Threat actors may develop payloads or insert malicious logic to be executed at a specific time. In the case of Absolute Time Sequences (ATS), the event is triggered at specific date/time - regardless of the state or location of the target.
|ID||Name||Description||NIST Rev5||D3FEND||ISO 27001|
|CM0015||Software Source Control||Prohibit the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code.||CM-11 CM-14 CM-2 CM-4 CM-7(8) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-9||D3-PM D3-SBV D3-EI D3-EAL D3- EDL D3-DCE||A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.19 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30|
|CM0018||Dynamic Analysis||Employ dynamic analysis (e.g., using simulation, penetration testing, fuzzing, etc.) to identify software/firmware weaknesses and vulnerabilities in developed and incorporated code (open source, commercial, or third-party developed code). Testing should occur (1) on potential system elements before acceptance; (2) as a realistic simulation of known adversary tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs), and tools; and (3) throughout the lifecycle on physical and logical systems, elements, and processes. FLATSATs as well as digital twins can be used to perform the dynamic analysis depending on the TTPs being executed. Digital twins via instruction set simulation (i.e., emulation) can provide robust environment for dynamic analysis and TTP execution.||CA-8 CP-4(5) RA-3 RA-5(11) SA-11 SA-11(5) SA-11(8) SA-11(9) SA-3 SA-8 SC-2(2) SC-7(29) SI-3 SR-6(1) SR-6(1)||D3-DA D3-FBA D3-PSA D3-PLA D3-PA D3-SEA D3-MBT||6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.7|
|CM0019||Static Analysis||Perform static source code analysis for all available source code looking for system-relevant weaknesses (see CM0016) using no less than two static code analysis tools.||RA-3 RA-5 SA-11 SA-11(1) SA-11(4) SA-15(7) SA-3 SA-8||D3-PM D3-FBA D3-FEMC D3-FV D3-PFV D3-SFV D3-OSM||6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.8.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.28|
|CM0046||Long Duration Testing||Perform testing using hardware or simulation/emulation where the test executes over a long period of time (30+ days). This testing will attempt to flesh out race conditions or time-based attacks.||PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-8||D3-SJA D3-PM D3-OSM D3-SDM D3-UBA D3-SYSVA||A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28|
|CM0032||On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention||Utilize on-board intrusion detection/prevention system that monitors the mission critical components or systems and audit/logs actions. The IDS/IPS should have the capability to respond to threats (initial access, execution, persistence, evasion, exfiltration, etc.) and it should address signature-based attacks along with dynamic never-before seen attacks using machine learning/adaptive technologies. The IDS/IPS must integrate with traditional fault management to provide a wholistic approach to faults on-board the spacecraft. Spacecraft should select and execute safe countermeasures against cyber-attacks. These countermeasures are a ready supply of options to triage against the specific types of attack and mission priorities. Minimally, the response should ensure vehicle safety and continued operations. Ideally, the goal is to trap the threat, convince the threat that it is successful, and trace and track the attacker — with or without ground support. This would support successful attribution and evolving countermeasures to mitigate the threat in the future. “Safe countermeasures” are those that are compatible with the system’s fault management system to avoid unintended effects or fratricide on the system.||AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8)||D3-FA D3-DA D3-FCR D3-FH D3-ID D3-IRA D3-HD D3-IAA D3-FHRA D3-NTA D3-PMAD D3-RTSD D3-ANAA D3-CA D3-CSPP D3-ISVA D3-PM D3-SDM D3-SFA D3-SFV D3-SICA D3-USICA D3-FBA D3-FEMC D3-FV D3-OSM D3-PFV D3-EHB D3-IDA D3-MBT D3-SBV D3-PA D3-PSMD D3-PSA D3-SEA D3-SSC D3-SCA D3-FAPA D3-IBCA D3-PCSV D3-FCA D3-PLA D3-UBA D3-RAPA D3-SDA D3-UDTA D3-UGLPA D3-ANET D3-AZET D3-JFAPA D3-LAM D3-NI D3-RRID D3-NTF D3-ITF D3-OTF D3-EI D3-EAL D3-EDL D3-HBPI D3-IOPR D3-KBPI D3-MAC D3-SCF||A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16|
|CM0042||Robust Fault Management||Ensure fault management system cannot be used against the spacecraft. Examples include: safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of telemetry to cause action from ground, or some sort of proximity operation to cause spacecraft to go into safe mode. Understanding the safing procedures and ensuring they do not put the spacecraft in a more vulnerable state is key to building a resilient spacecraft.||CP-2 CP-4(5) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(13) SA-8(24) SA-8(3) SA-8(4) SC-16(2) SC-24 SC-5 SI-13 SI-17||D3-AH D3-EHPV D3-PSEP D3-PH D3-SCP||7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28|