Adversaries may inject malicious code into trusted onboard software processes in order to execute arbitrary functionality within the context of legitimate spacecraft software. Targeted processes may include flight software tasks, operating system services, telemetry handlers, middleware, communication daemons, scheduler services, device drivers, or other mission-critical runtime components. Process injection enables malicious code to inherit the permissions, memory access, execution context, and trust relationships associated with the compromised process. This may allow adversaries to manipulate telemetry, alter spacecraft operational behavior, suppress reporting, interfere with fault management, inject unauthorized commands, or evade detection without interrupting nominal spacecraft operations. Unlike standalone malicious binaries or scripts, injected code executes within legitimate onboard software contexts, causing malicious activity to appear operationally valid and making detection and forensic analysis significantly more difficult.
| ID | Name | Tiering | Description | NIST Rev5 | ISO 27001 | Onboard SV | Ground | |
| CM0020 | Threat modeling | Threat modeling is a structured analytical process that identifies, enumerates, and prioritizes potential threats to a system by systematically examining assets, trust boundaries, data flows, and adversary capabilities relative to the system's architecture. Applied in combination with attack surface analysis and vulnerability analysis, threat modeling produces an integrated picture of where the system is most exposed and what the consequences of successful exploitation would be. Analysis should draw on findings from similar systems, components, or services where applicable, leveraging documented threat experience from comparable missions or architectures to avoid re-learning known lessons. The outputs of threat modeling must directly inform design decisions throughout the development process, with attack surface reduction treated as a design objective rather than a post-development hardening activity: interfaces, services, protocols, and code paths that are not necessary to mission function should be eliminated or constrained before they become embedded in the architecture. Threat model artifacts should be treated as living documents, updated as the system design evolves and as new threat intelligence becomes available. | CA-3 CM-4 CP-2 PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-3 SA-11 SA-11(2) SA-11(3) SA-11(6) SA-15(6) SA-15(8) SA-2 SA-3 SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(25) SA-8(30) | A.5.14 A.8.21 A.8.9 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.8 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 | ||||
| CM0011 | Vulnerability Scanning | Vulnerability scanning systematically identifies known security weaknesses in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and open-source software (OSS) components, including vulnerable dependencies and outdated software versions, across spacecraft and ground system environments. Custom-developed code requires separate analysis approaches, such as static and dynamic code analysis, that fall outside the scope of this countermeasure; however, COTS, OSS, and third-party dependencies incorporated into custom-developed software remain within the scope of vulnerability scanning and SCA. Scanning programs should incorporate software composition analysis (SCA) to detect vulnerabilities introduced through third-party libraries and dependency chains, which represent a significant and frequently underestimated attack surface in modern space systems. Scanning tools and processes should conform to recognized interoperability standards that support enumeration of platforms, software flaws, and configuration weaknesses; standardized formatting of checklists and test procedures; and consistent measurement of vulnerability impact. Adherence to these standards enables automation of key vulnerability management workflow steps, facilitates tool interoperability across the mission ecosystem, and produces outputs that are comparable across programs and organizations. Vulnerability scanning shall be performed against the approved as-built or deployed software baseline using methods that do not jeopardize mission operations. Active scanning of live spacecraft, safety-critical ground systems, or operational technology should occur only after the scanning method has been authorized and evaluated for operational impact. Where live scanning presents unacceptable risk, scanning should be performed against representative software images, firmware packages, or test environments that match the approved operational baseline. | CM-10(1) RA-3 RA-5 RA-5(11) RA-5(3) RA-7 SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-15(7) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(30) SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-7 | 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.8.8 6.1.3 8.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.7 | ||||
| CM0012 | Software Bill of Materials | A software bill of materials (SBOM) is a structured inventory of software components, libraries, dependencies, and associated metadata comprising a delivered system, spanning first-party code and available third-party and open-source supply-chain information. The SBOM serves as the foundational reference for continuous vulnerability management: by cross-correlating the component inventory against known vulnerability databases, such as those cataloging common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs), mission owners and operators can rapidly identify which specific system components are affected by newly disclosed vulnerabilities and prioritize remediation accordingly. SBOM generation must cover the full software supply chain, including transitive dependencies that are not explicitly declared in top-level manifests, as these indirect inclusions represent a persistent and frequently exploited blind spot in software inventory programs. An SBOM may reveal component composition and vulnerability-relevant information that could assist adversary reconnaissance. Its classification, sensitivity, dissemination, and handling requirements shall be determined using applicable mission guidance, contractual requirements, and a documented disclosure-risk assessment. If deemed to have sensitive information then the handling controls applied should align to other mission-critical security documentation as defined in CM0001. | CM-10 CM-10(1) CM-11 CM-11(3) CM-2 CM-5(6) CM-7(4) CM-7(5) CM-8 CM-8(7) PM-5 RA-5 RA-5(11) SA-10(2) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(13) SA-8(29) SA-8(30) SA-8(7) SA-9 SI-7 | A.8.9 A.8.19 A.8.19 A.5.9 A.8.9 A.5.32 A.8.19 A.8.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 | ||||
| CM0015 | Software Source Control | Binary or machine-executable code obtained from sources that provide no warranty and no access to the corresponding source code must not be incorporated into spacecraft or ground systems. This prohibition addresses a fundamental software assurance gap: without source code, missions cannot perform source-based static analysis or independently review and modify implementation details, and may have reduced ability to assess, repair, or extend the software. Code from sources with limited or no warranty and no source code provision may be difficult to independently analyze, repair, or extend and leaves the mission dependent on supplier assurances and remediation capabilities. This countermeasure applies throughout the software supply chain, including components integrated by subcontractors. | CM-11 CM-14 CM-2 CM-4 CM-5(6) CM-7(8) SA-10(2) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(19) SA-8(29) SA-8(30) SA-8(31) SA-8(7) SA-9 SI-7 | A.8.9 A.8.9 A.8.19 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 | ||||
| CM0016 | CWE List | A prioritized list of software weakness classes, drawn from a recognized weakness enumeration taxonomy such as the common weakness enumeration (CWE) framework, provides the analytical foundation for targeted, mission-relevant static code analysis. Rather than treating all weakness classes as equally significant, mission teams should derive a system-specific priority ranking based on the spacecraft or ground system's architecture, threat environment, operational constraints, and consequence of exploitation for each weakness class. This prioritized list serves two functions: it directs static analysis tool configuration toward the weakness classes most relevant to the mission, and it provides a defensible, documented basis for triaging and ranking analysis findings so that remediation resources are applied where mission risk is highest. The prioritization rationale should be documented and maintained as a controlled artifact, as it reflects security-relevant design decisions about the system's risk posture. | RA-5 SA-11 SA-11(1) SA-15(7) SI-7 | A.8.8 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.28 | ||||
| CM0017 | Coding Standard | A formally defined coding standard establishes the rules, conventions, and constraints that govern how software is written across the mission's development program, directly influencing the security, maintainability, and verifiability of the delivered system. The standard must specify acceptable programming language types, with language selection driven by a documented evaluation of security requirements, application complexity, scalability needs, available development resources, schedule constraints, and the availability of security-relevant language features such as memory safety, type safety, and bounds checking. Language choices that introduce classes of vulnerability by design, such as languages without memory safety guarantees used in contexts where memory corruption is a plausible attack vector, require explicit justification and compensating controls. The coding standard must include security-relevant rules for input validation, error handling, cryptographic usage, memory management, and concurrency, as applicable to the selected languages and system design. Adherence should be evaluated through automated means where supported, supplemented by manual review for requirements that cannot be reliably automated. | PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-15 SA-3 SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(30) SA-8(7) SI-7 | A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.5.8 A.8.25 | ||||
| CM0018 | Dynamic Testing | Dynamic analysis subjects executing software and firmware to active testing conditions to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities that static analysis alone cannot detect, including runtime memory corruption, logic errors, timing vulnerabilities, and interface behaviors that only manifest under operational conditions. Applicable techniques include simulation-based testing, penetration testing, fuzz testing, and adversarial emulation using realistic threat actor tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Dynamic testing must be applied to all software and firmware categories: mission-developed code, open-source components, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software, and third-party developed code. Dynamic testing should be performed on potential system elements before acceptance, include realistic simulation of known adversary TTPs, and tools, and continue throughout the lifecycle on applicable physical and logical systems, elements, and processes. Full-scale hardware integration testbeds, commonly referred to as flat satellite (FLATSAT) environments, provide high-fidelity physical test platforms for dynamic analysis; digital twins implemented via instruction set simulation, also known as emulation, provide a flexible and scalable alternative environment capable of supporting TTP execution across a broad range of test scenarios without requiring physical hardware availability. | CA-8 CA-8(1) CM-4(2) CP-4(5) RA-3 RA-5(11) RA-7 SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-11(5) SA-11(8) SA-11(9) SA-3 SA-8 SA-8(30) SC-2(2) SC-7(29) SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-7 SR-6(1) | 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 6.1.3 8.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.7 | ||||
| CM0019 | Static Analysis | Static source code analysis examines software without executing it, identifying security-relevant weaknesses in the codebase before they can be exploited at runtime. Static analysis must be performed across all available source code. The mission’s weakness prioritization (i.e., CM0016) process should guide tool configuration and finding triage without unnecessarily excluding other weakness classes supported by the tools. The static analysis program must employ no fewer than two distinct tools with complementary language and weakness-detection capabilities. The tools should be applied at defined points throughout the development and maintenance lifecycle to provide overlapping and complementary analysis coverage and reduce the likelihood that exploitable weaknesses persist into integration or deployment. Tool selection should account for language compatibility, weakness class coverage, and the ability to produce findings in formats that support triage and remediation tracking. Static analysis should be integrated into the software build pipeline as an automated, recurring activity rather than conducted as a periodic manual exercise, ensuring that new code contributions are analyzed continuously throughout development. | CM-4(2) RA-3 RA-5 RA-7 SA-11 SA-11(1) SA-11(3) SA-11(4) SA-15(7) SA-3 SA-8 SA-8(30) SI-7 | 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.8.8 6.1.3 8.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.28 | ||||
| CM0021 | Software Digital Signature | Each software or firmware image subject to installation or update control shall be verified using an approved digital signature and an approved trust anchor before installation or activation. The trust anchor may be represented by a certificate or by a directly provisioned verification key, depending on the approved trust architecture. Successful verification establishes that the image was signed by an authorized signing identity and has not been modified since signing; it does not establish that the signed code is non-malicious, vulnerability-free, or operationally safe. Signature verification confirms the integrity and approved origin of the software but does not, by itself, prevent installation of an older validly signed version; update authorization and rollback protections must be enforced separately. The verification mechanism must be implemented such that it cannot be bypassed through operational commands, configuration changes, or software updates, and must reject any component whose signature is absent or invalid, or whose signing certificate or trust anchor is not recognized and approved by the mission. Digital signature enforcement complements but is distinct from the boot-time chain of trust established through secure boot; it applies to software installation and update events throughout the operational lifecycle, not only at system startup. | AC-14 CM-11 CM-11(3) CM-14 CM-5(6) IA-2 SA-10(1) SA-11 SA-4(5) SA-8(29) SA-8(31) SA-9 SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(12) SI-7(15) SI-7(6) | A.8.19 A.5.16 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 | ||||
| CM0047 | Operating System Security | The spacecraft operating system (OS) must be subjected to software assurance scrutiny commensurate with its mission criticality and security role. Prior assurance and flight-history evidence may be reused only after its applicability to the selected OS version, configuration, target hardware, operational use, and current mission security requirements has been evaluated. The OS must be analyzed for its attack surface, and all features, services, libraries, and interfaces not required for the mission's defined operational functions must be stripped, disabled, or removed before the OS is integrated into the flight software stack. This hardening requirement is particularly significant for some real-time operating systems (RTOS), which commonly include networking stacks, file systems, shell interfaces, diagnostic services, and other general-purpose capabilities that are unnecessary for spacecraft operations but expand the exploitable attack surface available to an adversary. Only an organization-approved OS product, version, build, and configuration baseline may be used in the delivered spacecraft system. The approved baseline must be enforced through reproducible build controls, configuration management, component inventories, and automated verification where supported. | CM-11(3) CM-7 CM-7(5) CM-7(8) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-15(6) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(19) SA-8(30) SI-3(8) | A.8.19 A.8.19 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 | ||||
| CM0069 | Process White Listing | Process whitelisting establishes an approved set of executable images, tasks, applications, or process types that may run on the spacecraft computing platform. Enforcement should occur within a trusted layer capable of controlling process or task creation, which may be implemented in firmware, a secure monitor, a hypervisor, the operating system, or the real-time executive according to the platform architecture. The enforcement mechanism must verify an approved process identity before execution and deny unapproved process creation unless a mission-approved recovery mechanism applies. This countermeasure limits the creation or execution of software identities not present in the approved baseline. It does not prevent an adversary from abusing an approved process, altering its runtime memory, redirecting its control flow, or exploiting permitted scripting or loading functionality unless those behaviors are addressed by complementary integrity and execution controls. | CM-11 CM-7(5) PL-8 PL-8(1) SI-10(5) | A.8.19 A.8.19 A.5.8 | ||||
| CM0032 | On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention | An on-board intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS) monitors mission-critical spacecraft components and systems, generates and stores audit records, and supports mission-approved responses to detected threats. Depending on the mission architecture, threat, and availability of ground support, responses may be autonomous, ground-directed, or a combination of both. The system should address both known attack patterns and previously unseen anomalous behavior through complementary signature-based and behavior- or anomaly-based detection methods. Machine learning or adaptive technologies may be used when their performance, resource consumption, and failure behavior have been validated for the mission environment. Detection and response coverage should address applicable adversary activities across the attack lifecycle, including initial access, execution, persistence, defense evasion, and exfiltration. The on-board IDS/IPS must be integrated with the spacecraft's traditional fault management system to provide a unified approach to anomaly response, ensuring that cyber-triggered responses are compatible with fault management logic and do not produce unintended effects or fratricide against the spacecraft's own systems; countermeasures that are incompatible with fault management are considered unsafe and must not be executed autonomously. The response hierarchy must prioritize vehicle safety and continued mission operations. Advanced containment or deception responses may be considered when they can be executed without unacceptable mission risk. The system should preserve evidence that supports post-event analysis, threat characterization, and potential attribution by authorized ground support. | AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-4(7) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) | A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 | ||||
| CM0042 | Robust Fault Management | The fault management system is a high-privilege, autonomous spacecraft function that adversaries may attempt to exploit as an attack vector, triggering protective responses that place the spacecraft in a degraded or more vulnerable operational state. Attack scenarios include manipulating sensor, state, or telemetry information to induce onboard or ground-directed safing actions; creating false fault conditions through sensor spoofing or proximity operations; exploiting safe-mode configurations that reduce security protections; and inducing autonomous maneuver responses through crafted fault indications. Robust fault management requires that safing procedures and autonomous responses be designed with explicit security analysis confirming that each protective action does not introduce a more exploitable system state than the fault condition it responds to. The integrity and authenticity of sensor data, state information, commands, and telemetry used by onboard or ground-based fault management functions must be protected to prevent falsified inputs from triggering unintended responses. Every fault response, including mode transitions, actuator commands, and communication reconfigurations, must be evaluated against the question of whether an adversary could deliberately induce that response and whether the resulting system state provides the adversary with meaningful advantage. | CP-2 CP-4(5) IR-3 IR-3(1) IR-3(2) PE-10 PE-11 PE-11(1) PE-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(13) SA-8(24) SA-8(26) SA-8(3) SA-8(30) SA-8(4) SC-16(2) SC-24 SC-5 SI-13 SI-13(4) SI-17 SI-4(13) SI-4(7) SI-7(5) | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.7.11 A.7.11 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.16 | ||||
| CM0044 | Cyber-safe Mode | Cyber-safe mode is a dedicated, configuration-controlled spacecraft operating state entered autonomously or by authorized ground command when mission-defined conditions indicate a credible threat to platform integrity. In this state, nonessential functions are shut down or isolated and the spacecraft operates from an integrity-protected, validated software and configuration baseline. Unlike traditional safe mode, which addresses hardware faults and operational anomalies, cyber-safe mode is specifically designed to respond to cyber threats, providing a secure recovery baseline from which the spacecraft can reconstitute compromised functions. Authentication and encryption must remain enabled within cyber-safe mode, ensuring that the reduced operational state does not degrade the security posture of the vehicle. The cyber-safe mode software and configuration must be stored onboard using hardware-based protections that prevent modification by nominal flight software, ordinary commands, and other untrusted execution paths. Where baseline updates are permitted, they must use a separately authorized and integrity-verified maintenance process that preserves a recoverable trusted version. Following entry into cyber-safe mode, the spacecraft must be capable of reconstituting firmware and software functions to pre-attack capability levels, either autonomously through self-healing mechanisms or with ground assistance, and must be capable of replanning operations based on whatever equipment remains available after the cyber event. The primary recovery objective is restoration of full mission capability; where that is not achievable, the spacecraft should attain the maximum reduced mission capability available given the post-attack system state. | CP-10 CP-10(4) CP-12 CP-2 CP-2(5) IR-3 IR-3(1) IR-3(2) IR-4 IR-4(12) IR-4(3) PE-10 PE10 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-8 SA-8(10) SA-8(12) SA-8(13) SA-8(19) SA-8(21) SA-8(23) SA-8(24) SA-8(26) SA-8(3) SA-8(4) SC-16(2) SC-24 SC-5 SI-11 SI-17 SI-4(7) SI-7(17) SI-7(5) | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 | ||||
| CM0014 | Secure boot | Secure boot establishes and enforces a cryptographically verified chain of trust from a hardware-anchored root of trust (RoT) through each applicable stage of the startup sequence to the operating system or flight software image. Each stage in the chain must verify the integrity and authenticity of the next before transferring execution control. The boot policy must also prevent execution of unauthorized or revoked images, including unauthorized rollback to an older but validly signed software version. The trust anchor and initial verification function should be immutable after provisioning or protected by hardware-enforced mechanisms that prevent unauthorized modification and preserve their integrity. Components implementing the RoT must also be qualified for the expected mission radiation environment. Radiation tolerance addresses the reliability of the trust anchor, while immutability or protected update mechanisms address its resistance to unauthorized modification. This is particularly critical where radiation-induced bit flips and the physical inaccessibility of on-orbit hardware make a tamper-resistant, immutable hardware anchor essential to sustained boot integrity across the mission lifetime. | AC-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(10) SA-8(12) SA-8(13) SA-8(3) SA-8(30) SA-8(4) SC-51 SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(10) SI-7(9) | A.5.8 | ||||