In this variant, telemetry is suppressed at the source by manipulating on-board generation or transmission. Methods include disabling or pausing telemetry publishers, altering packet filters and rates, muting event/report channels, reconfiguring recorder playback, retuning/muting transmitters, or switching to modes that emit only minimal beacons. The spacecraft continues operating, but the downlink no longer reflects true activity or arrives too sparsely to support monitoring. By constraining what is produced or transmitted, the adversary reduces opportunities for detection while other actions proceed.
| ID | Name | Tiering | Description | NIST Rev5 | ISO 27001 | Onboard SV | Ground | |
| CM0070 | Alternate Communications Paths | Establishing alternate communications paths for spacecraft and ground system operations reduces the likelihood that a single adversarial event, physical disruption, or technical failure will deny all mission communications. Reliance on a single communications pathway creates a single point of failure that adversaries can exploit through jamming, denial of service against ground infrastructure, physical disruption of a ground station, or compromise of network connectivity, any of which could result in complete loss of commanding and telemetry capability. Alternate paths must be assessed end to end for shared failure modes and operational dependencies. Differences in frequency, ground station, relay service, or network provider provide meaningful resilience only when the paths do not remain dependent on the same critical spacecraft, ground, management, or service infrastructure. The selection and configuration of alternate paths must be governed by the mission's concept of operations (CONOPS), which defines the conditions under which each path is used, the priority and switchover procedures between paths, and the minimum communications capability that must be maintained to satisfy mission safety and operational continuity requirements. | AC-17 CP-2 CP-4(2) CP-8(3) PL-8 PL-8(1) SC-47 | A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.8 | ||||
| CM0032 | On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention | An on-board intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS) monitors mission-critical spacecraft components and systems, generates and stores audit records, and supports mission-approved responses to detected threats. Depending on the mission architecture, threat, and availability of ground support, responses may be autonomous, ground-directed, or a combination of both. The system should address both known attack patterns and previously unseen anomalous behavior through complementary signature-based and behavior- or anomaly-based detection methods. Machine learning or adaptive technologies may be used when their performance, resource consumption, and failure behavior have been validated for the mission environment. Detection and response coverage should address applicable adversary activities across the attack lifecycle, including initial access, execution, persistence, defense evasion, and exfiltration. The on-board IDS/IPS must be integrated with the spacecraft's traditional fault management system to provide a unified approach to anomaly response, ensuring that cyber-triggered responses are compatible with fault management logic and do not produce unintended effects or fratricide against the spacecraft's own systems; countermeasures that are incompatible with fault management are considered unsafe and must not be executed autonomously. The response hierarchy must prioritize vehicle safety and continued mission operations. Advanced containment or deception responses may be considered when they can be executed without unacceptable mission risk. The system should preserve evidence that supports post-event analysis, threat characterization, and potential attribution by authorized ground support. | AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-4(7) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) | A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 | ||||
| CM0042 | Robust Fault Management | The fault management system is a high-privilege, autonomous spacecraft function that adversaries may attempt to exploit as an attack vector, triggering protective responses that place the spacecraft in a degraded or more vulnerable operational state. Attack scenarios include manipulating sensor, state, or telemetry information to induce onboard or ground-directed safing actions; creating false fault conditions through sensor spoofing or proximity operations; exploiting safe-mode configurations that reduce security protections; and inducing autonomous maneuver responses through crafted fault indications. Robust fault management requires that safing procedures and autonomous responses be designed with explicit security analysis confirming that each protective action does not introduce a more exploitable system state than the fault condition it responds to. The integrity and authenticity of sensor data, state information, commands, and telemetry used by onboard or ground-based fault management functions must be protected to prevent falsified inputs from triggering unintended responses. Every fault response, including mode transitions, actuator commands, and communication reconfigurations, must be evaluated against the question of whether an adversary could deliberately induce that response and whether the resulting system state provides the adversary with meaningful advantage. | CP-2 CP-4(5) IR-3 IR-3(1) IR-3(2) PE-10 PE-11 PE-11(1) PE-14 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(13) SA-8(24) SA-8(26) SA-8(3) SA-8(30) SA-8(4) SC-16(2) SC-24 SC-5 SI-13 SI-13(4) SI-17 SI-4(13) SI-4(7) SI-7(5) | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.7.11 A.7.11 A.7.5 A.7.8 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.8.16 | ||||
| CM0044 | Cyber-safe Mode | Cyber-safe mode is a dedicated, configuration-controlled spacecraft operating state entered autonomously or by authorized ground command when mission-defined conditions indicate a credible threat to platform integrity. In this state, nonessential functions are shut down or isolated and the spacecraft operates from an integrity-protected, validated software and configuration baseline. Unlike traditional safe mode, which addresses hardware faults and operational anomalies, cyber-safe mode is specifically designed to respond to cyber threats, providing a secure recovery baseline from which the spacecraft can reconstitute compromised functions. Authentication and encryption must remain enabled within cyber-safe mode, ensuring that the reduced operational state does not degrade the security posture of the vehicle. The cyber-safe mode software and configuration must be stored onboard using hardware-based protections that prevent modification by nominal flight software, ordinary commands, and other untrusted execution paths. Where baseline updates are permitted, they must use a separately authorized and integrity-verified maintenance process that preserves a recoverable trusted version. Following entry into cyber-safe mode, the spacecraft must be capable of reconstituting firmware and software functions to pre-attack capability levels, either autonomously through self-healing mechanisms or with ground assistance, and must be capable of replanning operations based on whatever equipment remains available after the cyber event. The primary recovery objective is restoration of full mission capability; where that is not achievable, the spacecraft should attain the maximum reduced mission capability available given the post-attack system state. | CP-10 CP-10(4) CP-12 CP-2 CP-2(5) IR-3 IR-3(1) IR-3(2) IR-4 IR-4(12) IR-4(3) PE-10 PE10 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-8 SA-8(10) SA-8(12) SA-8(13) SA-8(19) SA-8(21) SA-8(23) SA-8(24) SA-8(26) SA-8(3) SA-8(4) SC-16(2) SC-24 SC-5 SI-11 SI-17 SI-4(7) SI-7(17) SI-7(5) | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 | ||||