Before engaging in an On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OSAM) mission, verification of servicer should be multi-factor authenticated/authorized by both the serviced ground station and the serviced asset.
|LM-0004||Visiting Vehicle Interface(s)||Threat actors may move from one spacecraft to another through visiting vehicle interfaces. When a vehicle docks with a spacecraft, many programs are automatically triggered in order to ensure docking mechanisms are locked. This entails several data points and commands being sent to and from the spacecraft and the visiting vehicle. If a threat actor were to compromise a visiting vehicle, they could target these specific programs in order to send malicious commands to the victim spacecraft once docked.|
|SV-AC-5||Proximity operations (i.e., grappling satellite)|
|SV-AC-6||Three main parts of S/C. CPU, memory, I/O interfaces with parallel and/or serial ports. These are connected via busses (i.e., 1553) and need segregated. Supply chain attack on CPU (FPGA/ASICs), supply chain attack to get malware burned into memory through the development process, and rogue RTs on 1553 bus via hosted payloads are all threats. Security or fault management being disabled by non-mission critical or payload; fault injection or MiTM into the 1553 Bus - China has developed fault injector for 1553 - this could be a hosted payload attack if payload has access to main 1553 bus; One piece of FSW affecting another. Things are not containerized from the OS or FSW perspective;|
|SV-AC-1||Attempting access to an access-controlled system resulting in unauthorized access|