a. Assign a senior official as the authorizing official for the system;
b. Assign a senior official as the authorizing official for common controls available for inheritance by organizational systems;
c. Ensure that the authorizing official for the system, before commencing operations:
1. Accepts the use of common controls inherited by the system; and
2. Authorizes the system to operate;
d. Ensure that the authorizing official for common controls authorizes the use of those controls for inheritance by organizational systems;
e. Update the authorizations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].
Obtaining a formal ATO for a spacecraft is often more complex than for a terrestrial system because pre-launch configuration may differ from on-orbit operation, and the vehicle’s risk posture can evolve with each orbital maneuver or payload activation. The authorization process typically integrates the results of extensive ground testing, final flight readiness checks, and post-launch verification. This ensures that the authorizing official understands the baseline security posture and the spacecraft’s capability to adapt if unknown threats emerge once it is fully operational. By aligning authorization milestones with mission-critical events, the organization maintains a clear view of residual risks at each phase of the mission lifecycle.
Assessment and authorization (A&A) is a structured, formal process through which an organization evaluates the extent to which a system's design and implementation satisfy a defined set of security requirements, and grants or denies authorization for that system to operate based on the assessed risk. For space mission systems, A&A may apply to spacecraft, ground systems, mission networks, supporting infrastructure, common controls, and the interfaces and dependencies among them. The authorization scope and boundary must be defined by the governing risk management framework, mission architecture, information types, applicable requirements, and organizational risk decisions. The assessment phase produces evidence concerning whether selected controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the required security outcomes. The resulting authorization package should contain the system security plan, assessment reports, plan of action and milestones, executive risk summary, and other evidence required by the authorizing authority. The authorization decision, made by a designated authority with accountability for accepting the residual risk of operating the system, formally records the organization's acceptance of that risk and establishes the conditions under which the system may operate. Authorization must be supported throughout the system lifecycle by continuous monitoring, security impact analysis, updated risk information, and maintenance of the authorization evidence. Proposed system changes must be assessed before implementation when they could affect the authorization boundary, control implementation, or accepted risk. Significant changes or material deviations from the authorization basis must be reported to the authorizing authority, who determines whether additional assessment, modified authorization conditions, or reauthorization is required.
Space Threats Tagged by Control
ID
Description
Sample Requirements
SPARTA ID
Requirement
Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
SPR-381
The [organization] shall designate an authorizing official for the system.{SV-MA-6}{CA-6}
These officials must be federal employees, and are responsible for reviewing the security authorization package, assessing the risks, and making the decision to authorize system operation. They shall ensure compliance with relevant organizational policies and standards and are accountable for the decision to accept the risks associated with operating the system. The authorizing officials must be empowered with the authority to oversee and enforce the implementation and maintenance of security controls in accordance with organizational requirements and applicable regulations.