| IA-0004 |
Secondary/Backup Communication Channel |
Adversaries pursue alternative paths to the spacecraft that differ from the primary TT&C in configuration, monitoring, or authentication. Examples include backup MOC/ground networks, contingency TT&C chains, maintenance or recovery consoles, low-rate emergency beacons, and secondary receivers or antennas on the vehicle. These channels exist to preserve commandability during outages, safing, or maintenance; they may use different vendors, legacy settings, or simplified procedures. Initial access typically pairs reconnaissance of failover rules with actions that steer operations onto the backup path, natural events, induced denial on the primary, or simple patience until scheduled tests and handovers occur. Once traffic flows over the alternate path, the attacker leverages its distinct procedures, dictionaries, or rate/size limits to introduce commands or data that would be harder to inject on the primary. |
| EX-0001 |
Replay |
Replay is the re-transmission of previously captured traffic, over RF links, crosslinks, or internal buses, to elicit the same processing and effects a second time. Adversaries first observe and record authentic exchanges (telecommands, ranging/acquisition frames, housekeeping telemetry acknowledgments, bus messages), then resend them within acceptance conditions that the system recognizes, matching link geometry, timetags, counters, or mode states. The aim can be functional (re-triggering an action such as a mode change), observational (fingerprinting how the vehicle reacts at different states), or disruptive (saturating queues and bandwidth to crowd out legitimate traffic). Because replays preserve valid syntax and often valid context, they can blend with normal operations, especially during periods with reduced monitoring or when counters and windows reset (e.g., handovers, safing entries). On encrypted links, metadata replays (acquisition beacons, schedule requests) may still yield informative responses. |
| EX-0004 |
Compromise Boot Memory |
The attacker manipulates memory and configuration used in the earliest stages of boot so that their code runs before normal protections and integrity checks take hold. Targets include boot ROM vectors, first-stage/second-stage bootloaders, boot configuration words and strap pins, one-time-programmable (OTP) fuses, non-volatile images in flash/EEPROM, and scratch regions copied into RAM during cold start. Techniques range from replacing or patching boot images to flipping configuration bits that alter trust decisions (e.g., image selection, fallback order, watchdog behavior). Faults can be induced deliberately (timed power/clock/EM glitches) or via crafted update/write sequences that leave a partially programmed but executable state. Once resident, the modification can insert early hooks, disable or short-circuit checks, or select downgraded images; destructive variants corrupt the boot path to induce a persistent reset loop or safeing entry (a denial of service). Because boot logic initializes buses, memory maps, and handler tables, even small changes at this stage cascade, shaping how command handlers load, how keys and counters are initialized, and which peripherals are trusted for subsequent execution. |
| EX-0005 |
Exploit Hardware/Firmware Corruption |
The adversary achieves execution or effect beneath the software stack, in device firmware, programmable logic, or the hardware itself, either by corrupting that layer or by driving it through interfaces that function exactly as designed. Examples include tampering with firmware images or configuration blobs burned into non-volatile memory; targeting MCU/SoC boot ROM fallbacks; editing FPGA bitstreams or partial-reconfiguration frames; leveraging physical phenomena and timing to flip bits or skip checks; or issuing legitimate low-level device, maintenance, and calibration commands that act directly on hardware without passing through high-level command mediation. Because these actions occur below or alongside the operating system and application FSW, traditional endpoint safeguards see normal interfaces while trust anchors are already altered. |
| EX-0006 |
Disable/Bypass Encryption |
The adversary alters how confidentiality or integrity is applied so traffic or data is processed in clear or with weakened protection. Paths include toggling configuration flags that place links or storage into maintenance/test modes; forcing algorithm “fallbacks” or null ciphers; downgrading negotiated suites or keys; manipulating anti-replay/counter state so checks are skipped; substituting crypto libraries or tables during boot/update; and selecting alternate routes that carry the same content without encryption. On some designs, distinct modes handle authentication and confidentiality separately, allowing an actor who obtains authentication material to request unencrypted service or to switch to legacy profiles. The end state is that command, telemetry, or data products traverse a path the spacecraft accepts while cryptographic protection is absent, weakened, or inconsistently applied, enabling subsequent tactics such as inspection, manipulation, or exfiltration. |
| EX-0007 |
Trigger Single Event Upset |
The attacker induces or opportunistically exploits a single-event upset (SEU), a transient bit flip or latch disturbance in logic or memory, so that software executes in a state advantageous to the attack. SEUs arise when charge is deposited at sensitive nodes by energetic particles or intense electromagnetic stimuli. An actor may time operations to coincide with natural radiation peaks or use artificial means from close range. Outcomes include corrupted stacks or tables, altered branch conditions, flipped configuration bits in FPGAs or controllers, and transient faults that push autonomy/FDIR into recovery modes with broader command acceptance. SEU exploitation is probabilistic; the technique couples repeated stimulation with careful observation of mode transitions, watchdogs, and error counters to land the system in a desired but nominal-looking state from which other actions can proceed. |
| EX-0009 |
Exploit Code Flaws |
The adversary executes actions on-board by abusing defects in software that runs on the vehicle, ranging from application logic in flight software to libraries, drivers, and supporting services. Outcomes range from arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation to silent logic manipulation (e.g., bypassing interlocks, suppressing alarms) that appears operationally plausible. The hallmark of this technique is that the attacker co-opts existing code paths, often rarely used ones, to run unintended behavior under nominal interfaces. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components. |
| EX-0010 |
Malicious Code |
The adversary achieves on-board effects by introducing executable logic that runs on the vehicle, either native binaries and scripts, injected shellcode, or “data payloads” that an interpreter treats as code (e.g., procedure languages, table-driven automations). Delivery commonly piggybacks on legitimate pathways: software/firmware updates, file transfer services, table loaders, maintenance consoles, or command sequences that write to executable regions. Once staged, activation can be explicit (a specific command, mode change, or file open), environmental (time/geometry triggers), or accidental, where operator actions or routine autonomy invoke the implanted logic. Malicious code can target any layer it can reach: altering flight software behavior, manipulating payload controllers, patching boot or device firmware, or installing hooks in drivers and gateways that bridge bus and payload traffic. Effects range from subtle logic changes (quiet data tampering, command filtering) to overt actions (forced mode transitions, resource starvation), and may include secondary capabilities like covert communications, key material harvesting, or persistence across resets by rewriting images or configuration entries. |
| EX-0012 |
Modify On-Board Values |
The attacker alters live or persistent data that the spacecraft uses to make decisions and route work. Targets include device and control registers, parameter and limit tables, internal routing/subscriber maps, schedules and timelines, priority/QoS settings, watchdog and timer values, autonomy/FDIR rule tables, ephemeris and attitude references, and power/thermal setpoints. Many missions expose legitimate mechanisms for updating these artifacts, direct memory read/write commands, table load services, file transfers, or maintenance procedures, which can be invoked to steer behavior without changing code. Edits may be transient (until reset) or latched/persistent across boots; they can be narrowly scoped (a single bit flip on an enable mask) or systemic (rewriting a routing table so commands are misdelivered). The effect space spans subtle biasing of control loops, selective blackholing of commands or telemetry, rescheduling of operations, and wholesale changes to mode logic, all accomplished by modifying the values the software already trusts and consumes. |
| EX-0013 |
Flooding |
Flooding overwhelms a communication or processing path by injecting traffic at rates or patterns the system cannot comfortably absorb. In space contexts this can occur across layers: RF/optical links (continuous carriers, wideband noise, or protocol-shaped bursts); link/protocol layers (valid-looking frames at excessive cadence); application layers (command and telemetry messages that saturate parsers and queues); and internal vehicles buses where repeated messages starve critical publishers. Effects range from outright denial of service, dropped commands, lost telemetry, missed windows, to subtler corruption, such as out-of-order processing, watchdog trips, or autonomy entering protective modes due to backlogged health data. Secondary impacts include power and thermal strain as decoders, modems, or software loops spin at maximum duty, storage filling from retries, and control loops jittering when their messages are delayed. Timing matters: floods during handovers, maneuvers, or safing transitions can magnify consequences because margins are thinnest. |
| EX-0014 |
Spoofing |
The adversary forges inputs that subsystems treat as trustworthy truth, time tags, sensor measurements, bus messages, or navigation signals, so onboard logic acts on fabricated reality. Because many control loops and autonomy rules assume data authenticity once it passes basic sanity checks, carefully shaped spoofs can trigger mode transitions, safing, actuator commands, or payload behaviors without touching flight code. Spoofing may occur over RF (e.g., GNSS, crosslinks, TT&C beacons), over internal networks/buses (message injection with valid identifiers), or at sensor/actuator interfaces (electrical/optical stimulation that produces plausible readings). Effects range from subtle bias (drifting estimates, skewed calibrations) to acute events (unexpected slews, power reconfiguration, recorder re-indexing), and can also pollute downlinked telemetry or science products so ground controllers interpret a false narrative. The hallmark is that the spacecraft chooses the adversary’s action path because the forged data passes through normal processing chains. |
| PER-0002 |
Backdoor |
A backdoor is a covert access path that bypasses normal authentication, authorization, or operational checks so the attacker can reenter the system on demand. Backdoors may be preexisting (undocumented service modes, maintenance accounts, debug features) or introduced by the adversary during development, integration, or on-orbit updates. Triggers range from “magic” opcodes and timetags to specific geometry/time conditions, counters, or data patterns embedded in routine traffic. The access they provide varies from expanded command sets and relaxed rate/size limits to alternate communications profiles and hidden file/parameter interfaces. Well-crafted backdoors blend with nominal behavior, appearing as ordinary operations while quietly accepting instructions that other paths would reject, thereby sustaining the attacker’s foothold across passes, resets, and operator handovers. |
| PER-0004 |
Replace Cryptographic Keys |
The adversary cements control by changing the cryptographic material the spacecraft uses to authenticate or protect links and updates. Targets include uplink authentication keys and counters, link-encryption/session keys and key-encryption keys (KEKs), key identifiers/selectors, and algorithm profiles. Using authorized rekey commands or key-loading procedures, often designed for over-the-air use, the attacker installs new values in non-volatile storage and updates selectors so subsequent traffic must use the attacker’s keys to be accepted. Variants desynchronize anti-replay by advancing counters or switching epochs, or strand operators by flipping profiles to a mode for which only the adversary holds parameters. Once replaced, the new material persists across resets and mode changes, turning the spacecraft into a node that recognizes the adversary’s channel while rejecting former controllers. |
| DE-0001 |
Disable Fault Management |
The adversary suppresses or alters fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) so unauthorized actions proceed without triggering safing or alerts. Targets include watchdogs and heartbeat monitors; limit and sanity checks on sensor/command values; command interlocks and inhibit masks; voting and redundancy-management logic; and event/alert generation and routing. Techniques range from patching or bypassing checks in flight code, to rewriting parameter/limit tables, to muting publishers that report faults. More subtle variants desensitize thresholds, freeze counters, or delay responses just long enough for a malicious sequence to complete. With FDIR dulled or offline, anomalous states resemble nominal behavior and automated mitigations do not engage, masking the attack from ground oversight. |
| DE-0002 |
Disrupt or Deceive Downlink |
Threat actors may target any point in the telemetry chain, onboard generation and transmission, the downlink path itself, or ground-side reception, processing, and display, to disrupt the operator’s visibility into spacecraft health and activity. This may involve denial-based attacks that prevent the spacecraft from transmitting telemetry to the ground (e.g., disabling telemetry links or crashing telemetry software), or more subtle deception-based attacks that manipulate telemetry content to conceal unauthorized actions. Since telemetry is the primary method ground controllers rely on to monitor spacecraft status, any disruption or manipulation can delay or prevent detection of malicious activity, suppress automated or manual mitigations, or degrade trust in telemetry-based decision support systems. |
| DE-0003 |
On-Board Values Obfuscation |
The adversary manipulates housekeeping and control values that operators and autonomy rely on to judge activity, health, and command hygiene. Targets include command/telemetry counters, event/severity flags, downlink/reporting modes, cryptographic-mode indicators, and the system clock. By rewriting, freezing, or biasing these fields, and by selecting reduced or summary telemetry modes, unauthorized actions can proceed while the downlinked picture appears routine or incomplete. The result is delayed recognition, misattribution to environmental effects, or logs that cannot be reconciled post-facto. |
| DE-0005 |
Subvert Protections via Safe-Mode |
The adversary exploits the spacecraft’s recovery posture to bypass controls that are stricter in nominal operations. During safe-mode, vehicles often accept contingency dictionaries, relax rate/size and timetag checks, activate alternate receivers or antennas, and emit reduced or summary telemetry. By timing actions to this state, or deliberately inducing it, the attacker issues maintenance-looking edits, loads, or mode changes that proceed under broadened acceptance while downlink visibility is thinned. Unauthorized activity blends with anomaly response, evading both automated safeguards and operator suspicion. |
| DE-0008 |
Evasion via Bootkit |
A bootkit hides activity by running first and shaping what higher layers will later observe. Positioned in boot ROM handoff or early loaders, it can select or patch images in memory, alter device trees and driver tables, seed forged counters and timestamps, and preconfigure telemetry/crypto modes so subsequent components launch into a reality curated by the attacker. Because integrity and logging mechanisms are initialized afterward, the resulting view of processes, files, and histories reflects the bootkit’s choices, allowing long-term evasion that persists across resets and mode transitions. |
| EXF-0001 |
Replay |
The adversary re-sends previously valid commands or procedures to cause the spacecraft to transmit data again, then captures the resulting downlink. Typical targets are recorder playbacks, payload product dumps, housekeeping snapshots, or file directory listings. By aligning replays with geometry (e.g., when the satellite is in view of actor-controlled apertures) and with acceptance conditions (counters, timetags, mode), the attacker induces legitimate transmissions that appear routine to operators. Variants include selectively replaying index ranges to fetch only high-value intervals, reissuing subscription/telemetry-rate changes to increase data volume, or queueing playbacks that fire during later passes when interception is feasible. |
| EXF-0004 |
Out-of-Band Communications Link |
Some missions field secondary links, separate frequencies and hardware, for limited, purpose-built functions (e.g., rekeying, emergency commanding, beacons, custodial crosslinks). Adversaries co-opt these channels as covert data paths: embedding content in maintenance messages, beacon fields, or low-rate housekeeping; initiating vendor/service modes that carry file fragments; or switching to contingency profiles that bypass normal routing and monitoring. Because these paths are distinct from the main TT&C and may be sparsely supervised, they provide discreet avenues to move data off the spacecraft or to external relays without altering the primary link’s traffic patterns. |
| EXF-0006 |
Modify Communications Configuration |
The adversary alters radio/optical link configuration so the spacecraft emits mission data over paths the program does not monitor or control. Levers include retuning carriers, adding sidebands or subcarriers, changing modulation/coding profiles, remapping virtual channels/APIDs, editing beacon content, or redirecting routing tables in regenerative payloads. Data can be embedded steganographically (idle fields, padding, frame counters, pilot tones) or carried on a covert auxiliary downlink/crosslink pointed at attacker-owned apertures. Because these emissions conform to plausible waveforms and scheduler behavior, they appear as ordinary link activity while quietly conveying payload products, housekeeping, or file fragments to non-mission receivers. |