SI-7(5) - Reference

SI-7(5) - Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Automated Response to Integrity Violations

Automatically [Selection (one or more): shut the system down; restart the system; implement [Assignment: organization-defined controls] ] when integrity violations are discovered.

ID: SI-7(5)

Enhancement of : SI-7

Space Segment Guidance

Automated responses can reduce exposure between contacts. Consider failing over to a known-good (golden/alternate) bank, narrowing command acceptance to recovery-only sets, or isolating a partition, while keeping essential safing available. Make actions explicit in telemetry (trigger, action taken, active bank/mode) and reversible at the next pass with clear operator cues.

Countermeasures Related to Control

ID	Name	Description	D3FEND
CM0049	Machine Learning Data Integrity	When AI/ML is being used for mission critical operations, the integrity of the training data set is imperative. Data poisoning against the training data set can have detrimental effects on the functionality of the AI/ML. Fixing poisoned models is very difficult so model developers need to focus on countermeasures that could either block attack attempts or detect malicious inputs before the training cycle occurs. Regression testing over time, validity checking on data sets, manual analysis, as well as using statistical analysis to find potential injects can help detect anomalies.	D3-PH \| D3-FE \| D3-DENCR \| D3-PA \| D3-FA
CM0005	Ground-based Countermeasures	This countermeasure is focused on the protection of terrestrial assets like ground networks and development environments/contractor networks, etc. Traditional detection technologies and capabilities would be applicable here. Utilizing resources from NIST CSF to properly secure these environments using identify, protect, detect, recover, and respond is likely warranted. Additionally, NISTIR 8401 may provide resources as well since it was developed to focus on ground-based security for space systems (https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8401/final). Furthermore, the MITRE ATT&CK framework provides IT focused TTPs and their mitigations https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/enterprise/. Several recommended NIST 800-53 Rev5 controls are provided for reference when designing ground systems/networks.	Nearly all D3FEND Techniques apply to Ground
CM0042	Robust Fault Management	Ensure fault management system cannot be used against the spacecraft. Examples include: safe mode with crypto bypass, orbit correction maneuvers, affecting integrity of telemetry to cause action from ground, or some sort of proximity operation to cause spacecraft to go into safe mode. Understanding the safing procedures and ensuring they do not put the spacecraft in a more vulnerable state is key to building a resilient spacecraft.	D3-AH \| D3-EHPV \| D3-PSEP \| D3-PH \| D3-SCP
CM0044	Cyber-safe Mode	Provide the capability to enter the spacecraft into a configuration-controlled and integrity-protected state representing a known, operational cyber-safe state (e.g., cyber-safe mode). Spacecraft should enter a cyber-safe mode when conditions that threaten the platform are detected. Cyber-safe mode is an operating mode of a spacecraft during which all nonessential systems are shut down and the spacecraft is placed in a known good state using validated software and configuration settings. Within cyber-safe mode, authentication and encryption should still be enabled. The spacecraft should be capable of reconstituting firmware and software functions to pre-attack levels to allow for the recovery of functional capabilities. This can be performed by self-healing, or the healing can be aided from the ground. However, the spacecraft needs to have the capability to replan, based on equipment still available after a cyber-attack. The goal is for the spacecraft to resume full mission operations. If not possible, a reduced level of mission capability should be achieved. Cyber-safe mode software/configuration should be stored onboard the spacecraft in memory with hardware-based controls and should not be modifiable.	D3-PH \| D3-EI \| D3-NI \| D3-BA

Space Threats Tagged by Control

ID		Description
SV-IT-2		Unauthorized modification or corruption of data
SV-MA-7		Exploit ground system and use to maliciously to interact with the spacecraft

Sample Requirements

SPARTA ID	Requirement	Rationale/Additional Guidance/Notes
SPR-74	The [organization] shall define the security safeguards that are to be automatically employed when integrity violations are discovered.{SV-IT-2}{CP-2,SA-8(21),SI-3,SI-4(7),SI-4(12),SI-7(5),SI-7(8)}	Predefined safeguards ensure consistent and timely response to detected integrity violations. Ad hoc response increases uncertainty and recovery time. Automated actions may include isolation, reconstitution from gold images, or transition to cyber-safe mode. Defined response paths improve resilience and reduce operator burden during crisis.

Related SPARTA Techniques and Sub-Techniques

ID		Name	Description
REC-0001		Gather Spacecraft Design Information	Threat actors seek a coherent picture of the spacecraft and its supporting ecosystem to reduce uncertainty and plan follow-on actions. Useful design information spans avionics architecture, command and data handling, comms and RF chains, power and thermal control, flight dynamics constraints, payload-to-bus interfaces, redundancy schemes, and ground segment dependencies. Artifacts often include ICDs, block diagrams, SBOMs and toolchains, test procedures, AIT travelers, change logs, and “as-built” versus “as-flown” deltas. Adversaries combine open sources (papers, patents, theses, conference slides, procurement documents, FCC/ITU filings, marketing sheets) with gray sources (leaked RFP appendices, vendor manuals, employee resumes, social posts) to infer single points of failure, unsafe modes, or poorly defended pathways between space, ground, and supply chain. The output of this activity is not merely a document set but a working mental model and, often, a lab replica that enables rehearsal, timing studies, and failure-mode exploration.
	REC-0001.01	Software Design	Adversaries target knowledge of flight and ground software to identify exploitable seams and to build high-fidelity emulators for rehearsal. Valuable details include RTOS selection and version, process layout, inter-process messaging patterns, memory maps and linker scripts, fault-detection/isolation/recovery logic, mode management and safing behavior, command handlers and table services, bootloaders, patch/update mechanisms, crypto libraries, device drivers, and test harnesses. Artifacts may be source code, binaries with symbols, stripped images with recognizable patterns, configuration tables, and SBOMs that reveal vulnerable dependencies. With these, a threat actor can reverse engineer command parsing, locate debug hooks, craft inputs that bypass FDIR, or time payload and bus interactions to produce cascading effects. Supply-chain access to vendors of COTS components, open-source communities, or integrators can be used to insert weaknesses or to harvest build metadata. Even partial disclosures, such as a unit test name, an assert message, or a legacy API, shrink the search space for exploitation.
	REC-0001.02	Firmware	Firmware intelligence covers microcontroller images, programmable logic bitstreams, boot ROM behavior, peripheral configuration blobs, and anti-rollback or secure-boot settings for devices on the bus. Knowing device types, versions, and footprints enables inference of default passwords, debug interfaces (JTAG, SWD, UART), timing tolerances, and error handling under brownout or thermal stress. A threat actor may obtain firmware from vendor reference packages, public evaluation boards, leaked manufacturing files, over-the-air update images, or crash dumps. Correlating that with board layouts, harness drawings, or part markings helps map trust boundaries and locate choke points like power controllers, bus bridges, and watchdog supervisors. Attack goals include: preparing malicious but apparently valid updates, exploiting unsigned or weakly verified images, forcing downgrades, or manipulating configuration fuses to weaken later defenses. Even when cryptographic verification is present, knowledge of recovery modes, boot-pin strapping, or maintenance commands can offer alternate paths.
	REC-0001.03	Cryptographic Algorithms	Adversaries look for the complete crypto picture: algorithms and modes, key types and lifecycles, authentication schemes, counter or time-tag handling, anti-replay windows, link-layer protections, and any differences between uplink and downlink policy. With algorithm and key details, a threat actor can craft valid telecommands, masquerade as a trusted endpoint, or degrade availability through replay and desynchronization. Sources include interface specifications, ground software logs, test vectors, configuration files, contractor laptops, and payload-specific ICDs that reuse bus-level credentials. Particular risk arises when command links rely on authentication without confidentiality; once an adversary acquires the necessary keys or counters, they can issue legitimate-looking commands outside official channels. Programs should assume that partial disclosures, MAC length, counter reset rules, or key rotation cadence, aid exploitation.
	REC-0001.04	Data Bus	Bus intelligence focuses on which protocols are used (e.g., MIL-STD-1553, SpaceWire, etc.), controller roles, addressing, timings, arbitration, redundancy management, and the location of critical endpoints on each segment. Knowing the bus controller, remote terminal addresses, message identifiers, and schedule tables allows an adversary to craft frames that collide with or supersede legitimate traffic, to starve health monitoring, or to trigger latent behaviors in payload or power systems. Additional details such as line voltages, termination, connector types, harness pinouts, and EMC constraints inform feasibility of injection and disruption techniques. Attackers assemble this picture from ICDs, vendor datasheets, AIT procedures, harness drawings, lab photos, and academic or trade publications that reveal typical configurations. Enumeration of bridges and gateways is especially valuable because they concentrate trust across fault-containment regions and between payload and bus.
	REC-0001.05	Thermal Control System	Adversaries seek a working map of the thermal architecture and its operating envelopes to anticipate stress points and plan timing for other techniques. Valuable details include passive elements (MLI, coatings, radiators, heat pipes/straps, louvers) and active control (survival and control heaters, thermostats, pumped loops), plus sensor placement, setpoints, deadbands, heater priority tables, and autonomy rules that protect critical hardware during eclipses and anomalies. Artifacts often come from thermal math models (TMMs), TVAC test reports, heater maps and harness drawings, command mnemonics, and on-orbit thermal balance procedures. When correlated with attitude constraints, payload duty cycles, and power budgets, this information lets a threat actor infer when components run close to limits, how safing responds to off-nominal gradients, and where power-thermal couplings can be exploited. Even small fragments, such as louver hysteresis or a heater override used for decontamination, can reveal opportunities to mask heating signatures or provoke nuisance safing.
	REC-0001.06	Maneuver & Control	Threat actors collect details of the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) stack to predict vehicle response and identify leverage points during station-keeping, momentum management, and anomaly recovery. Useful specifics include propulsion type and layout (monoprop/biprop/electric; thruster locations, minimum impulse bit, plume keep-out zones), reaction wheels/CMGs and desaturation logic, control laws and gains, estimator design (e.g., EKF), timing and synchronization, detumble/safe-mode behaviors, and the full sensor suite (star trackers, sun sensors, gyros/IMUs, GNSS). Artifacts include AOCS/AOCS ICDs, maneuver procedures, delta-v budgets, ephemeris products, scheduler tables, and wheel management timelines. Knowing when and how attitude holds, acquisition sequences, or wheel unloads occur helps an adversary choose windows where injected commands or bus perturbations have outsized effect, or where sensor blinding and spoofing are most disruptive.
	REC-0001.07	Payload	Adversaries pursue a clear picture of payload type, operating modes, command set, and data paths to and from the bus and ground. High-value details include vendor and model, operating constraints (thermal, pointing, contamination), mode transition logic, timing of calibrations, safety inhibits and interlocks, firmware/software update paths, data formatting and compression, and any crypto posture differences between payload links and the main command link. Payload ICDs often reveal addresses, message identifiers, and gateway locations where payload traffic bridges to the C&DH or data-handling networks, creating potential pivot points. Knowledge of duty cycles and scheduler entries enables timing attacks that coincide with high-power or high-rate operations to stress power/thermal margins or saturate storage and downlink. Even partial information, calibration script names, test vectors, or engineering telemetry mnemonics, can shrink the search space for reverse engineering.
	REC-0001.08	Power	Reconnaissance of the electrical power system (EPS) focuses on generation, storage, distribution, and autonomy. Useful details include solar array topology and SADA behavior, MPPT algorithms, array string voltages, eclipse depth assumptions, battery chemistry and configuration, BMS charge/discharge limits and thermal dependencies, PCDU architecture, load-shed priorities, latching current limiters, and survival power rules. Artifacts surface in EPS ICDs, acceptance test data, TVAC power margin reports, anomaly response procedures, and vendor manuals. Correlating these with attitude plans and payload schedules lets a threat actor infer when state-of-charge runs tight, which loads are shed first, and how fast recovery proceeds after a brownout or safing entry. Knowledge of housekeeping telemetry formats and rate caps helps identify blind spots where abusive load patterns or command sequences may evade detection.
	REC-0001.09	Fault Management	Fault management (FDIR/autonomy/safing) materials are a prime reconnaissance target because they encode how the spacecraft detects, classifies, and responds to off-nominal states. Adversaries seek trigger thresholds and persistence timers, voting logic, inhibit and recovery ladders, safe-mode entry/exit criteria, command authority in safed states, watchdog/reset behavior, and any differences between flight and maintenance builds. Artifacts include fault trees, FMEAs, autonomy rule tables, safing flowcharts, and anomaly response playbooks. With these, a threat actor can craft inputs that remain just below detection thresholds, stack benign-looking events to cross safing boundaries at tactically chosen times, or exploit recovery windows when authentication, visibility, or redundancy is reduced. Knowledge of what telemetry is suppressed or rate-limited during safing further aids concealment.
REC-0002		Gather Spacecraft Descriptors	Threat actors compile a concise but highly actionable dossier of “who/what/where/when” attributes about the spacecraft and mission. Descriptors include identity elements (mission name, NORAD catalog number, COSPAR international designator, call signs), mission class and operator, country of registry, launch vehicle and date, orbit regime and typical ephemerides, and any publicly filed regulatory artifacts (e.g., ITU/FCC filings). They also harvest operational descriptors such as ground network affiliations, common pass windows by latitude band, and staffing patterns implied by press, social media, and schedules. Even when each item is benign, the aggregate picture enables precise timing (e.g., during beta-angle peaks, eclipse seasons, or planned maintenance), realistic social-engineering pretexts, and better targeting of ground or cloud resources that support the mission.
	REC-0002.01	Identifiers	Adversaries enumerate and correlate all identifiers that uniquely tag the vehicle throughout its lifecycle and across systems. Examples include NORAD/Satellite Catalog numbers, COSPAR designators, mission acronyms, spacecraft serials and bus IDs, regulatory call signs, network addresses used by mission services, and any constellation slot or plane tags. These identifiers allow cross-reference across public catalogs, tracking services, regulatory filings, and operator materials, shrinking search spaces for pass prediction, link acquisition, and vendor ecosystem discovery. Seemingly minor clues, like a configuration filename embedding a serial number or an operator using the same short name across environments, can expose test assets or internal tools. Rideshare and hosted-payload contexts introduce additional ambiguity that an attacker can exploit to mask activity or misattribute traffic.
	REC-0002.02	Organization	Threat actors map the human and institutional terrain surrounding the mission to find leverage for phishing, credential theft, invoice fraud, or supply-chain compromise. Targeted details include the owner/operator, prime and subcontractors (bus, payload, ground, launch), key facilities and labs, cloud/SaaS providers, organizational charts, distribution lists, and role/responsibility boundaries for operations, security, and engineering. The objective is to identify who can approve access, who can move money, who holds admin roles on ground and cloud systems, and which vendors maintain remote access for support. Understanding decision chains also reveals when changes control boards meet, when ops handovers occur, and where a single compromised account could bridge enclaves.
	REC-0002.03	Operations	Adversaries collect high-level operational descriptors to predict when the mission will be busy, distracted, or temporarily less instrumented. Useful items include CONOPS overviews, daily/weekly activity rhythms, ground pass schedules, DSN or commercial network windows, calibration and maintenance timelines, planned wheel unloads or thruster burns, conjunction-assessment cycles, and anomaly response playbooks at the level of “who acts when.” For constellations, they seek plane/slot assignments, phasing and drift strategies, crosslink usage, and failover rules between vehicles. These descriptors enable time-targeted campaigns, e.g., sending malicious but syntactically valid commands near handovers, exploiting reduced telemetry during safing, or saturating links during high-rate downlinks.
REC-0003		Gather Spacecraft Communications Information	Threat actors assemble a detailed picture of the mission’s RF and networking posture across TT&C and payload links. Useful elements include frequency bands and allocations, emission designators, modulation/coding, data rates, polarization sense, Doppler profiles, timing and ranging schemes, link budgets, and expected Eb/N0 margins. They also seek antenna characteristics, beacon structures, and whether transponders are bent-pipe or regenerative. On the ground, they track station locations, apertures, auto-track behavior, front-end filters/LNAs, and handover rules, plus whether services traverse SLE, SDN, or commercial cloud backbones. Even small details, polarization sense, roll-off factors, or beacon cadence, shrink the search space for interception, spoofing, or denial. The outcome is a lab-replicable demod/decode chain and a calendar of advantageous windows.
	REC-0003.01	Communications Equipment	Adversaries inventory space and ground RF equipment to infer capabilities, limits, and attack surfaces. On the spacecraft, they seek antenna type and geometry, placement and boresight constraints, polarization, RF front-end chains, transponder type, translation factors, gain control, saturation points, and protective features. On the ground, they collect dish size/aperture efficiency, feed/polarizer configuration, tracking modes, diversity sites, and backend modem settings. Beacon frequency/structure, telemetry signal type, symbol rates, and framing reveal demodulator parameters and help an actor build compatible SDR pipelines. Knowledge of power budgets and AGC behavior enables strategies to push hardware into non-linear regimes, causing self-inflicted denial or intermodulation. Equipment location and mounting inform visibility and interference opportunities.
	REC-0003.02	Commanding Details	Threat actors study how commands are formed, authorized, scheduled, and delivered. High-value details include the telecommand protocol (e.g., CCSDS TC), framing and CRC/MAC fields, authentication scheme (keys, counters, anti-replay windows), command dictionary/database formats, critical-command interlocks and enable codes, rate and size limits, timetag handling, command queue semantics, and the roles of scripts or procedures that batch actions. They also collect rules governing “valid commanding periods”: line-of-sight windows, station handovers, maintenance modes, safing states, timeouts, and when rapid-response commanding is permitted. With this, an adversary can craft syntactically valid traffic, time injections to coincide with reduced monitoring, or induce desynchronization (e.g., counter resets, stale timetags).
	REC-0003.03	Mission-Specific Channel Scanning	Beyond TT&C, many missions expose additional RF or network surfaces: high-rate payload downlinks (e.g., X/Ka-band), user terminals, inter-satellite crosslinks, and hosted-payload channels that may be operated by different organizations. Adversaries scan spectrum and public telemetry repositories for these mission-specific channels, characterizing carrier plans, burst structures, access schemes (TDMA/FDMA/CDMA), addressing, and gateway locations. For commercial services, they enumerate forward/return links, user terminal waveforms, and provisioning backends that could be impersonated or jammed selectively. In hosted-payload or rideshare contexts, differences in configuration control and key management present opportunities for pivoting between enclaves.
	REC-0003.04	Valid Credentials	Adversaries seek any credential that would let them authenticate as a legitimate actor in space, ground, or supporting cloud networks. Targets include TT&C authentication keys and counters, link-encryption keys, PN codes or spreading sequences, modem and gateway accounts, mission control mission control user and service accounts, station control credentials, VPN and identity-provider tokens, SLE/CSP service credentials, maintenance backdoor accounts, and automation secrets embedded in scripts or CI/CD pipelines. Acquisition paths include spear-phishing, supply-chain compromise, credential reuse across dev/test/ops, logs and core dumps, misconfigured repositories, contractor laptops, and improperly sanitized training data. Because some missions authenticate uplink without encrypting it, possession of valid keys or counters may be sufficient to issue accepted commands from outside official channels.
REC-0004		Gather Launch Information	Adversaries collect structured launch intelligence to forecast when and how mission assets will transition through their most time-compressed, change-prone phase. Useful elements include the launch date/time windows, launch site and range operator, participating organizations (launch provider, integrator, range safety, telemetry networks), vehicle family and configuration, fairing type, and upper-stage restart profiles. This picture enables realistic social-engineering pretexts, supply-chain targeting of contractors, and identification of auxiliary systems (range instrumentation, TLM/FTS links) that may be less hardened than the spacecraft itself. Knowledge of ascent comms (bands, beacons, ground stations), early-orbit operations (LEOP) procedures, and handovers to mission control further informs when authentication, staffing, or telemetry margins may be tight.
	REC-0004.01	Flight Termination	Threat actors may attempt to learn how the launch vehicle’s flight termination capability is architected and governed, command-destruct versus autonomous flight termination (AFTS), authority chains, cryptographic protections, arming interlocks, inhibit ladders, telemetry indicators, and range rules for safe-flight criteria. While FTS is a range safety function, its interfaces (command links, keys, timing sources, decision logic) can reveal design patterns, dependencies, and potential misconfigurations across the broader launch ecosystem. Knowledge of test modes, simulation harnesses, and pre-launch checks could inform social-engineering or availability-degrading actions against range or contractor systems during critical windows.
REC-0006		Gather FSW Development Information	Adversaries collect a cradle-to-operations view of how flight software is built, tested, signed, and released. Useful artifacts include architecture docs, source trees and SBOMs, compiler/linker toolchains and flags, RTOS and middleware versions, build scripts, CI/CD pipelines, code-signing workflows, defect trackers, and release notes that describe “as-built” vs. “as-flown” deltas. They also seek integration environments, emulators/SIL, flatsats/iron birds, hardware-in-the-loop rigs, and the autonomy/FDIR logic that governs mode transitions and patch acceptance. With this knowledge, a threat actor can identify weak crypto or provenance controls on update paths, predict error-handling behavior, and craft inputs that slip past unit/integration tests. Even small disclosures (e.g., a linker script, an assert string, or a sanitized crash dump) shrink the search space for exploitation.
	REC-0006.01	Development Environment	Threat actors enumerate the exact environment used to produce flight builds: IDEs and plugins, cross-compilers and SDKs, container images/VMs, environment variables, path conventions, build systems, static libraries, and private package registries. They correlate repository layouts (mono- vs multi-repo), branch and review policies, protected branches/tags, and CI orchestrators to find where policy gaps allow unreviewed code or tool updates. Secrets embedded in configs (tokens, service accounts), permissive compiler/linker flags, or disabled hardening options are especially valuable. Knowledge of debug/diagnostic builds, symbol servers, and crash-dump handling lets an adversary reconstruct higher-fidelity testbeds or derive function boundaries in stripped images.
	REC-0006.02	Security Testing Tools	Adversaries study how you test to learn what you don’t test. They inventory static analyzers and coding standards (MISRA/C, CERT, CWE rulesets), dynamic tools (address/UB sanitizers, valgrind-class tools), fuzzers targeted at command parsers and protocols (e.g., CCSDS TC/TM, payload formats), property-based tests, mutation testing, coverage thresholds, and formal methods applied to mode logic or crypto. They also examine HIL setups, fault-injection frameworks, timing/jitter tests, and regression suites that gate release. Gaps, such as minimal negative testing on rare modes, weak corpus diversity, or untested rate/size limits, inform exploit design and the timing of inputs to evade FDIR or saturate queues.
REC-0007		Monitor for Safe-Mode Indicators	Adversaries watch for telltale signs that the spacecraft has entered a safed or survival configuration, typically sun-pointing or torque-limited attitude, reduced payload activity, conservative power/thermal setpoints, and low-rate engineering downlink. Indicators include specific mode bits or beacon fields, changes in modulation/coding and cadence, distinctive event packets (e.g., wheel unload aborts, brownout recovery), elevated heater duty, altered load-shed states, and operator behaviors such as emergency DSN requests, longer ground passes, or public anomaly notices. This reconnaissance helps time later actions to coincide with periods of reduced bandwidth, altered monitoring, or maintenance command availability. It may also reveal how safing affects authentication (e.g., whether rapid-response paths or recovery consoles differ from nominal).
REC-0008		Gather Supply Chain Information	Threat actors map the end-to-end pathway by which hardware, software, data, and people move from design through AIT, launch, and on-orbit sustainment. They catalog manufacturers and lots, test and calibration houses, logistics routes and waypoints, integrator touchpoints, key certificates and tooling, update and key-loading procedures, and who holds custody at each handoff. They correlate this with procurement artifacts, SBOMs, BOMs, and service contracts to locate where trust is assumed rather than verified. Particular attention falls on exceptions, engineering builds, rework tickets, advance replacements, depot repairs, and urgent field updates, because controls are frequently relaxed there. The result is a prioritized list of choke points (board fabrication, FPGA bitstream signing, image repositories, CI/CD runners, cloud artifact stores, freight forwarders) where compromise yields outsized effect.
	REC-0008.01	Hardware Recon	Adversaries seek insight into component sources, screening levels, test histories, and configuration states to prepare pre-delivery manipulation of boards and modules. High-value details include ASIC/FPGA part numbers and stepping, security fuses and life-cycle states, JTAG/SWD access policies, secure-boot and anti-rollback configuration, golden bitstream handling, board layouts and test points, conformal coat practices, and acceptance test procedures with allowable tolerances. Knowledge of substitute/alternate parts, counterfeit screening thresholds, and waiver histories reveals where counterfeit insertion or parametric “near-miss” parts might evade detection. For programmable logic, attackers target synthesis/place-and-route toolchains, IP core versions, and bitstream encryption keys to enable hardware Trojans or debug backdoors that survive functional test. Logistics artifacts (packing lists, RMA workflows, depot addresses) expose moments when custody is thin and tamper opportunities expand.
	REC-0008.02	Software Recon	Threat actors enumerate the software factory: where source lives, how dependencies are pulled, how artifacts are built, signed, stored, and promoted to flight. They inventory repos and access models, CI/CD orchestrators, build containers and base images, package registries, signing services/HSMs, update channels, and the policies that gate promotion (tests, reviews, attestations). With this, an adversary can plan dependency confusion or typosquatting attacks, modify build scripts, poison cached artifacts, or swap binaries at distribution edges (mirrors, CDN, ground station staging).
	REC-0008.03	Known Vulnerabilities	Adversaries correlate discovered component and software versions with public and private vulnerability sources to assemble a ready exploit catalog. Inputs include CPE/CVE mappings, vendor advisories, CWE-class weaknesses common to selected RTOS/middleware, FPGA IP core errata, cryptographic library issues, and hardware stepping errata that interact with thermal/power regimes. They mine leaked documents, demo code, bug trackers, and community forums; pivot from ground assets to flight by following shared libraries and tooling; and watch for lag between disclosure and patch deployment. Even when a vulnerability seems “ground-only,” it may expose build systems or update paths that ultimately control flight artifacts.
	REC-0008.04	Business Relationships	Threat actors map contractual and operational relationships to identify the weakest well-connected node. They enumerate primes and subs (bus, payload, ground, launch), managed service providers, ground-network operators, cloud/SaaS tenants, testing and calibration labs, logistics and customs brokers, and warranty/repair depots, plus who holds remote access, who moves money, and who approves changes. Public artifacts (press releases, procurement records, org charts, job postings, conference bios) and technical traces (email MX/DMARC, shared SSO/IdP providers, cross-domain service accounts) reveal trust bridges between enclaves. Shipment paths and integration schedules expose when and where hardware and sensitive data concentrate. Understanding these ties enables tailored phishing, invoice fraud, credential reuse, and supply-chain insertion timed to integration milestones.
REC-0009		Gather Mission Information	Adversaries compile a CONOPS-level portrait of the mission to predict priorities, constraints, and operational rhythms. They harvest stated needs, goals, and performance measures; enumerate key elements/instruments and their duty cycles; and extract mode logic, operational constraints (pointing, keep-outs, contamination, thermal/power margins), and contingency concepts. They mine the scientific and engineering basis, papers, algorithms, calibration methods, to anticipate data value, processing chains, and where integrity or availability attacks would have maximal effect. They correlate physical and support environments (ground networks, cloud pipelines, data distribution partners, user communities) and public schedules (campaigns, calibrations, maneuvers) to identify periods of elevated workload or reduced margin. The aim is not merely understanding but timing: choosing moments when authentication might be relaxed, monitoring is saturated, or rapid-response authority is invoked.
RD-0002		Compromise Infrastructure	Rather than purchasing or renting assets, adversaries compromise existing infrastructure, mission-owned, third-party, or shared, to obtain ready-made reach into space, ground, or cloud environments with the benefit of plausible attribution. Targets range from physical RF chains and timing sources to mission control servers, automation/scheduling systems, SLE/CSP gateways, identity providers, and cloud data paths. Initial access often comes via stolen credentials, spear-phishing of operators and vendors, exposed remote-support paths, misconfigured multi-tenant platforms, or lateral movement from enterprise IT into operations enclaves. Once resident, actors can pre-position tools, modify configurations, suppress logging, and impersonate legitimate stations or operators to support later Execution, Exfiltration, or Denial.
	RD-0002.01	Mission-Operated Ground System	Compromising a mission’s own ground system grants the adversary preconfigured access to TT&C and automation. High-value targets include operator workstations, mission control servers, procedure libraries, scheduler/orchestration services, key-loading tools and HSMs, antenna control systems, timing/distribution, and RF modems/baseband units. Typical paths: phishing an operator or contractor, abusing remote-support channels, pivoting from enterprise IT to ops, exploiting unpatched services on enclave gateways, or harvesting credentials from poorly segmented test environments. Once inside, an actor can stage malicious procedures, alter rate/size limits, manipulate pass schedules, downgrade authentication in maintenance modes, or quietly siphon telemetry and ephemerides to refine later attacks.
	RD-0002.02	3rd Party Ground System	Third-party networks (commercial ground stations, hosted modems, cloud-integrated ground-station services) present attractive stepping-stones: they already have vetted RF chains, globally distributed apertures, and trusted IP space. Adversaries may acquire customer credentials via phishing or purchase, exploit weak vetting to create front-company accounts, or compromise provider portals/APIs to submit schedules, alter front-end settings, or exfiltrate collected data. Because traffic originates from “expected” stations and ASN ranges, misuse blends into normal operations. Multi-tenant risks include configuration bleed-over and shared management planes.
RD-0003		Obtain Cyber Capabilities	Adversaries acquire ready-made tools, code, and knowledge so they can move faster and with lower attribution when operations begin. Capabilities span commodity malware and loaders, bespoke implants for mission control mission control and ground enclaves, privilege-escalation and lateral-movement kits, SDR/codec stacks for TT&C and payload links, fuzzers and protocol harnesses, exploit chains for RTOS/middleware and ground services, and databases of configuration playbooks from prior intrusions. Actors prefer modular kits that can be re-skinned (new C2, new certs) and exercised in flatsat or SIL/HIL labs before use. They also collect operational “how-tos”, procedures, scripts, and operator macros, that convert technical access into mission effects.
	RD-0003.02	Cryptographic Keys	Adversaries seek any cryptographic material that confers command or decryption authority: uplink authentication/MAC keys and counters, link-encryption/session keys and KEKs, loading/transfer keys for HSMs, PN/spreading codes, modem credentials, and station or crosslink keys. Acquisition routes include compromised ground systems and laptops, misconfigured repositories and ticket systems, memory/core dumps, training datasets and screenshots, contractor support channels, and poorly controlled key-loading or recovery procedures. Because some missions authenticate uplink without encrypting it, possession of the right keys/counters may be sufficient to inject accepted commands outside official channels or to desynchronize anti-replay.
RD-0004		Stage Capabilities	Before execution, adversaries prepare the ground, literally and figuratively. They upload tooling, exploits, procedures, and datasets to infrastructure they own or have compromised, wire up C2 and telemetry pipelines, and pre-configure RF/baseband chains and protocol stacks to match mission parameters. Staging often uses cloud object stores, VPS fleets, or CI/CD runners masquerading as benign automation; artifacts are containerized or signed with hijacked material to blend in. For RF operations, actors assemble demod/encode flowgraphs, precompute CRC/MAC fields and timetags, and script rate/size pacing to fit pass windows. For ground/cloud, they stage credentials, macros, and schedule templates that can push changes or exfiltrate data quickly during handovers or safing. Dry-runs on flatsats/HIL rigs validate timing and error paths; OPSEC measures (rotating domains, domain fronting, traffic mixers) reduce attribution.
	RD-0004.01	Identify/Select Delivery Mechanism	Adversaries select the pathway that best balances effect, risk, bandwidth, and attribution. Options include over-the-air telecommand injection on TT&C links, manipulation of payload downlinks or user terminals, abuse of crosslinks or gateways, pivoting through commercial ground networks, or pushing malicious updates via supply-chain paths (software, firmware, bitstreams). Selection considers modulation/coding, Doppler and polarization, anti-replay windows, pass geometry, rate/size limits, and expected operator workload (handover, LEOP, safing exits). For ground/cloud paths, actors account for identity boundaries, automation hooks, and change-control cadence. The “delivery mechanism” is end-to-end: RF front-end (antenna, converters, HPAs), baseband/SDR chain, protocol/framing, authentication/counter handling, scheduling, and fallbacks if detection occurs. Rehearsal artifacts, test vectors, mock dictionaries, ephemerides, are built alongside.
	RD-0004.02	Upload Exploit/Payload	Having chosen a path, adversaries pre-position the specific packages and procedures they intend to use: binary exploits, malicious tables and ephemerides, patch images, modem profiles, and operator macros that chain actions. On compromised or leased infrastructure, they stage these items where execution will be fastest, provider portals, scheduler queues, ground station file drops, or automation repos, with triggers tied to pass start, beacon acquisition, or operator shift changes. Artifacts are formatted to mission protocols (framing, CRC/MAC, timetags), chunked to meet rate/size constraints, and signed or wrapped to evade superficial checks. Anti-forensics (timestamp tampering, log suppression, ephemeral storage) reduce audit visibility, while fallback payloads are kept for alternate modes (safe-mode dictionaries, recovery consoles).
IA-0002		Compromise Software Defined Radio	Adversaries target SDR-based transceivers and payload radios because reconfigurable waveforms, FPGA bitstreams, and software flowgraphs create programmable footholds. Manipulation can occur in the radio’s development pipeline (toolchains, out-of-tree modules), at integration (loading of bitstreams, DSP coefficients, calibration tables), or in service via update channels that deliver new waveforms or patches. On-orbit SDRs often expose control planes (command sets for mode/load/select), data planes (baseband I/Q), and management/telemetry paths, any of which can embed covert behavior, alternate demod paths, or hidden subcarriers. A compromised SDR can establish clandestine command-and-control by activating non-public waveforms, piggybacking on idle fields, or toggling to time/ephemeris-triggered profiles that blend with nominal operations. On the ground, compromised SDR modems can be used to fabricate mission-compatible emissions or to decode protected downlinks for reconnaissance. Attackers leverage the SDR’s malleability so that malicious signaling, once seeded, presents as a legitimate but rarely exercised configuration.
IA-0004		Secondary/Backup Communication Channel	Adversaries pursue alternative paths to the spacecraft that differ from the primary TT&C in configuration, monitoring, or authentication. Examples include backup MOC/ground networks, contingency TT&C chains, maintenance or recovery consoles, low-rate emergency beacons, and secondary receivers or antennas on the vehicle. These channels exist to preserve commandability during outages, safing, or maintenance; they may use different vendors, legacy settings, or simplified procedures. Initial access typically pairs reconnaissance of failover rules with actions that steer operations onto the backup path, natural events, induced denial on the primary, or simple patience until scheduled tests and handovers occur. Once traffic flows over the alternate path, the attacker leverages its distinct procedures, dictionaries, or rate/size limits to introduce commands or data that would be harder to inject on the primary.
	IA-0004.01	Ground Station	Threat actors may target the backup ground segment, standby MOC sites, alternate commercial stations, or contingency chains held in reserve. Threat actors establish presence on the backup path (operator accounts, scheduler/orchestration, modem profiles, antenna control) and then exploit moments when operations shift: planned exercises, maintenance at the primary site, weather diversions, or failover during anomalies. They may also shape conditions so traffic is re-routed, e.g., by saturating the primary’s RF front end or consuming its schedules, without revealing their involvement. Once on the backup, prepositioned procedures, macros, or configuration sets allow command injection, manipulation of pass timelines, or quiet collection of downlink telemetry.
IA-0006		Compromise Hosted Payload	Adversaries target hosted payloads as an alternate doorway into the host spacecraft. Hosted payloads often expose their own command sets, file services, and telemetry paths, sometimes via the host’s TT&C chain, sometimes through a parallel ground infrastructure under different operational control. Initial access arises when an attacker obtains the ability to issue payload commands, upload files, or alter memory/register state on the hosted unit. Because data and control must traverse an interface to the host bus (power, time, housekeeping, data routing, gateway processors), the payload–host boundary can also carry management functions: mode transitions, table loads, firmware updates, and cross-strapped links that appear only in maintenance or contingency modes. With knowledge of the interface specification and command dictionaries, a threat actor can activate rarely used modes, inject crafted data products, or trigger gateway behaviors that extend influence beyond the payload itself. In multi-tenant or commercial hosting arrangements, differences in keying, procedures, or scheduling between the payload operator and the bus operator provide additional opportunity for a first foothold that looks like routine payload commanding.
IA-0007		Compromise Ground System	Compromising the ground segment gives an adversary the most direct path to first execution against a spacecraft. Ground systems encompass operator workstations and mission control mission control software, scheduling/orchestration services, front-end processors and modems, antenna control, key-loading tools and HSMs, data gateways (SLE/CSP), identity providers, and cloud-hosted mission services. Once inside, a threat actor can prepare on-orbit updates, craft and queue valid telecommands, replay captured traffic within acceptance windows, or manipulate authentication material and counters to pass checks. The same foothold enables deep reconnaissance: enumerating mission networks and enclaves, discovering which satellites are operated from a site, mapping logical topology between MOC and stations, identifying in-band “birds” reachable from a given aperture, and learning pass plans, dictionaries, and automation hooks. From there, initial access to the spacecraft is a matter of timing and presentation, injecting commands, procedures, or update packages that align with expected operations so the first execution event appears indistinguishable from normal activity.
	IA-0007.01	Compromise On-Orbit Update	Adversaries may target the pipeline that produces and transmits updates to an on-orbit vehicle. Manipulation points include source repositories and configuration tables, build and packaging steps that generate images or differential patches, staging areas on ground servers, update metadata (versions, counters, manifests), and the transmission process itself. Spacecraft updates span flight software patches, FPGA bitstreams, bootloader or device firmware loads, and operational data products such as command tables, ephemerides, and calibration files, each with distinct formats, framing, and acceptance rules. An attacker positioned in the ground system can substitute or modify an artifact, alter its timing and timetags to match pass windows, and queue it through the same procedures operators use for nominal maintenance. Activation can be immediate or deferred: implants may lie dormant until a specific mode, safing entry, or table index is referenced.
	IA-0007.02	Malicious Commanding via Valid GS	Adversaries may use a compromised, mission-owned ground system to transmit legitimate-looking commands to the target spacecraft. Because the ground equipment is already configured for the mission, correct waveforms, framing, dictionaries, and scheduling, the attacker’s traffic blends with routine operations. Initial access unfolds by inserting commands or procedures into existing timelines, modifying rate/size limits or command queues, or invoking maintenance dictionaries and rapid-response workflows that accept broader command sets. Pre-positioned scripts can chain actions across multiple passes and stations, while telemetry routing provides immediate feedback to refine follow-on steps. Exfiltration can be embedded in standard downlink channels or forwarded through gateways as ordinary mission data. The distinguishing feature is that command origin appears valid, transmitted from approved apertures using expected parameters, so the first execution event is not a protocol anomaly but a misuse of legitimate command authority obtained through the compromised ground system.
IA-0009		Trusted Relationship	Adversaries obtain first execution by riding connections that the mission already trusts, formal interconnections with partners, vendors, and user communities. Once a third party is compromised, the actor inherits that entity’s approved routes into mission enclaves: VPNs and jump hosts into ground networks, API keys into cloud tenants, automated file drops that feed command or update pipelines, and collaboration spaces where procedures and dictionaries circulate. Because traffic, credentials, and artifacts originate from known counterparts, the initial execution event can appear as a routine payload task, scheduled procedure, or software update promoted through established processes.
	IA-0009.01	Mission Collaborator (academia, international, etc.)	Missions frequently depend on distributed teams, instrument builders at universities, science operations centers, and international partners, connected by data portals, shared repositories, and federated credentials. A compromise of a collaborator yields access to telescience networks, analysis pipelines, instrument commanding tools, and file exchanges that deliver ephemerides, calibration products, procedures, or configuration tables into mission workflows. Partners may operate their own ground elements or payload gateways under delegated authority, creating additional entry points whose authentication and logging differ from the prime’s. Initial access emerges when attacker-modified artifacts or commands traverse these sanctioned paths: a revised calibration script uploaded through a science portal, a configuration table promoted by a cross-org CI job, or a payload task submitted via a collaboration queue and forwarded by the prime as routine work. Variations in process rigor, identity proofing, and toolchains across institutions amplify the attacker’s options while preserving the appearance of legitimate partner activity.
	IA-0009.02	Vendor	Vendors that design, integrate, or support mission systems often hold elevated, persistent routes into operations: remote administration of ground software and modems, access to identity providers and license servers, control of cloud-hosted services, and authority to deliver firmware, bitstreams, or patches. Attackers who compromise a vendor’s enterprise or build environment can assume these roles, issuing commands through approved consoles, queuing updates in provider-operated portals, or invoking maintenance procedures that the mission expects the vendor to perform. Some vendor pathways terminate directly on RF equipment or key-management infrastructure; others ride cross-account cloud roles or managed SaaS backends that handle mission data and scheduling.
	IA-0009.03	User Segment	The “user segment” encompasses end users and their equipment that interact with mission services, SATCOM terminals, customer ground gateways, tasking portals, and downstream processing pipelines for delivered data. Where these environments interconnect with mission cores, a compromised user domain becomes a springboard. Attackers can inject malformed tasking requests that propagate into payload scheduling, craft user-plane messages that traverse gateways into control or management planes, or seed data products that flow back to mission processing systems and automation. In broadband constellations and hosted services, user terminals may share infrastructure with TT&C or provider management networks, creating opportunities to pivot from customer equipment into provider-run nodes that the spacecraft trusts.
IA-0010		Unauthorized Access During Safe-Mode	Adversaries time their first execution to coincide with safe-mode, when the vehicle prioritizes survival and recovery. In many designs, safe-mode reconfigures attitude, reduces payload activity, lowers data rates, and enables contingency dictionaries or maintenance procedures that are dormant in nominal operations. Authentication, rate/size limits, command interlocks, and anti-replay handling may differ; some implementations reset counters, relax timetag screening, accept broader command sets, or activate alternate receivers and beacons to improve commandability. Ground behavior also shifts: extended passes, emergency scheduling, and atypical station use create predictable windows. An attacker who understands these patterns can present syntactically valid traffic that aligns with safe-mode expectations, maintenance loads, recovery scripts, table edits, or reboot/patch sequences, so the first accepted action appears consistent with fault recovery rather than intrusion.
IA-0012		Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation Compromise	Assembly, Test, and Launch Operation (ATLO) concentrates people, tools, and authority while components first exchange real traffic across flight interfaces. Test controllers, EGSE, simulators, flatsats, loaders, and data recorders connect to the same buses and command paths that will exist on orbit. Threat actors exploit this density and dynamism: compromised laptops or transient cyber assets push images and tables; lab networks bridge otherwise separate enclaves; vendor support accounts move software between staging and flight hardware; and “golden” artifacts created or modified in ATLO propagate into the as-flown baseline. Malware can traverse shared storage and scripting environments, ride update/checklist execution, or piggyback on protocol translators and gateways used to stimulate subsystems. Because ATLO often introduces late firmware loads, key/counter initialization, configuration freezes, and full-system rehearsals, a single well-placed change can yield first execution on multiple devices and persist into LEOP.
IA-0013		Compromise Host Spacecraft	The inverse of "IA-0006: Compromise Hosted Payload", this technique describes adversaries that are targeting a hosted payload, the host space vehicle (SV) can serve as an initial access vector to compromise the payload through vulnerabilities in the SV's onboard systems, communication interfaces, or software. If the SV's command and control systems are exploited, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the vehicle's internal network. Once inside, the attacker may laterally move to the hosted payload, particularly if it shares data buses, processors, or communication links with the vehicle.
EX-0006		Disable/Bypass Encryption	The adversary alters how confidentiality or integrity is applied so traffic or data is processed in clear or with weakened protection. Paths include toggling configuration flags that place links or storage into maintenance/test modes; forcing algorithm “fallbacks” or null ciphers; downgrading negotiated suites or keys; manipulating anti-replay/counter state so checks are skipped; substituting crypto libraries or tables during boot/update; and selecting alternate routes that carry the same content without encryption. On some designs, distinct modes handle authentication and confidentiality separately, allowing an actor who obtains authentication material to request unencrypted service or to switch to legacy profiles. The end state is that command, telemetry, or data products traverse a path the spacecraft accepts while cryptographic protection is absent, weakened, or inconsistently applied, enabling subsequent tactics such as inspection, manipulation, or exfiltration.
EX-0007		Trigger Single Event Upset	The attacker induces or opportunistically exploits a single-event upset (SEU), a transient bit flip or latch disturbance in logic or memory, so that software executes in a state advantageous to the attack. SEUs arise when charge is deposited at sensitive nodes by energetic particles or intense electromagnetic stimuli. An actor may time operations to coincide with natural radiation peaks or use artificial means from close range. Outcomes include corrupted stacks or tables, altered branch conditions, flipped configuration bits in FPGAs or controllers, and transient faults that push autonomy/FDIR into recovery modes with broader command acceptance. SEU exploitation is probabilistic; the technique couples repeated stimulation with careful observation of mode transitions, watchdogs, and error counters to land the system in a desired but nominal-looking state from which other actions can proceed.
EX-0008		Time Synchronized Execution	Malicious logic is arranged to run at precise times derived from onboard clocks or distributed time sources. The trigger may be absolute or relative. Spacecraft commonly maintain multiple clocks and counters and schedule autonomous sequences against them. An attacker leverages this machinery to ensure effects occur during tactically advantageous windows. Time-based execution reduces exposure, simplifies coordination across assets, and makes reproduction difficult in lab settings that lack the same temporal context.
	EX-0008.01	Absolute Time Sequences	Execution is keyed to a fixed wall-clock timestamp or epoch, independent of current vehicle state. The implant watches a trusted time source, GNSS-derived time, crosslink-distributed network time, oscillator-disciplined UTC/TAI, or mission elapsed time anchored at activation, and triggers exactly at a programmed date/time. Absolute triggering supports coordinated multi-asset actions and allows long dormancy with a precise activation moment. Variants incorporate calendar logic (e.g., “first visible pass after YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss”) or guard bands to fire only if the clock is within certain tolerances, ensuring the event occurs even with minor drift yet remains rare enough to blend with scheduled operations.
	EX-0008.02	Relative Time Sequences	Execution is keyed to elapsed time since a reference event. The implant latches a start point, boot, reset, safing entry/exit, receipt of a particular telemetry/command pattern, achievement of sun-pointing, and arms a countdown or set of offsets (“N seconds after event,” “repeat every M cycles”). Relative sequences are resilient to clock discontinuities and mirror how many spacecraft schedule internal activities (e.g., after boot, run calibrations; after acquisition, start downlink). An attacker exploits this to ensure the trigger fires only within specific operational phases and to survive resets that would thwart absolute timestamps: after every reboot, wait for housekeeping steady state, then act; or, after a wheel unload completes, inject an additional command while control laws are in a known configuration.
EX-0009		Exploit Code Flaws	The adversary executes actions on-board by abusing defects in software that runs on the vehicle, ranging from application logic in flight software to libraries, drivers, and supporting services. Outcomes range from arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation to silent logic manipulation (e.g., bypassing interlocks, suppressing alarms) that appears operationally plausible. The hallmark of this technique is that the attacker co-opts existing code paths, often rarely used ones, to run unintended behavior under nominal interfaces. These attacks may be extremely targeted and tailored to specific coding errors introduced as a result of poor coding practices or they may target known issues in the commercial software components.
	EX-0009.01	Flight Software	Flight software presents rich attack surface where mission-specific parsing and autonomy live. Vulnerable components include command and telemetry handlers, table loaders, file transfer services, mode management and safing logic, payload control applications, and gateway processes that bridge payload and bus protocols. Typical flaws are unchecked lengths and indices in command fields, arithmetic overflows in rate/size calculations, insufficient validation of table contents, format-string misuse in logging, incomplete state cleanup across rapid mode changes, and race conditions in concurrent message processing. Some FSW suites expose operator-facing APIs or scripting/procedure engines used for automation; malformed invocations can coerce unexpected behaviors or enable arbitrary expressions. Because many subsystems act on “last write wins,” logic errors can yield durable configuration changes without obvious anomalies in protocol syntax. Successful exploitation lets an adversary execute code, alter persistent parameters, or chain effects across partitions that would otherwise be segmented by design.
	EX-0009.02	Operating System	At the OS layer the attacker targets primitives that schedule work and mediate hardware. Maintenance builds may expose shells or management consoles; misconfigurations around these interfaces can provide paths to command interpreters or privileged syscalls. Exploitation yields kernel-mode execution, arbitrary memory read/write, or control of scheduling and address spaces, letting the actor tamper with FSW processes, intercept command paths, or manipulate storage and bus drivers beneath application checks. The technique leverages generic OS weaknesses adapted to the spacecraft’s particular build, turning low-level control into mission-facing effects that appear to originate from legitimate processes.
	EX-0009.03	Known Vulnerability (COTS/FOSS)	Using knowledge of the software composition on-board, the adversary maps components and versions to publicly or privately known defects and then crafts inputs to trigger them. Typical targets include standard libraries (libc, STL), cryptographic and compression libraries, protocol stacks (CCSDS implementations, IP over space links, SpaceWire bridges), filesystems and parsers (FITS/CCSDS packetization, custom table formats), and vendor SDKs for radios, sensors, or payloads. Triggers arrive as well-formed but malicious packets, frames, or files whose edge-case fields exercise version-specific bugs, overflowing a parser, bypassing an authentication check, or causing a kernel/driver fault that reboots into a more permissive mode. Because these flaws are documented somewhere, exploitation emphasizes matching the exact build and build-time options used on the mission.
EX-0010		Malicious Code	The adversary achieves on-board effects by introducing executable logic that runs on the vehicle, either native binaries and scripts, injected shellcode, or “data payloads” that an interpreter treats as code (e.g., procedure languages, table-driven automations). Delivery commonly piggybacks on legitimate pathways: software/firmware updates, file transfer services, table loaders, maintenance consoles, or command sequences that write to executable regions. Once staged, activation can be explicit (a specific command, mode change, or file open), environmental (time/geometry triggers), or accidental, where operator actions or routine autonomy invoke the implanted logic. Malicious code can target any layer it can reach: altering flight software behavior, manipulating payload controllers, patching boot or device firmware, or installing hooks in drivers and gateways that bridge bus and payload traffic. Effects range from subtle logic changes (quiet data tampering, command filtering) to overt actions (forced mode transitions, resource starvation), and may include secondary capabilities like covert communications, key material harvesting, or persistence across resets by rewriting images or configuration entries.
	EX-0010.01	Ransomware	Ransomware on a spacecraft encrypts data or critical configuration so that nominal operations can no longer proceed without the attacker’s cooperation. Targets include mass-memory file stores (engineering telemetry, payload data), configuration and command tables, event logs, on-board ephemerides, and even intermediate buffers used by downlink pipelines. Some variants interfere with key services instead of bulk data, e.g., encrypting a command dictionary or table index so valid inputs are rejected, or wrapping the payload data path in an attacker-chosen cipher so downlinked products appear as noise. By denying access to on-board content or control artifacts at scale, attackers convert execution into bargaining power or irreversible mission degradation.
	EX-0010.02	Wiper Malware	Wipers deliberately destroy or irreversibly corrupt data and, in some cases, executable images to impair or end mission operations. Destructive routines may overwrite with patterns or pseudorandom data, repeatedly reformat volumes, trigger wear mechanisms on non-volatile memory, or manipulate low-level translation layers so recovery tools see a blank or inconsistent device. Activation can be immediate or staged, sleeping until a specific time, pass, or maintenance action, and may be paired with anti-recovery steps such as erasing checksums, undo logs, or golden images. Because wipers operate at storage and image layers that underpin many subsystems, collateral effects can cascade: autonomy enters safing without viable recovery paths, downlinks carry only noise, and subsequent updates cannot be authenticated or applied. The defining feature is irreversible loss of data or executables as the primary objective, rather than concealment or monetization.
	EX-0010.03	Rootkit	A rootkit hides the presence and activity of other malicious components by interposing on the mechanisms that report system state. On spacecraft this can occur within flight software processes, at OS kernel level, inside separation kernels/hypervisors, or down in system firmware where drivers and initialization routines run. Techniques include API and syscall hooking, patching message queues and inter-process communication paths, altering task lists and scheduler views, filtering telemetry packets and event logs, and rewriting sensor or health values before they are recorded or downlinked. Rootkits may also hook command handlers and gateways so certain opcodes, timetags, or sources are silently accepted or ignored while external observers see normal acknowledgments. Because many missions rely on deterministic procedures and limited observability, even small alterations to reporting can make malicious actions appear as plausible mode transitions or benign anomalies. Persistence often pairs with the concealment layer, with the rootkit reinjecting companions after resets or rebuilds by monitoring for specific files, tables, or image loads and modifying them on the fly.
	EX-0010.04	Bootkit	A bootkit positions itself in the pre-OS boot chain so that it executes before normal integrity checks and can shape what the system subsequently trusts. After seizing early control, the bootkit can redirect image selection, patch kernels or flight binaries in memory, adjust device trees and driver tables, or install hooks that persist across warm resets. Some variants maintain shadow copies of legitimate images and present them to basic verification routines while steering actual execution to a modified payload; others manipulate fallback logic so recovery modes load attacker-controlled code. Because the boot path initializes memory maps, buses, and authentication material, a bootkit can also influence key/counter setup and gateway configurations, creating conditions favorable to later tactics. The central characteristic is precedence: by running first, the implant defines the reality higher layers observe, ensuring that every subsequent component launches under conditions curated by the attacker.
EX-0011		Exploit Reduced Protections During Safe-Mode	The adversary times on-board actions to the period when the vehicle is in safe-mode and operating with altered guardrails. In many designs, safe-mode enables contingency command dictionaries, activates alternate receivers or antennas, reduces data rates, and prioritizes survival behaviors (sun-pointing, thermal/power conservation). Authentication checks, anti-replay windows, rate/size limits, and interlocks may differ from nominal; counters can be reset, timetag screening relaxed, or maintenance procedures made available for recovery. Ground cadence also changes, longer passes, emergency scheduling, atypical station selection, creating predictable windows for interaction. Using knowledge of these patterns, an attacker issues maintenance-looking loads, recovery scripts, parameter edits, or boot/patch sequences that the spacecraft is primed to accept while safed. Because responses (telemetry beacons, acknowledgments, mode bits) resemble normal anomaly recovery, the first execution event blends with expected behavior, allowing unauthorized reconfiguration, software modification, or state manipulation to occur under the cover of fault response.
EX-0012		Modify On-Board Values	The attacker alters live or persistent data that the spacecraft uses to make decisions and route work. Targets include device and control registers, parameter and limit tables, internal routing/subscriber maps, schedules and timelines, priority/QoS settings, watchdog and timer values, autonomy/FDIR rule tables, ephemeris and attitude references, and power/thermal setpoints. Many missions expose legitimate mechanisms for updating these artifacts, direct memory read/write commands, table load services, file transfers, or maintenance procedures, which can be invoked to steer behavior without changing code. Edits may be transient (until reset) or latched/persistent across boots; they can be narrowly scoped (a single bit flip on an enable mask) or systemic (rewriting a routing table so commands are misdelivered). The effect space spans subtle biasing of control loops, selective blackholing of commands or telemetry, rescheduling of operations, and wholesale changes to mode logic, all accomplished by modifying the values the software already trusts and consumes.
	EX-0012.01	Registers	Threat actors may target the internal registers of the victim spacecraft in order to modify specific values as the FSW is functioning or prevent certain subsystems from working. Most aspects of the spacecraft rely on internal registers to store important data and temporary values. By modifying these registers at certain points in time, threat actors can disrupt the workflow of the subsystems or onboard payload, causing them to malfunction or behave in an undesired manner.
	EX-0012.02	Internal Routing Tables	Threat actors may rewrite the maps that tell software where to send and receive things. In publish/subscribe or message-queued flight frameworks, tables map message IDs to subscribers, opcodes to handlers, and pipes to processes; at interfaces, address/port maps define how traffic traverses bridges and gateways (e.g., SpaceWire node/port routes, 1553 RT/subaddress mappings, CAN IDs). By altering these structures, commands can be misdelivered, dropped, duplicated, or routed through unintended paths; telemetry can be redirected or blackholed; and handler bindings can be swapped so an opcode triggers the wrong function. Schedule/routing hybrids, used to sequence activities and distribute results, can be edited to reorder execution or to create feedback loops that occupy bandwidth and processor time. The result is control over who hears what and when, achieved by changing the lookup tables that underpin command/telemetry distribution rather than the code that processes them.
	EX-0012.03	Memory Write/Loads	The adversary uses legitimate direct-memory commands or load services to place chosen bytes at chosen addresses. Many spacecraft support raw read/write operations, block loads into RAM or non-volatile stores, and table/file loaders that copy content into working memory. With knowledge of address maps and data structures, an attacker can patch function pointers or vtables, alter limit and configuration records, seed scripts or procedures into interpreter buffers, adjust DMA descriptors, or overwrite portions of executable images resident in RAM. Loads may be sized and paced to fit link and queue constraints, then activated by a subsequent command, mode change, or natural reference by the software.
	EX-0012.04	App/Subscriber Tables	In publish/subscribe flight frameworks, applications and subsystems register interest in specific message classes via subscriber (or application) tables. These tables map message IDs/topics to subscribers, define delivery pipes/queues, and often include filters, priorities, and rate limits. By altering these mappings, an adversary can quietly reshape information flow: critical consumers stop receiving health or sensor messages; non-critical tasks get flooded; handlers are rebound so an opcode or message ID reaches the wrong task; or duplicates create feedback loops that consume bandwidth and CPU. Because subscription state is usually read at init or refreshed on command, subtle edits can persist across reboots or take effect at predictable times. Similar effects appear in legacy MIL-STD-1553 deployments by modifying Remote Terminal (RT), subaddress, or mode-code configurations so that messages are misaddressed or dropped at the bus interface. The net result is control-by-misdirection: the software still “works,” but the right data no longer reaches the right recipient at the right time.
	EX-0012.05	Scheduling Algorithm	Spacecraft typically rely on real-time scheduling, fixed-priority or deadline/periodic schemes, driven by timers, tick sources, and per-task parameters. Threat actors target these parameters and associated tables to skew execution order and timing. Edits may change priorities, periods, or deadlines; adjust CPU budgets and watchdog thresholds; alter ready-queue disciplines; or reconfigure timer tick rates and clock sources. They may also modify task affinities, message-queue depths, and interrupt masks so preemption and latency characteristics shift. Small changes can have large effects: high-rate control loops see added jitter, estimator updates miss deadlines, command/telemetry handling starves, or low-priority maintenance tasks monopolize cores due to mis-set periods. Manipulated schedules can create intermittent, state-dependent malfunctions that are hard to distinguish from environmental load. The essence of the technique is to weaponize time, reshaping when work happens so that otherwise correct code produces unsafe or exploitable behavior.
	EX-0012.06	Science/Payload Data	Payload data, and the metadata that gives it meaning, can be altered in place to steal value, mislead users, or degrade mission outputs. Targets include raw detector frames, packetized Level-0 streams, onboard preprocessed products, and file catalogs/directories on mass memory. Adjacent metadata such as timestamps, pointing/attitude tags, calibration coefficients, compression settings, and quality flags are equally potent; slight bias in a calibration table or time tag can skew entire downlink campaigns while appearing routine. An adversary may rewrite frame headers, reorder packets, substitute segments from prior passes, or flip quality bits so ground pipelines silently discard or misclassify products. Recorder index manipulation can orphan files or cause downlinks to serve stale or fabricated content. Because many missions perform some processing or filtering onboard, tampering upstream of downlink propagates forward as “authoritative” truth, jeopardizing mission objectives without obvious protocol anomalies.
	EX-0012.07	Propulsion Subsystem	Propulsion relies on parameters and sensed values that govern burns, pressure management, and safing. Editable items include thruster calibration and minimum impulse bit, valve timing and duty limits, inhibit masks, delta-V tables, plume keep-out constraints, tank pressure/temperature thresholds, leak-detection limits, and momentum-management coupling with attitude control. By modifying these, an adversary can provoke over-correction, waste propellant through repeated trims, bias orbit maintenance, or trigger protective sequences at inopportune times. False pressure or temperature readings can cause autonomous venting or lockouts; tweaked alignment matrices or misapplied gimbal limits can yield off-axis thrust and attitude excursions; altered desaturation rules can induce frequent wheel unloads that sap resources. Because consumables are finite and margins tight, even modest parameter drift can shorten mission life or violate keep-out and conjunction constraints while presenting as “normal” control activity.
	EX-0012.08	Attitude Determination & Control Subsystem	ADCS depends on tightly coupled models and parameters: star-tracker catalogs and masks, sensor alignments and bias terms, gyro scale factors and drift rates, estimator covariances and process/measurement noise, controller gains and saturation limits, wheel/CMG torque constants, magnetic torquer maps, and sun sensor thresholds. Editing these values skews estimation or control, producing slow bias, limit cycles, loss of lock, or abrupt safing triggers. For example, a small change to a star-tracker mask can force frequent dropouts; an inflated gyro bias drives the filter away from truth; softened actuator limits or mis-set gains let disturbances accumulate; altered sun-point entry criteria cause unnecessary mode switches. Secondary impacts propagate to power, thermal, and communications because pointing and geometry underpin array generation, radiator view factors, and antenna gain. The technique turns the spacecraft against itself by nudging the parameters that close the loop between what the vehicle believes and how it responds.
	EX-0012.09	Electrical Power Subsystem	Adversaries alter parameters and sensed values that govern power generation, storage, and distribution so the spacecraft draws or allocates energy in harmful ways. Editable items include bus voltage/current limits, MPPT setpoints and sweep behavior, array and SADA modes, battery charge/discharge thresholds and temperature derates, state-of-charge estimation constants, latching current limiter (LCL) trip/retry settings, load-shed priorities, heater duty limits, and survival/keep-alive rules. By changing these, a threat actor can drive excess consumption (e.g., disabling load shed, raising heater floors), misreport remaining energy (skewed SoC), or push batteries outside healthy ranges, producing brownouts, repeated safing, or premature capacity loss. Manipulating thresholds and hysteresis can also create oscillations where loads repeatedly drop and re-engage, wasting energy and stressing components. The effect is accelerated depletion or misallocation of finite power, degrading mission operations and potentially preventing recovery after eclipse or anomalies.
	EX-0012.10	Command & Data Handling Subsystem	C&DH relies on tables and runtime values that define how commands are parsed, queued, and dispatched and how telemetry is collected, stored, and forwarded. Targets include opcode-to-handler maps, argument limits and schemas, queue depths and priorities, message ID routing, publish/subscribe bindings, timeline/schedule entries, file catalog indices, compression and packetization settings, and event/telemetry filters. Edits to these artifacts reshape control and visibility: commands are delayed, dropped, or misrouted; telemetry is suppressed or redirected; timelines slip; and housekeeping/data products are repackaged in ways that confuse ground processing. Because many frameworks treat these values as authoritative configuration, small changes can silently propagate across subsystems, degrading responsiveness, creating backlogs, or severing the logical pathways that keep the vehicle coordinated, without modifying the underlying code.
	EX-0012.11	Watchdog Timer (WDT)	Watchdogs supervise liveness by requiring software to “pet” within defined windows or the system resets. Threat actors manipulate WDT behavior by changing timeout durations, windowed-WDT bounds, reset actions, enable/mask bits, or the source that performs the petting (e.g., moving it into a low-level ISR so higher layers can be stalled indefinitely). Software WDTs can be disabled or starved; hardware WDTs are influenced via control registers, strap pins, or supervisor commands that alter prescalers and reset ladders. Outcomes include preventing intended resets so runaway tasks consume power and bandwidth, or forcing repeated resets at tactically chosen moments, e.g., during updates or handovers, to keep the system in a degraded or easily predictable state. The technique converts a safety mechanism into a tool for either unbounded execution or rhythmic disruption, depending on how the WDT parameters are rewritten.
	EX-0012.12	System Clock	Spacecraft maintain multiple time bases and distribute time to schedule sequences, validate timetags, manage anti-replay counters, and align navigation/attitude processing. By writing to clock registers, altering time-distribution services, switching disciplining sources, or biasing oscillator parameters, an adversary can skew these references. Effects include reordering or prematurely firing stored command sequences, invalidating timetag checks, desynchronizing counters used by authentication or ranging, misaligning estimator windows, and corrupting timestamped payload data. Even small offsets can accumulate into observable misbehavior when autonomy and scheduling depend on tight temporal guarantees. The result is execution that happens at the wrong moment, or not at all, because the system’s notion of “now” has been shifted.
	EX-0012.13	Poison AI/ML Training Data	When missions employ AI/ML, for onboard detection/classification, compression, anomaly screening, guidance aids, or ground-side planning, training data becomes a control surface. Data poisoning inserts crafted examples or labels into the training corpus or fine-tuning set so the resulting model behaves incorrectly while appearing valid. Variants include clean-label backdoors (benign-looking samples with a hidden trigger that later induces a targeted response), label flipping and biased sampling (to skew decision boundaries), and corruption of calibration/ground-truth products that the pipeline trusts. For space systems, poisoning may occur in science archives, test vectors, simulated scenes, or housekeeping datasets used to train autonomy/anomaly models; models trained on poisoned corpora are then packaged and uplinked as routine updates. Once fielded, a simple trigger pattern in imagery, telemetry, or RF features can cause misclassification, suppression, or false positives at the time and place the adversary chooses, turning model behavior into an execution mechanism keyed by data rather than code.
EX-0013		Flooding	Flooding overwhelms a communication or processing path by injecting traffic at rates or patterns the system cannot comfortably absorb. In space contexts this can occur across layers: RF/optical links (continuous carriers, wideband noise, or protocol-shaped bursts); link/protocol layers (valid-looking frames at excessive cadence); application layers (command and telemetry messages that saturate parsers and queues); and internal vehicles buses where repeated messages starve critical publishers. Effects range from outright denial of service, dropped commands, lost telemetry, missed windows, to subtler corruption, such as out-of-order processing, watchdog trips, or autonomy entering protective modes due to backlogged health data. Secondary impacts include power and thermal strain as decoders, modems, or software loops spin at maximum duty, storage filling from retries, and control loops jittering when their messages are delayed. Timing matters: floods during handovers, maneuvers, or safing transitions can magnify consequences because margins are thinnest.
	EX-0013.01	Valid Commands	Here the adversary saturates paths with legitimate telecommands or bus messages so the spacecraft burns scarce resources honoring them. Inputs may be innocuous (no-ops, time queries, telemetry requests) or low-risk configuration edits, but at scale they consume command handler cycles, fill queues, generate events and logs, trigger acknowledgments, and provoke downstream work in subsystems (e.g., repeated state reports, mode toggles, or file listings). On internal buses, valid actuator or housekeeping messages replayed at high rate can starve higher-priority publishers or cause control laws to chase stale stimuli. Because the traffic is syntactically correct, and often contextually plausible, the system attempts to process it rather than discard it early, increasing CPU usage, memory pressure, and power draw. Consequences include delayed or preempted legitimate operations, transient loss of commandability, and knock-on FDIR activity as deadlines slip and telemetry appears inconsistent.
	EX-0013.02	Erroneous Input	In this variant, the attacker injects non-useful energy or data, noise, malformed frames, or near-valid messages, so receivers and parsers labor to acquire, decode, and reject it. At the RF layer, wideband or protocol-shaped interference drives AGC and clock recovery to hunt, elevates BER, and forces repeated acquisitions; at the link layer, frames with correct preambles but bad CRCs keep decoders busy while yielding no payload; at the application layer, malformed packets force parse/validate/deny cycles that still consume CPU and fill error logs. On internal buses, collisions or bursts of misaddressed traffic reduce effective bandwidth and reorder legitimate messages. Even though little of the injected content passes semantic checks, the effort of dealing with it crowds out real work and may trigger retransmission storms or fallback modes that further increase load. The hallmark is volumetric invalid activity, crafted to engage front ends and parsers just long enough, that degrades integrity and availability without relying on privileged or authenticated commands.
EX-0014		Spoofing	The adversary forges inputs that subsystems treat as trustworthy truth, time tags, sensor measurements, bus messages, or navigation signals, so onboard logic acts on fabricated reality. Because many control loops and autonomy rules assume data authenticity once it passes basic sanity checks, carefully shaped spoofs can trigger mode transitions, safing, actuator commands, or payload behaviors without touching flight code. Spoofing may occur over RF (e.g., GNSS, crosslinks, TT&C beacons), over internal networks/buses (message injection with valid identifiers), or at sensor/actuator interfaces (electrical/optical stimulation that produces plausible readings). Effects range from subtle bias (drifting estimates, skewed calibrations) to acute events (unexpected slews, power reconfiguration, recorder re-indexing), and can also pollute downlinked telemetry or science products so ground controllers interpret a false narrative. The hallmark is that the spacecraft chooses the adversary’s action path because the forged data passes through normal processing chains.
	EX-0014.01	Time Spoof	Time underpins sequencing, anti-replay, navigation filtering, and data labeling. An attacker that forges or biases the time seen by onboard consumers can reorder stored command execution, break timetag validation, desynchronize counters, and misalign estimation windows. Spoofing vectors include manipulating the distributed time service, introducing a higher-priority/cleaner time source (e.g., GNSS-derived time), or crafting messages that cause clock discipline to slew toward attacker-chosen values. Once time shifts, autonomous routines keyed to epochs, wheel unloads, downlink starts, heater schedules, fire early/late or not at all, and telemetry appears inconsistent to ground analysis. The signature is correct-looking time metadata that steadily or abruptly departs from truth, driving downstream logic to act at the wrong moment.
	EX-0014.02	Bus Traffic Spoofing	Here the adversary forges messages on internal command/data paths (e.g., 1553, SpaceWire, CAN, custom). By emitting frames with valid identifiers, addresses, and timing, the attacker can make subscribers accept actuator setpoints, power switch toggles, mode changes, or housekeeping values that originated off-path. Because many consumers act on “latest value wins” or on message cadence, forged traffic can mask real publishers, starve critical topics, or force handlers to execute unintended branches. Gateways that translate between networks amplify impact: a spoofed message on one side can propagate to multiple domains as legitimate payload. Outcomes include misdelivered commands, silent configuration drift, and control loops chasing phantom stimuli, all while bus monitors show protocol-conformant traffic.
	EX-0014.03	Sensor Data	The attacker presents fabricated or biased measurements that estimation and control treat as ground truth. Targets include attitude/position sensors (star trackers, gyros/IMUs, sun sensors, magnetometers, GNSS), environmental and health sensors (temperatures, currents, voltages, pressures), and payload measurements used in autonomy. Spoofs may be injected electrically at interfaces, optically (blinding/dazzling trackers or sun sensors), magnetically, or by crafting packets fed into sensor gateways. Even small, consistent biases can drive filters to incorrect states; stepwise changes can trigger fault responses or mode switches. Downstream, timestamps, quality flags, and derived products inherit the deception, creating uncertainty for operators and potentially inducing temporary loss of service as autonomy reacts to a world that never existed.
	EX-0014.04	Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Spoofing	The adversary transmits GNSS-like signals (or manipulates crosslink-distributed time/ephemeris) so the spacecraft’s navigation solution reflects attacker-chosen states. With believable code phases, Doppler, and navigation messages, the victim can be pulled to a false position/velocity/time, causing downstream functions, attitude pointing limits, station visibility prediction, eclipse timing, antenna pointing, and anti-replay windows, to misbehave. Even when GNSS is not the primary navigation source, spoofed PNT can bias timekeeping or seed filters that fuse multiple sensors, leading to mis-scheduling and errant control. The defining feature is externally provided navigation/time that passes validity checks yet encodes a crafted trajectory or epoch.
EX-0015		Side-Channel Attack	Adversaries extract secrets or steer execution by observing or perturbing physical byproducts of computation rather than the intended interfaces. Passive channels include timing, power draw, electromagnetic emissions, acoustic/optical leakage, and thermal patterns correlated with operations such as key use, counter updates, or parser activity. Active channels deliberately induce faults during runtime, e.g., voltage or clock glitches, electromagnetic/laser injection, or targeted radiation, to flip bits, skip checks, or bias intermediate values. On spacecraft, prime targets include crypto modules, SDR/FPGA pipelines, bootloaders, and bus controllers whose switching behavior or error handling reveals protocol state or key material. With sufficient samples, or with repeated fault attempts, statistical features emerge that reduce entropy of the sensitive variable under study; in effect, a successful fault campaign turns into information leakage comparable to a passive side channel. Collection vantage points range from on-orbit proximity (for EM/optical), to ATLO and ground test (for direct probing), to instrumented compromised hardware already in the signal path.
EX-0016		Jamming	Jamming is an electronic attack that uses radio frequency signals to interfere with communications. A jammer must operate in the same frequency band and within the field of view of the antenna it is targeting. Unlike physical attacks, jamming is completely reversible, once the jammer is disengaged, communications can be restored. Attribution of jamming can be tough because the source can be small and highly mobile, and users operating on the wrong frequency or pointed at the wrong satellite can jam friendly communications.* Similiar to intentional jamming, accidential jamming can cause temporary signal degradation. Accidental jamming refers to unintentional interference with communication signals, and it can potentially impact spacecraft in various ways, depending on the severity, frequency, and duration of the interference. *https://aerospace.csis.org/aerospace101/counterspace-weapons-101
	EX-0016.03	Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Jamming	The attacker raises the noise floor in GNSS bands so satellite navigation signals are not acquired or tracked. Loss of PNT manifests as degraded or unavailable position/velocity/time solutions, which in turn disrupts functions that depend on them, time distribution, attitude aiding, scheduling, anti-replay windows, and visibility prediction. Because GNSS signals at the receiver are extremely weak, modest jammers within the antenna field of view can produce outsized effects; mobile emitters can create intermittent outages aligned with the attacker’s objectives.
PER-0001		Memory Compromise	The adversary arranges for malicious content to survive resets and mode changes by targeting memories and execution paths that initialize the system. Candidates include boot ROM handoff vectors, first/second-stage loaders, non-volatile images (flash/EEPROM), “golden” fallback partitions, configuration words/fuses, and RAM regions reconstructed at start-up from stored files or tables. Persistence may also ride auto-run mechanisms, init scripts, procedure engines, stored command sequences, or event hooks that execute on boot, safe-mode entry/exit, time triggers, or receipt of specific telemetry/commands. Variants keep the core payload only in RAM but ensure it is reloaded after every restart by patching copy-on-boot routines, altering file catalogs, or modifying table loaders so the same bytes are restored. The common thread is control of where the spacecraft looks for what to run next, so unauthorized logic is reinstated whenever the system resets or transitions modes.
PER-0002		Backdoor	A backdoor is a covert access path that bypasses normal authentication, authorization, or operational checks so the attacker can reenter the system on demand. Backdoors may be preexisting (undocumented service modes, maintenance accounts, debug features) or introduced by the adversary during development, integration, or on-orbit updates. Triggers range from “magic” opcodes and timetags to specific geometry/time conditions, counters, or data patterns embedded in routine traffic. The access they provide varies from expanded command sets and relaxed rate/size limits to alternate communications profiles and hidden file/parameter interfaces. Well-crafted backdoors blend with nominal behavior, appearing as ordinary operations while quietly accepting instructions that other paths would reject, thereby sustaining the attacker’s foothold across passes, resets, and operator handovers.
	PER-0002.01	Hardware Backdoor	Hardware backdoors leverage properties of the physical design to provide durable, low-visibility reentry. Examples include enabled test/scan chains, manufacturing or boot-strap modes invoked by pins or registers, persistent debug interfaces (JTAG/SWD/UART), undocumented device commands, and logic inserted in FPGA/ASIC designs that activates under specific stimuli. Because these mechanisms sit below or beside flight software, they can grant direct access to buses, memories, or peripheral control even when higher layers appear healthy. Triggers may be electrical (pin states, voltage/clock sequences), protocol-level (special patterns on an instrument link), or environmental/temporal (particular temperature ranges, timing offsets). Once on orbit, such pathways are difficult to remove or reconfigure, allowing the attacker to persist by reusing the same physical entry points whenever conditions are met.
	PER-0002.02	Software Backdoor	Software backdoors are code paths intentionally crafted or later inserted to provide privileged functionality on cue. In flight contexts, they appear as hidden command handlers, alternate authentication checks, special user/role constructs, or procedure/script hooks that accept nonpublic inputs. They can be embedded in flight applications, separation kernels or drivers, gateway processors that translate bus/payload traffic, or update/loader utilities that handle tables and images. SDR configurations offer another avenue: non-public waveforms, subcarriers, or framing profiles that, when selected, expose a private command channel. Activation is often conditional, specific timetags, geometry, message sequences, or file names, to keep the feature dormant during routine testing and operations. Once present, the backdoor provides a repeatable way to execute commands or modify state without traversing the standard control surfaces, sustaining the adversary’s access over time.
PER-0003		Ground System Presence	The adversary maintains long-lived access by residing within mission ground infrastructure that already has end-to-end reach to the spacecraft. Persistence can exist in operator workstations and mission control software, schedulers/orchestrators, station control (antenna/mount, modem/baseband), automation scripts and procedure libraries, identity and ticketing systems, and cloud-hosted mission services. With this foothold, the actor can repeatedly queue commands, updates, or file transfers during routine passes; mirror legitimate operator behavior to blend in; and refresh their tooling as software is upgraded. Presence on the ground also supports durable reconnaissance (pass plans, dictionaries, key/counter states) and continuous staging so each window to the vehicle can be exploited without re-establishing access.
PER-0004		Replace Cryptographic Keys	The adversary cements control by changing the cryptographic material the spacecraft uses to authenticate or protect links and updates. Targets include uplink authentication keys and counters, link-encryption/session keys and key-encryption keys (KEKs), key identifiers/selectors, and algorithm profiles. Using authorized rekey commands or key-loading procedures, often designed for over-the-air use, the attacker installs new values in non-volatile storage and updates selectors so subsequent traffic must use the attacker’s keys to be accepted. Variants desynchronize anti-replay by advancing counters or switching epochs, or strand operators by flipping profiles to a mode for which only the adversary holds parameters. Once replaced, the new material persists across resets and mode changes, turning the spacecraft into a node that recognizes the adversary’s channel while rejecting former controllers.
PER-0005		Credentialed Persistence	Threat actors may acquire or leverage valid credentials to maintain persistent access to a spacecraft or its supporting command and control (C2) systems. These credentials may include system service accounts, user accounts, maintenance access credentials, cryptographic keys, or other authentication mechanisms that enable continued entry without triggering access alarms. By operating with legitimate credentials, adversaries can sustain access over extended periods, evade detection, and facilitate follow-on tactics such as command execution, data exfiltration, or lateral movement. Credentialed persistence is particularly effective in environments lacking strong credential lifecycle management, segmentation, or monitoring allowing threat actors to exploit trusted pathways while remaining embedded in mission operations.
DE-0001		Disable Fault Management	The adversary suppresses or alters fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) so unauthorized actions proceed without triggering safing or alerts. Targets include watchdogs and heartbeat monitors; limit and sanity checks on sensor/command values; command interlocks and inhibit masks; voting and redundancy-management logic; and event/alert generation and routing. Techniques range from patching or bypassing checks in flight code, to rewriting parameter/limit tables, to muting publishers that report faults. More subtle variants desensitize thresholds, freeze counters, or delay responses just long enough for a malicious sequence to complete. With FDIR dulled or offline, anomalous states resemble nominal behavior and automated mitigations do not engage, masking the attack from ground oversight.
DE-0002		Disrupt or Deceive Downlink	Threat actors may target ground-side telemetry reception, processing, or display to disrupt the operator’s visibility into spacecraft health and activity. This may involve denial-based attacks that prevent the spacecraft from transmitting telemetry to the ground (e.g., disabling telemetry links or crashing telemetry software), or more subtle deception-based attacks that manipulate telemetry content to conceal unauthorized actions. Since telemetry is the primary method ground controllers rely on to monitor spacecraft status, any disruption or manipulation can delay or prevent detection of malicious activity, suppress automated or manual mitigations, or degrade trust in telemetry-based decision support systems.
	DE-0002.01	Inhibit Ground System Functionality	Threat actors may utilize access to the ground system to inhibit its ability to accurately process, render, or interpret spacecraft telemetry, effectively leaving ground controllers unaware of the spacecraft’s true state or activity. This may involve traditional denial-based techniques, such as disabling telemetry software, corrupting processing pipelines, or crashing display interfaces. In addition, more subtle deception-based techniques may be used to falsify telemetry data within the ground system , such as modifying command counters, acknowledgments, housekeeping data, or sensor outputs , to provide the appearance of nominal operation. These actions can suppress alerts, mask unauthorized activity, or prevent both automated and manual mitigations from being initiated based on misleading ground-side information. Because telemetry is the primary method by which ground controllers monitor the health, behavior, and safety of the spacecraft, any disruption or falsification of this data directly undermines situational awareness and operational control.
	DE-0002.03	Inhibit Spacecraft Functionality	In this variant, telemetry is suppressed at the source by manipulating on-board generation or transmission. Methods include disabling or pausing telemetry publishers, altering packet filters and rates, muting event/report channels, reconfiguring recorder playback, retuning/muting transmitters, or switching to modes that emit only minimal beacons. The spacecraft continues operating, but the downlink no longer reflects true activity or arrives too sparsely to support monitoring. By constraining what is produced or transmitted, the adversary reduces opportunities for detection while other actions proceed.
DE-0003		On-Board Values Obfuscation	The adversary manipulates housekeeping and control values that operators and autonomy rely on to judge activity, health, and command hygiene. Targets include command/telemetry counters, event/severity flags, downlink/reporting modes, cryptographic-mode indicators, and the system clock. By rewriting, freezing, or biasing these fields, and by selecting reduced or summary telemetry modes, unauthorized actions can proceed while the downlinked picture appears routine or incomplete. The result is delayed recognition, misattribution to environmental effects, or logs that cannot be reconciled post-facto.
	DE-0003.01	Vehicle Command Counter (VCC)	The VCC tracks how many commands the spacecraft has accepted. An adversary masks activity by zeroing, freezing, or selectively decrementing the VCC, or by steering actions through paths that do not increment it (maintenance dictionaries, alternate receivers, hidden handlers). They may also overwrite the telemetry field that reports the VCC so ground displays show a lower or steady count while high volumes of commands are processed. This breaks simple “command volume” heuristics and makes bursty activity look normal.
	DE-0003.02	Rejected Command Counter	This counter records commands that failed checks or were refused. To hide probing and trial-and-error, the adversary suppresses increments, periodically clears the value, or forges the downlinked field so rejection rates appear benign. Variants also tamper with associated reason codes or event entries, replacing them with innocuous outcomes. Analysts reviewing telemetry see no evidence of failed attempts even as the system is being exercised aggressively.
	DE-0003.03	Command Receiver On/Off Mode	By toggling receiver enable states (per-receiver, per-antenna, or per-band), the adversary creates deliberate “quiet windows” in which outside intervention cannot arrive. Turning a command receiver off, or shifting to a configuration that ignores the primary path, allows queued actions or onboard procedures to run without interruption, while operators perceive a transient loss of commandability consistent with geometry or environment. Brief, well-timed toggles can also desynchronize counters and handovers, complicating reconstruction of what occurred.
	DE-0003.04	Command Receivers Received Signal Strength	Threat actors may target the on-board command receivers received signal parameters (i.e., automatic gain control (AGC)) in order to stop specific commands or signals from being processed by the spacecraft. For ground controllers to communicate with spacecraft in orbit, the on-board receivers need to be configured to receive signals with a specific signal to noise ratio (ratio of signal power to the noise power). Targeting values related to the antenna signaling that are modifiable can prevent the spacecraft from receiving ground commands.
	DE-0003.05	Command Receiver Lock Modes	Receivers advertise acquisition states, bit lock, frame lock, and command lock, that indicate readiness to accept telecommands. Adversaries leverage these indicators in two ways: (1) use command-lock tests to validate geometry, power, Doppler, and polarization without risking visible command execution; and (2) tamper with the values that report lock status so ground views never show that lock was achieved. Techniques include freezing or clearing lock flags and counters, raising/lowering internal thresholds so lock occurs without being reported (or vice versa), and timing brief lock intervals between telemetry samples. The result is a window where the spacecraft is receptive to commands while downlinked status suggests otherwise.
	DE-0003.06	Telemetry Downlink Modes	Spacecraft expose modes that control what telemetry is sent and how, real-time channels, recorder playback, beacon/summary only, event-driven reporting, and per-virtual-channel/APID selections. By switching modes or editing the associated parameters (rates, filters, playback queues, index ranges), an adversary can thin, defer, or reroute observability. Typical effects include suppressing high-rate engineering streams in favor of minimal beacons, delaying playback of time periods of interest, replaying benign segments, or redirecting packets to alternate virtual channels that are not routinely monitored. Telemetry continues to flow, but it no longer reflects the activity the operators need to see.
	DE-0003.07	Cryptographic Modes	Many missions separate authentication from confidentiality and allow on-orbit selection of algorithms, keys, profiles, or “crypto off/clear” states. Adversaries manipulate these mode controls and selectors to desynchronize ground and space or to hide content: flipping to a profile that the ground is not using, requesting clear telemetry while maintaining authenticated uplink, or rotating key IDs so frames validate internally but appear undecodable to external tools. Mode indicators and status words can also be biased so ground displays show expected settings while the link actually operates under attacker-chosen parameters, masking command and data exchanges within normal-looking traffic.
	DE-0003.08	Received Commands	Spacecraft typically maintain histories of accepted, rejected, and executed commands, buffers, logs, or file records that can be downlinked on demand or periodically. An adversary conceals activity by editing or pruning these artifacts: removing entries, altering opcodes or arguments, rewriting timestamps and source identifiers, rolling logs early, or repopulating with benign-looking commands to balance counters. Related acknowledgments and event records may be suppressed or reclassified so cross-checks appear consistent. After manipulation, the official command history shows a plausible narrative that omits or mischaracterizes the adversary’s actions.
	DE-0003.09	System Clock for Evasion	The adversary biases the spacecraft’s authoritative time so that telemetry, event logs, and command histories appear shifted or inconsistent. By writing clock registers, altering disciplining sources (e.g., GNSS vs. free-running oscillator), or tweaking distribution services and offsets, they can make stored commands execute “earlier” or “later” on the timeline and misalign acknowledgments with actual actions. Downlinked frames still carry plausible timestamps near packet headers, but those stamps no longer reflect when data was produced, complicating reconstruction of sequences and masking causality during incident analysis.
	DE-0003.10	GPS Ephemeris	A satellite with a GPS receiver can use ephemeris data from GPS satellites to estimate its own position in space. A hostile actor could spoof the GPS signals to cause erroneous calculations of the satellite’s position. The received ephemeris data is often telemetered and can be monitored for indications of GPS spoofing. Reception of ephemeris data that changes suddenly without a reasonable explanation (such as a known GPS satellite handoff), could provide an indication of GPS spoofing and warrant further analysis. Threat actors could also change the course of the vehicle and falsify the telemetered data to temporarily convince ground operators the vehicle is still on a proper course.
	DE-0003.11	Watchdog Timer (WDT) for Evasion	By modifying watchdog parameters or who “pets” them, an adversary shapes what evidence survives. Extending or disabling timeouts allows long-running processes to operate without forced resets that would expose abnormal CPU or power usage; conversely, shortening windows or relocating the petting source to a low-level ISR can induce frequent resets that wipe volatile traces, break correlation in logs, and explain anomalies as “spurious reboots.” In both directions, the watchdog becomes a timing tool for hiding activity rather than a guardrail against it.
	DE-0003.12	Poison AI/ML Training for Evasion	When security monitoring relies on AI/ML (e.g., anomaly detection on telemetry, RF fingerprints, or command semantics), the training data itself is a target. Data-poisoning introduces crafted examples or labels so the learned model embeds false associations, treating attacker behaviors as normal, or flagging benign patterns instead. Variants include clean-label backdoors keyed to subtle triggers, label flipping that shifts decision boundaries, and biased sampling that suppresses rare-but-critical signatures. Models trained on tainted corpora are later deployed as routine updates; once in service, the adversary presents inputs containing the trigger or profile they primed, and the detector omits or downranks the very behaviors that would reveal the intrusion.
DE-0004		Masquerading	The adversary presents themselves as an authorized origin so activity appears legitimate across RF, protocol, and organizational boundaries. Techniques include crafting telecommand frames with correct headers, counters, and dictionaries; imitating station “fingerprints” such as Doppler, polarization, timing, and framing; replaying or emulating crosslink identities; and using insider-derived credentials or roles to operate mission tooling. Masquerading can also target metadata, virtual channel IDs, APIDs, source sequence counts, and facility identifiers, so logs and telemetry attribute actions to expected entities. The effect is that commands, file transfers, or configuration changes are processed as if they came from approved sources, reducing scrutiny and delaying detection.
DE-0005		Subvert Protections via Safe-Mode	The adversary exploits the spacecraft’s recovery posture to bypass controls that are stricter in nominal operations. During safe-mode, vehicles often accept contingency dictionaries, relax rate/size and timetag checks, activate alternate receivers or antennas, and emit reduced or summary telemetry. By timing actions to this state, or deliberately inducing it, the attacker issues maintenance-looking edits, loads, or mode changes that proceed under broadened acceptance while downlink visibility is thinned. Unauthorized activity blends with anomaly response, evading both automated safeguards and operator suspicion.
DE-0007		Evasion via Rootkit	A rootkit hides malicious activity by interposing on reporting paths after the system has booted. In flight contexts this includes patching flight software APIs, kernel syscalls, message queues, and telemetry publishers so task lists, counters, health channels, and event severities are falsified before downlink. Command handlers can be hooked to suppress evidence of certain opcodes or sources; recorder catalogs and file listings can be rewritten on the fly; and housekeeping can be biased to show nominal temperatures, currents, or voltages while actions proceed. The defining feature is runtime concealment: the observability surfaces operators rely on are altered to present a curated, benign narrative.
DE-0008		Evasion via Bootkit	A bootkit hides activity by running first and shaping what higher layers will later observe. Positioned in boot ROM handoff or early loaders, it can select or patch images in memory, alter device trees and driver tables, seed forged counters and timestamps, and preconfigure telemetry/crypto modes so subsequent components launch into a reality curated by the attacker. Because integrity and logging mechanisms are initialized afterward, the resulting view of processes, files, and histories reflects the bootkit’s choices, allowing long-term evasion that persists across resets and mode transitions.
DE-0009		Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys (CCD)	The adversary exploits the physical and operational environment to reduce detectability or to mislead observers. Tactics include signature management (minimizing RF/optical/thermal/RCS), controlled emissions timing, deliberate power-down/dormancy, geometry choices that hide within clutter or eclipse, and the deployment of decoys that generate convincing tracks. CCD can also leverage naturally noisy conditions, debris-rich regions, auroral radio noise, solar storms, to mask proximity operations or to provide plausible alternate explanations for anomalies. The unifying theme is environmental manipulation: shape what external sensors perceive so surveillance and attribution lag, misclassify, or look elsewhere.
	DE-0009.05	Corruption or Overload of Ground-Based SDA Systems	The adversary targets terrestrial space-domain awareness pipelines, sensor networks, tracking centers, catalogs, and their data flows, to blind or confuse broad-area monitoring. Paths include compromising or spoofing observational feeds (radar/optical returns, TLE updates, ephemeris exchanges), injecting falsified or time-shifted tracks, tampering with fusion/association parameters, and saturating ingestion and alerting with noisy or adversarial inputs. Where SDA employs AI/ML for detection and correlation, the attacker can degrade models by flooding them with ambiguous scenes or crafted features that increase false positives/negatives and consume analyst cycles. Unlike onboard deception, this approach skews the external decision-support picture across many assets at once, delaying detection of real maneuvers and providing cover for concurrent operations.
DE-0010		Overflow Audit Log	The adversary hides activity by exhausting finite on-board logging and telemetry buffers so incriminating events are overwritten before they can be downlinked. Spacecraft typically use ring buffers with severity filters, per-subsystem quotas, and scheduled dump windows; by generating bursts of benign but high-frequency events (file listings, status queries, low-severity housekeeping, repeated mode toggles) or by provoking chatter from chatty subsystems, the attacker accelerates rollover. Variants target recorder indexes and event catalogs so new entries displace older ones, or they align floods with known downlink gaps and pass handovers when retention is shortest. To analysts on the ground, logs appear present but incomplete, showing a plausible narrative that omits the very interval when unauthorized commands or updates occurred.
DE-0011		Credentialed Evasion	Threat actors may leverage valid credentials to conduct unauthorized actions against a spacecraft or related system in a way that conceals their presence and evades detection. By using trusted authentication mechanisms attackers can blend in with legitimate operations and avoid triggering access control alarms or anomaly detection systems. This technique enables evasion by appearing authorized, allowing adversaries to issue commands, access sensitive subsystems, or move laterally within spacecraft or constellation architectures without exploiting software vulnerabilities. When credential use is poorly segmented or monitored, this form of access can be used to maintain stealthy persistence or facilitate other tactics under the guise of legitimate activity.
LM-0001		Hosted Payload	The adversary pivots through the host–payload boundary to reach additional subsystems. Hosted payloads exchange power, time, housekeeping, and data with the bus via defined gateways (e.g., SpaceWire, 1553, Ethernet) and often support file services, table loads, and command dictionaries distinct from the host’s. A foothold on the payload can be used to inject traffic through the gateway processor, request privileged services (time/ephemeris distribution, firmware loads), or ride shared backplanes where payload traffic is bridged into C&DH networks. In some designs, payload processes execute on host compute or expose maintenance modes that temporarily widen access, creating paths from the payload into attitude, power, storage, or recorder resources. The movement is transitive: compromise a co-resident unit, then traverse the trusted interface that already exists for mission operations.
LM-0007		Credentialed Traversal	Movement is achieved by reusing legitimate credentials and keys to cross boundaries that rely on trust rather than strict isolation. Using operator or service accounts, maintenance logins, station certificates, or spacecraft-recognized crypto, the adversary invokes gateways that bridge domains, C&DH to payload, crosslink routers to onboard networks, or constellation management planes to individual vehicles. Because the traversal occurs through approved interfaces (file services, table loaders, remote procedure calls, crosslink tasking), actions appear as routine operations while reaching progressively more privileged subsystems or neighboring spacecraft. Where roles and scopes are broad or reused, the same credential opens multiple enclaves, turning authorization itself into the lateral path.
EXF-0006		Modify Communications Configuration	The adversary alters radio/optical link configuration so the spacecraft emits mission data over paths the program does not monitor or control. Levers include retuning carriers, adding sidebands or subcarriers, changing modulation/coding profiles, remapping virtual channels/APIDs, editing beacon content, or redirecting routing tables in regenerative payloads. Data can be embedded steganographically (idle fields, padding, frame counters, pilot tones) or carried on a covert auxiliary downlink/crosslink pointed at attacker-owned apertures. Because these emissions conform to plausible waveforms and scheduler behavior, they appear as ordinary link activity while quietly conveying payload products, housekeeping, or file fragments to non-mission receivers.
	EXF-0006.01	Software Defined Radio	Programmable SDRs let an attacker introduce new waveforms or piggyback payloads into existing ones. By modifying DSP chains (filters, mixers, FEC, framing), the actor can: add a low-rate subcarrier under the main modulation, alter preamble/pilot sequences to encode bits, vary puncturing/interleaver patterns as a covert channel, or schedule brief “maintenance” bursts that actually carry exfiltrated data. Changes may be packaged as legitimate updates or configuration profiles so the SDR transmits toward attacker-visible geometry using standard equipment, while mission tooling interprets the emission as routine.
	EXF-0006.02	Transponder	On bent-pipe or regenerative transponders, configuration controls what is translated, amplified, and routed. An adversary can remap input–output paths, shift translation frequencies, adjust polarization or gain to favor non-mission receivers, or enable auxiliary ports so selected virtual channels or recorder playbacks are forwarded outside the planned ground segment. In regenerative systems, edited routing tables or QoS rules can mirror traffic to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The result is a sanctioned-looking carrier that quietly delivers mission data to unauthorized listeners.
EXF-0007		Compromised Ground System	The adversary resides in mission ground infrastructure and uses its trusted position to siphon data at scale. With access to operator workstations, mission control servers, baseband/modem chains, telemetry processing pipelines, or archive databases, the attacker can mirror real-time streams, scrape recorder playbacks, export payload products, and harvest procedure logs and command histories. Because exfiltration rides normal paths, file staging areas, data distribution services, cloud relays, or cross-site links, it blends with routine dissemination. Compromise of scheduling tools and pass plans also lets the actor time captures to high-value downlinks and automate bulk extraction without touching the spacecraft.
EXF-0008		Compromised Developer Site	By breaching development or integration environments (at the mission owner, contractor, or partner), the adversary gains access to source code, test vectors, telemetry captures, build artifacts, documentation, and configuration data, material that is often more complete than flight archives. Beyond theft of intellectual property, the attacker can embed telemetry taps, extended logging, or data “export” features into test harnesses, simulators, or flight builds so that, once fielded, the system produces extra observables or forwards content to non-mission endpoints. This activity typically occurs pre-launch during software production and ATLO, positioning exfiltration mechanisms to activate later in flight.
EXF-0009		Compromised Partner Site	The adversary leverages third-party infrastructure connected to the mission, commercial ground stations, relay networks, operations service providers, data processing partners, to capture or relay mission data outside official channels. From these footholds, the attacker can mirror TT&C and payload feeds, scrape shared repositories, and man-in-the-middle cross-organization links (e.g., between partner stations and the primary MOC). Because partner environments vary in segmentation and monitoring, exfiltration can affect multiple missions or operators simultaneously, with stolen data exiting through the partner’s routine distribution mechanisms.