| IA-0001 |
Compromise Supply Chain |
Adversaries achieve first execution before the spacecraft ever flies by inserting malicious code, data, or configuration during manufacturing, integration, or delivery. Targets include software sources and dependencies, build systems and compilers, firmware/bitstreams for MCUs and FPGAs, configuration tables, test vectors, and off-the-shelf avionics. Inserted artifacts are designed to appear legitimate, propagate through normal processes, and activate under routine procedures or specific modes (e.g., safing, maintenance). Common insertion points align with where trust is assumed, vendor updates, mirrors and registries, CI/CD runners, programming stations, and “golden image” repositories. The result is pre-positioned access that blends with baseline behavior, often with delayed or conditional triggers and strong deniability. |
|
IA-0001.02 |
Software Supply Chain |
Here the manipulation targets software delivered to flight or ground systems: altering source before build, swapping signed binaries at distribution edges, subverting update metadata, or using stolen signing keys to issue malicious patches. Space-specific vectors include mission control applications, schedulers, gateway services, flight tables and configuration packages, and firmware loads during I&T or LEOP. Adversaries craft payloads that pass superficial validation, trigger under particular operating modes, or reintroduce known weaknesses through version rollback. “Data payloads” such as malformed tables, ephemerides, or calibration products can double as exploits when parsers are permissive. The objective is to ride the normal promotion pipeline so the implant arrives pre-trusted and executes as part of routine operations. |
| IA-0002 |
Compromise Software Defined Radio |
Adversaries target SDR-based transceivers and payload radios because reconfigurable waveforms, FPGA bitstreams, and software flowgraphs create programmable footholds. Manipulation can occur in the radio’s development pipeline (toolchains, out-of-tree modules), at integration (loading of bitstreams, DSP coefficients, calibration tables), or in service via update channels that deliver new waveforms or patches. On-orbit SDRs often expose control planes (command sets for mode/load/select), data planes (baseband I/Q), and management/telemetry paths, any of which can embed covert behavior, alternate demod paths, or hidden subcarriers. A compromised SDR can establish clandestine command-and-control by activating non-public waveforms, piggybacking on idle fields, or toggling to time/ephemeris-triggered profiles that blend with nominal operations. On the ground, compromised SDR modems can be used to fabricate mission-compatible emissions or to decode protected downlinks for reconnaissance. Attackers leverage the SDR’s malleability so that malicious signaling, once seeded, presents as a legitimate but rarely exercised configuration. |
| IA-0007 |
Compromise Ground System |
Compromising the ground segment gives an adversary the most direct path to first execution against a spacecraft. Ground systems encompass operator workstations and mission control mission control software, scheduling/orchestration services, front-end processors and modems, antenna control, key-loading tools and HSMs, data gateways (SLE/CSP), identity providers, and cloud-hosted mission services. Once inside, a threat actor can prepare on-orbit updates, craft and queue valid telecommands, replay captured traffic within acceptance windows, or manipulate authentication material and counters to pass checks. The same foothold enables deep reconnaissance: enumerating mission networks and enclaves, discovering which satellites are operated from a site, mapping logical topology between MOC and stations, identifying in-band “birds” reachable from a given aperture, and learning pass plans, dictionaries, and automation hooks. From there, initial access to the spacecraft is a matter of timing and presentation, injecting commands, procedures, or update packages that align with expected operations so the first execution event appears indistinguishable from normal activity. |
|
IA-0007.01 |
Compromise On-Orbit Update |
Adversaries may target the pipeline that produces and transmits updates to an on-orbit vehicle. Manipulation points include source repositories and configuration tables, build and packaging steps that generate images or differential patches, staging areas on ground servers, update metadata (versions, counters, manifests), and the transmission process itself. Spacecraft updates span flight software patches, FPGA bitstreams, bootloader or device firmware loads, and operational data products such as command tables, ephemerides, and calibration files, each with distinct formats, framing, and acceptance rules. An attacker positioned in the ground system can substitute or modify an artifact, alter its timing and timetags to match pass windows, and queue it through the same procedures operators use for nominal maintenance. Activation can be immediate or deferred: implants may lie dormant until a specific mode, safing entry, or table index is referenced. |
|
IA-0007.02 |
Malicious Commanding via Valid GS |
Adversaries may use a compromised, mission-owned ground system to transmit legitimate-looking commands to the target spacecraft. Because the ground equipment is already configured for the mission, correct waveforms, framing, dictionaries, and scheduling, the attacker’s traffic blends with routine operations. Initial access unfolds by inserting commands or procedures into existing timelines, modifying rate/size limits or command queues, or invoking maintenance dictionaries and rapid-response workflows that accept broader command sets. Pre-positioned scripts can chain actions across multiple passes and stations, while telemetry routing provides immediate feedback to refine follow-on steps. Exfiltration can be embedded in standard downlink channels or forwarded through gateways as ordinary mission data. The distinguishing feature is that command origin appears valid, transmitted from approved apertures using expected parameters, so the first execution event is not a protocol anomaly but a misuse of legitimate command authority obtained through the compromised ground system. |
| IA-0012 |
Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation Compromise |
Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation (ATLO) concentrates people, tools, and authority while components first exchange real traffic across flight interfaces. Test controllers, EGSE, simulators, flatsats, loaders, and data recorders connect to the same buses and command paths that will exist on orbit. Threat actors exploit this density and dynamism: compromised laptops or transient cyber assets push images and tables; lab networks bridge otherwise separate enclaves; vendor support accounts move software between staging and flight hardware; and “golden” artifacts created or modified in ATLO propagate into the as-flown baseline. Malware can traverse shared storage and scripting environments, ride update/checklist execution, or piggyback on protocol translators and gateways used to stimulate subsystems. Because ATLO often introduces late firmware loads, key/counter initialization, configuration freezes, and full-system rehearsals, a single well-placed change can yield first execution on multiple devices and persist into LEOP. |
| EX-0004 |
Compromise Boot Memory |
The attacker manipulates memory and configuration used in the earliest stages of boot so that their code runs before normal protections and integrity checks take hold. Targets include boot ROM vectors, first-stage/second-stage bootloaders, boot configuration words and strap pins, one-time-programmable (OTP) fuses, non-volatile images in flash/EEPROM, and scratch regions copied into RAM during cold start. Techniques range from replacing or patching boot images to flipping configuration bits that alter trust decisions (e.g., image selection, fallback order, watchdog behavior). Faults can be induced deliberately (timed power/clock/EM glitches) or via crafted update/write sequences that leave a partially programmed but executable state. Once resident, the modification can insert early hooks, disable or short-circuit checks, or select downgraded images; destructive variants corrupt the boot path to induce a persistent reset loop or safeing entry (a denial of service). Because boot logic initializes buses, memory maps, and handler tables, even small changes at this stage cascade, shaping how command handlers load, how keys and counters are initialized, and which peripherals are trusted for subsequent execution. |
| PER-0001 |
Memory Compromise |
The adversary arranges for malicious content to survive resets and mode changes by targeting memories and execution paths that initialize the system. Candidates include boot ROM handoff vectors, first/second-stage loaders, non-volatile images (flash/EEPROM), “golden” fallback partitions, configuration words/fuses, and RAM regions reconstructed at start-up from stored files or tables. Persistence may also ride auto-run mechanisms, init scripts, procedure engines, stored command sequences, or event hooks that execute on boot, safe-mode entry/exit, time triggers, or receipt of specific telemetry/commands. Variants keep the core payload only in RAM but ensure it is reloaded after every restart by patching copy-on-boot routines, altering file catalogs, or modifying table loaders so the same bytes are restored. The common thread is control of where the spacecraft looks for what to run next, so unauthorized logic is reinstated whenever the system resets or transitions modes. |
| PER-0002 |
Backdoor |
A backdoor is a covert access path that bypasses normal authentication, authorization, or operational checks so the attacker can reenter the system on demand. Backdoors may be preexisting (undocumented service modes, maintenance accounts, debug features) or introduced by the adversary during development, integration, or on-orbit updates. Triggers range from “magic” opcodes and timetags to specific geometry/time conditions, counters, or data patterns embedded in routine traffic. The access they provide varies from expanded command sets and relaxed rate/size limits to alternate communications profiles and hidden file/parameter interfaces. Well-crafted backdoors blend with nominal behavior, appearing as ordinary operations while quietly accepting instructions that other paths would reject, thereby sustaining the attacker’s foothold across passes, resets, and operator handovers. |
|
PER-0002.02 |
Software Backdoor |
Software backdoors are code paths intentionally crafted or later inserted to provide privileged functionality on cue. In flight contexts, they appear as hidden command handlers, alternate authentication checks, special user/role constructs, or procedure/script hooks that accept nonpublic inputs. They can be embedded in flight applications, separation kernels or drivers, gateway processors that translate bus/payload traffic, or update/loader utilities that handle tables and images. SDR configurations offer another avenue: non-public waveforms, subcarriers, or framing profiles that, when selected, expose a private command channel. Activation is often conditional, specific timetags, geometry, message sequences, or file names, to keep the feature dormant during routine testing and operations. Once present, the backdoor provides a repeatable way to execute commands or modify state without traversing the standard control surfaces, sustaining the adversary’s access over time. |
| DE-0004 |
Masquerading |
The adversary presents themselves as an authorized origin so activity appears legitimate across RF, protocol, and organizational boundaries. Techniques include crafting telecommand frames with correct headers, counters, and dictionaries; imitating station “fingerprints” such as Doppler, polarization, timing, and framing; replaying or emulating crosslink identities; and using insider-derived credentials or roles to operate mission tooling. Masquerading can also target metadata, virtual channel IDs, APIDs, source sequence counts, and facility identifiers, so logs and telemetry attribute actions to expected entities. The effect is that commands, file transfers, or configuration changes are processed as if they came from approved sources, reducing scrutiny and delaying detection. |
| EXF-0006 |
Modify Communications Configuration |
The adversary alters radio/optical link configuration so the spacecraft emits mission data over paths the program does not monitor or control. Levers include retuning carriers, adding sidebands or subcarriers, changing modulation/coding profiles, remapping virtual channels/APIDs, editing beacon content, or redirecting routing tables in regenerative payloads. Data can be embedded steganographically (idle fields, padding, frame counters, pilot tones) or carried on a covert auxiliary downlink/crosslink pointed at attacker-owned apertures. Because these emissions conform to plausible waveforms and scheduler behavior, they appear as ordinary link activity while quietly conveying payload products, housekeeping, or file fragments to non-mission receivers. |
|
EXF-0006.01 |
Software Defined Radio |
Programmable SDRs let an attacker introduce new waveforms or piggyback payloads into existing ones. By modifying DSP chains (filters, mixers, FEC, framing), the actor can: add a low-rate subcarrier under the main modulation, alter preamble/pilot sequences to encode bits, vary puncturing/interleaver patterns as a covert channel, or schedule brief “maintenance” bursts that actually carry exfiltrated data. Changes may be packaged as legitimate updates or configuration profiles so the SDR transmits toward attacker-visible geometry using standard equipment, while mission tooling interprets the emission as routine. |
|
EXF-0006.02 |
Transponder |
On bent-pipe or regenerative transponders, configuration controls what is translated, amplified, and routed. An adversary can remap input–output paths, shift translation frequencies, adjust polarization or gain to favor non-mission receivers, or enable auxiliary ports so selected virtual channels or recorder playbacks are forwarded outside the planned ground segment. In regenerative systems, edited routing tables or QoS rules can mirror traffic to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The result is a sanctioned-looking carrier that quietly delivers mission data to unauthorized listeners. |
| EXF-0007 |
Compromised Ground System |
The adversary resides in mission ground infrastructure and uses its trusted position to siphon data at scale. With access to operator workstations, mission control servers, baseband/modem chains, telemetry processing pipelines, or archive databases, the attacker can mirror real-time streams, scrape recorder playbacks, export payload products, and harvest procedure logs and command histories. Because exfiltration rides normal paths, file staging areas, data distribution services, cloud relays, or cross-site links, it blends with routine dissemination. Compromise of scheduling tools and pass plans also lets the actor time captures to high-value downlinks and automate bulk extraction without touching the spacecraft. |
| EXF-0008 |
Compromised Developer Site |
By breaching development or integration environments (at the mission owner, contractor, or partner), the adversary gains access to source code, test vectors, telemetry captures, build artifacts, documentation, and configuration data, material that is often more complete than flight archives. Beyond theft of intellectual property, the attacker can embed telemetry taps, extended logging, or data “export” features into test harnesses, simulators, or flight builds so that, once fielded, the system produces extra observables or forwards content to non-mission endpoints. This activity typically occurs pre-launch during software production and ATLO, positioning exfiltration mechanisms to activate later in flight. |
| EXF-0009 |
Compromised Partner Site |
The adversary leverages third-party infrastructure connected to the mission, commercial ground stations, relay networks, operations service providers, data processing partners, to capture or relay mission data outside official channels. From these footholds, the attacker can mirror TT&C and payload feeds, scrape shared repositories, and man-in-the-middle cross-organization links (e.g., between partner stations and the primary MOC). Because partner environments vary in segmentation and monitoring, exfiltration can affect multiple missions or operators simultaneously, with stolen data exiting through the partner’s routine distribution mechanisms. |