Threat actors seek a coherent picture of the spacecraft and its supporting ecosystem to reduce uncertainty and plan follow-on actions. Useful design information spans avionics architecture, command and data handling, comms and RF chains, power and thermal control, flight dynamics constraints, payload-to-bus interfaces, redundancy schemes, and ground segment dependencies. Artifacts often include ICDs, block diagrams, SBOMs and toolchains, test procedures, AIT travelers, change logs, and “as-built” versus “as-flown” deltas. Adversaries combine open sources (papers, patents, theses, conference slides, procurement documents, FCC/ITU filings, marketing sheets) with gray sources (leaked RFP appendices, vendor manuals, employee resumes, social posts) to infer single points of failure, unsafe modes, or poorly defended pathways between space, ground, and supply chain. The output of this activity is not merely a document set but a working mental model and, often, a lab replica that enables rehearsal, timing studies, and failure-mode exploration.
| ID | Name | Tiering | Description | NIST Rev5 | ISO 27001 | Onboard SV | Ground | |
| CM0001 | Protect Sensitive Information | Space mission sensitive information spans a broad attack surface and must be inventoried, classified, and protected at a level commensurate with its sensitivity across every location where it resides, including ground systems, contractor networks, and remote access environments. Sensitive material typically includes functional and performance specifications, interface control documents (ICDs), command and telemetry (C&T) databases, uplink protection schemes including disable and bypass features, fault management logic, scripts, simulation and rehearsal results, failure and anomaly resolution records, and architecture and software documentation. Each information type must be assigned a protection level, such as unclassified, controlled, proprietary, or classified, and access must be restricted to personnel with defined roles and a verified need to know. Sensitive data shall be protected at rest and in transit using encryption or other mission-approved safeguards commensurate with its classification, sensitivity, threat exposure, and operational constraints. DLP capabilities shall be applied to systems and data flows where they are technically feasible and effective, with alternative access controls, monitoring, or information-flow protections used where conventional DLP technology is not suitable. Ongoing configuration management must track, control, and document all changes to command procedures and critical database content to prevent unauthorized modification and mission degradation. | AC-25 AC-3(11) AC-4(23) AC-4(25) AC-4(6) CA-3 CM-12 CM-12(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) PM-11 PM-17 SA-3 SA-3(1) SA-3(2) SA-4(12) SA-5 SA-8 SA-8(19) SA-9(7) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SI-12 SI-21 SI-23 SR-12 SR-7 | A.8.4 A.8.11 A.8.10 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.33 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.37 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 A.8.10 A.5.22 | ||||
| CM0005 | Ground-based Countermeasures | Ground-based countermeasures protect the terrestrial capabilities that develop, launch, command, monitor, operate, secure, and sustain space missions. These capabilities may be distributed across mission-owned systems, contractor environments, external partners, and commercial service providers. Because ground segment architectures and responsibilities vary, cybersecurity protections should be selected through threat-informed analysis of the mission functions being performed rather than through indiscriminate application of a single control set. The SPARTA Ground Segment Cyber Defenses guidance provides an interactive functional decomposition that maps ground segment function groups to applicable Defense-in-Depth sub-layers and countermeasure targets. The supporting report, VTR-2026-00702 Rev A, Ground Segment Cyber Defenses and Risk-Based Tiering, provides the methodology, definitions, and risk-tier rationale. The accompanying Ground Segment Cyber Defenses Excel Workbook consolidates the function mappings and Baseline and Enhanced countermeasure guidance into a resource that can be tailored to a specific mission architecture. | SPARTA Ground Segment Cyber Defenses guidance | None | ||||