check of digital signature (ideal but not explicitly required) or hash or CRC or a checksum. Crypto boxes provide another level of authentication for all commands, including SW updates but ideally there is another factor outside of crypto to protect against FSW updates. Multi-factor authorization could be the "two-man rule" where procedures are in place to prevent a successful attack by a single actor (note: development activities that are subsequently subject to review or verification activities may already require collaborating attackers such that a "two-man rule" is not appropriate).
SPR-153	The [spacecraft] operating system, if COTS or FOSS, shall be selected from a [organization]-defined acceptance list.{SV-SP-7}{CM-7(8),CM-7(5)}	Selecting OS from approved list reduces exposure to unvetted vulnerabilities. Controlled selection supports maintainability and patch governance. This mitigates risk from insecure or unsupported platforms. Trusted baselines simplify compliance verification.
SPR-229	The [organization] shall protect documentation and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-10,SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	Documentation may reveal architecture details exploitable by adversaries. Proper handling prevents leakage. Protection of CUI supports regulatory compliance. Information governance complements technical controls.
SPR-230	The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	* Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission.
SPR-233	The [organization] shall identify the applicable physical and environmental protection policies covering the development environment and spacecraft hardware. {SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5,SV-SP-10}{PE-1,PE-14,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-10(3)}	Development environments must be protected from tampering. Physical controls prevent hardware supply chain compromise. Policy clarity ensures consistent safeguards. Secure development underpins secure deployment.
SPR-234	The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific identification and authentication policies for accessing the development environment and spacecraft. {SV-SP-10,SV-AC-4}{AC-3,AC-14,IA-1,SA-3,SA-3(1)}	Strong authentication prevents unauthorized development access. Development compromise can introduce malicious code. Documented policies ensure consistent enforcement. Identity governance supports supply chain integrity.
SPR-235	The [organization] shall ensure security requirements/configurations are placed in accordance with NIST 800-171 with enhancements in 800-172 on the development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10,SV-CF-3}{AC-3,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-15}	Supply chain threats target development environments. Enhanced controls reduce risk of source code exfiltration. Compliance strengthens contractual and regulatory assurance. Development security directly impacts spacecraft integrity.
SPR-236	The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}	The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization.
SPR-237	The [organization] shall establish robust procedures and technical methods to perform testing to include adversarial testing (i.e.abuse cases) of the platform hardware and software.{SV-SP-2,SV-SP-1}{CA-8,CP-4(5),RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(2),SA-3,SA-4(3),SA-11,SA-11(1),SA-11(2),SA-11(5),SA-11(7),SA-11(8),SA-15(7)}	Abuse-case testing reveals design weaknesses before deployment. Red-teaming strengthens defensive posture. Proactive validation reduces operational risk. Testing must simulate realistic threat scenarios.
SPR-238	The [organization] shall require subcontractors developing information system components or providing information system services (as appropriate) to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}	Select the particular subcontractors, software vendors, and manufacturers based on the criticality analysis performed for the Program Protection Plan and the criticality of the components that they supply. Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
SPR-244	The [organization] shall define the secure communication protocols to be used within the mission in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-AC-7,SV-CF-1}{PL-7,RA-5(4),SA-4(9),SA-8(18),SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-16(3),SC-40(4),SI-12}	Standardized secure protocols reduce interoperability risk. Alignment with federal standards ensures validated cryptography. Defined protocols prevent ad hoc insecure implementations. Governance strengthens communication assurance.
SPR-245	The [organization] shall define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity verification tools detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-6,CP-2,IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SC-16(1),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(7),SI-7(10)}	Predefined response procedures reduce reaction time. Clear escalation paths improve containment. Consistent handling prevents confusion during incidents. Preparedness strengthens resilience.
SPR-251	The [organization] shall maintain evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11}	Documented evidence provides traceability and accountability for security testing activities. Without retained artifacts, organizations cannot demonstrate due diligence or validate corrective actions. Preserved results support audits, mission reviews, and lessons learned. This strengthens governance and compliance posture.
SPR-252	The [organization] shall create and implement a security assessment plan that includes: (1) The types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of all software and firmware components; (2) The degree of rigor to be applied to include abuse cases and/or penetration testing; and (3) The types of artifacts produced during those processes.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-8,SA-11,SA-11(5)}	The security assessment plan should include evaluation of mission objectives in relation to the security of the mission. Assessments should not only be control based but also functional based to ensure mission is resilient against failures of controls.
SPR-255	The [organization] shall employ independent third-party analysis and penetration testing of all software (COTS, FOSS, Custom) associated with the system, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6}{CA-2,CA-2(1),CA-8(1),CM-10(1),SA-9,SA-11(3),SA-12(11),SI-3,SI-3(10),SR-4(4),SR-6(1)}	Independent assessment reduces bias and uncovers blind spots in internal reviews. External testers provide objective validation of system resilience. Independent penetration testing strengthens confidence in defensive posture. Separation of duties enhances credibility and assurance.
SPR-256	The [organization] shall perform penetration testing/analysis: (1) On potential system elements before accepting the system; (2) As a realistic simulation of the active adversary’s known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) Throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CA-8(1),SA-9,SA-11(5),SR-5(2)}	Penetration testing should be performed throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes including: (1) Hardware, software, and firmware development processes; (2) Shipping/handling procedures; (3) Personnel and physical security programs; (4) Configuration management tools/measures to maintain provenance; and (5) Any other programs, processes, or procedures associated with the production/distribution of supply chain elements.
SPR-257	The [organization] shall analyze changes to the spacecraft to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation.{SV-MA-6,SV-SP-9}{CM-4,CM-3,CM-3(2),CM-3(7),CM-4(2),SA-10}	Changes to spacecraft configuration may introduce unintended vulnerabilities. Pre-implementation impact analysis prevents security regression. Structured review ensures modifications align with risk tolerance. Change control supports mission assurance.
SPR-272	The [organization] shall perform static binary analysis of all firmware that is utilized on the spacecraft.{SV-SP-7,SV-SP-11}{RA-5,SA-10,SA-11,SI-7(10)}	Many commercial products/parts are utilized within the system and should be analyzed for security weaknesses. Blindly accepting the firmware is free of weakness is unacceptable for high assurance missions. The intent is to not blindly accept firmware from unknown sources and assume it is secure. This is meant to apply to firmware the vendors are not developing internally. In-house developed firmware should be going through the vendor's own testing program and have high assurance it is secure. When utilizing firmware from other sources, "expecting" does not meet this requirement. Each supplier needs to provide evidence to support that claim that their firmware they are getting is genuine and secure.
SPR-277	In coordination with [organization], the [organization] shall prioritize and remediate flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}	Timely remediation reduces exploitation window. Coordination ensures mission continuity during patching. Documented prioritization demonstrates due diligence. Structured response enhances accountability.
SPR-278	The [organization] shall correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}	Flaws that impact the mission objectives should be prioritized.
SPR-279	The [organization] shall perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Program-defined depth and coverage].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{SA-11}	The depth needs to include functional testing as well as negative/abuse testing.
SPR-280	The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to deliver the system, component, or service with [Program-defined security configurations] implemented.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-9}{SA-4(5)}	For the spacecraft FSW, the defined security configuration could include to ensure the software does not contain a pre-defined list of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs)and/or CAT I/II Application STIGs.
SPR-282	The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)}	* The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers. * All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government.
SPR-283	The [organization] shall request threat analysis of suppliers of critical components and manage access to and control of threat analysis products containing U.S.person information.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-9,SA-12,SR-1}	The intent of this requirement is to address supply chain concerns on hardware and software vendors. Not required for trusted suppliers accredited to the Defense Microelectronic Activity (DMEA). If the Program intends to use a supplier not accredited by DMEA, the government customer should be notified as soon as possible. If the Program has internal processes to vet suppliers, it may meet this requirement. All software used and its origins must be included in the SBOM and be subjected to internal and Government vulnerability scans.
SPR-293	The [organization] shall employ techniques to limit harm from potential adversaries identifying and targeting the [organization]s supply chain.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5,SV-SP-6}{CP-2,PM-30,SA-9,SA-12(5),SC-38,SR-3,SR-3(1),SR-3(2),SR-5(2)}	Adversaries often exploit supplier relationships. Protective measures reduce reconnaissance and manipulation. Supply chain resilience strengthens mission integrity. Proactive defense mitigates systemic exposure.
SPR-299	The [organization] shall develop, document, and maintain under configuration control, a current baseline configuration of the spacecrafts.{SV-SP-9,SV-MA-6}{CM-2,CM-3(7),CM-4(2),CM-6,SA-8(30),SA-10}	Configuration control ensures traceability of hardware and software states. Unauthorized changes undermine security posture. Accurate baselines enable recovery and audit. Governance depends on configuration integrity.
SPR-300	The [organization] shall maintain the integrity of the mapping between the master build data (hardware drawings and software/firmware code) describing the current version of hardware, software, and firmware and the on-site master copy of the data for the current version.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-9}{CM-6,SA-8(21),SA-8(30),SA-10,SA-10(3),SA-10(4),SA-10(5),SI-7(10),SR-4(4)}	Build data linkage ensures reproducibility and traceability. Tampering detection depends on accurate mapping. Integrity of master copies prevents unauthorized modification. Configuration discipline supports resilience.
SPR-301	The [organization] shall develop a security plan for the spacecraft.{SV-MA-6}{PL-2,PL-7,PM-1,SA-8(29),SA-8(30)}	A comprehensive security plan aligns controls with mission objectives. Clear articulation ensures consistent implementation. Planning integrates security into operations. Formal documentation strengthens accountability.
SPR-302	The [organization] shall document the platform's security architecture, and how it is established within and is an integrated part of the overall [organization] mission security architecture.{SV-MA-6,SV-MA-4}{PL-7,SA-8(7),SA-8(13),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SA-17}	Architecture documentation provides structural clarity. Integration into enterprise mission security ensures alignment. Clear documentation reduces misinterpretation. Transparency strengthens lifecycle governance.
SPR-305	The [organization] shall develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including support tamper resistance and provide a level of protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{CM-3(8),CM-7(9),PM-30,SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-10(3),SA-19,SC-51,SR-4(3),SR-4(4),SR-5(2),SR-11}	Counterfeit hardware may embed malicious implants. Formal policies reduce infiltration risk. Supplier verification strengthens trust. Hardware authenticity is foundational to cybersecurity.
SPR-306	The [organization] shall conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a sub [organization] to acquire systems, system components, or system services.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-6}{PM-30,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-9,SA-12(2),SR-5(2),SR-6}	Pre-contract review ensures vendor security posture. Due diligence reduces third-party risk exposure. Structured evaluation strengthens procurement governance. Supplier trust must be verified.
SPR-320	The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific configuration management policies and procedures for the hardware and software for the spacecraft. {SV-SP-9,SV-MA-6}{CM-1,CM-3,CM-5(6),SA-10,SA-10(3)}	Clear configuration governance prevents unauthorized modification. Policy-backed processes ensure consistency. Lifecycle control supports traceability. Managed change reduces mission risk.
SPR-321	The [organization] shall develop and document spacecraft integrity policies covering both hardware and software. {SV-SP-5,SV-IT-3}{CM-5(6),SA-10(3),SI-1,SI-7(12)}	Integrity policies define expectations for hardware and software protection. Formalized governance ensures consistent enforcement. Clear standards reduce ambiguity. Integrity underpins mission trustworthiness.
SPR-322	The [organization] shall retain at least two previous versions of all spacecraft associated software on the ground with the capability to restore previous version on the spacecraft.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{CM-2(3),CM-3(7),CM-4(2),SA-10,SA-10(4)}	Maintaining prior software versions enables rapid rollback in the event of faulty or malicious updates. In space systems, recovery options are limited once deployed. Retained versions preserve operational continuity and reduce mission impact. Controlled rollback strengthens resilience against supply chain or update-based compromise.
SPR-323	The [organization] prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{CM-7(8),CM-7(8),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-10(2),SI-3,SR-4(4)}
SPR-328	The [organization] shall ensure any update to on-board software, memory, or stored procedures has met high assurance standards before execution. {SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{AC-3(2),CM-3,SA-8(8),SA-8(31),SA-10(2),SR-4(4)}	On-orbit updates carry significant risk if not validated. High assurance standards prevent unauthorized or corrupted uploads from executing. Structured validation protects system integrity. Update governance reduces mission-ending configuration errors.
SPR-331	The [organization] shall test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects on mission systems in a separate test environment before installation.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(2),CM-4(1),CM-4(2),CM-10(1),SA-8(31),SA-11(9),SI-2,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-5(2)}	This requirement is focused on software and firmware flaws. If hardware flaw remediation is required, refine the requirement to make this clear.
SPR-345	The [organization] shall update the inventory of spacecraft components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and spacecraft updates.{SV-MA-4,SV-SP-4}{CM-8(1),CA-7,CM-2,CM-3}	Accurate inventory enables vulnerability tracking and incident response. Lifecycle updates prevent undocumented changes. Asset visibility strengthens security management. Configuration awareness reduces blind spots.
SPR-393	The [organization] shall confirm that the operational spacecrafts correspond to the baseline configuration. {SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{CM-2,CM-3,CM-3(7),CM-4(2),CM-6,SA-10}	Configuration drift undermines trust and auditability. Confirming alignment ensures deployed assets reflect approved design. Baseline validation supports recovery and compliance. Continuous verification reduces unknown risk.
SPR-395	The [organization] shall prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CM-7(8)}	Closed binaries from unverified sources limit vulnerability inspection. Source availability supports transparency and review. Prohibiting opaque code reduces hidden malicious logic risk. Supply chain integrity depends on verifiability.
SPR-403	The [organization] shall develop and document an inventory of the spacecraft components that accurately reflects the to-be launched system. {SV-MA-4,SV-SP-4}{CM-8,CM-2}	Accurate inventory enables vulnerability tracking and configuration validation. Knowing what is deployed supports incident response. Inventory integrity strengthens supply chain assurance. Visibility reduces systemic blind spots.
SPR-404	The [organization] shall establish and formally review the baseline configuration to confirm that it represents an agreed-upon set of specifications for the spacecrafts.{SV-SP-4}{CM-2,CM-6}	Formal baseline review ensures consensus on spacecraft specifications. Structured validation prevents silent drift. Agreement strengthens accountability. Baseline governance supports mission reliability.
SPR-435	For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is not accredited, the [organization] shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by [organization]. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}	DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
SPR-436	The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}	Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
SPR-437	The [organization] shall enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-10(1),SI-3,SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-4(4)}	* The integrity verification mechanisms may include: Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites; Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery; Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure; Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses; Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing. Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites; Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery; Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure; Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses; Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
SPR-450	The [spacecraft] shall prevent flight software and payload applications from modifying access control labels or rules and shall validate label integrity at startup and during policy updates.{SV-AC-1,SV-IT-2}{AC-3(3),AC-3(11).AC-16,SI-7}	Label integrity ensures policy decisions remain trustworthy. Preventing modification protects data classification enforcement. Validation at startup prevents persistent compromise. Policy integrity underpins MAC assurance.
SPR-463	The [spacecraft] shall maintain configuration and cryptographic synchronization required to activate alternate processing or storage and shall verify the alternate before activation.{SV-SP-9,SV-AC-3}{CP-2(6),CM-2}	Activation of alternate nodes requires synchronized keys and configurations. Unsynchronized failover risks data corruption or exposure. Verification before activation prevents propagation of compromised states. Coordinated readiness supports secure recovery.
SPR-472	The [organization] shall define mission and business processes that map mission objectives to space-segment security requirements, including safe-mode criteria, secure uplink and downlink obligations, and recovery procedures, and shall baseline these processes under configuration control.{SV-MA-6,SV-AV-5}{PM-11,PL-2,CM-2}	Security must align with mission objectives. Explicit mapping ensures safe-mode criteria and communication obligations are controlled. Baseline governance prevents undocumented deviations. Integration supports mission assurance.
SPR-482	The [organization] shall require alternative configuration management and acceptance processes for suppliers lacking mature CM, including trusted build reproduction, cryptographic evidence of provenance, and hardware-in-the-loop acceptance testing prior to integration.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SA-10(2),CM-2}	Suppliers lacking mature CM require compensating controls. Trusted build reproduction and cryptographic evidence reduce risk. Hardware-in-the-loop testing validates integration integrity. Structured mitigation preserves assurance.
SPR-483	The [organization] shall require trusted generation of flight and payload software and configuration baselines in a controlled build environment that enforces signed commits, reproducible builds, cryptographic hashing, and code signing of release artifacts, and shall maintain a configuration-controlled golden image for comparison and rollback.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-10(4)}	Controlled builds prevent unauthorized code injection. Reproducible builds strengthen supply chain transparency. Golden images support rollback and forensic validation. Configuration control strengthens integrity.
SPR-503	The [organization] shall validate authenticity and integrity of all flight-designated hardware, firmware, and software upon receipt using program-controlled trust anchors (approved vendor list, golden hash/cert manifest){SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(3),SR-11,SI-7}	Receipt validation prevents counterfeit or tampered parts integration. Program-controlled trust anchors ensure consistency. Early detection reduces downstream risk. Intake verification strengthens SCRM posture.
SPR-504	The [organization] shall re-validate component identity (serial/lot), firmware measurements (cryptographic hashes), and certificate status immediately prior to installation, writing results to the SCRM/provenance ledger and blocking install on mismatch.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5}{SR-4(3),SR-11,SI-7}	Installation-time validation prevents stale or revoked components. Ledger recording strengthens traceability. Blocking on mismatch prevents compromise propagation. Continuous verification enhances assurance.
SPR-505	The [spacecraft] shall cryptographically verify boot images and configurations at power-on and after any update{SV-IT-3,SV-SP-9}{SR-4(3),SI-7,CM-14}	Secure boot prevents execution of unauthorized code. Post-update verification ensures integrity continuity. Root-of-trust enforcement protects mission-critical logic. Deterministic startup strengthens resilience.
SPR-528	The [organization] shall package each flight change (software, bitstreams, configuration tables) with a signed manifest, precondition checks (mode, power/thermal, link), explicit hold/commit points, and resumable procedures across AOS/LOS; the [spacecraft] shall enforce manifest checks prior to activation.{SV-SP-9,SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(2),SI-7,SA-10}	Manifest enforcement ensures integrity prior to activation. Precondition checks prevent unsafe changes. Resumable logic supports space contact constraints. Structured packaging strengthens update security.
SPR-530	The [spacecraft] shall enable selected maintenance capabilities only within time‑bounded and mode‑bounded windows, audit enable/disable events, auto‑revert on timeout/reset, and expose enabled/disabled capability state in telemetry.{SV-AC-8,SV-AC-4}{CM-7,CM-7(2),SA-8,SA-8(14),AC-3}	Maintenance capabilities expand risk surface. Time-limited activation reduces abuse window. Telemetry exposure ensures oversight. Auto-revert strengthens containment.
SPR-531	The [spacecraft] shall enforce whitelisting for executable images and mission scripts/procedures by ID, hash, or signature, accept only artifacts produced by the mission build pipeline, and constrain interpreters/macros to sandboxed contexts with provenance checks on inputs.{SV-SP-9,SV-SP-4}{CM-7,CM-7(5),CM-7(8),SI-7}	Accepting only pipeline-produced artifacts prevents unauthorized code execution. Hash/signature validation ensures integrity. Sandbox constraints limit interpreter abuse. Provenance enforcement strengthens defense.
SPR-547	The [spacecraft] shall support chunked uploads of software/bitstreams/configuration with per‑chunk verification and commit markers, resumable across passes, with atomic activation and rollback if activation checks fail.{SV-SP-9,SV-IT-2}{SI-7,SI-7(15)}	Per-chunk verification prevents partial corruption. Atomic activation avoids inconsistent states. Rollback ensures safe recovery. Structured update logic strengthens resilience.

Software Source Control

Pre-Operations Government

Pre-Operations Developer/Supplier

Sustainment & Maintenance Government

Sustainment & Maintenance Developer/Supplier

NIST Rev5 Controls

D3FEND Techniques

D3FEND Artifacts

ISO 27001

NASA Best Practice Guide

ESA Space Shield Mitigation

Related MITRE EMB3D Mitigations

Related CSF 2.0

Related BSI Security Measures

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

Sample Requirements