Threat Intelligence Program

A threat intelligence program enables an organization to systematically collect, analyze, and apply information about adversary capabilities, infrastructure, and intent to inform defensive priorities and drive risk-informed security decisions across the mission lifecycle. For space missions specifically, this may include leveraging available all-source intelligence services or commercial satellite imagery to identify and monitor adversary infrastructure development and acquisition activities that may signal emerging threats to mission assets. Threat intelligence outputs should be operationalized into concrete adjustments to defensive architecture, monitoring priorities, and incident response posture rather than treated as informational products alone. Direct countermeasures against adversary infrastructure identified through this program will fall outside the scope of the mission in the majority of cases; the primary value of the program is in generating actionable awareness that sharpens the organization's own defensive posture.

Sources

CCSDS 350.1-G-3 — Security Threats against Space Missions

CCSDS 350.7-G-2 — Security Guide for Mission Planners

https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1019/

ID: CM0009

Tier: II

Ground CM

Created: 2022/10/19

Last Modified: 2026/08/06

Pre-Operations Government

Acquisition strategies for space missions should incorporate threat intelligence requirements as an input to system security engineering from the earliest program phases, ensuring that threat assessments inform the selection and prioritization of security controls before architecture decisions are finalized. Government organizations with access to all-source intelligence services should ensure that relevant threat products are made available to program security personnel and system engineers at appropriate classification levels, with processes established to translate classified threat insights into unclassified or lower-classification design requirements that can be flowed to contractors. Contract language should require contractors to participate in threat briefings, incorporate threat intelligence inputs into their security risk assessments, and demonstrate that their security architectures are traceable to a current threat baseline. Where contractor performance requires access to classified threat intelligence, the contract should include an applicable Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specification, DD Form 254, and the required facility and personnel security provisions. Evaluation criteria for source selection should assess offerors' familiarity with the threat environment relevant to the mission domain and their demonstrated capability to adapt security designs in response to evolving threat intelligence.

Pre-Operations Developer/Supplier

Developers and suppliers should establish, subscribe to, or otherwise obtain access to threat intelligence capabilities that provide relevant, timely information about adversary interest in and activity against space systems, ground infrastructure, and the supply chains that support them. Intelligence subscriptions, information sharing partnerships, and sector-specific threat sharing communities provide scalable options for organizations that lack the resources to operate a fully internal threat intelligence function. Threat intelligence outputs should be integrated into the security architecture process, with threat actor profiles and known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to stress-test proposed designs against realistic adversary behaviors rather than generic threat assumptions. Where commercial satellite imagery or other open-source collection capabilities are accessible, they should be evaluated for applicability to monitoring adversary infrastructure relevant to the mission's threat environment. Threat intelligence inputs should be documented as part of the security risk assessment baseline so that future changes to the threat picture can be evaluated against the original design assumptions.

Sustainment & Maintenance Government

Operational threat intelligence programs should produce regular threat summaries tailored to the specific mission profile, asset types, and operational environment, with outputs distributed to personnel responsible for monitoring, incident response, and configuration management. Newly identified adversary TTPs relevant to space systems should be evaluated against current monitoring rules, detection thresholds, and defensive configurations, with updates implemented when gaps are identified. Mission-relevant indicators of compromise (IOCs) derived from threat intelligence should be validated, prioritized, and incorporated into applicable monitoring and detection systems in a timely manner. Organizations should participate in sector-relevant threat intelligence sharing communities where feasible, both to receive timely warning of emerging threats and to contribute observations that benefit the broader community. Threat intelligence findings that suggest adversary awareness of mission-specific vulnerabilities or targeting of mission infrastructure should be treated as potential precursors to attack and should trigger elevated monitoring and a review of incident response readiness.

Sustainment & Maintenance Developer/Supplier

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

ID		Name	Description
RD-0001		Acquire Infrastructure	Adversaries assemble the people, platforms, and plumbing they will later use to observe, reach, or impersonate mission components. Infrastructure spans RF and optical ground assets (antennas, modems, timing sources, front-ends), compute and storage (on-prem and cloud), network presence (leased ASNs/IP space, VPS fleets, CDN relays), identity fabric (burner accounts, domains, certificates), and fabrication/test environments for hardware and software. They favor assets that are inexpensive, deniable, and geographically diverse, mixing self-hosted gear with commercial services and compromised third-party systems. To support spacecraft operations, they may build SDR-based labs that replicate waveforms and framing, stage command/telemetry tooling behind traffic mixers, and pre-position data pipelines for collection and analysis. The objective is persistence and flexibility: the ability to pivot between reconnaissance, delivery, and command with minimal attribution risk.
	.01	Ground Station Equipment	Rather than compromising existing stations, adversaries may acquire or assemble their own RF ground stack. Typical building blocks include: steerable mounts with auto-track, time/frequency standards, band-appropriate antennas and feeds, LNAs and filters at the feed, low-loss IF chains, T/R switching, medium/high-power amplifiers with protection and telemetry, and weather protection. Baseband equipment often mixes SDRs with commercial modems to generate/capture mission waveforms and framing; signal generators and spectrum analyzers support calibration and banner-grabbing. On the digital side, ground data processors translate captured frames to packetized formats for analysis and rehearsal. With this kit, an actor can passively collect, actively probe, or attempt spoofing if link-layer authentication is weak.
	.02	Commercial Ground Station Services	Instead of building dishes, adversaries may rent time on commercial ground networks or cloud-integrated “ground-station-as-a-service.” Access can be obtained legitimately (front companies, weak vetting) or via compromised customer accounts, allowing schedule requests, RF front-end configuration, and data egress through reputable providers. The appeal is speed, global reach, and plausible deniability; the risk to defenders is that traffic originates from expected stations and IP ranges. Misuse may include reconnaissance (passive capture), selective denial (misconfiguration or saturation attempts), or, where authentication is weak, unauthorized commanding.
	.03	Spacecraft	A well-resourced actor may field their own spacecraft or hosted payload to gain proximity, visibility, or RF leverage. Small satellites can be launched into nearby planes or phasing orbits to observe emissions, perform spectrum measurements, or test spoofing and denial techniques at short range. Hosted payloads on commercial buses provide co-location without full spacecraft development. Proximity also enables on-orbit relay, crosslink probing, or attempts to exploit weak segmentation between payload and bus on rideshares. Regulatory and tracking regimes complicate overt misuse, but shell companies, benign-seeming mission declarations, or flags of convenience can mask intent.
	.04	Launch Facility	In practice, adversaries are far more likely to purchase launch services (rideshare slots, hosted-payload opportunities) than to “acquire a launch facility.” Nevertheless, understanding and exploiting launch infrastructure, pads, integration cells, range networks, and control centers, could support resource development (e.g., positioning an asset, staging equipment near range telemetry). The realistic objective is influence over access to orbit, schedule, or integration touchpoints rather than ownership of a pad. Shell entities might book benign-sounding rides, insert dual-use payloads, or seek special handling that relaxes controls.
RD-0003		Obtain Cyber Capabilities	Adversaries acquire ready-made tools, code, and knowledge so they can move faster and with lower attribution when operations begin. Capabilities span commodity malware and loaders, bespoke implants for mission control mission control and ground enclaves, privilege-escalation and lateral-movement kits, SDR/codec stacks for TT&C and payload links, fuzzers and protocol harnesses, exploit chains for RTOS/middleware and ground services, and databases of configuration playbooks from prior intrusions. Actors prefer modular kits that can be re-skinned (new C2, new certs) and exercised in flatsat or SIL/HIL labs before use. They also collect operational “how-tos”, procedures, scripts, and operator macros, that convert technical access into mission effects.
	.01	Exploit/Payload	Threat actors obtain or adapt exploits (the trigger) and payloads (the action after exploitation) for space, ground, and cloud components. Targets include flight software parsers and table loaders, bootloaders and patch/update handlers, bus gateways, payload controllers, and ground services. Payloads may be binaries, scripts, or command/procedure sequences that alter modes, bypass FDIR, or stage follow-on access; they can also be “data payloads” that exploit weak validation (malformed tables, ephemeris, or calibration products). Acquisition paths mirror the broader market, brokered N-day/0-day packages, open-source exploits re-tooled for mission stacks, and theft from vendors or researchers. Actors tune timing, size/rate limits, and anti-replay nuances so delivery fits pass windows and link budgets, and they rehearse on flatsats to achieve deterministic outcomes.
	.02	Cryptographic Keys	Adversaries seek any cryptographic material that confers command or decryption authority: uplink authentication/MAC keys and counters, link-encryption/session keys and KEKs, loading/transfer keys for HSMs, PN/spreading codes, modem credentials, and station or crosslink keys. Acquisition routes include compromised ground systems and laptops, misconfigured repositories and ticket systems, memory/core dumps, training datasets and screenshots, contractor support channels, and poorly controlled key-loading or recovery procedures. Because some missions authenticate uplink without encrypting it, possession of the right keys/counters may be sufficient to inject accepted commands outside official channels or to desynchronize anti-replay.
RD-0004		Stage Capabilities	Before execution, adversaries prepare the ground, literally and figuratively. They upload tooling, exploits, procedures, and datasets to infrastructure they own or have compromised, wire up C2 and telemetry pipelines, and pre-configure RF/baseband chains and protocol stacks to match mission parameters. Staging often uses cloud object stores, VPS fleets, or CI/CD runners masquerading as benign automation; artifacts are containerized or signed with hijacked material to blend in. For RF operations, actors assemble demod/encode flowgraphs, precompute CRC/MAC fields and timetags, and script rate/size pacing to fit pass windows. For ground/cloud, they stage credentials, macros, and schedule templates that can push changes or exfiltrate data quickly during handovers or safing. Dry-runs on flatsats/HIL rigs validate timing and error paths; OPSEC measures (rotating domains, domain fronting, traffic mixers) reduce attribution.
	.01	Identify/Select Delivery Mechanism	Adversaries select the pathway that best balances effect, risk, bandwidth, and attribution. Options include over-the-air telecommand injection on TT&C links, manipulation of payload downlinks or user terminals, abuse of crosslinks or gateways, pivoting through commercial ground networks, or pushing malicious updates via supply-chain paths (software, firmware, bitstreams). Selection considers modulation/coding, Doppler and polarization, anti-replay windows, pass geometry, rate/size limits, and expected operator workload (handover, LEOP, safing exits). For ground/cloud paths, actors account for identity boundaries, automation hooks, and change-control cadence. The “delivery mechanism” is end-to-end: RF front-end (antenna, converters, HPAs), baseband/SDR chain, protocol/framing, authentication/counter handling, scheduling, and fallbacks if detection occurs. Rehearsal artifacts, test vectors, mock dictionaries, ephemerides, are built alongside.
	.02	Upload Exploit/Payload	Having chosen a path, adversaries pre-position the specific packages and procedures they intend to use: binary exploits, malicious tables and ephemerides, patch images, modem profiles, and operator macros that chain actions. On compromised or leased infrastructure, they stage these items where execution will be fastest, provider portals, scheduler queues, ground station file drops, or automation repos, with triggers tied to pass start, beacon acquisition, or operator shift changes. Artifacts are formatted to mission protocols (framing, CRC/MAC, timetags), chunked to meet rate/size constraints, and signed or wrapped to evade superficial checks. Anti-forensics (timestamp tampering, log suppression, ephemeral storage) reduce audit visibility, while fallback payloads are kept for alternate modes (safe-mode dictionaries, recovery consoles).
RD-0005		Obtain Non-Cyber Capabilities	Adversaries may pursue non-cyber counterspace means to create access, leverage, or effects that complement cyber operations. These capabilities span kinetic physical (e.g., direct-ascent or co-orbital interceptors and attacks on ground segments), non-kinetic physical (e.g., lasers, high-power microwave/EMP), and electronic warfare (jamming and spoofing). Each class differs in required resources, detectability, attribution, and the permanence of effects, from reversible interference to irreversible destruction. A pragmatic actor mixes methods: electronic attack to mask or distract, directed energy to blind sensors or upset electronics, and, at the top end, kinetic capabilities to hold assets at risk. Resource development may involve acquisition, partnering, or covert access to such systems; rehearsals are often framed as testing or calibration.
	.01	Launch Services	Rather than “owning a pad,” a realistic path is purchasing launch services (rideshare, hosted payload) to place inspection or relay assets where they confer RF, optical, or proximity advantage. Launch providers deliver integration, testing, and scheduling; an actor can use benign mission covers to field small satellites that measure local spectrum, perform on-orbit characterization of target emissions, or support later rendezvous and proximity operations. The resource being developed is access to vantage points, not just spaceflight hardware.
	.02	Non-Kinetic Physical ASAT	Non-kinetic physical ASATs damage or degrade without contact, typically via directed energy or intense electromagnetic effects. Ground- or space-based lasers can dazzle or blind optical sensors; high-power microwave or related electromagnetic systems can disrupt or permanently damage susceptible electronics; some concepts aim to generate broader electromagnetic effects. These attacks propagate at light speed, can be tuned for reversible or lasting impact, and may leave limited forensic residue, complicating verification and attribution. Actors who obtain or partner for such systems can pair them with cyber operations (e.g., blind a star tracker while injecting misleading commands) to amplify effect.
	.03	Kinetic Physical ASAT	Kinetic capabilities physically strike space or ground elements. In space, direct-ascent systems launch from Earth to intercept a satellite on orbit; co-orbital systems maneuver in space to approach and impact a target. On the ground, kinetic attacks can target stations or support infrastructure. These actions are generally easier to detect and attribute and often produce persistent, hazardous debris in orbit, especially at higher altitudes, making them strategically escalatory. Actors developing or accessing such capabilities gain credible coercive power but at significant political and operational cost.
	.04	Electronic ASAT	Electronic ASAT attacks target the communications lifelines of space systems rather than their structures: jamming raises the noise floor to deny service; spoofing crafts believable but false signals (navigation, timing, or control). These effects are usually transient and can be difficult to attribute quickly, yet they are operationally useful and comparatively inexpensive. Actors may obtain portable or fixed jammers, high-gain antennas with agile waveforms, and specialized signal-processing toolchains; from orbit, a nearby asset can deliver highly selective interference.
IA-0001		Compromise Supply Chain	Adversaries achieve first execution before the spacecraft ever flies by inserting malicious code, data, or configuration during manufacturing, integration, or delivery. Targets include software sources and dependencies, build systems and compilers, firmware/bitstreams for MCUs and FPGAs, configuration tables, test vectors, and off-the-shelf avionics. Inserted artifacts are designed to appear legitimate, propagate through normal processes, and activate under routine procedures or specific modes (e.g., safing, maintenance). Common insertion points align with where trust is assumed, vendor updates, mirrors and registries, CI/CD runners, programming stations, and “golden image” repositories. The result is pre-positioned access that blends with baseline behavior, often with delayed or conditional triggers and strong deniability.
	.02	Software Supply Chain	Here the manipulation targets software delivered to flight or ground systems: altering source before build, swapping signed binaries at distribution edges, subverting update metadata, or using stolen signing keys to issue malicious patches. Space-specific vectors include mission control applications, schedulers, gateway services, flight tables and configuration packages, and firmware loads during I&T or LEOP. Adversaries craft payloads that pass superficial validation, trigger under particular operating modes, or reintroduce known weaknesses through version rollback. “Data payloads” such as malformed tables, ephemerides, or calibration products can double as exploits when parsers are permissive. The objective is to ride the normal promotion pipeline so the implant arrives pre-trusted and executes as part of routine operations.
	.03	Hardware Supply Chain	Adversaries alter boards, modules, or programmable logic prior to delivery to create latent access or reliability sabotage. Tactics include inserting hardware Trojans in ASIC/FPGA designs, modifying bitstreams or disabling security fuses, leaving debug interfaces (JTAG/SWD/UART) active, substituting near-spec counterfeits, or embedding parts that fail after specific environmental or temporal conditions (“time-bomb” components). Other avenues target programming stations and “golden” images so entire lots inherit the same weakness. Microcontroller boot configurations, peripheral EEPROMs, and supervisory controllers are common leverage points because small changes there can reshape trust boundaries across the bus. The effect is a platform that behaves nominally through acceptance test yet enables covert control, targeted degradation, or delayed failure once on orbit.
IA-0004		Secondary/Backup Communication Channel	Adversaries pursue alternative paths to the spacecraft that differ from the primary TT&C in configuration, monitoring, or authentication. Examples include backup MOC/ground networks, contingency TT&C chains, maintenance or recovery consoles, low-rate emergency beacons, and secondary receivers or antennas on the vehicle. These channels exist to preserve commandability during outages, safing, or maintenance; they may use different vendors, legacy settings, or simplified procedures. Initial access typically pairs reconnaissance of failover rules with actions that steer operations onto the backup path, natural events, induced denial on the primary, or simple patience until scheduled tests and handovers occur. Once traffic flows over the alternate path, the attacker leverages its distinct procedures, dictionaries, or rate/size limits to introduce commands or data that would be harder to inject on the primary.
	.02	Receiver	Threat actors may target the spacecraft’s secondary (backup) RF receive path, often a differently sourced radio, alternate antenna/feed, or cross-strapped front end that is powered or enabled under specific modes. Threat actors map when the backup comes into play (safing, antenna obscuration, maintenance, link degradation) and what command dictionaries, framing, or authentication it expects. If the backup receiver has distinct waveforms, counters, or vendor defaults, the attacker can inject traffic that is accepted only when that path is active, limiting exposure during nominal ops. Forcing conditions that enable the backup, jamming the primary, exploiting geometry, or waiting for routine tests, creates the window for first execution. The result is a foothold gained through a rarely used RF path, exploiting differences in implementation and operational cadence between primary and standby receive chains.
EX-0016		Jamming	Jamming is an electronic attack that uses radio frequency energy to deny the use of a signal, whether that signal carries communications, navigation, or timing. A jammer must operate in the same frequency band and within the field of view of the antenna it is targeting. Unlike physical attacks, the interference itself is completely reversible: once the jammer is disengaged, reception can be restored. Second-order effects may persist, however, where the outage has already caused a clock to drift, a schedule to slip, or a synchronization state to be lost. Attribution of jamming can be tough because the source can be small and highly mobile, and users operating on the wrong frequency or pointed at the wrong satellite can jam friendly communications.* Similar to intentional jamming, accidental jamming can cause temporary signal degradation. Accidental jamming refers to unintentional interference with communication signals, and it can potentially impact spacecraft in various ways, depending on the severity, frequency, and duration of the interference. *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
	.01	Uplink Jamming	The attacker transmits toward the spacecraft’s uplink receive antenna, within its main lobe or significant sidelobes, at the operating frequency and sufficient power spectral density to drive the uplink Eb/N₀ below the demodulator’s threshold. Uplink jamming prevents acceptance of telecommands and ranging/acquisition traffic, delaying or blocking scheduled operations. Because the receiver resides on the spacecraft, the jammer must be located within the spacecraft’s receive footprint and match its polarization and Doppler conditions well enough to couple energy into the front end.
	.02	Downlink Jamming	Downlink jammers target the users of a satellite by creating noise in the same frequency as the downlink signal from the satellite. A downlink jammer only needs to be as powerful as the signal being received on the ground and must be within the field of view of the receiving terminal’s antenna. This limits the number of users that can be affected by a single jammer. Since many ground terminals use directional antennas pointed at the sky, a downlink jammer typically needs to be located above the terminal it is attempting to jam. This limitation can be overcome by employing a downlink jammer on an air or space-based platform, which positions the jammer between the terminal and the satellite. This also allows the jammer to cover a wider area and potentially affect more users. Ground terminals with omnidirectional antennas, such as many GPS receivers, have a wider field of view and thus are more susceptible to downlink jamming from different angles on the ground.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
	.03	Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Jamming	The attacker raises the noise floor in GNSS bands so satellite navigation signals are not acquired or tracked. Loss of PNT manifests as degraded or unavailable position/velocity/time solutions, which in turn disrupts functions that depend on them, time distribution, attitude aiding, scheduling, anti-replay windows, and visibility prediction. Because GNSS signals at the receiver are extremely weak, modest jammers within the antenna field of view can produce outsized effects; mobile emitters can create intermittent outages aligned with the attacker’s objectives.
EX-0017		Kinetic Physical Attack	The adversary inflicts damage by physically striking space assets or their supporting elements, producing irreversible effects that are generally visible to space situational awareness. Kinetic attacks in orbit are commonly grouped into direct-ascent engagements, launched from Earth to intercept a target on a specific pass, and co-orbital engagements, in which an on-orbit vehicle maneuvers to collide with or detonate near the target. Outcomes include structural breakup, loss of attitude control, sensor or antenna destruction, and wholesale mission termination; secondary effects include debris creation whose persistence depends on altitude and geometry. Because launches and on-orbit collisions are measurable, these actions tend to be more attributable and offer near–real-time confirmation of effect compared to non-kinetic methods.
	.01	Direct Ascent ASAT	A direct-ascent ASAT is often the most commonly thought of threat to space assets. It typically involves a medium- or long-range missile launching from the Earth to damage or destroy a satellite in orbit. This form of attack is often easily attributed due to the missile launch which can be easily detected. Due to the physical nature of the attacks, they are irreversible and provide the attacker with near real-time confirmation of success. Direct-ascent ASATs create orbital debris which can be harmful to other objects in orbit. Lower altitudes allow for more debris to burn up in the atmosphere, while attacks at higher altitudes result in more debris remaining in orbit, potentially damaging other spacecraft in orbit.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
	.02	Co-Orbital ASAT	A co-orbital ASAT uses a spacecraft already in space to conduct a deliberate collision or near-field detonation. After insertion, often well before any hostile action, the vehicle performs rendezvous and proximity operations to achieve the desired relative geometry, then closes to impact or triggers a kinetic or explosive device. Guidance relies on relative navigation (optical, lidar, crosslink cues) and precise timing to manage closing speeds and contact angle. Compared with direct-ascent shots, co-orbital approaches can loiter, shadow, or “stalk” a target for extended periods, masking as inspection or servicing until the terminal maneuver. Effects include mechanical disruption, fragmentation, or mission-ending damage, with debris characteristics shaped by the chosen altitude, closing velocity, and collision geometry.
EX-0018		Non-Kinetic Physical Attack	The adversary inflicts physical effects on a satellite without mechanical contact, using energy delivered through the environment. Principal modalities are electromagnetic pulse (EMP), high-power laser (optical/thermal effects), and high-power microwave (HPM). These methods can be tuned for reversible disruption (temporary sensor saturation, processor upsets) or irreversible damage (component burnout, optics degradation), and may be executed from ground, airborne, or space platforms given line-of-sight and power/aperture conditions. Forensics are often ambiguous: signatures may resemble environmental phenomena or normal degradations, and confirmation of effect is frequently limited to what the operator observes in telemetry or performance loss.
	.01	Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)	An EMP delivers a broadband, high-amplitude electromagnetic transient that couples into spacecraft electronics and harnesses, upsetting or damaging components over wide areas. In space, the archetype is a high-altitude nuclear event whose prompt fields induce immediate upsets and whose secondary radiation environment elevates dose and charging for an extended period along affected orbits. Consequences include widespread single-event effects, latch-ups, permanent degradation of sensitive devices, and accelerated aging of solar arrays and materials. The effect envelope is large and largely indiscriminate: multiple satellites within view can experience simultaneous anomalies consistent with intense electromagnetic stress and enhanced radiation.
	.02	High-Powered Laser	A high-powered laser can be used to permanently or temporarily damage critical satellite components (i.e. solar arrays or optical centers). If directed toward a satellite’s optical center, the attack is known as blinding or dazzling. Blinding, as the name suggests, causes permanent damage to the optics of a satellite. Dazzling causes temporary loss of sight for the satellite. While there is clear attribution of the location of the laser at the time of the attack, the lasers used in these attacks may be mobile, which can make attribution to a specific actor more difficult because the attacker does not have to be in their own nation, or even continent, to conduct such an attack. Only the satellite operator will know if the attack is successful, meaning the attacker has limited confirmation of success, as an attacked nation may not choose to announce that their satellite has been attacked or left vulnerable for strategic reasons. A high-powered laser attack can also leave the targeted satellite disabled and uncontrollable, which could lead to collateral damage if the satellite begins to drift. A higher-powered laser may permanently damage a satellite by overheating its parts. The parts most susceptible to this are satellite structures, thermal control panels, and solar panels.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
	.03	High-Powered Microwave	High-powered microwave (HPM) weapons can be used to disrupt or destroy a satellite’s electronics. A “front-door” HPM attack uses a satellite’s own antennas as an entry path, while a “back-door” attack attempts to enter through small seams or gaps around electrical connections and shielding. A front-door attack is more straightforward to carry out, provided the HPM is positioned within the field of view of the antenna that it is using as a pathway, but it can be thwarted if the satellite uses circuits designed to detect and block surges of energy entering through the antenna. In contrast, a back-door attack is more challenging, because it must exploit design or manufacturing flaws, but it can be conducted from many angles relative to the satellite. Both types of attacks can be either reversible or irreversible; however, the attacker may not be able to control the severity of the damage from the attack. Both front-door and back-door HPM attacks can be difficult to attribute to an attacker, and like a laser weapon, the attacker may not know if the attack has been successful. A HPM attack may leave the target satellite disabled and uncontrollable which can cause it to drift into other satellites, creating further collateral damage.* *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
PER-0002		Backdoor	A backdoor is a covert access path that bypasses normal authentication, authorization, or operational checks so the attacker can reenter the system on demand. Backdoors may be preexisting (undocumented service modes, maintenance accounts, debug features) or introduced by the adversary during development, integration, or on-orbit updates. Triggers range from “magic” opcodes and timetags to specific geometry/time conditions, counters, or data patterns embedded in routine traffic. The access they provide varies from expanded command sets and relaxed rate/size limits to alternate communications profiles and hidden file/parameter interfaces. Well-crafted backdoors blend with nominal behavior, appearing as ordinary operations while quietly accepting instructions that other paths would reject, thereby sustaining the attacker’s foothold across passes, resets, and operator handovers.
	.01	Hardware Backdoor	Hardware backdoors leverage properties of the physical design to provide durable, low-visibility reentry. Examples include enabled test/scan chains, manufacturing or boot-strap modes invoked by pins or registers, persistent debug interfaces (JTAG/SWD/UART), undocumented device commands, and logic inserted in FPGA/ASIC designs that activates under specific stimuli. Because these mechanisms sit below or beside flight software, they can grant direct access to buses, memories, or peripheral control even when higher layers appear healthy. Triggers may be electrical (pin states, voltage/clock sequences), protocol-level (special patterns on an instrument link), or environmental/temporal (particular temperature ranges, timing offsets). Once on orbit, such pathways are difficult to remove or reconfigure, allowing the attacker to persist by reusing the same physical entry points whenever conditions are met.
	.02	Software Backdoor	Software backdoors are code paths intentionally crafted or later inserted to provide privileged functionality on cue. In flight contexts, they appear as hidden command handlers, alternate authentication checks, special user/role constructs, or procedure/script hooks that accept nonpublic inputs. They can be embedded in flight applications, separation kernels or drivers, gateway processors that translate bus/payload traffic, or update/loader utilities that handle tables and images. SDR configurations offer another avenue: non-public waveforms, subcarriers, or framing profiles that, when selected, expose a private command channel. Activation is often conditional, specific timetags, geometry, message sequences, or file names, to keep the feature dormant during routine testing and operations. Once present, the backdoor provides a repeatable way to execute commands or modify state without traversing the standard control surfaces, sustaining the adversary’s access over time.

ID	Description
SV-SP-4	General supply chain interruption or manipulation

Sample Requirements

SPARTA ID	Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
SPR-9	The [organization] shall implement a security architecture and design that provides the required security functionality, allocates security controls among physical and logical components, and integrates individual security functions, mechanisms, and processes together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.{SV-MA-6}{PL-7,SA-2,SA-8,SA-8(1),SA-8(2),SA-8(3),SA-8(4),SA-8(5),SA-8(6),SA-8(7),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(13),SA-8(19),SA-8(29),SA-8(30),SC-32,SC-32(1)}	Security functionality must be intentionally distributed across physical and logical components rather than bolted on post-design. A unified architecture prevents inconsistent enforcement, duplicated controls, or unprotected interfaces. Integrated design reduces attack surface and improves verification of mission-critical protections.
SPR-15	The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.{SV-AV-1,SV-IT-1}{AC-3,AC-20,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-23(3),SC-40(3),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}	Adversaries may attempt imitative RF signals to inject commands or manipulate spacecraft behavior. Signal parameter validation (modulation, power, timing, waveform characteristics) strengthens command authentication beyond cryptographic validation alone. This helps mitigate spoofing, replay, and rogue emitter attacks. RF-layer validation complements cryptographic controls.
SPR-46	The [spacecraft] shall monitor [Program‑defined telemetry points] for malicious commanding attempts and alert ground operators upon detection.{SV-AC-2,SV-IT-1,SV-DCO-1}{AC-17,AC-17(1),AC-17(10),AU-3(1),RA-10,SC-7,SC-16,SC-16(2),SC-16(3),SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}	Telemetry-based detection enables identification of anomalous command patterns, replay attempts, and injection attacks. Early detection allows rapid containment before mission impact escalates. Onboard monitoring is critical when ground latency limits intervention. This supports proactive defense.
SPR-48	The [spacecraft] shall implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity of audit information and audit tools.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-9(3),RA-10,SC-8(1),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(24)}	Audit logs are essential for attribution and forensic analysis. If adversaries can modify audit data, detection and recovery become unreliable. Cryptographic integrity protections preserve evidentiary value.
SPR-53	The [organization] shall employ automated tools that provide notification to ground operators upon discovering discrepancies during integrity verification.{CM-3(5),CM-6,IR-6,IR-6(2),SA-8(21),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(2)}
SPR-55	The [spacecraft] shall provide cyber threat status to the ground segment for the Defensive Cyber Operations team, per the governing specification.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-5,PM-16,PM-16(1),RA-3(3),RA-10,SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}	The future space enterprises will include full-time Cyber Defense teams supporting space mission systems. Their work is currently focused on the ground segment but may eventually require specific data from the space segment for their successful operation. This requirement is a placeholder to ensure that any DCO-related requirements are taken into consideration for this document.
SPR-56	The [spacecraft] shall provide automated onboard mechanisms that integrate audit review, analysis, and reporting processes to support mission processes for investigation and response to suspicious activities to determine the attack class in the event of a cyber attack.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(1),IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),PM-16(1),RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(22),SC-5(3),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}	* Identifying the class (e.g., exfiltration, Trojans, etc.), nature, or effect of cyberattack (e.g., exfiltration, subverted control, or mission interruption) is necessary to determine the type of response. The first order of identification may be to determine whether the event is an attack or a non-threat event (anomaly). The objective requirement would be to predict the impact of the detected signature. * Unexpected conditions can include RF lockups, loss of lock, failure to acquire an expected contact and unexpected reports of acquisition, unusual AGC and ACS control excursions, unforeseen actuator enabling's or actions, thermal stresses, power aberrations, failure to authenticate, software or counter resets, etc. Mitigation might include additional TMONs, more detailed AGC and PLL thresholds to alert operators, auto-capturing state snapshot images in memory when unexpected conditions occur, signal spectra measurements, and expanded default diagnostic telemetry modes to help in identifying and resolving anomalous conditions.
SPR-57	The [spacecraft] shall monitor and collect all onboard cyber- data (from multiple system components), including identification of potential attacks and information about the attack for subsequent analysis.{SV-DCO-1}{AC-6(9),AC-20,AC-20(1),AU-2,AU-12,IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(2),SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}	The spacecraft will monitor and collect data that provides accountability of activity occurring onboard the spacecraft. Due to resource limitations on the spacecraft, analysis must be performed to determine which data is critical for retention and which can be filtered. Full system coverage of data and actions is desired as an objective; it will likely be impractical due to the resource limitations. “Cyber-relevant data” refers to all data and actions deemed necessary to support accountability and awareness of onboard cyber activities for the mission. This would include data that may indicate abnormal activities, critical configuration parameters, transmissions on onboard networks, command logging, or other such data items. This set of data items should be identified early in the system requirements and design phase. Cyber-relevant data should support the ability to assess whether abnormal events are unintended anomalies or actual cyber threats. Actual cyber threats may rarely or never occur, but non-threat anomalies occur regularly. The ability to filter out cyber threats for non-cyber threats in relevant time would provide a needed capability. Examples could include successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g., classification levels).
SPR-58	The [spacecraft] shall generate cyber related audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, and the outcome of the event. For privileged or hazardous commands, the audit record shall include the approver identifiers and the command identifier.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-3,AU-3(1),AU-12,IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}	Detailed audit records are essential for attribution, anomaly detection, and post-incident forensic reconstruction. Capturing what occurred, when, where, and by whom enables rapid differentiation between system fault and adversarial activity. Including approver identifiers for privileged or hazardous commands strengthens accountability and insider threat mitigation. Without complete audit context, recovery and containment decisions may be delayed or misinformed.
SPR-59	The [spacecraft] shall attribute cyber attacks and identify unauthorized use of the platform by downlinking onboard cyber information to the mission ground station within [Program‑defined time ≤ 3 minutes].{SV-DCO-1,SV-IT-1,SV-IT-2}{AU-4(1),IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),RA-10,SA-8(22),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(5),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24)}	Rapid transmission of cyber-relevant telemetry supports near-real-time ground-based fusion and correlation with enterprise security events. Delayed reporting increases risk of adversary persistence or mission degradation. Early attribution enables containment actions before cascading effects occur. Defined timeliness ensures detection capability aligns with operational tempo.
SPR-60	The [spacecraft] shall integrate cyber related detection and responses with existing fault management capabilities to ensure tight integration between traditional fault management and cyber intrusion detection and prevention.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-6(4),IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(26),SC-3(4),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(16),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-7(7),SI-13}	The onboard IPS system should be integrated into the existing onboard spacecraft fault management system (FMS) because the FMS has its own fault detection and response system built in. SV corrective behavior is usually limited to automated fault responses and ground commanded recovery actions. Intrusion prevention and response methods will inform resilient cybersecurity design. These methods enable detected threat activity to trigger defensive responses and resilient SV recovery.
SPR-61	The [spacecraft] shall protect information obtained from logging/intrusion-monitoring from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-9,AU-9(3),RA-10,SI-4(7),SI-4(24)}	Monitoring data is a high-value target for attackers seeking to evade detection or erase traces of compromise. Protecting log integrity preserves evidentiary value and detection continuity. Unauthorized modification or deletion could mask malicious behavior or delay response. Cryptographic protection and access controls ensure monitoring mechanisms cannot be silently disabled.
SPR-62	The [spacecraft] shall enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected, enters a cyber-safe mode of operation with restrictions as defined based on the cyber-safe mode.{SV-AV-5,SV-AV-6,SV-AV-7}{CP-10(6),CP-12,CP-13,IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(3),PE-10,RA-10,SA-8(16),SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-13,SI-17}	Cyber-safe mode provides a deterministic fallback posture when compromise or anomalous conditions threaten mission integrity. Restricting non-essential functions reduces attack surface and prevents further propagation of malicious activity. Defined restrictions ensure predictable behavior under cyber stress conditions. This supports survivability and controlled recovery rather than uncontrolled degradation.
SPR-63	The [spacecraft] shall be able to locate the onboard origin of a cyber attack and alert ground operators within [Program‑defined time ≤ 3 minutes].{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,IR-4(1),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),RA-10,SA-8(22),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(16),SI-4(24)}	The origin of any attack onboard the vehicle should be identifiable to support mitigation. At the very least, attacks from critical element (safety-critical or higher-attack surface) components should be locatable quickly so that timely action can occur.
SPR-64	The [spacecraft] shall detect and deny unauthorized outgoing communications posing a threat to the spacecraft.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,IR-4(1),RA-5(4),RA-10,SC-7(9),SC-7(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(4),SI-4(7),SI-4(11),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25)}	Outbound communications may indicate data exfiltration, covert channels, or compromised subsystem behavior. Monitoring and blocking unauthorized egress prevents leakage of mission data or cryptographic material. Many attacks rely on command-and-control or data extraction channels; egress control disrupts this persistence mechanism. Outbound traffic should be as tightly controlled as inbound command paths.
SPR-65	The [spacecraft] shall select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber attacks prior to entering cyber-safe mode.{SV-DCO-1}{IR-4,RA-10,SA-8(21),SA-8(24),SI-4(7),SI-17}	These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker exquisitely—with or without ground aiding. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system." These countermeasures are likely executed prior to entering into a cyber-safe mode.
SPR-66	The [spacecraft] shall be designed and configured so that encrypted communications traffic and data is visible to on-board security monitoring tools.{SV-DCO-1}{RA-10,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(10),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25)}	Encryption must not blind onboard intrusion detection capabilities. Security tools require access to sufficient context (pre-encryption or post-decryption inspection points) to detect malicious patterns. Without visibility, encrypted channels become covert channels. Proper architectural placement ensures both confidentiality and detectability are preserved.
SPR-67	The [spacecraft] shall be designed and configured so that spacecraft memory can be monitored by the on-board intrusion detection/prevention capability.{SV-DCO-1}{RA-10,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(24),SI-16}	Many spacecraft attacks target memory corruption, firmware modification, or unauthorized process injection. Monitoring memory state enables detection of tampering, abnormal writes, or execution anomalies. Memory visibility supports early detection of wiper malware or boot-level compromise. This is essential for protecting deterministic flight software environments.
SPR-68	The [spacecraft] shall have on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems.{SV-AC-1,SV-AC-2,SV-MA-4}{RA-10,SC-7,SI-3,SI-3(8),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(13),SI-4(24),SI-4(25),SI-10(6)}	The mission critical components or systems could be GNC/Attitude Control, C&DH, TT&C, Fault Management.
SPR-69	The [spacecraft] shall alert in the event of the audit/logging processing failures.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2),SI-3,SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24)}	Failure of logging mechanisms may signal active tampering or resource exhaustion attacks. Immediate alerting ensures loss of visibility does not go unnoticed. Silent failure of audit systems creates blind spots exploitable by adversaries. Monitoring the monitors is critical to resilient detection.
SPR-70	The [spacecraft] shall provide an alert immediately to [at a minimum the mission director, administrators, and security officers] when the following failure events occur: [minimally but not limited to: auditing software/hardware errors; failures in the audit capturing mechanisms; and audit storage capacity reaching 95%, 99%, and 100%] of allocated capacity, including security component failover events; alerts shall include component identity, time, and fault reason.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5,AU-5(1),AU-5(2),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}	Intent is to have human on the ground be alerted to failures. This can be decomposed to SV to generate telemetry and to Ground to alert.
SPR-71	The [spacecraft] shall provide the capability of a cyber “black-box” to capture necessary data for cyber forensics of threat signatures and anomaly resolution when cyber attacks are detected. The [spacecraft] shall automatically route audit events to the alternate audit logging capability upon primary audit failure and shall resynchronize the alternate store to the primary upon recovery.{SV-DCO-1}{AU-5(5),AU-9(2),AU-9(3),AU-12,IR-4(12),IR-4(13),IR-5(1),SI-3,SI-3(10),SI-4,SI-4(1),SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7(7)}	Similar concept of a "black box" on an aircraft where all critical information is stored for post forensic analysis. Black box can be used to record CPU utilization, GNC physical parameters, audit records, memory contents, TT&C data points, etc. The timeframe is dependent upon implementation but needs to meet the intent of the requirement. For example, 30 days may suffice.
SPR-72	The [spacecraft] shall automatically notify ground operators when onboard integrity verification detects discrepancies.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(2),SI-7(12)}	Integrity check failures may indicate unauthorized modification, corruption, or hardware faults induced by malicious activity. Automatic notification ensures ground teams can rapidly assess risk and initiate recovery procedures. Delay in reporting increases mission impact. Transparency between onboard detection and ground response is essential for coordinated defense.
SPR-73	The [spacecraft], upon detection of a potential integrity violation, shall provide the capability to [audit the event and alert ground operators].{SV-DCO-1}{CM-3(5),SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-4(24),SI-7(8)}	One example would be for bad commands where the system would reject the command and not increment the Vehicle Command Counter (VCC) and include the information in telemetry.
SPR-229	The [organization] shall protect documentation and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy.{SV-CF-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-10,SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	Documentation may reveal architecture details exploitable by adversaries. Proper handling prevents leakage. Protection of CUI supports regulatory compliance. Information governance complements technical controls.
SPR-230	The [organization] shall identify and properly classify mission sensitive design/operations information and access control shall be applied in accordance with classification guides and applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.{SV-CF-3,SV-AV-5}{AC-3,CM-12,CP-2,PM-17,RA-5(4),SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-5,SA-8(19),SC-8(1),SC-28(3),SI-12}	* Mission sensitive information should be classified as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or formally known as Sensitive but Unclassified. Ideally these artifacts would be rated SECRET or higher and stored on classified networks. Mission sensitive information can typically include a wide range of candidate material: the functional and performance specifications, the RF ICDs, databases, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results/reports, descriptions of uplink protection including any disabling/bypass features, failure/anomaly resolution, and any other sensitive information related to architecture, software, and flight/ground /mission operations. This could all need protection at the appropriate level (e.g., unclassified, SBU, classified, etc.) to mitigate levels of cyber intrusions that may be conducted against the project’s networks. Stand-alone systems and/or separate database encryption may be needed with controlled access and on-going Configuration Management to ensure changes in command procedures and critical database areas are tracked, controlled, and fully tested to avoid loss of science or the entire mission.
SPR-233	The [organization] shall identify the applicable physical and environmental protection policies covering the development environment and spacecraft hardware. {SV-SP-4,SV-SP-5,SV-SP-10}{PE-1,PE-14,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-10(3)}	Development environments must be protected from tampering. Physical controls prevent hardware supply chain compromise. Policy clarity ensures consistent safeguards. Secure development underpins secure deployment.
SPR-234	The [organization] shall develop and document program-specific identification and authentication policies for accessing the development environment and spacecraft. {SV-SP-10,SV-AC-4}{AC-3,AC-14,IA-1,SA-3,SA-3(1)}	Strong authentication prevents unauthorized development access. Development compromise can introduce malicious code. Documented policies ensure consistent enforcement. Identity governance supports supply chain integrity.
SPR-235	The [organization] shall ensure security requirements/configurations are placed in accordance with NIST 800-171 with enhancements in 800-172 on the development environments to prevent the compromise of source code from supply chain or information leakage perspective.{SV-SP-4,SV-SP-10,SV-CF-3}{AC-3,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-15}	Supply chain threats target development environments. Enhanced controls reduce risk of source code exfiltration. Compliance strengthens contractual and regulatory assurance. Development security directly impacts spacecraft integrity.
SPR-236	The [organization] shall implement a verifiable flaw remediation process into the developmental and operational configuration management process.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{CA-2,CA-5,SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-11,SI-3,SI-3(10)}	The verifiable process should also include a cross reference to mission objectives and impact statements. Understanding the flaws discovered and how they correlate to mission objectives will aid in prioritization.
SPR-237	The [organization] shall establish robust procedures and technical methods to perform testing to include adversarial testing (i.e.abuse cases) of the platform hardware and software.{SV-SP-2,SV-SP-1}{CA-8,CP-4(5),RA-5,RA-5(1),RA-5(2),SA-3,SA-4(3),SA-11,SA-11(1),SA-11(2),SA-11(5),SA-11(7),SA-11(8),SA-15(7)}	Abuse-case testing reveals design weaknesses before deployment. Red-teaming strengthens defensive posture. Proactive validation reduces operational risk. Testing must simulate realistic threat scenarios.
SPR-238	The [organization] shall require subcontractors developing information system components or providing information system services (as appropriate) to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}	Select the particular subcontractors, software vendors, and manufacturers based on the criticality analysis performed for the Program Protection Plan and the criticality of the components that they supply. Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
SPR-245	The [organization] shall define processes and procedures to be followed when integrity verification tools detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3,CM-3(1),CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-6,CP-2,IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-30,SC-16(1),SC-51,SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(7),SI-7(10)}	Predefined response procedures reduce reaction time. Clear escalation paths improve containment. Consistent handling prevents confusion during incidents. Preparedness strengthens resilience.
SPR-259	The [organization] shall develop an incident response and forensics plan that covers the spacecrafts.{SV-MA-5}{CP-2,IR-1,IR-3,IR-3(2),IR-4(12),IR-4(13),IR-8,SA-15(10),SI-4(24)}	A structured response plan enables coordinated containment and recovery. Forensics planning ensures evidence preservation. Defined procedures reduce confusion during crisis. Incident readiness enhances resilience.
SPR-262	The [organization] includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.{SV-AC-4}{AT-2(2),IR-4(6),IR-6,IR-6(2),PM-16}	Authorized users present significant risk vectors. Awareness training improves detection of anomalous behavior. Early reporting reduces insider dwell time. Human vigilance complements technical controls.
SPR-263	The [organization] shall provide training to its personnel on how to identify and respond to malicious code indicators to include but not limited to indicators of potentially malicious code in flight software, indicators from development machine’s anti-virus/anti-malware software of potential malicious code, and to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in [organization] information systems.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-10}{AT-3(4),IR-6,IR-6(2),SI-4(24)}	Personnel must recognize signs of compromised flight or development systems. Early detection prevents propagation into mission assets. Training strengthens defense across lifecycle stages. Awareness reduces supply chain exposure.
SPR-281	The [organization] shall have an Insider Threat Program to aid in the detection and prevention of people with authorized access to perform malicious activities.{SV-AC-4}{AT-2(2),IR-4(6),IR-4(7),PM-12,PM-16}	Formal insider programs provide monitoring, reporting, and mitigation mechanisms. Behavioral analysis strengthens early detection. Structured governance reduces insider impact. Policy-backed programs improve deterrence.
SPR-282	The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers of the information system, system components, or system services to inform engineering, acquisition, and risk management decisions.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-AV-7,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30,RA-2,RA-3(1),RA-3(2),RA-7,SA-9,SA-12(8),SR-5(2)}	* The Program should also consider sub suppliers and potential sub suppliers. * All-source intelligence of suppliers that the organization may use includes: (1) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Threat Assessment Center (TAC), the enterprise focal point for supplier threat assessments for the DOD acquisition community risks; (2) Other U.S. Government resources including: (a) Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) – Database where government and industry can record issues with suppliers, including counterfeits; and (b) System for Award Management (SAM) – Database of companies that are barred from doing business with the US Government.
SPR-283	The [organization] shall request threat analysis of suppliers of critical components and manage access to and control of threat analysis products containing U.S.person information.{SV-SP-3,SV-SP-4,SV-SP-11}{PM-16,PM-30(1),RA-3(1),SA-9,SA-12,SR-1}	The intent of this requirement is to address supply chain concerns on hardware and software vendors. Not required for trusted suppliers accredited to the Defense Microelectronic Activity (DMEA). If the Program intends to use a supplier not accredited by DMEA, the government customer should be notified as soon as possible. If the Program has internal processes to vet suppliers, it may meet this requirement. All software used and its origins must be included in the SBOM and be subjected to internal and Government vulnerability scans.
SPR-284	The [organization] shall use all-source intelligence analysis on threats to mission critical capabilities and/or system components to inform risk management decisions.{SV-MA-4}{PM-16,RA-3(2),RA-3(3),RA-7,RA-9,SA-12(8),SA-15(8)}	Intelligence-informed risk management anticipates adversary capabilities. External threat awareness improves proactive defense. Integration into decision-making strengthens resilience. Threat-informed design reduces reactive posture.
SPR-285	The [organization] risk assessment shall include the full end to end communication pathway (i.e., round trip) to include any crosslink communications.{SV-MA-4}{AC-20,AC-20(1),AC-20(3),RA-3,SA-8(18)}	Full pathway analysis prevents overlooking intermediate segments. Crosslinks may introduce lateral risk exposure. Round-trip evaluation strengthens confidentiality and integrity assurance. Holistic view reduces blind spots.
SPR-286	The [organization] shall conduct an assessment of risk prior to each milestone review [SRR\PDR\CDR], including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the platform and the information it processes, stores, or transmits.{SV-MA-4}{RA-2,RA-3,SA-8(25)}	Major design decisions must reflect updated threat posture. Pre-milestone risk review prevents costly redesign. Structured evaluation supports informed governance. Early risk integration enhances mission confidence.
SPR-287	The [organization] shall document risk assessment results in [risk assessment report].{SV-MA-4}{RA-3}	Formal documentation preserves rationale for decisions. Traceability enables future reassessment. Written records support compliance. Documentation strengthens transparency.
SPR-288	The [organization] shall review risk assessment results [At least annually if not otherwise defined in formal organizational policy].{SV-MA-4}{RA-3}	Periodic review ensures evolving threats are considered. Regular reassessment prevents stagnation. Continuous evaluation supports adaptive defense. Governance must be iterative.
SPR-289	The [organization] shall update the risk assessment [At least annually if not otherwise defined in formal institutional policy] or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the spacecraft.{SV-MA-4}{RA-3}	System modifications alter risk posture. Immediate reassessment ensures continued compliance. Responsive review strengthens mission assurance. Risk management must be dynamic.
SPR-290	The [organization] shall document risk assessment results in risk assessment report upon completion of each risk assessment.{SV-MA-6}{RA-3,RA-7}	Formal documentation preserves rationale for decisions. Traceability enables future reassessment. Written records support compliance. Documentation strengthens transparency.
SPR-291	The [organization] shall use the threat and vulnerability analyses of the as-built system, system components, or system services to inform and direct subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-6,SV-SP-7,SV-SP-9,SV-SP-11}{RA-3(3),SA-11(2),SA-15(8),SI-3}	Security analysis should guide test design. Threat-informed evaluation improves relevance. Feedback loops strengthen defensive posture. Analytical alignment enhances coverage.
SPR-435	For FPGA pre-silicon artifacts that are developed, coded, and tested by a developer that is not accredited, the [organization] shall be subjected to a development environment and pre-silicon artifacts risk assessment by [organization]. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the [organization] may need to implement protective measures or other processes to ensure the integrity of the FPGA pre-silicon artifacts.{SV-SP-5}{SA-3,SA-3(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-12,SA-12(1),SR-1,SR-5}	DOD-I-5200.44 requires the following: 4.c.2 “Control the quality, configuration, and security of software, firmware, hardware, and systems throughout their lifecycles... Employ protections that manage risk in the supply chain… (e.g., integrated circuits, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), printed circuit boards) when they are identifiable (to the supplier) as having a DOD end-use. “ 4.e “In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a Trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custommanufactured, or tailored for a specific DOD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC)). “ 1.g “In coordination with the DOD CIO, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Heads of the DOD Components, develop a strategy for managing risk in the supply chain for integrated circuit-related products and services (e.g., FPGAs, printed circuit boards) that are identifiable to the supplier as specifically created or modified for DOD (e.g., military temperature range, radiation hardened).
SPR-436	The [organization] shall require the developer of the system, system component, or system services to demonstrate the use of a system development life cycle that includes [state-of-the-practice system/security engineering methods, software development methods, testing/evaluation/validation techniques, and quality control processes].{SV-SP-1,SV-SP-2,SV-SP-3,SV-SP-9}{SA-3,SA-4(3)}	Examples of good security practices would be using defense-in-depth tactics across the board, least-privilege being implemented, two factor authentication everywhere possible, using DevSecOps, implementing and validating adherence to secure coding standards, performing static code analysis, component/origin analysis for open source, fuzzing/dynamic analysis with abuse cases, etc.
SPR-437	The [organization] shall enable integrity verification of software and firmware components.{SV-IT-2}{CM-3(5),CM-5(6),CM-10(1),SA-8(9),SA-8(11),SA-8(21),SA-10(1),SI-3,SI-4(24),SI-7,SI-7(10),SI-7(12),SR-4(4)}	* The integrity verification mechanisms may include: Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites; Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery; Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure; Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses; Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing. Stipulating and monitoring logical delivery of products and services, requiring downloading from approved, verification-enhanced sites; Encrypting elements (software, software patches, etc.) and supply chain process data in transit (motion) and at rest throughout delivery; Requiring suppliers to provide their elements “secure by default”, so that additional configuration is required to make the element insecure; Implementing software designs using programming languages and tools that reduce the likelihood of weaknesses; Implementing cryptographic hash verification; and Establishing performance and sub-element baseline for the system and system elements to help detect unauthorized tampering/modification during repairs/refurbishing.
SPR-473	The [organization] shall establish a threat awareness program that provides mission-relevant cyber and EW threat briefings and advisories to spacecraft engineering, integration, and operations personnel at an [organization]-defined frequency, and shall track completion.{SV-MA-6}{PM-16}	Continuous threat awareness informs engineering decisions. Structured briefings reduce blind spots. Tracking completion ensures accountability. Knowledge improves preparedness.
SPR-474	The [organization] shall incorporate space cyber threat scenarios and mitigations into mission rehearsals and anomaly response training.{SV-MA-5,SV-AV-5}{PM-16,IR-2}	Realistic exercises validate preparedness. Embedding cyber threats in rehearsals strengthens operational readiness. Scenario-based training reduces reaction latency. Prepared teams enhance resilience.
SPR-475	The [organization] shall implement automated mechanisms to ingest, validate, and distribute space-relevant threat intelligence to [organization]-defined recipients, and to format uplinkable indicators or signatures for onboard detection capabilities where applicable.{SV-DCO-1,SV-IT-1}{SI-5,PM-16(1)}	Timely ingestion and distribution of space-relevant intelligence reduces exposure. Formatting indicators for onboard use supports proactive detection. Automation accelerates defensive posture. Integration supports adaptive security.
SPR-478	The [organization] shall map supplier failure impact to mission functions and assign risk-based oversight and acceptance criteria.{SV-SP-4,SV-MA-6}{PM-30(1),SR-2,RA-3}	Understanding supplier failure impact informs oversight priority. Risk-based criteria ensure proportional governance. Structured assessment prevents blind spots. Supply chain risk alignment strengthens mission resilience.
SPR-530	The [spacecraft] shall enable selected maintenance capabilities only within time‑bounded and mode‑bounded windows, audit enable/disable events, auto‑revert on timeout/reset, and expose enabled/disabled capability state in telemetry.{SV-AC-8,SV-AC-4}{CM-7,CM-7(2),SA-8,SA-8(14),AC-3}	Maintenance capabilities expand risk surface. Time-limited activation reduces abuse window. Telemetry exposure ensures oversight. Auto-revert strengthens containment.
SPR-537	The [organization] shall define event‑driven triggers for rapid risk reassessment (e.g., new images/bitstreams, key rotations, partner‑station onboarding, notable anomalies, vendor advisories) and rehearse fast‑turn evaluations in a twin/flatsat to drive decisions within one or two passes.{SV-SP-6,SV-SP-9}{RA-3,RA-3(1),CA-7}	Triggers ensure timely re-evaluation after impactful events. Flatsat rehearsal validates mitigation feasibility. Rapid cycles align with limited contact windows. Structured agility strengthens mission defense.

Threat Intelligence Program

Sources

Pre-Operations Government

Pre-Operations Developer/Supplier

Sustainment & Maintenance Government

Sustainment & Maintenance Developer/Supplier

NIST Rev5 Controls

D3FEND Techniques

D3FEND Artifacts

ISO 27001

NASA Best Practice Guide

ESA Space Shield Mitigation

Related MITRE EMB3D Mitigations

Related CSF 2.0

Related BSI Security Measures

Techniques Addressed by Countermeasure

Space Threats Addressed by Countermeasure

Sample Requirements