Adversaries may field their own ground system, transportable or fixed, to transmit and receive mission-compatible signals. A typical setup couples steerable apertures and GPS-disciplined timing with SDR/modems configured for the target’s bands, modulation/coding, framing, and beacon structure. Using pass schedules and Doppler/polarization predictions, the actor crafts over-the-air traffic that appears valid at the RF and protocol layers.
| ID | Name | Tiering | Description | NIST Rev5 | ISO 27001 | Onboard SV | Ground | |
| CM0080 | Stealth Technology | Spacecraft stealth encompasses design and operational techniques that reduce a satellite's detectability and trackability by adversary space surveillance systems, increasing the cost and difficulty of adversary targeting, tracking, and characterization efforts. Design-based approaches include reducing physical size to decrease radar cross-section (RCS), applying radar-absorbing coatings, using radar-deflecting geometric shapes, and controlling the emission or reflection of radar, optical, and infrared (IR) energy to minimize the observable signatures that surveillance sensors rely upon. Operational stealth techniques include optimizing maneuver profiles to avoid detection by known ground-based or space-based tracking sensors, executing maneuvers at unexpected times or with trajectories that complicate orbit determination, and employing active measures such as radar jamming or spoofing to degrade tracking accuracy. These approaches collectively raise the adversary's intelligence collection burden, degrade the accuracy of targeting solutions, and reduce the predictability of the spacecraft's future position, complicating the planning and execution of both kinetic and directed energy counterspace attacks. Stealth is a design philosophy and operational discipline that must be balanced against mission functional requirements, as size reductions and coating applications that reduce observability may affect payload capacity, thermal management, and power generation. | CP-10(6) CP-13 SC-30 SC-30(5) | A.5.29 | ||||
| CM0081 | Defensive Jamming and Spoofing | Defensive jamming and spoofing are active electronic countermeasures that may disrupt or deceive the terminal guidance sensors of an incoming kinetic anti-satellite weapon. When combined with evasive maneuvering, these measures may reduce the accuracy of the threat’s targeting solution and lower the probability of a successful intercept. Effectiveness depends on timely threat detection, knowledge of the relevant sensor characteristics, available transmit power and geometry, and the threat’s ability to recognize or overcome the countermeasure. Development, testing, and employment of these capabilities must occur only under applicable governmental authorization, spectrum authority, rules of engagement, and information-protection requirements. The design must limit unintended interference and account for effects on friendly, civil, and safety-related radio services. | CP-10(6) CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(1) CP-2(5) CP-2(7) PE-20 | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.30 A.5.29 A.5.10 | ||||
| CM0082 | Deception and Decoys | Deception and decoy techniques can reduce the accuracy or confidence of adversary assessments concerning spacecraft location, capability, operational status, mission type, or constellation robustness. Ground segment honeypots, such as HoneySat, extend deception into the cyber domain by simulating realistic satellite ground infrastructure and mission control systems to attract, deceive, and collect intelligence on adversaries attempting network-based compromise of satellite operations. Their effectiveness depends on whether the deception remains credible when evaluated across the observable signatures and intelligence sources available to the adversary. Strategic deception encompasses information operations approaches such as controlled public messaging and launch announcements that limit disclosure or actively introduce uncertainty about satellite capabilities, as well as operational practices that conceal spacecraft functions through careful management of observable behaviors and emissions. On-orbit capability deception, enabled by swappable payload modules and on-orbit servicing vehicles that periodically transfer payloads between satellites, creates persistent uncertainty in the adversary's intelligence picture about which capabilities are resident on which platform at any given time, directly complicating targeting calculus. Tactical decoys provide active point defense by creating false targets that confuse the sensors of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and space domain awareness (SDA) surveillance systems; physical decoys, such as deployable inflatable devices that replicate a satellite's size and radar cross-section, and electromagnetic decoys that mimic a spacecraft's radio frequency (RF) signature, can each divert adversary attention and degrade the reliability of tracking and targeting solutions. Multiple decoys stored onboard for sequential deployment extend the utility of the capability across engagement scenarios. Cyber-layer deception through satellite honeypots represents an emerging defensive capability that complements physical and electromagnetic deception techniques. Systems like HoneySat simulate complete satellite missions, including ground segment software, mission control interfaces, orbital pass timing, and realistic telemetry generation, to create high-fidelity decoys accessible over network protocols commonly used in satellite operations. By mimicking the communication patterns, telecommand structures, and subsystem behaviors of operational small satellites, these honeypots can successfully deceive adversaries conducting reconnaissance or attempting unauthorized access via Internet-exposed ground infrastructure. The intelligence collected from honeypot interactions provides visibility into adversary TTPs targeting space systems, enabling defenders to characterize threat actor capabilities, refine attribution assessments, and develop countermeasures based on observed attack patterns. Integration of honeypots into satellite mission architectures, whether as standalone decoy systems or as protective layers around operational ground segments, adds depth to cyber defense postures while imposing costs on adversaries who must expend resources distinguishing genuine targets from sophisticated simulations. | SC-26 SC-30 | None | ||||
| CM0083 | Antenna Nulling and Adaptive Filtering | Antenna nulling and adaptive filtering are complementary electronic protection techniques that reduce the effects of jamming on spacecraft communication and sensing links while preserving access to legitimate signals. Antenna nulling dynamically adjusts the receive antenna pattern to reduce sensitivity in the estimated direction of arrival of a jammer. For terrestrial interference, the affected geographic region depends on the spacecraft’s position and attitude, antenna geometry, and uncertainty in the jammer’s location. Nulling is most effective against a limited number of discrete, detectable interference sources, but it may also attenuate legitimate signals arriving from the same or a nearby direction. Adaptive filtering suppresses interference based on its spectral or signal characteristics, such as by placing adaptive notches around narrowband or slowly varying interference. It can preserve operation within unaffected portions of the received bandwidth but may also remove or distort legitimate signal energy that overlaps the rejected frequencies. Its effectiveness decreases against wideband, rapidly changing, or multiple simultaneous jammers when too little usable bandwidth remains to support mission requirements. Used together, antenna nulling and adaptive filtering can address a broader range of jamming conditions than either technique alone. Both techniques depend on the interference remaining within the operating range of the antenna and receiver chain. If a jammer saturates or damages the low-noise amplifier, analog front end, or analog-to-digital converter, downstream digital processing may be unable to recover the legitimate signal. Receiver dynamic range and front-end protection must therefore be incorporated into the overall electronic protection design. | SC-40 SI-4(14) | None | ||||
| CM0086 | Filtering and Shuttering | Optical filters and shutters are passive and active protective mechanisms for remote sensing spacecraft sensors against laser dazzling and blinding attacks that exploit the same optical pathways used for legitimate mission collection. Optical filters selectively attenuate light outside the sensor's design wavelength bands, blocking laser energy at wavelengths that fall outside the mission's collection bands while preserving sensitivity to legitimate return signals; however, filters provide no protection against lasers operating at the same wavelengths the sensor is designed to detect, as filtering those wavelengths would simultaneously block the sensor from its intended mission function. Shutters provide complementary broadband protection by blocking or diverting light from the protected detector path when an exposure threshold or other anomaly criterion is met. Protection depends on the threat-detection latency, decision time, shutter actuation time, optical leakage, and duration of the incident illumination. A shutter may limit exposure from sustained or repeated illumination, but it must not be assumed to prevent damage from a short pulse that deposits damaging energy before closure. Together, filters and shutters provide layered protection: filters continuously attenuate selected wavelengths, while shutters can limit additional exposure from threats that cannot be sufficiently rejected by filtering. The fundamental tradeoff of shuttering is that it trades temporary collection interruption for sensor preservation, making the shutter activation threshold a critical design parameter that must balance sensor protection against mission data continuity requirements. Sustainment activities are limited because the filter and shutter hardware is generally fixed after launch, but operational monitoring, calibration assessment, mechanism exercising, threshold configuration control, and post-event analysis remain applicable. | CP-13 PE-18 SC-30(5) SC-5 SC-5(3) | A.5.29 A.5.10 A.7.5 A.7.8 | ||||
| CM0087 | Defensive Dazzling/Blinding | Defensive dazzling and blinding employs directed laser energy to degrade or defeat the optical or infrared (IR) sensors of adversary systems, providing an active countermeasure against kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and adversary reconnaissance platforms in the space domain. Against kinetic ASAT threats, laser energy directed toward the terminal guidance sensor of an incoming weapon may temporarily saturate, disrupt, or damage the sensor and reduce the accuracy of terminal guidance. When coordinated with evasive maneuvering, this capability may reduce the probability of a successful intercept. Effectiveness depends on timely threat detection, target-sensor characteristics, engagement geometry, laser performance, pointing accuracy, dwell time, and the threat’s ability to maintain or recover guidance. Against adversary inspector satellites or SDA collection platforms, defensive dazzling may temporarily degrade or deny optical or infrared collection of the protected spacecraft. Permanent sensor damage is a materially different effect that requires separate authorization, targeting criteria, and escalation analysis. Dazzling generally produces temporary sensor degradation, while blinding produces permanent sensor damage. Both effects carry legal, policy, safety, and escalation implications, but their legal characterization depends on the target, circumstances, intended effect, actual consequences, and applicable national and international authorities. Employment authorities and prohibited target or effect categories must be established before the capability is operationally relied upon. | CP-10(6) CP-13 CP-2 CP-2(1) CP-2(5) CP-2(7) PE-20 SC-30(5) | 7.5.1 7.5.2 7.5.3 A.5.2 A.5.29 A.8.1 A.5.30 A.5.29 A.5.10 | ||||
| CM0002 | COMSEC | Communications security (COMSEC) denies unauthorized parties access to information derived from telecommunications while ensuring the authenticity of those communications. COMSEC is commonly defined as a broad discipline that may encompass cryptographic security, transmission security, emissions security, cryptographic key management, traffic-flow security, and physical security of COMSEC material. Within SPARTA, these areas are further broken down through separate countermeasures, including CM0029 | TRANSEC, CM0030 | Crypto Key Management, CM0003 | TEMPEST/EMSEC, and CM0073 | Traffic Flow Analysis Defense. CM0002 provides the overarching communications-security context and supports the coordinated application of these specialized countermeasures. All mission links, particularly telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C) links, should employ communications-security protections appropriate to the sensitivity, criticality, operational environment, and threat exposure of the information being exchanged. These protections may include cryptographic protection, transmission security, emissions security, traffic-flow protection, secure key management, and physical protection of COMSEC material, as addressed by the applicable specialized countermeasures. Spacecraft should not provide an operational mode that permits required cryptographic protection or command authentication on TT&C links to be bypassed or disabled. Operational, maintenance, test, recovery, and contingency modes should be considered when evaluating whether communications-security protections can be unintentionally or improperly circumvented. Communication receivers and associated signal-processing or TRANSEC mechanisms should detect and, when mission-defined criteria are met, reject or otherwise safely handle transmissions exhibiting anomalous signal characteristics consistent with communications deception. Cryptographic mechanisms should authenticate and integrity-check received content but should not be treated as RF-deception detectors. | AC-17 AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18 AC-18(1) AC-2(11) AC-3(10) CA-3 IA-4(9) IA-5 IA-5(7) IA-7 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(18) SA-8(19) SA-9(6) SC-10 SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-13 SC-16(3) SC-28(1) SC-28(3) SC-7 SC-7(10) SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SC-7(5) SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SI-10 SI-10(3) SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-19(4) SI-3(8) | A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.8.16 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.16 A.5.17 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.12 A.5.33 A.8.20 A.8.24 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 A.5.33 A.8.11 | ||||
| CM0030 | Crypto Key Management | Effective cryptographic key management is a foundational requirement for all mission encryption and authentication functions; the security of cryptographic implementations is only as strong as the protection afforded to the keys those implementations rely upon. Key management must conform to recognized cryptographic guidance and address the full lifecycle applicable to each key type, including generation or establishment, distribution, storage, activation, use, replacement, deactivation or revocation, recovery where authorized, compromise response, and destruction. Only approved cryptographic algorithms, key generation methods, key distribution techniques, and authentication mechanisms may be used; the use of unapproved, deprecated, or custom cryptographic primitives is prohibited regardless of perceived functional adequacy. Encryption key handling must be performed outside of onboard software and protected through dedicated cryptographic mechanisms, preventing keys from being exposed through software vulnerabilities, memory inspection, or software-level debugging interfaces. Secret and private key material must not be retrievable in plaintext through telecommands, telemetry, diagnostic outputs, debugging interfaces, or other externally accessible mechanisms, regardless of the privilege level of the requesting entity. | CM-3(6) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-9(6) SC-12 SC-12(1) SC-12(2) SC-12(3) SC-12(6) SC-28(3) SC-8(1) | A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 A.8.24 | ||||
| CM0031 | Authentication | All command-bearing sessions, frames, or messages involving spacecraft command links, crosslinks, or relay services shall provide cryptographic authentication of the command origin and integrity verification before commands are accepted. Mutual or bidirectional authentication shall be required where both endpoints must authenticate one another and the link and protocol architecture support that exchange. Acquisition requirements should mandate cryptographically based, bidirectional authentication for all command sessions across external links, including ground-to-spacecraft uplinks, spacecraft-to-spacecraft crosslinks, and any relay or intermediary ground station connections, with authentication required aBidirectional authentication enables both communicating entities to verify each other’s identity and helps prevent impersonation. Authentication establishes identity but does not by itself authorize a command, protect mission-data confidentiality, or prevent session hijacking. Command acceptance must also enforce authorization, and authenticated sessions or security associations must maintain integrity and replay resistance so that subsequent traffic remains bound to the authenticated entities. Beyond external links, authentication is strongly recommended for spacecraft internal bus communications and onboard inter-component connections, as an adversary with access to internal interfaces, whether through a compromised component or a physical access event, should face the same authentication barrier as an external adversary attempting to inject commands from outside the spacecraft. | AC-14 AC-17 AC-17(10) AC-17(2) AC-18 AC-18(1) IA-2 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-4(9) IA-7 IA-9 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-4(5) SA-8 SA-8(15) SA-8(9) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-7(11) SC-8(1) SI-14(3) SI-7(6) | A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.16 A.5.16 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.33 | ||||
| CM0033 | Relay Protection | Replay attacks capture and later retransmit previously valid authentication messages, frames, credentials, or tokens. Relay attacks forward an authentication exchange in real time between legitimate endpoints, causing an endpoint to authenticate a connection or action that the adversary is relaying without requiring compromise of the underlying cryptographic keys. Relay- and replay-resistant authentication mechanisms must be implemented when establishing remote connections or security associations with the spacecraft and for authenticated communications on spacecraft internal buses. The protections must prevent previously accepted authentication material or authenticated traffic from being reused outside its authorized context. Replay resistance should use freshness and anti-reuse mechanisms such as nonces, sequence numbers, timestamps where operationally suitable, and managed anti-replay windows. Relay resistance additionally requires authentication to be cryptographically bound to the intended endpoints, security association, session or channel context, and authenticated action. Challenge-response authentication provides replay resistance when fresh challenges are used but does not, by itself, prevent an adversary from relaying the challenge and response between legitimate endpoints. These protections must be applied at both external interface boundaries, including ground-to-spacecraft command links and crosslinks, and internal spacecraft bus connections where component-to-component authentication is implemented. | AC-17(10) IA-2(8) IA-3 IA-3(1) IA-4 IA-7 SC-13 SC-16(1) SC-23 SC-23(1) SC-23(3) SC-7 SC-7(11) SC-7(18) SI-10 SI-10(5) SI-10(6) SI-3(8) | A.5.16 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 A.8.24 A.8.26 A.5.31 | ||||
| CM0055 | Secure Command Mode(s) | Secure command modes provide additional layers of restriction on spacecraft command acceptance beyond standard authentication and encryption, constraining when, where, and under what operational conditions the spacecraft will process commands. These supplemental controls reduce the window of opportunity for unauthorized commanding by limiting command receptivity to defined parameters that an adversary would need to satisfy simultaneously with authentication requirements, substantially increasing the difficulty of a successful command injection attack. Specific implementations include geographic restriction, in which the spacecraft accepts commands only when in contact with designated ground station locations; operational mode restrictions, in which special flight software (FSW) modes must be active before certain command categories are accepted; and temporal controls, in which the spacecraft enforces time-bounded windows during which commands are valid. These mechanisms complement command authentication, integrity protection, anti-replay controls, and authorization and do not replace them. Encryption should also be applied where command confidentiality is required. Secure command modes may combine geographic, temporal, operational-state, source, or other mission-defined conditions according to the active command policy. Secure command modes helps create a multi-dimensional command acceptance policy that an adversary must defeat in its entirety to achieve unauthorized command execution. | AC-17(1) AC-17(10) AC-2(11) AC-2(12) AC-3 AC-3(2) AC-3(3) AC-3(4) AC-3(8) CA-3(7) IA-10 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-3 SA-8 SC-7 SI-3(8) | A.8.16 A.5.15 A.5.33 A.8.3 A.8.4 A.8.18 A.8.20 A.8.2 A.8.16 A.5.8 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 | ||||
| CM0034 | Monitor Critical Telemetry Points | Monitoring defined spacecraft telemetry points provides a key source of evidence for detecting adversary activity against on-orbit systems, where observability is largely limited to the events and conditions the spacecraft can sense, record, and report. Monitored telemetry must include both accepted and rejected commands, command mode transitions, command counters, and other indicators of commanding activity, enabling detection of unauthorized command attempts that fail authentication as well as anomalous patterns in legitimate command traffic. Monitoring scope should include RF and link-quality indicators that support detection and triage of interference or suspected jamming. These indicators should be correlated with expected link conditions and other available evidence before hostile activity is concluded. Security-relevant telemetry should be integrated and time-correlated with ground-based defensive cyber operations infrastructure, including security information and event management (SIEM) and audit platforms, to provide unified space-system cybersecurity situational awareness. The resulting view should correlate spacecraft observations with relevant ground-system security events while accounting for telemetry latency, contact availability, and other observability limitations. | AC-17(1) AU-3(1) CA-7(6) IR-4(14) PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(13) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-7 SI-3(8) SI-4(7) | A.8.16 A.5.8 A.5.14 A.8.16 A.8.20 A.8.22 A.8.23 A.8.26 | ||||
| CM0032 | On-board Intrusion Detection & Prevention | An on-board intrusion detection and prevention system (IDS/IPS) monitors mission-critical spacecraft components and systems, generates and stores audit records, and supports mission-approved responses to detected threats. Depending on the mission architecture, threat, and availability of ground support, responses may be autonomous, ground-directed, or a combination of both. The system should address both known attack patterns and previously unseen anomalous behavior through complementary signature-based and behavior- or anomaly-based detection methods. Machine learning or adaptive technologies may be used when their performance, resource consumption, and failure behavior have been validated for the mission environment. Detection and response coverage should address applicable adversary activities across the attack lifecycle, including initial access, execution, persistence, defense evasion, and exfiltration. The on-board IDS/IPS must be integrated with the spacecraft's traditional fault management system to provide a unified approach to anomaly response, ensuring that cyber-triggered responses are compatible with fault management logic and do not produce unintended effects or fratricide against the spacecraft's own systems; countermeasures that are incompatible with fault management are considered unsafe and must not be executed autonomously. The response hierarchy must prioritize vehicle safety and continued mission operations. Advanced containment or deception responses may be considered when they can be executed without unacceptable mission risk. The system should preserve evidence that supports post-event analysis, threat characterization, and potential attribution by authorized ground support. | AU-14 AU-2 AU-3 AU-3(1) AU-4 AU-4(1) AU-5 AU-5(2) AU-5(5) AU-6(1) AU-6(4) AU-8 AU-9 AU-9(2) AU-9(3) CA-7(6) CM-11(3) CP-10 CP-10(4) IR-4 IR-4(11) IR-4(12) IR-4(14) IR-4(5) IR-5 IR-5(1) PL-8 PL-8(1) RA-10 RA-3(4) SA-8(21) SA-8(22) SA-8(23) SC-16(2) SC-32(1) SC-5 SC-5(3) SC-7(10) SC-7(9) SI-10(6) SI-16 SI-17 SI-3 SI-3(10) SI-3(8) SI-4 SI-4(1) SI-4(10) SI-4(11) SI-4(13) SI-4(16) SI-4(17) SI-4(2) SI-4(23) SI-4(24) SI-4(25) SI-4(4) SI-4(5) SI-4(7) SI-6 SI-7(17) SI-7(8) | A.8.15 A.8.15 A.8.6 A.8.17 A.5.33 A.8.15 A.8.15 A.5.29 A.5.25 A.5.26 A.5.27 A.5.8 A.5.7 A.8.12 A.8.7 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 A.8.16 | ||||
| CM0029 | TRANSEC | Transmission security (TRANSEC) is the component of communications security (COMSEC) concerned with protecting the characteristics of the transmission itself, as distinct from protecting the content of the information being communicated. TRANSEC controls reduce the likelihood, effectiveness, or operational impact of transmission interception, signal disruption, communications deception, and exploitation of transmission characteristics within the defined threat model. Applicable TRANSEC techniques include jam-resistant waveforms that increase resistance to jamming and communications deception, spread spectrum and frequency hopping techniques that reduce signal predictability and improve resistance to interception and disruption, low probability of intercept and low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) signal designs that reduce transmission observability, and transmission scheduling or pattern discipline that limits the intelligence value of traffic analysis. TRANSEC requirements should be applied to mission communication links according to link criticality (e.g., TT&C, crosslinks), threat exposure, and operational consequence. TRANSEC must be treated as a distinct layer of protection complementary to, but not a substitute for, cryptographic protection of information content. | AC-17 AC-18 AC-18(5) CA-3 CP-8 PL-8 PL-8(1) SA-8(19) SC-16 SC-16(1) SC-40 SC-40(1) SC-40(3) SC-40(4) SC-5 SC-8(1) SC-8(3) SC-8(4) | A.5.14 A.6.7 A.8.1 A.5.14 A.8.1 A.8.20 A.5.14 A.8.21 A.5.29 A.7.11 A.5.8 A.5.33 | ||||