Receiver, Technique IA-0004.02

Secondary/Backup Communication Channel: Receiver

Threat actors may target the backup/secondary receiver on the spacecraft as a method to inject malicious communications into the mission. The secondary receivers may come from different supply chains than the primary which could have different level of security and weaknesses. Similar to the ground station, the communication through the secondary receiver could be forced or happening naturally.

Other Subtechniques of Secondary/Backup Communication Channel ( 2 )

ID	Name
IA-0004.01	Ground Station
IA-0004.02	Receiver

ID: IA-0004.02

Sub-technique of: IA-0004

Notional Risk (H | M | L): 24 | 21 | 17

Related Aerospace Threat IDs: SV-MA-3 | SV-SP-11

Related MITRE ATT&CK TTPs: No related MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Related ESA SPACE-SHIELD TTPs: No related Spaceshield TTPs

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Tactic: Initial Access

Created: 2022/10/19

Last Modified: 2024/06/11

Countermeasures

ID	Name	Description	NIST Rev5	D3FEND	ISO 27001
CM0009	Threat Intelligence Program	A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities and mitigate risk. Leverage all-source intelligence services or commercial satellite imagery to identify and track adversary infrastructure development/acquisition. Countermeasures for this attack fall outside the scope of the mission in the majority of cases.	PM-16 \| PM-16(1) \| PM-16(1) \| RA-10 \| RA-3 \| RA-3(2) \| RA-3(3) \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SI-4(24) \| SR-8	D3-PH \| D3-AH \| D3-NM \| D3-NVA \| D3-SYSM \| D3-SYSVA \|	A.5.7 \| A.5.7 \| 6.1.2 \| 8.2 \| 9.3.2 \| A.8.8 \| A.5.7 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28
CM0024	Anti-counterfeit Hardware	Develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures designed to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system, including tamper resistance and protection against the introduction of malicious code or hardware.	AC-14 \| AC-20(5) \| CM-7(9) \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-10(3) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(11) \| SA-8(13) \| SA-8(16) \| SA-9 \| SR-1 \| SR-10 \| SR-11 \| SR-11 \| SR-11(3) \| SR-11(3) \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-9 \| SR-9(1)	D3-AI \| D3-SWI \| D3-HCI \| D3-FEMC \| D3-DLIC \| D3-FV \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29
CM0025	Supplier Review	Conduct a supplier review prior to entering into a contractual agreement with a contractor (or sub-contractor) to acquire systems, system components, or system services.	PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-11 \| SA-11(3) \| SA-17 \| SA-2 \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SA-9 \| SR-11 \| SR-3(1) \| SR-3(1) \| SR-3(3) \| SR-4 \| SR-4(1) \| SR-4(2) \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5(1) \| SR-5(1) \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6 \| SR-6	D3-OAM \| D3-ODM \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.27 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29 \| A.5.22
CM0027	ASIC/FPGA Manufacturing	Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) / Field Programmable Gate Arrays should be developed by accredited trusted foundries to limit potential hardware-based trojan injections.	AC-14 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-10(3) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-8 \| SA-8(11) \| SA-8(13) \| SA-8(16) \| SA-9 \| SI-3 \| SI-3(10) \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-11 \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6(1)	D3-OAM \| D3-ODM \| D3-AM \| D3-FV \| D3-SFV \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| A.8.7 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29
CM0028	Tamper Protection	Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering. Leverage tamper proof protection where possible when shipping/receiving equipment.	AC-14 \| AC-25 \| CA-8(1) \| CA-8(1) \| CA-8(3) \| CM-7(9) \| MA-7 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| PL-8(2) \| PM-30 \| PM-30(1) \| RA-3(1) \| SA-10(3) \| SA-10(4) \| SA-11 \| SA-3 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-4(9) \| SA-8 \| SA-8(11) \| SA-8(13) \| SA-8(16) \| SA-8(19) \| SA-8(31) \| SA-9 \| SC-51 \| SC-51 \| SR-1 \| SR-1 \| SR-10 \| SR-11 \| SR-11(3) \| SR-2 \| SR-2(1) \| SR-3 \| SR-4(3) \| SR-4(4) \| SR-5 \| SR-5 \| SR-5(2) \| SR-6(1) \| SR-9 \| SR-9(1)	D3-PH \| D3-AH \| D3-RFS \| D3-FV \|	A.5.8 \| 4.4 \| 6.2 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| 10.2 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.8 \| A.8.25 \| A.8.31 \| A.8.27 \| A.8.28 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30 \| 5.2 \| 5.3 \| 7.5.1 \| 7.5.2 \| 7.5.3 \| A.5.1 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.31 \| A.5.36 \| A.5.37 \| A.5.19 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.8.30 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.20 \| A.5.21 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.29
CM0021	Software Digital Signature	Prevent the installation of Flight Software without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the mission.	AC-14 \| CM-11 \| CM-11(3) \| CM-14 \| CM-14 \| CM-5(6) \| IA-2 \| SA-10(1) \| SA-11 \| SA-4(5) \| SA-8(29) \| SA-8(31) \| SA-9 \| SI-7 \| SI-7 \| SI-7(1) \| SI-7(12) \| SI-7(15) \| SI-7(6)	D3-CH \| D3-CBAN \| D3-FV \| D3-DLIC \| D3-EAL \| D3-SBV \|	A.8.19 \| A.5.16 \| A.5.2 \| A.5.4 \| A.5.8 \| A.5.14 \| A.5.22 \| A.5.23 \| A.8.21 \| A.8.29 \| A.8.30
CM0068	Reinforcement Learning	Institute a reinforcement learning agent that will detect anomalous events and redirect processes to proceed by ignoring malicious data/input.	IR-5 \| IR-5(1) \| SI-4 \| SI-4(2)	D3-PM \| D3-FBA \| D3-ID \| D3-HD \| D3-SSC \| D3-NTA \| D3-PMAD \|	A.8.16
CM0014	Secure boot	Software/Firmware must verify a trust chain that extends through the hardware root of trust, boot loader, boot configuration file, and operating system image, in that order. The trusted boot/RoT computing module should be implemented on radiation tolerant burn-in (non-programmable) equipment.	AC-14 \| PL-8 \| PL-8(1) \| SA-8(10) \| SA-8(12) \| SA-8(13) \| SA-8(3) \| SA-8(30) \| SA-8(4) \| SC-51 \| SI-7 \| SI-7(1) \| SI-7(10) \| SI-7(9)	D3-PH \| D3-BA \| D3-DLIC \| D3-TBI \|	A.5.8

Secondary/Backup Communication Channel: Receiver

Other Subtechniques of Secondary/Backup Communication Channel ( 2 )

Countermeasures

References