Rather than “owning a pad,” a realistic path is purchasing launch services (rideshare, hosted payload) to place inspection or relay assets where they confer RF, optical, or proximity advantage. Launch providers deliver integration, testing, and scheduling; an actor can use benign mission covers to field small satellites that measure local spectrum, perform on-orbit characterization of target emissions, or support later rendezvous and proximity operations. The resource being developed is access to vantage points, not just spaceflight hardware.
| ID | Name | Tiering | Description | NIST Rev5 | ISO 27001 | Onboard SV | Ground | |
| CM0009 | Threat Intelligence Program | A threat intelligence program enables an organization to systematically collect, analyze, and apply information about adversary capabilities, infrastructure, and intent to inform defensive priorities and drive risk-informed security decisions across the mission lifecycle. For space missions specifically, this may include leveraging available all-source intelligence services or commercial satellite imagery to identify and monitor adversary infrastructure development and acquisition activities that may signal emerging threats to mission assets. Threat intelligence outputs should be operationalized into concrete adjustments to defensive architecture, monitoring priorities, and incident response posture rather than treated as informational products alone. Direct countermeasures against adversary infrastructure identified through this program will fall outside the scope of the mission in the majority of cases; the primary value of the program is in generating actionable awareness that sharpens the organization's own defensive posture. | PM-16 PM-16(1) RA-10 RA-3 RA-3(2) RA-3(3) SA-3 SA-8 SI-4(24) SR-8 | A.5.7 A.5.7 6.1.2 8.2 9.3.2 A.8.8 A.5.7 A.5.2 A.5.8 A.8.25 A.8.31 A.8.27 A.8.28 | ||||
| CM0077 | Space Domain Awareness | Space domain awareness (SDA) enables mission owners to detect and characterize objects, behaviors, environmental conditions, and anomalous events that may affect their space systems. When correlated with other intelligence and mission data, SDA can also support assessment of possible threats and attribution. SDA encompasses the tracking and cataloging of space objects, prediction of future object positions, monitoring of the space environment and space weather, and characterization of the capabilities and behaviors of on-orbit objects. SDA data must provide the accuracy, timeliness, coverage, and characterization needed for the mission’s defined decisions. Publicly available data may support general awareness but may be insufficient for time-sensitive conjunction, proximity, or threat assessment; appropriate government, commercial, partner, or owner-operator data should be obtained where required. SDA is generated by a diverse sensor architecture spanning terrestrial optical, infrared, and radar systems and space-based sensors including inspector satellites capable of close-approach observation. The SDA landscape is increasingly populated by national space agencies, military programs, allied partners, commercial providers, and amateur tracking communities, making the space environment progressively more transparent and creating opportunities for mission owners to leverage diverse data sources to build a more complete operational picture. | CP-13 CP-2(3) CP-2(5) CP-2(7) PE-20 PE-6 PE-6(1) PE-6(2) PE-6(4) RA-6 SI-4(17) | A.5.29 A.7.4 A.8.16 A.7.4 A.7.4 A.5.10 | ||||