The adversary achieves execution or effect beneath the software stack, in device firmware, programmable logic, or the hardware itself, either by corrupting that layer or by driving it through interfaces that function exactly as designed. Examples include tampering with firmware images or configuration blobs burned into non-volatile memory; targeting MCU/SoC boot ROM fallbacks; editing FPGA bitstreams or partial-reconfiguration frames; leveraging physical phenomena and timing to flip bits or skip checks; or issuing legitimate low-level device, maintenance, and calibration commands that act directly on hardware without passing through high-level command mediation. Because these actions occur below or alongside the operating system and application FSW, traditional endpoint safeguards see normal interfaces while trust anchors are already altered.
| ID | Name | Tiering | Description | NIST Rev5 | ISO 27001 | Onboard SV | Ground | |
| CM0022 | Criticality Analysis | Criticality analysis is a structured engineering process that identifies the mission functions, system components, and data flows whose compromise, degradation, or loss would most severely impact mission success, crew safety, or operational continuity. The outputs of this analysis directly drive security investment prioritization: components and functions assessed as most critical receive the most rigorous design-phase protections, supply chain scrutiny, and operational security controls, while lower-criticality elements are protected proportionately. Criticality analysis findings should inform the application of complementary security design principles, including network and functional segmentation and least-privilege access control, to isolate critical components from less-trusted system elements and reduce the consequence of compromise elsewhere in the system. Supply chain protection resources and oversight rigor should be explicitly allocated in proportion to component criticality, ensuring that the most mission-essential hardware and software receive the most intensive sourcing controls, provenance verification, and supplier oversight. Criticality analysis must be initiated early in the system design process and updated as the architecture evolves, threat intelligence changes, or operational experience reveals previously unrecognized dependencies. | CM-4 CP-2 CP-2(8) PL-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) PM-11 PM-17 PM-30 PM-30(1) PM-32 RA-3 RA-3(1) RA-9 SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-15(3) SA-2 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(25) SA-8(3) SA-8(30) SC-32(1) SC-7(29) SR-1 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(2) SR-3(3) SR-5(1) SR-7 | A.8.9 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.30 8.1 A.5.8 A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.5.22 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.22 | ||||
| CM0024 | Anti-counterfeit Hardware | Counterfeit electronic components represent a direct supply chain threat to space mission integrity, introducing hardware that may fail prematurely, perform outside specification, or contain malicious functionality deliberately embedded by an adversary during manufacture or distribution. A formal anti-counterfeit program must establish policy and procedures that span the entire component acquisition and integration lifecycle, from supplier qualification and procurement through incoming inspection, storage, and installation. The program must address two distinct but related risks: counterfeit components that fail to perform their intended function, degrading mission reliability; and deliberately tampered components that introduce malicious hardware functionality or create pathways for malicious code execution. Anti-counterfeit controls must include measures appropriate to component criticality and supply chain risk to authenticate components, detect evidence of tampering, and resist unauthorized modification. Detection and prevention must be treated as complementary objectives: prevention through qualified sourcing and procurement controls, detection through inspection and authentication techniques applied before components enter the system. | AC-14 AC-20(5) CM-7(9) PL-8 PL-8(1) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(11) SA-8(13) SA-8(16) SA-9 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | ||||
| CM0025 | Supplier Review | A supplier review is a structured pre-contract assessment conducted before entering into any agreement with a contractor or subcontractor for the acquisition of systems, system components, or system services. The review evaluates the prospective supplier's security posture, trustworthiness, and capability to deliver components or services that meet the mission's integrity and assurance requirements, before contractual commitments are made and before the supplier gains access to mission information or influence over mission systems. Supplier reviews reduce the risk of introducing supply chain vulnerabilities through poorly qualified, compromised, or adversary-influenced suppliers at any tier of the acquisition chain. The rigor and depth of the review should be calibrated to the criticality of the components or services being acquired, with suppliers of mission-critical hardware, software, or services subject to the most intensive assessment. Supplier review findings should inform not only the decision to contract but also the specific security requirements, oversight provisions, and flow-down obligations included in the resulting agreement. | PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-17 SA-2 SA-3 SA-8 SA-9 SR-11 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) SR-6 | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.25 A.8.27 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 A.5.22 | ||||
| CM0026 | Original Component Manufacturer | Hardware components that cannot be sourced directly from the original component manufacturer (OCM) or an authorized franchised distributor, and software that cannot be obtained from the original publisher, developer, or an authorized distribution channel, represent elevated supply-chain risk and must not be procured or incorporated into the mission system without documented approval from the program’s supply-chain governance authority. Sourcing hardware from the OCM or authorized franchised distributors provides greater assurance of component authenticity, traceability, and conformance to specification. Obtaining software from the original publisher, developer, or an authorized distribution channel similarly reduces the risk of unauthorized, altered, fraudulent, or malicious software. Deviations from these approved sourcing channels introduce additional supply-chain risk that must be assessed before acceptance. The approval process for non-OCM-sourced items must evaluate the specific risk posed by the alternative source, the criticality of the component or software to mission function, the availability and adequacy of compensating inspection and authentication measures, and whether a compliant source can be identified before accepting the deviation. This governance requirement applies to hardware components, firmware, and software, although the applicable sourcing and authentication methods differ. Hardware controls should address component authenticity and traceability, while software controls should address publisher or developer provenance, distribution-channel integrity, license legitimacy, and cryptographic verification where available. | AC-20(5) PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-8 SA-9 SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-3(1) SR-3(3) SR-4 SR-4(1) SR-4(2) SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(1) SR-5(2) | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | ||||
| CM0027 | ASIC/FPGA Manufacturing | Custom application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) should be fabricated through accredited trusted foundries, and field-programmable gate array (FPGA) devices should be procured through trusted suppliers with documented fabrication provenance, to reduce the risk of hardware Trojan insertion or unauthorized modification. Unlike software, hardware trojans embedded during semiconductor manufacturing are extremely difficult to detect through functional testing alone, as they may be designed to activate only under specific operational conditions or remain dormant indefinitely; the integrity of the fabrication source is therefore a primary defense. Trusted foundry accreditation provides assurance that the accredited fabrication activities are subject to security controls intended to reduce the risk of unauthorized modification. Assurance for design, intellectual property, aggregation, packaging, assembly, testing, and distribution must be addressed through trusted suppliers or other controls applicable to those lifecycle stages. This requirement applies to custom ASICs and to the base silicon used in FPGA implementations. The programmable design loaded onto an FPGA requires separate protection because trusted fabrication of the device does not establish the integrity or authenticity of the configured bitstream. | AC-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-11 SA-3 SA-8 SA-8(11) SA-8(13) SA-8(16) SA-9 SI-3 SI-3(10) SR-1 SR-11 SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.7 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | ||||
| CM0028 | Tamper Protection | Tamper protection encompasses physical and logical controls that detect, deter, and respond to unauthorized modification of mission hardware and software throughout the acquisition, transit, storage, integration, and operational phases of the mission lifecycle. Physical tamper protection requires inspection of hardware at defined custody transfer points to detect evidence of unauthorized access or modification, and requires the use of tamper-evident packaging and sealing mechanisms during shipping and receiving to ensure that any interference with equipment in transit is detectable upon arrival. Logical tamper protection addresses the integrity of software and firmware through layered techniques including code obfuscation, integrity checks that verify software has not been altered from its approved state, and runtime integrity monitoring mechanisms such as self-checking code. Watchdog processes may supplement these controls by detecting abnormal execution or failure to complete expected processing, but do not by themselves verify software integrity. Physical and logical tamper protections are complementary and should be applied together where warranted by system criticality, threat exposure, and lifecycle conditions. Physical access to hardware can enable logical tampering, while failure to verify software integrity can reduce the assurance provided by physical controls. | AC-14 AC-25 CA-8(1) CA-8(3) CM-7(9) MA-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) PL-8(2) PM-30 PM-30(1) RA-3(1) SA-10(3) SA-10(4) SA-11 SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-4(9) SA-8 SA-8(11) SA-8(13) SA-8(16) SA-8(19) SA-8(31) SA-9 SC-51 SR-1 SR-10 SR-11 SR-11(3) SR-2 SR-2(1) SR-3 SR-4(3) SR-4(4) SR-5 SR-5(2) SR-6(1) SR-9 SR-9(1) | A.5.8 4.4 6.2 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.5.22 A.5.23 A.8.21 A.8.29 A.8.30 5.2 5.3 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.1 A.5.2 A.5.4 A.5.19 A.5.31 A.5.36 A.5.37 A.5.19 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.8.30 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.20 A.5.21 A.5.23 A.8.29 | ||||
| CM0018 | Dynamic Testing | Dynamic analysis subjects executing software and firmware to active testing conditions to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities that static analysis alone cannot detect, including runtime memory corruption, logic errors, timing vulnerabilities, and interface behaviors that only manifest under operational conditions. Applicable techniques include simulation-based testing, penetration testing, fuzz testing, and adversarial emulation using realistic threat actor tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Dynamic testing must be applied to all software and firmware categories: mission-developed code, open-source components, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software, and third-party developed code. Dynamic testing should be performed on potential system elements before acceptance, include realistic simulation of known adversary TTPs, and tools, and continue throughout the lifecycle on applicable physical and logical systems, elements, and processes. Full-scale hardware integration testbeds, commonly referred to as flat satellite (FLATSAT) environments, provide high-fidelity physical test platforms for dynamic analysis; digital twins implemented via instruction set simulation, also known as emulation, provide a flexible and scalable alternative environment capable of supporting TTP execution across a broad range of test scenarios without requiring physical hardware availability. | CA-8 CA-8(1) CM-4(2) CP-4(5) RA-3 RA-5(11) RA-7 SA-11 SA-11(3) SA-11(5) SA-11(8) SA-11(9) SA-3 SA-8 SA-8(30) SC-2(2) SC-7(29) SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-7 SR-6(1) | 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 6.1.3 8.3 10.2 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.29 A.8.30 A.8.7 | ||||
| CM0032 | On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention | An on-board intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS) monitors mission-critical spacecraft components and systems, generates and stores audit records, and supports mission-approved responses to detected threats. Depending on the mission architecture, threat, and availability of ground support, responses may be autonomous, ground-directed, or a combination of both. The system should address both known attack patterns and previously unseen anomalous behavior through complementary signature-based and behavior- or anomaly-based detection methods. Machine learning or adaptive technologies may be used when their performance, resource consumption, and failure behavior have been validated for the mission environment. Detection and response coverage should address applicable adversary activities across the attack lifecycle, including initial access, execution, persistence, defense evasion, and exfiltration. The on-board IDS/IPS must be integrated with the spacecraft's traditional fault management system to provide a unified approach to anomaly response, ensuring that cyber-triggered responses are compatible with fault management logic and do not produce unintended effects or fratricide against the spacecraft's own systems; countermeasures that are incompatible with fault management are considered unsafe and must not be executed autonomously. The response hierarchy must prioritize vehicle safety and continued mission operations. Advanced containment or deception responses may be considered when they can be executed without unacceptable mission risk. The system should preserve evidence that supports post-event analysis, threat characterization, and potential attribution by authorized ground support. | AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-4(7) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) | A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 | ||||
| CM0014 | Secure boot | Secure boot establishes and enforces a cryptographically verified chain of trust from a hardware-anchored root of trust (RoT) through each applicable stage of the startup sequence to the operating system or flight software image. Each stage in the chain must verify the integrity and authenticity of the next before transferring execution control. The boot policy must also prevent execution of unauthorized or revoked images, including unauthorized rollback to an older but validly signed software version. The trust anchor and initial verification function should be immutable after provisioning or protected by hardware-enforced mechanisms that prevent unauthorized modification and preserve their integrity. Components implementing the RoT must also be qualified for the expected mission radiation environment. Radiation tolerance addresses the reliability of the trust anchor, while immutability or protected update mechanisms address its resistance to unauthorized modification. This is particularly critical where radiation-induced bit flips and the physical inaccessibility of on-orbit hardware make a tamper-resistant, immutable hardware anchor essential to sustained boot integrity across the mission lifetime. | AC-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(10) SA-8(12) SA-8(13) SA-8(3) SA-8(30) SA-8(4) SC-51 SI-7 SI-7(1) SI-7(10) SI-7(9) | A.5.8 | ||||