Space-based radio frequency (RF) mapping can provide broad-area monitoring and analysis of RF activity affecting space systems in orbit and on the ground. Depending on the sensor architecture, it may support recurring or persistent detection, signal characterization, and geolocation of interference sources, with performance determined by factors such as frequency coverage, signal strength, antenna pattern, sensor geometry, and revisit rate. By correlating RF observations with mission link performance, operators can better distinguish potential jamming or spoofing from unintentional interference and estimate relevant signal characteristics and source location. Although these observations do not independently establish intent, attribution, or a precise emitter location in every case, they provide an important intelligence layer that supports faster investigation and more informed defensive decisions when communications degradation occurs.
| ID | Name | Description | |
| EX-0016 | Jamming | Jamming is an electronic attack that uses radio frequency energy to deny the use of a signal, whether that signal carries communications, navigation, or timing. A jammer must operate in the same frequency band and within the field of view of the antenna it is targeting. Unlike physical attacks, the interference itself is completely reversible: once the jammer is disengaged, reception can be restored. Second-order effects may persist, however, where the outage has already caused a clock to drift, a schedule to slip, or a synchronization state to be lost. Attribution of jamming can be tough because the source can be small and highly mobile, and users operating on the wrong frequency or pointed at the wrong satellite can jam friendly communications.* Similar to intentional jamming, accidental jamming can cause temporary signal degradation. Accidental jamming refers to unintentional interference with communication signals, and it can potentially impact spacecraft in various ways, depending on the severity, frequency, and duration of the interference. *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| .01 | Uplink Jamming | The attacker transmits toward the spacecraft’s uplink receive antenna, within its main lobe or significant sidelobes, at the operating frequency and sufficient power spectral density to drive the uplink Eb/N₀ below the demodulator’s threshold. Uplink jamming prevents acceptance of telecommands and ranging/acquisition traffic, delaying or blocking scheduled operations. Because the receiver resides on the spacecraft, the jammer must be located within the spacecraft’s receive footprint and match its polarization and Doppler conditions well enough to couple energy into the front end. | |
| .02 | Downlink Jamming | Downlink jammers target the users of a satellite by creating noise in the same frequency as the downlink signal from the satellite. A downlink jammer only needs to be as powerful as the signal being received on the ground and must be within the field of view of the receiving terminal’s antenna. This limits the number of users that can be affected by a single jammer. Since many ground terminals use directional antennas pointed at the sky, a downlink jammer typically needs to be located above the terminal it is attempting to jam. This limitation can be overcome by employing a downlink jammer on an air or space-based platform, which positions the jammer between the terminal and the satellite. This also allows the jammer to cover a wider area and potentially affect more users. Ground terminals with omnidirectional antennas, such as many GPS receivers, have a wider field of view and thus are more susceptible to downlink jamming from different angles on the ground.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| EX-0017 | Kinetic Physical Attack | The adversary inflicts damage by physically striking space assets or their supporting elements, producing irreversible effects that are generally visible to space situational awareness. Kinetic attacks in orbit are commonly grouped into direct-ascent engagements, launched from Earth to intercept a target on a specific pass, and co-orbital engagements, in which an on-orbit vehicle maneuvers to collide with or detonate near the target. Outcomes include structural breakup, loss of attitude control, sensor or antenna destruction, and wholesale mission termination; secondary effects include debris creation whose persistence depends on altitude and geometry. Because launches and on-orbit collisions are measurable, these actions tend to be more attributable and offer near–real-time confirmation of effect compared to non-kinetic methods. | |
| .01 | Direct Ascent ASAT | A direct-ascent ASAT is often the most commonly thought of threat to space assets. It typically involves a medium- or long-range missile launching from the Earth to damage or destroy a satellite in orbit. This form of attack is often easily attributed due to the missile launch which can be easily detected. Due to the physical nature of the attacks, they are irreversible and provide the attacker with near real-time confirmation of success. Direct-ascent ASATs create orbital debris which can be harmful to other objects in orbit. Lower altitudes allow for more debris to burn up in the atmosphere, while attacks at higher altitudes result in more debris remaining in orbit, potentially damaging other spacecraft in orbit.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| .02 | Co-Orbital ASAT | A co-orbital ASAT uses a spacecraft already in space to conduct a deliberate collision or near-field detonation. After insertion, often well before any hostile action, the vehicle performs rendezvous and proximity operations to achieve the desired relative geometry, then closes to impact or triggers a kinetic or explosive device. Guidance relies on relative navigation (optical, lidar, crosslink cues) and precise timing to manage closing speeds and contact angle. Compared with direct-ascent shots, co-orbital approaches can loiter, shadow, or “stalk” a target for extended periods, masking as inspection or servicing until the terminal maneuver. Effects include mechanical disruption, fragmentation, or mission-ending damage, with debris characteristics shaped by the chosen altitude, closing velocity, and collision geometry. | |
| EX-0018 | Non-Kinetic Physical Attack | The adversary inflicts physical effects on a satellite without mechanical contact, using energy delivered through the environment. Principal modalities are electromagnetic pulse (EMP), high-power laser (optical/thermal effects), and high-power microwave (HPM). These methods can be tuned for reversible disruption (temporary sensor saturation, processor upsets) or irreversible damage (component burnout, optics degradation), and may be executed from ground, airborne, or space platforms given line-of-sight and power/aperture conditions. Forensics are often ambiguous: signatures may resemble environmental phenomena or normal degradations, and confirmation of effect is frequently limited to what the operator observes in telemetry or performance loss. | |
| .02 | High-Powered Laser | A high-powered laser can be used to permanently or temporarily damage critical satellite components (i.e. solar arrays or optical centers). If directed toward a satellite’s optical center, the attack is known as blinding or dazzling. Blinding, as the name suggests, causes permanent damage to the optics of a satellite. Dazzling causes temporary loss of sight for the satellite. While there is clear attribution of the location of the laser at the time of the attack, the lasers used in these attacks may be mobile, which can make attribution to a specific actor more difficult because the attacker does not have to be in their own nation, or even continent, to conduct such an attack. Only the satellite operator will know if the attack is successful, meaning the attacker has limited confirmation of success, as an attacked nation may not choose to announce that their satellite has been attacked or left vulnerable for strategic reasons. A high-powered laser attack can also leave the targeted satellite disabled and uncontrollable, which could lead to collateral damage if the satellite begins to drift. A higher-powered laser may permanently damage a satellite by overheating its parts. The parts most susceptible to this are satellite structures, thermal control panels, and solar panels.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| .03 | High-Powered Microwave | High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can be used to disrupt or destroy a satellite’s electronics. A “front-door” HPM attack uses a satellite’s own antennas as an entry path, while a “back-door” attack attempts to enter through small seams or gaps around electrical connections and shielding. A front-door attack is more straightforward to carry out, provided the HPM is positioned within the field of view of the antenna that it is using as a pathway, but it can be thwarted if the satellite uses circuits designed to detect and block surges of energy entering through the antenna. In contrast, a back-door attack is more challenging, because it must exploit design or manufacturing flaws, but it can be conducted from many angles relative to the satellite. Both types of attacks can be either reversible or irreversible; however, the attacker may not be able to control the severity of the damage from the attack. Both front-door and back-door HPM attacks can be difficult to attribute to an attacker, and like a laser weapon, the attacker may not know if the attack has been successful. A HPM attack may leave the target satellite disabled and uncontrollable which can cause it to drift into other satellites, creating further collateral damage.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101 | |
| DE-0009 | Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys (CCD) | The adversary exploits the physical and operational environment, or manipulates the sensing and processing on which observers depend, to reduce detectability, mislead, or provoke a response. Tactics include signature management (minimizing RF/optical/thermal/RCS), controlled emissions timing, deliberate power-down/dormancy, geometry choices that hide within clutter or eclipse, and the deployment of decoys that generate convincing tracks. CCD can also leverage naturally noisy conditions, debris-rich regions, auroral radio noise, solar storms, to mask proximity operations or to provide plausible alternate explanations for anomalies. The unifying theme is perception management: shape what sensors and their processing chains perceive so surveillance and attribution lag, misclassify, or look elsewhere. This may be achieved through the environment, through decoys and signatures presented to distant observers, or through deception directed at a particular vehicle’s onboard sensing or a particular ground processing pipeline. The same methods may be used to provoke a defender into committing limited resources prematurely. | |
| .01 | Debris Field | The attacker co-orbits within or near clusters of small objects, matching apparent characteristics (brightness, RCS, tumbling, intermittent emissions) so the vehicle blends with background debris. Dormant periods with minimized attitude control and emissions further the illusion. This posture supports covert inspection, staging for a later intercept, or timing cyber-physical actions (e.g., propulsion or actuator manipulation) to coincide with passages through clutter, increasing the chance that damage or anomalies are attributed to debris strikes rather than deliberate activity. Maintenance of the disguise may involve small, infrequent maneuvers to keep relative motion consistent with “free” debris dynamics. | |
| ID | Description |
| SV-AC-2 | Replay of recorded authentic communications traffic at a later time with the hope that the authorized communications will provide data or some other system reaction |
| SV-IT-1 | Communications system spoofing resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity |
| SV-AV-1 | Communications system jamming resulting in denial of service and loss of availability and data integrity |
| SPARTA ID | Requirement | Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| SPR-361 | The [organization] shall maintain 24/7 space situational awareness for potential collision with space debris that could come in contact with the spacecraft.{SV-MA-1}{PE-20} | Collision risk threatens mission availability. Continuous monitoring enables avoidance maneuvers. Situational awareness reduces physical hazard risk. Space domain awareness supports survivability. |
| SPR-362 | The [organization] shall develop policies and procedures to establish sufficient space domain awareness to avoid potential collisions or hostile proximity operations.This includes establishing relationships with relevant organizations needed for data sharing.{SV-AC-5}{PE-6,PE-6(1),PE-6(4),PE-18,PE-20,RA-6,SC-7(14)} | Formal policies ensure structured collision avoidance and hostile proximity response. Data sharing strengthens predictive capabilities. Governance supports coordinated action. Preparedness mitigates orbital hazards. |
| SPR-363 | The [organization] shall monitor physical access to all facilities where the system or system components reside throughout development, integration, testing, and launch to detect and respond to physical security incidents in coordination with the organizational incident response capability using automated intrusion recognition and predefined responses.{SV-SP-5,SV-SP-4}{PE-6,PE-6(1),PE-6(4),PE-18,PE-20,SC-7(14)} | Physical compromise may introduce hardware implants or configuration changes. Monitoring detects unauthorized entry. Integration with IR capability enables rapid response. Physical security underpins cyber integrity. |
| SPR-467 | The [spacecraft] shall maintain an onboard inventory of mission components, including unique identifiers, firmware versions or hashes, configuration state, and operational status, and shall downlink the inventory at [organization]-defined intervals and upon any change.{SV-MA-4,SV-SP-4}{PE-20,CM-8} | Real-time inventory visibility enables anomaly detection and supply chain verification. Downlinked fingerprints support ground-based validation. Continuous attestation strengthens configuration assurance. Transparency reduces silent tampering risk. |
| SPR-468 | The [spacecraft] shall detect and report the connection of any unauthorized or unknown component to onboard interfaces.{SV-SP-5,SV-SP-4}{PE-20,CM-8(3),SI-4} | Hardware implants pose existential mission risk. Detection of unknown components prevents covert insertion. Automated alerting reduces dwell time. Inventory integrity supports physical security. |
| SPR-480 | The [organization] shall conduct technical surveillance countermeasures surveys of integration, test, and storage facilities for spacecraft and link-segment equipment to detect covert devices or unauthorized transmissions prior to launch, and shall document and remediate findings.{SV-CF-2,SV-SP-5}{RA-6,PE-18} | Pre-launch surveillance reduces covert hardware risk. Detecting unauthorized transmissions prevents compromise before orbit. Documented remediation strengthens assurance. Physical inspection complements cyber controls. |